BIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY PROTOCOLS - Portal do Professor

PART II / CHAPTER 6
• In-kind payments, such as the beehive-for-conservation
payment transaction that Fundación Natura is making
in Bolivia; 20
and
• Recognition of rights, such as increased land or access
rights and increased participation in decision-making
processes. 21
Additional methods are also listed by UNEP, including a “pay
per tree” scheme, forest protection or restoration schemes
and payment through improved service delivery.
There are many other options for PES schemes that could
be adapted to the local needs of the involved provider
communities. 22
In order to identify the optimal form of PES scheme, there
must be dialogue about the different options. This should
include increasing the provider community’s understanding
of the benefits of the different forms of PES available in
order to strengthen its capacity to make effective decisions
and increase its bargaining power in negotiations.
4.4 High Transaction Costs of
Community-based Negotiations
In a study on forest ESS and the impact of payment schemes
for poor communities living in or near the forest, the
International Institute for Environment and Development
(IIED) warns: …transaction costs are likely to be highest
for small forest holders who lack basic organisational,
forest management and marketing skills. Monitoring and
certifying delivery of biodiversity management, for instance,
will tend to be more expensive for a number of small plots
than for larger landholdings. Where a minimum area is
required to qualify for a biodiversity protection contract,
additional costs are born by smallholders who must
BIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY PROTOCOLS IN THE
CONTEXT OF PAYMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
co-ordinate amongst themselves before negotiating
with buyers. 23
Furthermore, overcoming any of the abovementioned
challenges that are a part of participatory
engagement with communities will be time-consuming and
expensive. Most potential ESS buyers will seek out negotiation
partners with the lowest transaction costs, which tend
to be larger landowners, minimizing the need for prolonged
negotiations or pre-negotiations. This is a clear disadvantage
for involving communities in PES schemes and donor funding
may be necessary to cover the high initial transaction
and set-up costs.
4.5 The Need for a Clear Definition
of Property Rights
While PES schemes are often set up privately and in the large
majority of cases do not rely on a specific regulatory framework,
it is important to remember that they also do not take place
in a legal or political vacuum. For example, certain national
fiscal policies or subsidies may run counter to the concepts
of PES schemes and may prevent the introduction of
alternative forms of land use in certain areas. Some countries
such as Ecuador and Costa Rica have recently revisited their
forestry laws precisely to update such national fiscal policies
and facilitate the success of PES schemes. 24
Furthermore, clarity of property rights is central to the
functioning of any PES scheme. 25
In situations in which land
ownership and tenure and access and use rights are ambiguous,
it is unclear who is the provider of ESS and thus very difficult
to create PES schemes. Particularly if PES schemes are to
benefit small and local communities, it is of utmost importance
to ensure that their rights to accessing the land are in
place and clarified.
20. http://www.naturabolivia.org/Informacion/Proy2.pdf
21. Supra note 5.
22. Furthermore, communities are likely to also experience certain secondary benefits from engaging in PES schemes. These include: the transfer of technical skills such as
mapping, surveying, and new, alternative and sustainable forms of land use. It may also lead to economic empowerment of communities that are seen as providing a
service rather than engaging in ‘practice as usual’, and they may also gain experience in engaging with outside business. In cases in which communities already actively
contribute to the maintenance of the local environment through sustainable harvesting practices, they should be rewarded for such activities as an incentive to maintain
the status quo in the future. Indeed, as case studies in Costa Rica have shown, communities above all derive benefits from the secondary effects of PES schemes.
This includes their engagement with the supporting organizations, such as training to develop forestry activities, strengthened organization and improved external
linkages. When local landscape is transformed, it may also generate value for local communities through its impact on other ESS on which they depend, such as water
quality and quantity. In turn, this may generate increased local tourism and scientific opportunities, which would also benefit them in the medium-term.
See: “Payment for Environmental Services and Rural Communities: Lessons from the Americas” Herman Rosa, Susan Kandel, Leopoldo Dimas and Ernesto Mendez,
PRISMA (Programa Salvadoreño de Investigación sobre Desarrollo y Medio Ambiente)
23. “Silver bullet or fools’ gold? A global review of markets for forest environmental services and their impact on the poor” Natasha Landell-Mills and
Ina T. Porras March 2002, IIED. Page 62.
24. See for example: Pagiola, S. 2002. “Paying for Water Services in Central America: Learning from Costa Rica,” and Echevarría, M. 2002. “Financing Watershed Conservation:
The Fonag Water Fund in Quito, Ecuador,” both in Pagiola, S. et al. “Selling Forest Environmental Services. Market-based Mechanisms for Conservation and Development.”
London: Earthscan Publications Ltd (2002).
25. Supra note 11.
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