A THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL XLIV 2002 Published by the Protestant ...

TONY CARROLL SJ
from the analytical tradition of philosophy as developed by Austin and
Searle and considers normal language to be based on the solving of
problems and coordination of actions within the world. Habermas uses
this model of language himself in his own social theory. This model
assumes language to be like a tool with a particular function to perform.
Thus in moving from a theological language to a secular language
all that is happening is that the same actions and problems are
being coordinated and solved by a better and more efficient language
use. In this sense language is seen as a neutral carrier of the information
we need to negotiate our way around the world. The use of secular
language in the place of religious language would then simply be a
strategic choice in order to achieve influence in the public sphere
which would not necessarily affect the religious tradition in any negative
way. However, when one considers language from the other major
tradition, that is, the tradition developed by the later Heidegger and
presently championed by Derrida, the ëworld-disclosing modelí then
not only is language never properly speaking ënormal languageí, since
it is always a fictive construction, 32 but it carries with it a worldview.
Thus to translate from one language to another in this model of ëworlddisclosingí
language use would in effect be to change ones basic view
of the world. Translation from religious to secular language would
thus be a way of draining the content of ones own tradition and accepting
the secular world view. Secularisation thus understood would
result in the erosion and eventual elimination of the religious tradition
as the language of the secular worldview was accepted. It is clear that
Habermas uses the necessity of translating as a form of domestication
of the potential violent tendencies in religion which are not prepared
to submit themselves to the rules of democratic debate. However, the
question is, in submitting to the secular rules of democratic exchange
does one end up ëselling ones own very soulí? 33
32 See Jacques Derrida, Marges de la Philosophie, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit,
1972, pp. 367ñ393.
33 An interesting point raised by Peter Berger would seem to suggest that one does
indeed end up ëselling ones soulí. He notes, in his recent study, that the religious
institutions which have adopted adaptation strategies to modern secular culture have
tended to die out, whilst religious movements which tend, on the contrary, to be
steeped in various forms of supernaturalism tend to be thriving. See Peter Berger, op
cit., p. 4.
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