conference proceedings - Australian Army

PRePARING ARMOuReD uNITS FOR OVeRSeAS SeRVICe
again able to demonstrate how valuable tanks and cavalry could be, either against an
entrenched enemy in bunkers or on the move in a wide range of mobile tasks.
Therefore, whatever negative aspects came out of the Vietnam War, the enhancement
of the status of Australian Armour was not one of them. And all of us in the Royal
Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) took pleasure in the fact that our greatest
protagonists from that conflict were the up-and-coming young infantry commanders and
their troops who preferred not to go anywhere near a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese
Army bunker position without both tank and cavalry support. In short, the Vietnam
War helped to restore the RAAC to its place as one of the two manoeuvre arms of the
Australian Army.
It did so from a very small base, and a central part of this essay is how we made
the ‘trickle’ system of replacement work as well as it did. Admittedly opinions among
tank and cavalry commanders on this subject are not unanimous. Some of us would
have preferred to do as the infantry battalions did: concentrate and train as an entity in
Australia, test the organisation during exercises and simulated situations, then deploy
to Vietnam as a cohesive whole. Others felt that ‘trickling’ had its advantages. Because
the learning curve in actual operations in Vietnam was so steep, they believed we were
better to confirm the lessons by stages, absorb them, then instruct others as they arrived.
In other words ‘learn on the job’. For example: how did you check out a Vietnamese
civilian found in a suspicious or ‘no go’ area? What did legitimate Vietnamese identity
papers look like? Information from the villagers from Binh Gia (mostly Roman Catholic
refugees from the North) was almost always reliable; that from the villagers of Hoa
Long (heavily penetrated by Viet Cong cadres), was almost never so. every province
chief ‘took his cut’ from franchises in his province, but he got things done and therefore
needed to be accorded respect. Old French maps of the area were valuable because
they showed places, tracks, and river crossings that were no longer prominent or even
recognisable, except by the Viet Cong; when escorting trucks, no matter how good
the communications, it was essential to put an armoured vehicle in front to control the
speed. This was bread and butter information that was only available in country, and
then only if you had been there a while. 3 Thus, there were definite advantages in the
‘trickle’ approach. It also meant that we were always ‘on the air’ in Vietnam, as one
officer put it.
Probably the best answer was a compromise, ‘trickle’ at first, then switch to unit
replacement when know-how and numbers, especially National Service numbers, had
built up. As it happened, the successive tank squadrons were a compromise; in most cases
3. For the immediately preceding information, and much else besides, I am indebted to Brigadier Gordon
Murphy, a Duntroon classmate, who commanded ‘A’ Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, in 1966-67.
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