IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering

Annex 3: Keynote Abstracts
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques; and four, creating a new
regime to govern aspects of geoengineering that other regimes or national institutions cannot handle. Each governance
option has merits and demerits. In order to understand the conditions under which different options might emerge, the
presentation will use a framework to identify the functions that are necessary to promote international cooperation and
respond to differing motivations. Three relevant governance functions may be identified: making decisions, monitoring
actions, and resolving disputes. The motivations may be broadly grouped into interest-based and ethical concerns. The
former seek a balance between maintaining flexibility for oneself while constraining others’ actions. Ethical concerns ask
whether the processes and outcomes of geoengineering governance are considered legitimate and for whom.
Table A.3.1: The design of international governance of geoengineering will depend on functions and motivations
Interest-based concerns
Ethical concerns
Maintain flexibility Constrain others Process legitimacy Outcome legitimacy
Making decision
Scope of international
governance limited
Scope of international
governance broad
Inclusive process vs.
Ease of decisionmaking
in small
groups
Equally weighted
voting rules vs.
Capability-driven
voting
Monitoring
actions
Self-reporting
Institutional reporting plus
verification
Inclusiveness of
review procedures
Quality and
timeliness of
reporting
Resolving disputes
Decentralised
adjudication
Centralised adjudication
plus
centralised/decentralised
enforcement
Ease of access to
dispute settlement
forums
Ability to enforce
decisions
The interplay of functional demands for international cooperation and interest-based and ethical concerns offers choices for
regime design (Table A.3.1). Decision-making depends on the scope of issues that would be governed internationally, who
has a seat at the table, and the rules to aggregate votes and positions. Inclusive processes give countries without capacity
to have a say in activities that have international consequences, but this approach competes against the efficiency of small
group settings. Influence over outcomes depends on different voting rules. Monitoring actions is highly contested. Selfreporting
may be preferred by sovereignty-protecting states. But regulating other’s actions needs some form of institutional
reporting with independent verification. Ethical concerns also drive options for monitoring depending on how broad review
procedures are and whether reporting offers timely, accurate and salient information. Resolving disputes is perhaps hardest
because intentions are hard to define and responsibility not attributed easily. To preserve flexibility, countries would prefer
domestic courts for disputes over activities in their territories but international mechanisms for those arising elsewhere.
Enforcement may be either decentralised (leaving it to countries to pursue means of influencing other) or centralised (using
sanctions stemming from an international institution). For ethical concerns, barriers to entry in the formal dispute resolution
arrangement could include lack of information and/or lack of resources. Outcome legitimacy depends on disputants having
the ability to enforce rules against more powerful countries.
The presentation will draw upon the experience of and lessons from other international regimes and with the international
coordination of research activities. By combining motivations and governance functions, the presentation suggests ways in
which international cooperation might evolve depending on the balance of power, interests and ethics.
<strong>IPCC</strong> <strong>Expert</strong> <strong>Meeting</strong> on Geoengineering - 38