conference proceedings - Australian Army
conference proceedings - Australian Army
conference proceedings - Australian Army
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162<br />
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962–1972<br />
Johnson authorised an ‘18,000 to 20,000-man increase in US military support forces’ and<br />
‘urgent exploration’ with Korea, Australia, and New Zealand for a ‘rapid deployment<br />
of significant combat elements’ in proportion with American escalation. 51 Since the US<br />
had only a slim chance of getting sizable forces from the latter two, this instruction was<br />
essentially a proposal for a US-Korean military alliance in Vietnam.<br />
Park’s state visit to Washington in mid-may 1965, which coincided with the fourth<br />
anniversary of his coup, opened the formal negotiations for South Korea’s intervention<br />
in the Vietnam War. It was Park’s moment of personal triumph. Four years earlier<br />
Washington sought to exploit Park’s insecurities to undertake measures that, in the<br />
short run, threatened the survival of his government. Now, Park was a state guest of a<br />
US that was confronted with the most tenacious enemy it had encountered but without<br />
the commitment of meaningful assistance from its treaty partners. Reflecting his sense<br />
of urgency, Johnson requested from Park a combat division at four different points<br />
throughout their conversation. In return, Johnson assured Park that ‘Korean aid to<br />
Viet-Nam would mean that there would be kept in Korea a military strength equivalent<br />
to that at present so that Korean security would not suffer’. At the same time, Johnson<br />
pledged to ‘see to it that troops and money enough will be provided to ensure’ Korea’s<br />
security. 52 With this statement Johnson made a dramatic turnabout in his policy vis-à-vis<br />
South Korea. As late as two months prior to the meeting, the Johnson Administration<br />
was going forward with the decision to ‘subtract 9,000 spaces from present authorized<br />
strength of 8th US <strong>Army</strong> amounting to 51,000’. No longer would Johnson seek a<br />
reduction of forces in any form. The American president in essence notified Park that<br />
his administration’s campaign to de-conventionalise the Korean forces would halt as<br />
long as South Koreans were fighting in Vietnam. 53 The following day Park returned to<br />
the White House for a second meeting with Johnson and confided that South Korea’s<br />
‘well-trained and well-disciplined [soldiers] really formed part of [the] US forces’.<br />
Korean soldiers were ‘ready to fight against Communism’ and that ‘they would be<br />
with the United States’. Park also reminded Johnson that his forces were ‘dependent<br />
on US assistance’. Park’s assurance was ‘very heartening’, said Johnson. 54 Five months<br />
later the first contingent of Korean combat forces left for South Vietnam. After eleven<br />
years of rebuffing Korea’s offer to enter the fray, and failing to win significant troop<br />
commitment from SEATO allies, the US embraced South Korea as a combat-sharing<br />
partner in the jungles of South Vietnam. By the end of 1966, there were 50,000 South<br />
51. NSAm 328, 6 April 1965, reprinted in US Department of Defense, Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel<br />
Edition, vol. III (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 702-3.<br />
52. memorandum of Conversation: US Korean Relations, 17 may 1965, ‘memos, Vol. II, 7/64-8/65’, Box<br />
254, Korea Country File, LBJL.<br />
53. Telegram 866 from Seoul, 15 march 1965, FRUS 1964-1968, Korea, 61.<br />
54. memorandum of Conversation: Visit of President Park, Communiqué meeting, 18 may 1965, ‘memos,<br />
Vol. II, 7/64-8/65’, Box 254, Korea Country File, LBJL.