IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering

Annex 3: Keynote Abstracts
Keynote III-1: Policy, Governance and Socio-Economical Aspects of Geoengineering
Catherine Redgwell
Professor of International Law and Vice-Dean, Faculty of Laws, University College London, United Kingdom
Increasingly it is apparent that some geoengineering methods may be technically possible, though with major uncertainties
regarding their effectiveness, cost and socio-economic and environmental impacts (The Royal Society, 2009). This
presentation explores the regulation of geoengineering and the principles which should guide the establishment of the
governance structure necessary to guide research in the short term and to ensure that any decisions ultimately taken with
respect to deployment occur within an appropriate governance framework. The uncertainties and controversies surrounding
geoengineering have recently been considered both nationally (UK House of Commons, 2010; U.S. House of
Representatives, 2010) and internationally. In the latter context, the State parties to the 1972 London Convention and
1996 Protocol and to the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, have each actively debated the consistency of ocean
iron fertilization activities with convention obligations, inter alia, to protect and preserve the marine environment, and in
late 2010 the CBD considered the matter of geogengineering more broadly. Thus both domestically and internationally it is
clear that governance of geoengineering is moving up the legal and policy agenda.
To date there has been little comprehensive assessment of the international regulation of geoengineering. Indeed, absent
from the current legal landscape is a single treaty or institution addressing all aspects of geoengineering; rather, the
regulatory picture is a diverse and fragmented one both at the international and national levels (Bracmort et al., 2010;
Hester, 2011). Thus a major strand in the sparse legal literature addressed to geoengineering is an assessment of the
extent to which existing rules may be adapted to regulate geoengineering actors and activities (e.g. Bodansky, 1996;
Michaelson, 1998; Rayfuse et al., 2008; Zedalis, 2010; Redgwell, 2011; Lin, 2011).This relies on the flexible adaptation, or
possible amendment, of existing treaty rules or the application of customary international law rules, seeking to employ the
legal tools at hand to regulate geoengineering activities, whether field trials or potential deployment. The difficulty of
drawing a sharp distinction between these in terms of the nature of the activity and its effects, especially where large-scale
field trials are in question, is significant, An example of a cautious graduated approach is found in the response by the
parties to the 1972 London Convention and 1996 Protocol to ocean iron fertilization to prohibit all but small-scale scientific
field trials pending further development of a regulatory framework.
Assessment of existing instruments should also take into account the dynamism of the norm-generating process,
particularly in the environmental context. Existing instruments may be divided between those potentially applicable to all
geoengineering methods (e.g. the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques and the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) and those potentially
applicable to particular methods (e.g. the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and other Matter and 1996 Protocol, for ocean iron fertilization, and the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and 1987 Montreal Protocol with respect to stratospheric aerosols.)
There are a number of alternatives for geoengineering governance. The first would be the conclusion of a “bespoke” legal
instrument or instruments to address geoengineering. However, a multilateral geoengineering treaty is neither likely nor
desirable. It is unlikely because the appetite for law-making, particularly in the climate change context as evidenced by the
Copenhagen and Cancun meetings, is low (D. Bodansky and Diringer, 2010; Werksman and Herbertson, 2010; Rajamani,
2010, 2011). It seems inconceivable that the political will would be generated for law-making on this scale and where such
a degree of controversy exists. Achieving consensus on all but the lowest common denominator – if that – seems very
unlikely.
Such a route is also undesirable, for two reasons. The first is that international law hardly presents a blank slate, with a
plethora of potentially applicable instruments where “regime legitimacy” has been established over time. The swift
response to carbon capture and storage by the parties to the global LC/LP and regional OSPAR regime is an illustration of
what can be done when there is clear consensus regarding the need for international regulation, the political will to do so,
and appropriate instruments to adapt. Existing instruments can, and likely will, regulate aspects of geoengineering which
fall within their treaty mandate. By the same token, there are gaps, most obviously with respect to the regulation in areas
beyond national jurisdiction of SRM methods. A single treaty on geoengineering is also undesirable owing to the range of
methods, where they may be carried out, and by whom. There can be no “one size fits all” approach to geoengineering
regulation beyond the identification of key guiding principles or concerns of general application. Amongst other things,
these could inform the interpretation and application of existing instruments.
<strong>IPCC</strong> <strong>Expert</strong> <strong>Meeting</strong> on Geoengineering - 34