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166 THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM WAR 1962–1972 Enemy casualties inflicted by Korean Units (as of 18 October 1966) Tiger Blue Dove White Misc. Total Dragon Horse Killed (Verified) 3584 1112 47 10 5 4758 Killed (Presumed) 1138 108 6 1252 Captured VC 1292 133 6 1431 Detained 3515 1516 56 5087 Voluntary Surrender 57 140 1 198 Total 9586 3009 109 11 11 meanwhile Koreans suffered casualties of 354 killed, 992 wounded, and ten missing. 68 It meant there were 13.4 enemy killed in action, for every Korean soldier killed in battle, not counting presumed ones. Some US officials did question the validity of this successful record in the beginning. Westmoreland for one had ‘initially suspected’ that the numbers were ‘not accurate’. However, he concluded them to be ‘reasonably factual based on the opinion of Americans now stationed with the Republic of Korea forces and working with the units on a liaison basis’. 69 Koreans attributed their success in battle to the so-called ‘cut and destroy’ strategy with its heavy emphasis on psychological operation in contrast to the ‘search and destroy’ strategy of the American units. 70 This is how a typical operation by Korean units unfolded: prior to undertaking military actions, Korean forces often relocated a large number of villagers, for the purpose of ‘denying the fish the water’. Then, they undertook preliminary psychological operations designed to persuade the enemy not to resist, and, at the same time, collect information on them. Here, in the eyes of American observers, Korean units undertook some novel approaches to psychological operations. For one of the relocated populations, Koreans sent back the wives or mothers of suspected Vietcong operatives or sympathisers to the villages in the hope of persuading their husbands and 68. ‘memorandum for the President’, 11 October 1966, ‘memos (B) Vol. 60, 10/66’, Box 37, Vietnam Country File, LBJL. 69. ‘mission Council Action memorandum No. 163’, 1 February 1967, ‘Vietnam memos (B) Vol. 65, 2/1- 16/67’, Box 40, Vietnam Country File, LBJL. 70. Dong Wook Lee, ‘Interview: Chae myung Shin, The Former Commanding General of ROK Forces in Vietnam’, Wolganchosun, August 2000, 352-67. Wolganchosun is a leading monthly news magazine in Korea that is considered right of centre in terms of its editorial stance. 71. ‘Operation Oh Jak Kyo’, 11 June 1967, ‘#18 History File, 1 June-1 July 1967 [I]’, box 12, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL.
THE mAKING OF TIGERS children to give up ‘if they really cared for their lives’. 71 Another type of preliminary psychological operation was called market strategy. Before commencing military action, Korean units set up a ‘market facility’ where ‘villagers from the VC controlled areas, as well as from the GVN controlled areas were allowed to trade and, occasionally, provided with food and medical treatment’ by the Korean soldiers. The main goal was to dispel the image of the Koreans as a hostile occupation force in the minds of the villagers, some of whom were Viet Cong operatives or sympathisers. Also, the markets allowed people to prepare themselves for the upcoming military campaigns that were certain to disrupt the flow of goods. The Korean military commanders boasted that the market strategy encouraged many ‘ralliers and refugees’ to enter into the friendly areas and provide information that was of great help in planning the upcoming military operation. In many ways, the market was similar to neutral Switzerland where enemies trade and spy on each other. When told of this particular strategy, Westmoreland commented excitedly that it was ‘the most sophisticated psywar plan’ that he had heard of in Vietnam. 72 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was equally impressed. He cabled Johnson, ‘This is the kind of clever politics, plus clever soldiering which our side must do. It is what I have been dreaming of for three years. And now it has happened. We are going all out to get the word around so that others may do the same.’ 73 Only after conducting such psychological operations did Korean units embark on search and destroy operations. Once the operation was underway, the Korean units’ modus operandi was invariably described as ‘meticulous’, ‘deliberate’, and ‘harrowing’. For example, Henry mcPherson, Johnson’s special assistant, sent to Vietnam to report on America’s third country allies, wrote back, ‘God, they [Koreans] are a tough bunch. They have a method of seal-andsearch that is the epitome of war psychology; it is slow, harrowing, and effective.’ He told Johnson that his only hope vis-à-vis Koreans was that he would ‘never meet one in a rice paddy some night without the right set of credentials’. mcPherson also visited an <strong>Australian</strong> unit, where the commanding office himself recognised that Aussies were ‘too cautious’ and that their ‘effectiveness was being diminished by their conservatism’. There were problems as well. Because of the Koreans’ tough approach to weeding out the enemy, McPherson reported, some US officials felt that they ‘created as many problems as they solved’ by being ‘too brutal and careless of civilian life’. 74 What caused such rumblings, even among American allies, that Koreans could be doing more harm than good? The problem was the Koreans’ extensive dealings with 72. ‘Memorandum for Record: MACV Commanders’ Conference, 22 January 1967’, ‘#12 History File, 13 December 1966-26 January 1967 [II]’, Box 10, Westmoreland Papers, LBJL. 73. Cable 16456 from Saigon, 25 January 1967, ‘NODIS, Vol. 5(B) 1/67-4/67’, Box 47, Vietnam Country File, LBJL. 74. Henry mcPherson (Special Assistant to President) to Johnson, 13 June 1967, ‘Vietnam-1967 (part 2) [3 of 3]’, Box 29, Files of Harry mcPherson’, National Security File, LBJL. 167
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY AND THE VIETNAM
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Contents Preface vii Contributors x
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Preface Vietnam was Australia’s l
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PReFACe whose behalf and alongside
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CONTRIBUTORS which he was joint edi
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CONTRIBUTORS Command and General St
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CONTRIBUTORS Barry Smith was conscr
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Introduction Lieutentant General Pe
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The Vietnam Syndrome: A Brief Histo
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THE VIETNAM SYNDROME: A BRIEF HISTO
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP support in
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP had stated
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP This patte
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP of the Fed
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP targeting
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP was intere
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP Between Mc
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CONVERSATIONS AT THE TOP least your
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The Higher Direction of the Army in
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The hIGheR dIReCTION OF The ARMy IN
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The TrAInIng oF The AusTrAlIAn Army
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TRAININg foR SeRVIce IN SouTh VIeTN
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PRePARING ARMOuReD uNITS FOR OVeRSe
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THe deVeLoPMeNT oF THe AusTrALIAN A
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Page 133 and 134: THe deVeLoPMeNT oF THe AusTrALIAN A
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Page 157 and 158: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Vietnam. for
Page 159 and 160: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme By 1963 the A
Page 161 and 162: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme of Staff, ‘
Page 163 and 164: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme To the south,
Page 165 and 166: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Bewildered by
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Page 169 and 170: fIGHTING AGAINST TIme Decreased fun
Page 171 and 172: THE mAKING OF TIGERS and under the
Page 173 and 174: THE mAKING OF TIGERS military build
Page 175 and 176: THE mAKING OF TIGERS out of America
Page 177 and 178: THE mAKING OF TIGERS was no comfort
Page 179 and 180: THE mAKING OF TIGERS Until the summ
Page 181 and 182: THE mAKING OF TIGERS Korean soldier
Page 183: THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the south.
Page 187 and 188: THE mAKING OF TIGERS South Korean u
Page 189 and 190: THE mAKING OF TIGERS in the Lunar C
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Page 193 and 194: THE mAKING OF TIGERS estimate, he h
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Page 197 and 198: THE mAKING OF TIGERS the 70s, Korea
Page 199 and 200: NeW ZeALAND’S COMMITMeNT OF INFAN
Page 217 and 218: Meeting the Challenge of Training a
Page 219 and 220: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING
Page 221 and 222: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING I
Page 223 and 224: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING T
Page 225 and 226: MEETING ThE ChALLENGE OF TRAINING F
Page 227 and 228: ANZAC Battalions: Australian Experi
Page 229 and 230: ANZAC BATTALIONS: AUSTRALIAN ExPERI
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ANZAC BATTALIONS: AUSTRALIAN ExPERI
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The Role and Impact of Civil Affair
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THe ROLe AND IMPACT OF CIVIL AFFAIR
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Liaison Detachment THe ROLe AND IMP
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THe AUSTrAlIAN ArMy TrAININg TeAM V
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM In late 1961,
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM eventually de
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM Compounding t
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM After arrivin
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM ARVN’s lack
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM reports that
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ADVISoRS AND oPTIMISM war was unwin
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Becoming the 3rd XV: The Citizen Mi
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV conventional wa
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV the time did no
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV The CMF’s his
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV out and the CMF
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV thus discharged
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV January 1967 an
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BECOMING THE 3RD XV the distant pos
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The Australian Army and the Vietnam
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THE AUSTRALIAN ARMy AND THE VIETNAM
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HoW HISToRy WoRKS: AFTERTHoUGHTS Al
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