Scripture and God in Christianity

Furthermore, the doctrine of one Person and two natures as is understood in the traditional circles,
in reality, leads us to the old Alexandrian Cyrillian Christology and does not help much to
understand the humanity of Christ. What Dr. Mascall says about the person or human knowledge
of Christ would suffice to elaborate the point. He argues, "In Christ, however, the person is really
distinct from the human nature; the nature with which the Person is really identical is not the
human but the divine, and in this it shares in the omniscience which is the inalienable possession
of Godhead. Is it therefore unreasonable to suppose that the contents of Christ's human mind will
include not only that experimental knowledge which is acquired by him in the course of his development
from infancy to manhood in a way substantially the same as, though immeasurably
more consistent and unimpeded than, the way in which we acquire ours, but also an infused
knowledge which is directly communicated to his human nature from the divine Person who is
its subject, and which is a participation in the divine omniscience and is limited only by the receptive
capacity of human nature as such?" 731
Now, if the person of Christ consists of two natures, two wills, and in reality identical with the
divine nature and knowledge rather than the human nature, then, one is fully justified to inquire
with Maurice Wiles as to how genuine is that humanity and "How genuinely human is so qualified
a human will?" 732 Moreover, this doctrine of the absolute unity of the person and two natures
faces a number of other crucial challenges. The narration of Jesus praying to God, calling upon
him with the words such as "My God, My God" etc. would make no sense even if one accepts
that it was Jesus' human nature that was engaged in such acts of prayer. Was the Person of Jesus
calling the Person of Christ? But there is only One Person in Jesus the Christ who, according to
the doctrine, is God also. Moreover, such a union of the person and wills will definitely make the
Godhead suffer the agonies of crucifiction. On the other hand, if it be asserted that it was Christ's
human person or nature going through pains and suffering on the Cross, then how in the world
can salvation, redemption, and atonement be achieved, for which the whole myth had been
brought into existence?
The world has yet to see a theologian or a philosopher who can resolve these contradictions and
explain in intelligible terms the Chalcedonian doctrine of Christ's person. Brunner contends that
"The aim of this doctrine is not that it may solve the mystery of Jesus. We know that when we
confess Him as God-Man, and must so confess Him, we are saying something which goes far beyond
anything we can understand." 733 W. Bright, after strongly defending the outcome of the
Council of Chalcedon, finally could not escape saying, "After all, if Christ is believed in as One,
yet as both truly God and truly Man-however little we can comprehend the relation thus created-
that belief is all that the Chalcedonian terminology implies: to hold it is to be at one with the
Fourth Council." 734 J.S. Whale reaches the same conclusion by observing, "Of course, an explanation
of Christ's person must always be beyond our reach if by `explain' we mean `put into a
class'. Jesus is inexplicable just because he cannot be put into a class. His uniqueness constitutes
the problem to be explained. It is impossible to describe him without becoming entangled in
paradoxes. The great merit of Creeds is that they left the paradox as such." 735
It is unfortunate to believe in logical impossibilities and contradictions in the name of paradox.
Faith can be substantiated by the facts, it cannot create facts. We conclude here with the remarks
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