IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering

Annex 3: Keynote Abstracts
Keynote III-2: International Cooperation and the Governance of Geoengineering
Arunabha Ghosh
Chief Executive Officer, Council on Energy, Environment and Water, India
The case for the international governance of geoengineering is unclear for several reasons: why governance is needed;
what to govern; how widely would international governance work. This presentation asks: If geoengineering were to be
governed at the international level, what would be the underlying motivations and what forms could such governance
take? The purpose is two-fold: to inquire into the explicit and implicit concerns and interests that motivate countries to
demand or oppose international governance; and secondly, to inquire into the functional forms that international
governance could take depending on varied motivations. Not only is international cooperation on geoengineering not a
given; its design and effectiveness would depend on the ultimate goals for promoting governance at the international level.
Why govern?
Demands for governing geoengineering derive from a mix of interests and ethical concerns. On interests, states are
motivated by at least two competing pressures, both stemming from uncertainty over the science of geoengineering.
Without further research, the state of knowledge on geoengineering will not be robust enough for policymakers to make
informed decisions. An individual country might want to retain the freedom to experiment with geoengineering
technologies, so that its scientific community may build an advanced knowledge base on yet unproven technologies.
Viewed in this way, international rules could be considered ‘status quo-ist’, a constraint on a single country’s freedom of
manoeuvre in future. But uncertainties associated with geoengineering also mean that the actions of other countries might
have unforeseen consequences. Could geoengineering offer a technological edge to some countries? Could deployment of
certain techniques outside one’s borders adversely affect weather patterns within one’s territory? With the current state of
knowledge, it is hard to answer such questions with certainty. Viewed in this way, international rules could be considered a
useful tool to rein in runaway, unilateral action in an uncertain technological field. Thus, countries would favour rules that
offered them maximum flexibility while keeping other countries off balance. But the demand for rules also derives from
ethical concerns. Countries (and/or their citizens) could seek governance over geoengineering technologies because they
oppose interference with nature, or because they want to ascertain the intent behind research into these technologies, or
simply because they claim a say over actions that have international impact. Process-related concerns include: having the
opportunity to participate in forums where rules might be drawn up, having the power to influence rules, and being
sufficiently aware to offer informed consent or dissent. Outcome-related concerns include: capability to conduct
geonengineering research and/or deployment; intentions and actions deriving from such capability; the manner in which
actions are monitored and reviewed; and how disputes are adjudicated and resolved.
Why cooperate?
Even the most powerful of countries need international regimes at least under three conditions: the lack of a framework
establishing legal liability for state actions; positive transaction costs; and imperfect information. The presentation will
distinguish between forms of international cooperation depending on the motivations of countries demanding governance
arrangements. Cooperation over scientific experiments would entail decisions about funding, building capacity,
coordinating research, reviewing results, and ensuring transparency. Such cooperation could bypass national governments,
at least for small scale or laboratory experiments. International cooperation gets trickier when geoengineering research is
not only funded from public resources but also where intentionality is hard to identify and responsibility is hard to attribute.
Even if intentions were benign, some would argue that since geoengineering is a response to climate change (an issue the
burden of responsibility), the international community should have a say in why and how it is researched and deployed.
Whatever the motivation, the case for international cooperation is based on: firstly, imperfect information about
geoengineering activities, their intent and impact; and, secondly, the absence of a framework to establish legal liability over
actions.
Which functions for what motivations?
It is unclear a priori what institutional form international cooperation would take in order to influence geoengineering
activities. At least four options may be identified: one, national-level governance; two, ad hoc codes of conduct and
principles developed by the scientific community; three, adapting the mandates of existing international treaties, such as
the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on
<strong>IPCC</strong> <strong>Expert</strong> <strong>Meeting</strong> on Geoengineering - 37