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52 THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962–1972 remained unmoved. 80 The problem was, as Gordon Blakers, the Deputy Secretary B in the Department (the deputy secretary responsible for strategic policy), reminded Sir Henry Bland shortly before the Defence Committee meeting, that in television interviews in June and August the Prime Minister, Gorton, had emphasised that 1ATF was a self-contained force and to withdraw parts of it would be ‘quite ridiculous’. This made it ‘difficult to bring about a suitably graduated Australian participation in the overall reduction programme’. 81 Despite his earlier comments, on 21 September Gorton urgently asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on a possible withdrawal. In the absence of the other chiefs, Wilton and Daly jointly advised that a ‘premature reduction or withdrawal of our forces would cause further pressures on the US to withdraw their forces in the minimum time without regard to the “criteria” and “principles”’ already expounded by President Nixon. It was therefore in Australia’s strategic interest to maintain all our present forces in Vietnam unless: (a) An agreement is reached with Hanoi for a mutual withdrawal. (b) The stage is reached in a US withdrawal plan, which realistically observes ‘the criteria’ and ‘principles’, when our Task Force can be completely withdrawn by agreement with the US (and South Vietnam). (c) The US decide to withdraw their forces in minimum time without proper regard to the ‘criteria’ and ‘principles’. … Under present circumstances and failing an agreement with Hanoi for mutual withdrawal, we could not withdraw the Australian Task Force and its supporting units from Vietnam in progressive stages without endangering the safety of the Force. 82 This advice remained largely unchanged when the Cabinet considered the Defence Committee’s views on 9 December, except the Defence Committee had now admitted that the task force could be reduced to two battalions if a US battalion were available to be placed under operational control if necessary. 83 It was this Cabinet meeting that led to Gorton’s cable to Nixon of 13 December seeking his ‘long-term thinking’ so that Australian withdrawals could be based on joint Australian-American planning. It is likely that Wilton thought that Gorton had gone too far. Wilton had agreed that the cable would state: 80. Defence Committee Minute 11 September 1969, CCOSC Files, Box 26, File 1858 Part 1. 81. Blakers to Secretary, Department of Defence, 10 September 1969, loc cit. 82. Wilton and Daly to Defence Minister, 22 September 1969, loc cit. 83. Defence Committee Minute 5 December 1969, loc cit.
The hIGheR dIReCTION OF The ARMy IN The VIeTNAM WAR The Military advice relating to our Army task force is that any adjustment could call for co-ordinated Australian/United States Military planning. The final text, as approved by Gorton read: As to our Army Task Force our military advice is that all our ground force units should, if possible, be withdrawn as one unit though it is possible this might be avoided if there were co-ordinated Australian/United States planning. Wilton thought that this paragraph made it look as though the Chiefs of Staff had recommended withdrawal. On the night of Saturday 12 December he discussed the matter with Sir Henry Bland and the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Sir James Plimsoll. He then telephoned the Minister for Defence, Malcolm Fraser, who had succeeded Fairhall the previous month, and Fraser promised to bring Wilton’s views to the Prime Minister. The cable remained unchanged, but later that night Gorton telephoned Wilton who pointed out that the proposed text applied only if the government had decided for political reasons to reduce the force. Gorton argued that the text was ‘a logical interpretation of the military advice in the event of a government decision for political reasons to withdraw or reduce the Task Force under present circumstances’. Gorton asked Wilton to confirm that this was the military advice. Wilton did so and the cable was sent as Gorton wished. 84 One suspects that Wilton was not happy as he made a detailed three-page note of the matter for file. While the American reply was not encouraging it did raise the possibility that increased Australian economic aid might offset a reduced troop strength. Gorton spoke to Nixon by phone but the details of the conversation were not released. On 15 December Nixon announced further troop reductions. Next day Gorton stated that when the military situation in Vietnam allowed the Americans to make another substantial withdrawal then ‘in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, some Australian units will be included in the numbers scheduled for such a withdrawal’. 85 As Peter Edwards commented: ‘It was the beginning of the end of the Vietnam commitment, but all too obviously it was an immediate reaction to an American announcement, not the first phase of a carefully considered Australian defence strategy.’ 86 The new Defence Minister, Malcolm Fraser, moved quickly to take some initiative. On 18 December he wrote to Wilton and asked for ‘various possibilities’ to be canvassed by the Chiefs of Staff and Defence Committee. He was not convinced that the withdrawal 84. Note for File by CCOSC, 17 December 1969, loc cit. 85. Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr John Gorton, PM No 88 1969, 16 December 1969, loc cit. 86. Edwards, A Nation at War, 241. 53
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM
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Contents Preface vii Contributors x
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Preface Vietnam was Australia’s l
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PReFACe whose behalf and alongside
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CONTRIBUTORS which he was joint edi
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CONTRIBUTORS Command and General St
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CONTRIBUTORS Barry Smith was conscr
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Introduction Lieutentant General Pe
Page 19 and 20: The Vietnam Syndrome: A Brief Histo
Page 21 and 22: THE VIETNAM SYNDROME: A BRIEF HISTO
Page 35 and 36: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP support in
Page 37 and 38: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP had stated
Page 39 and 40: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP This patte
Page 41 and 42: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP of the Fed
Page 43 and 44: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP targeting
Page 45 and 46: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP was intere
Page 47 and 48: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP Between Mc
Page 49 and 50: CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP least your
Page 51 and 52: The Higher Direction of the Army in
Page 53 and 54: The hIGheR dIReCTION OF The ARMy IN
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Page 77 and 78: The TrAInIng oF The AusTrAlIAn Army
Page 87 and 88: TRAININg foR SeRVIce IN SouTh VIeTN
Page 93 and 94: PRePARING ARMOuReD uNITS FOR OVeRSe
Page 115 and 116: THe deVeLoPMeNT oF THe AusTrALIAN A
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THe deVeLoPMeNT oF THe AusTrALIAN A
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dOCTRINE, TRAININg ANd COMBAT WITH
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AUSTRAliAN TASk FORce OPeRATiONS iN
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Vietnam. for
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme By 1963 the A
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme of Staff, ‘
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme To the south,
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Bewildered by
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme the ARVN was
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fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Decreased fun
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS and under the
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS military build
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS out of America
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS was no comfort
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS Until the summ
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS Korean soldier
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the south.
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS children to gi
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS South Korean u
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the Lunar C
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS remark, which
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS estimate, he h
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS to official gu
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THE mAKING OF TIGERS the 70s, Korea
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NeW ZeALAND’S COMMITMeNT OF INFAN
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Meeting the Challenge of Training a
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING I
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING T
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MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING F
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ANZAC Battalions: Australian Experi
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ANZAC BATTALIONS: AUSTRALIAN ExPERI
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The Role and Impact of Civil Affair
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THe ROLe AND IMPACT OF CIVIL AFFAIR
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Liaison Detachment THe ROLe AND IMP
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THe AUSTrAlIAN ArMy TrAININg TeAM V
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM In late 1961,
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM eventually de
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM Compounding t
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM After arrivin
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM ARVN’s lack
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM reports that
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM war was unwin
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Becoming the 3rd XV: The Citizen Mi
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV conventional wa
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV the time did no
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV The CMF’s his
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV out and the CMF
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV thus discharged
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV January 1967 an
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV the distant pos
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The Australian Army and the Vietnam
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMy AND THE VIETNAM
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HoW HISToRy WoRKS: AFTERTHoUGHTS Al
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