Notes on computational linguistics.pdf - UCLA Department of ...
Notes on computational linguistics.pdf - UCLA Department of ...
Notes on computational linguistics.pdf - UCLA Department of ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Stabler - Lx 185/209 2003<br />
but also things like<br />
human(Socrates ∧ Plato)<br />
(human ∧ Greek)(Socrates)<br />
((snub-nosed ∧ Greek)(human))(Socrates)<br />
(((to ∧ from)(Athens))(walked))(Socrates)<br />
• Standard logical inference is deep, uses few inference rules, and depends <strong>on</strong> few premises, while typical<br />
human reas<strong>on</strong>ing seems rather shallow, with possibly a large number <strong>of</strong> inference rules and multiple<br />
supports for each premise. – We discuss this in §16.5.1 below.<br />
• Standard logical inference seems well designed for m<strong>on</strong>ot<strong>on</strong>icity-based inferences, and negative-polarity<br />
items <strong>of</strong> various kinds (any, ever, yet, a red cent, give a damn, <strong>on</strong>e bit, budge an inch) provide a visible<br />
syntactic reflex <strong>of</strong> this. For example:<br />
i. every publisher <strong>of</strong> any book will get his m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
ii. * every publisher <strong>of</strong> Plato will get any m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
iii. no publisher <strong>of</strong> Plato will get any m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
We see in these sentences that the c<strong>on</strong>texts in which any can appear with this meaning depend <strong>on</strong> the<br />
quantifier in some way. Roughly, any can appear <strong>on</strong>ly in m<strong>on</strong>ot<strong>on</strong>e decreasing c<strong>on</strong>texts – where this<br />
noti<strong>on</strong> is explained below, a noti<strong>on</strong> that is relevant for a very powerful inference step. We will see that<br />
“the sec<strong>on</strong>d argument <strong>of</strong> every” is increasing, but “the sec<strong>on</strong>d argument <strong>of</strong> no” isdecreasing.<br />
12 Review: first semantic categories<br />
12.1 Things<br />
Let’s assume that we are talking about a certain domain, a certain collecti<strong>on</strong> <strong>of</strong> things. In a trivial case, we<br />
might be discussing just John and Mary, and so our domain <strong>of</strong> things, or entities is:<br />
E ={j,m}.<br />
A simple idea is that names like John refer to elements <strong>of</strong> the universe, but M<strong>on</strong>tague and Keenan and many<br />
others have argued against this idea. So we will also reject that idea and assume that no linguistic expressi<strong>on</strong>s<br />
refer directly to elements <strong>of</strong> E.<br />
12.2 Properties <strong>of</strong> things<br />
The denotati<strong>on</strong>s <strong>of</strong> unary predicates will be properties, which we will identify “extensi<strong>on</strong>ally,” as the sets <strong>of</strong><br />
things that have the properties. When E is the set above, there are <strong>on</strong>ly 4 different properties <strong>of</strong> things,<br />
℘(E) ={∅, {j}, {m}, {j,m}}.<br />
We can reveal some important relati<strong>on</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g these by displaying them with with arcs indicating subset<br />
relati<strong>on</strong>s am<strong>on</strong>g them as follows:<br />
234