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198 THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962–1972 but soon lost interest when the likely time needed to negotiate such an outcome and, above all, the cost of a full battalion deployment became apparent. 66 By April 1968 the idea was effectively dead, ensuring that the pattern of infantry commitment established in 1967 would persist. Over the next three and a half years three further replacement ‘V’ Companies and three replacement ‘W’ Companies brought to nine in all the number of New Zealand infantry companies that served in South Vietnam with the Anzac battalion, the Australian component of which alternated between 2RAR, 4RAR, and 6RAR. ‘W’ Company was withdrawn in November 1970 and ‘V’ Company in December the following year. New Zealand’s commitment of infantry companies in South Vietnam in 1967 was reactive rather than proactive. It moved only when American pressure for contributions made a commitment unavoidable, not least because of likely Australian action. The government’s lack of enthusiasm for the war, its unwillingness to bite the bullet of political unpopularity that the provision of a substantial force would entail, and its constant concern about the financial implications of any overseas effort—all ensured that New Zealand’s effort in South Vietnam would be very limited. In doing anything at all, it depended on Australia’s assistance and co-operation. The formation of the Anzac battalion reflected a warming of Anzac relations at a governmental level. Even if the arrangement may have caused problems for some of the New Zealand troops in the field, it was a successful response to the practical problems of deploying New Zealand sub-units in an unfamiliar environment. With concurrent British moves to withdraw from the Southeast Asian region undermining the traditional basis of New Zealand’s defence policy, such co-operation in meeting military requirements augured well for the future, when Australia and New Zealand would face new challenges in ensuring their regional interests. 66. Bangkok to Wellington, 109, 23 February 1968, Kuala Lumpur to Wellington, 29 February 1968, Minute by Thornton, 20 March 1968 on CGS to CDS, 29 February 1968, MD 23/4/1.
Meeting the Challenge of Training and Preparing Elements of 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment, for Service in South Vietnam, 1967–1971 Rob Williams The French withdrawal followed by the Geneva conference’s ‘temporary’ partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, together with the subsequent developments in Indo-China, resulted in a dramatic shift in New Zealand’s stance towards security in Southeast Asia. This was evident in 1954 when New Zealand joined the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan in signing the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEACDT) and thereafter in joining the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). By so doing New Zealand accepted a security commitment to the region to be formalised shortly thereafter by its adoption of the strategy of ‘Forward Defence in Southeast Asia’. This essay draws on the following sources: • Roberto Rabel, ‘Vietnam and the collapse of the foreign policy consensus’, in Malcolm McKinnon, New Zealand in World Affairs, vol. II, 1957-1972 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1991) • The First Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment Journal, 25th Anniversary Commemorative Edition • Correspondence with Brigadier R.M. Gurr OBE, Comd 28 Comwel Inf Bde Gp and 28 ANZAC Brigade, and interviews with: Major General B. Meldrum CB OBE, Dep Comd V Force 1971-72 Brigadier R.T.V. Taylor MBE, 2ic 4RAR/ANZAC Battalion 1969-70 Lieutenant Colonel J.D. McGuire, OC ‘Victor 5’ Company, 1970-71 Lieutenant Colonel M.N. Ritchie, Admin Officer NZ Component 1970-71 • Access to correspondence between Brigadier R.V. Taylor and Dr C.J. Pugsley, Department of War Studies, The Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst • My own experience during the period as: BM 28 Comwel Inf Bde Gp, October 1965-January 1968 CO 1 Bn Depot, Burnham, New Zealand, Decem,ber 1968-October 1969 CO 1 RNZIR, Singapore, November 1969-December 1971 ACDS Ops/Plans and as a member of the ad hoc ANZUS Staff Planning Committee, August 1979- December 1981 199
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM
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Contents Preface vii Contributors x
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Preface Vietnam was Australia’s l
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PReFACe whose behalf and alongside
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CONTRIBUTORS which he was joint edi
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CONTRIBUTORS Command and General St
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CONTRIBUTORS Barry Smith was conscr
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Introduction Lieutentant General Pe
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The Vietnam Syndrome: A Brief Histo
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THE VIETNAM SYNDROME: A BRIEF HISTO
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP support in
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP had stated
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP This patte
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP of the Fed
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP targeting
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP was intere
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP Between Mc
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP least your
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The Higher Direction of the Army in
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The hIGheR dIReCTION OF The ARMy IN
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The TrAInIng oF The AusTrAlIAn Army
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TRAININg foR SeRVIce IN SouTh VIeTN
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PRePARING ARMOuReD uNITS FOR OVeRSe
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THe deVeLoPMeNT oF THe AusTrALIAN A
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dOCTRINE, TRAININg ANd COMBAT WITH
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AUSTRAliAN TASk FORce OPeRATiONS iN
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Vietnam. for
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme By 1963 the A
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme of Staff, ‘
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme To the south,
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Page 169 and 170: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Decreased fun
Page 171 and 172: THE mAKING OF TIGERS and under the
Page 173 and 174: THE mAKING OF TIGERS military build
Page 175 and 176: THE mAKING OF TIGERS out of America
Page 177 and 178: THE mAKING OF TIGERS was no comfort
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Page 181 and 182: THE mAKING OF TIGERS Korean soldier
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Page 187 and 188: THE mAKING OF TIGERS South Korean u
Page 189 and 190: THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the Lunar C
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Page 197 and 198: THE mAKING OF TIGERS the 70s, Korea
Page 199 and 200: NeW ZeALAND’S COMMITMeNT OF INFAN
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Page 219 and 220: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING
Page 221 and 222: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING I
Page 223 and 224: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING T
Page 225 and 226: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING F
Page 227 and 228: ANZAC Battalions: Australian Experi
Page 229 and 230: ANZAC BATTALIONS: AUSTRALIAN ExPERI
Page 247 and 248: The Role and Impact of Civil Affair
Page 249 and 250: THe ROLe AND IMPACT OF CIVIL AFFAIR
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM In late 1961,
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM eventually de
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM Compounding t
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM After arrivin
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM ARVN’s lack
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM reports that
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM war was unwin
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Becoming the 3rd XV: The Citizen Mi
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV conventional wa
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV the time did no
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV The CMF’s his
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV out and the CMF
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV thus discharged
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV January 1967 an
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV the distant pos
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The Australian Army and the Vietnam
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMy AND THE VIETNAM
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HoW HISToRy WoRKS: AFTERTHoUGHTS Al
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