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262 THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962–1972 Moreover, Johnson inherited a military situation in South Vietnam where the US had not yet succeeded in training the ARVN to a level where they could effectively reverse Viet Cong gains. Regardless of whether they were being trained for the wrong war, the ARVN after thirteen years of American aid and nine years of direct US training still could not match the enemy on the battlefield. Honouring the US commitment to maintain the independence of South Vietnam would bring renewed and expanded efforts to bring resolution to the situation there. Without question, the combat effectiveness of Hanoi’s military coupled with its leadership’s determination to achieve its goal of Vietnamese unification made training the ARVN a considerable challenge. The incremental application of direct American military force, beginning in 1964, also made the formulation of a strategy that would best utilise the ARVN and US military resources problematic. Moreover, the direct application of US military force tied American credibility ever tighter to South Vietnam’s continued non-communist status. Direct US military involvement lessened the importance of the ARVN’s shortcomings as its role in the war was significantly reduced. The American unwillingness or inability to confront seriously or resolve these problems in training and in strategy, therefore, must be seen as principal reasons why the US was dragged further and further into a war that its own military saw as, at best, problematic from the outset. From Truman through to Johnson, four presidents stressed, to varying degrees, the importance of training a non-communist indigenous military for the defence of Vietnam. As America’s goal was to establish and see maintained a non-communist government in Vietnam, this was a logical course of action. While the inability of successive South Vietnamese governments to rule effectively and the ARVN’s inability to defend the country may have been the United States’ rationale for its direct military involvement, it erred in not focussing on resolution of these problems after taking over the war. The Vietnamese Communists, not the US’s failure in training the ARVN, caused South Vietnam’s military collapse on 30 April 1975. Yet the US inability to successfully address problems within the South Vietnamese armed forces, which had been identified time and again by American military and civilian officials, cannot be overlooked in explaining the United States’ failure to succeed in its Vietnam policy.
Becoming the 3rd XV: The Citizen Military Forces and the Vietnam War Dayton McCarthy The August 2002 edition of the Army newspaper announced that an infantry company, consisting entirely of Reservists from various units around Australia, had been raised for service in East Timor. Becoming Alpha Company, 5th/7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and leaving in November this year, this is the first time since the Second World War that a complete infantry sub-unit of citizen soldiers has been deployed overseas. 1 The new legislative and non legislative measures created in the last several years has allowed this unprecedented move whereby Reservists can not only go onto full time service, but can also serve overseas and have their civil employment protected in their absence. Although these Reservists volunteered for this deployment, the recent legislative changes have also widened the scope for the calling out, or mobilisation, of the Reserves. The ability to use the Reserves to complement Regular units now gives the Army the ability to meet a number of overseas commitments. From the perspective of the Army Reservist, such opportunities for overseas service provide a relevance and motivation that has been lacking previously. This shows how far the Army, and for that matter Government thinking, has come in relation to the role, relevance and importance of part-time soldiers in the greater scheme of the nation’s defence since the 1960s. What is the relevance of these developments to the Vietnam War? As we all know, the Army Reserve’s predecessor, the Citizen Military Forces (CMF), did not go to Vietnam. To be sure, the odd CMF soldier went on full-time duty, and some left the CMF and joined the Regular Army, while others saw Vietnam over a two-week period as CMF observers. But the CMF was not called out nor were any of its units or sub-units sent to Vietnam. As a result, it struggled to define a role for itself both during, and after, the war. To make matters worse, not only was it relegated further down the military food chain, but the CMF was also plagued by accusations that it harboured so-called ‘draft dodgers’ who avoided operational service by joining the CMF. In other words, the 1. Captain Ian Toohill, ‘Ready for East Timor’, Army, No. 1056, 1 August 2002. 263
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM
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Contents Preface vii Contributors x
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Preface Vietnam was Australia’s l
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PReFACe whose behalf and alongside
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CONTRIBUTORS which he was joint edi
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CONTRIBUTORS Command and General St
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CONTRIBUTORS Barry Smith was conscr
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Introduction Lieutentant General Pe
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The Vietnam Syndrome: A Brief Histo
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THE VIETNAM SYNDROME: A BRIEF HISTO
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP support in
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP had stated
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP This patte
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP of the Fed
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP targeting
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP was intere
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP Between Mc
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP least your
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The Higher Direction of the Army in
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The hIGheR dIReCTION OF The ARMy IN
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The TrAInIng oF The AusTrAlIAn Army
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TRAININg foR SeRVIce IN SouTh VIeTN
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PRePARING ARMOuReD uNITS FOR OVeRSe
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THe deVeLoPMeNT oF THe AusTrALIAN A
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dOCTRINE, TRAININg ANd COMBAT WITH
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AUSTRAliAN TASk FORce OPeRATiONS iN
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Vietnam. for
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme By 1963 the A
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme of Staff, ‘
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme To the south,
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Bewildered by
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme the ARVN was
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Decreased fun
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS and under the
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS military build
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS out of America
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS was no comfort
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS Until the summ
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS Korean soldier
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the south.
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS children to gi
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS South Korean u
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the Lunar C
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS remark, which
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS estimate, he h
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS to official gu
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS the 70s, Korea
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NeW ZeALAND’S COMMITMeNT OF INFAN
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Meeting the Challenge of Training a
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING I
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING T
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING F
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ANZAC Battalions: Australian Experi
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Page 297 and 298: The Australian Army and the Vietnam
Page 299 and 300: THE AUSTRALIAN ARMy AND THE VIETNAM
Page 321 and 322: HoW HISToRy WoRKS: AFTERTHoUGHTS Al
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