Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal ... - Law Commission
Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal ... - Law Commission
Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal ... - Law Commission
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PART XVI<br />
SEVERANCE OF COUNTS OR<br />
INFORMATIONS<br />
16.1 The present law govern<strong>in</strong>g the severance <strong>of</strong> counts or <strong>in</strong>formations properly<br />
jo<strong>in</strong>ed is set out at paragraphs 2.91 – 2.95 above. Counts may be jo<strong>in</strong>ed if they<br />
“are founded on the same facts”, or if they “form or are a part <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong>fences <strong>of</strong> the same or a similar character”. 1 In Barrell and Wilson, 2 the Court <strong>of</strong><br />
Appeal said that<br />
the phrase “founded on the same facts” does not mean that for<br />
charges to be properly jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the same <strong>in</strong>dictment, the facts <strong>in</strong><br />
relation to the respective charges must be identical <strong>in</strong> substance or<br />
virtually contemporaneous. The test is whether the charges have a<br />
common factual orig<strong>in</strong>. 3<br />
16.2 A judge has a discretion to order that properly-jo<strong>in</strong>ed counts be tried separately. 4<br />
THE RESPONSE ON CONSULTATION<br />
16.3 In the consultation paper we considered the argument that a defendant is<br />
prejudiced by counts be<strong>in</strong>g heard together where the evidence is not crossadmissible<br />
and concluded:<br />
The logic <strong>of</strong> this approach is very powerful but, as we have seen, it is<br />
<strong>in</strong>consistent with general practice. We do not feel that we can make<br />
any provisional recommendations on this po<strong>in</strong>t, though the present<br />
practice does appear to be open to criticism on grounds <strong>of</strong> logic. We<br />
ask whether the present rules <strong>in</strong> respect <strong>of</strong> jo<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> charges are<br />
adequate, or whether the courts should sever charges where<br />
prejudicial evidence is not <strong>in</strong>ter-admissible between different charges,<br />
especially <strong>in</strong> sex cases. 5<br />
16.4 Thirty-seven respondents gave their views on this issue, <strong>of</strong> which roughly half<br />
thought there was no need for any change. One third did want to see change.<br />
The ma<strong>in</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g reason given by these respondents was that the prejudice<br />
caused to the defendant may be overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g and is unjustifiable <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciple if<br />
such evidence would not be admissible under the rules govern<strong>in</strong>g similar fact<br />
evidence. A further four respondents thought some modification necessary, and<br />
1 Indictment Rules SI 1971 No 1253, r 9.<br />
2 (1979) 69 Cr App R 250, 252-253.<br />
3 But see Lockley and Sa<strong>in</strong>sbury [1997] Crim LR 455.<br />
4<br />
Indictments Act 1915, s 5(3). The position is the same <strong>in</strong> the magistrates’ courts. See paras<br />
2.93 – 2.95 above.<br />
5 Para 10.111.<br />
195