conference proceedings - Australian Army

The hIGheR dIReCTION OF The ARMy IN The VIeTNAM WAR
And if he thinks he can hold us indefinitely then maybe he can win by tiring us
out—whilst we thin out in Vietnam he still has an infra-structure in being and a
South Vietnam too tired to make the super-effort to throw him out. 34
To Vincent the key was therefore to build up the capacity of his force quickly so
that it could be really effective. The request for tanks was interesting, because it was
opposed by the task force commander, Graham, a former Armoured Corps officer, who
believed that the tanks could not be maintained successfully in Vietnam (although his
opinion was not clearly stated at first). 35 Vincent, a former Signals Corps officer, was
convinced that the tanks would provide additional firepower and mobility; as he put it
the force needed ‘an additional national military capability to counter the possibility of
our being regarded as a casual army of the United States’. The tank squadron would be
a ‘valuable addition in this context’. 36 Wilton sought advice from the CGS, Daly, who
replied that the addition of a tank squadron would ‘significantly increase the operational
capability of the force’. 37
In a series of meeting in July and August 1967 the Defence Committee, consisting
of the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defence, External Affairs and the Treasury,
recommended additions to the force. At one stage the Defence Minister, Allen Fairhall,
sent for Daly and asked for an unequivocal answer as to whether tanks would be effective.
‘yes’, replied daly, ‘in the close support role’, and Fairhall agreed to recommend their
deployment to Cabinet. 38 On 6 September the Cabinet approved the addition of a tank
squadron, a joint RAAF/RAN helicopter contribution, additional engineers and other
support troops. It also approved in principle the deployment of a third battalion with an
announcement to be made at a later stage. The need for an additional battalion appears
to have been accepted throughout the year, but its deployment needed to be assessed in
the light of the additional burden this would place on the Australian defence organisation
(including the need to raise an additional battalion, 9 RAR) and the level of threat in the
Malaysia/Singapore region (Confrontation having finished the previous year). 39 In April
1967 Defence had advised the government that a third battalion would ‘almost double
the operational capability of the Force. The present Task Force is doing an effective
and worthwhile job but it could do it more quickly if a third battalion could be made
available’. 40
34. Vincent to Daly, 15 July 1967, Vincent Papers.
35. Signal, Graham to CGS, 3 September 1967, AWM 101, 26.
36. Signal, Vincent to CGS, 4 September 1967, AWM 101, 26.
37. CGS to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, 31 July 1967, Department of Defence, CCOSC Files, Box
18, Section File Part 4.
38. Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly to author, 26 November 1985.
39. Cabinet Minute 6 September 1967, Decision No 563(FASD), NAA, A5840 XM1, Volume 2.
40. Secretary, Department of Defence to Minister for Defence, 20 April 1967, NAA, A1946/26, 1967/1176
Part 1.
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