One more last working class hero
One more last working class hero
One more last working class hero
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cutting the fire service. This situation would meet with capitalisms’ approval and allow officers to ‘prove’ their<br />
authority/masculinity. Given that, extra wages apart, there is no economic dividend for officers in cutting the fire service<br />
(in <strong>class</strong> terms), the dividend for bossing firefighters around may be seen as a petty dividend (see Wright 1982a: 113;<br />
Grint 1998: 148); the proof of an officers’ masculinity.<br />
This chapter will now focus directly on the difficulties over the relations between firefighters and officers. In so<br />
doing, it will be important to question if the gap between officers and firefighters is not really about creating a <strong>more</strong><br />
efficient fire service at all. It may be a struggle between two groups of men trying to prove themselves in the same arena.<br />
On the one hand firefighters trying to prove themselves whilst firefighting and officers trying to prove themselves by<br />
cutting the fire service which inevitably affects firefighters ability to firefight as they currently do. Section 2, provides a<br />
clear example of how the gap between firefighters and officers may develop, by examining single tier entry promotion<br />
(STEP) and its main dynamic shared experience. This firmly establishes that there is a gap forming between firefighters<br />
and officers because both groups have differing expectations of shared experience. Section 3 focuses on how firefighters<br />
separate themselves from officers by creating a distance between firefighters’ hands-on, blue-collar (masculine) skills and<br />
officers’ white-collar (feminine) work. Section 4 investigates four key activities in the fire service where firefighters resist<br />
officers’ attempts to ‘prove’ their authority: dynamic risk assessment; BA control; training; fire prevention/CFS. Section<br />
5 examines some areas where male firefighters may construct their masculinity, their sexual adventures, public status and<br />
views on female firefighters. Section 6 is a brief examination of an official dispute between FBU and officers/employers,<br />
which suggests that the FBU provides an umbrella under which all firefighters can gather. The conclusion returns to the<br />
debates on petty dividends.<br />
78<br />
5.2. THE OFFICERS<br />
5.2.1. Single tier entry promotion (STEP)<br />
Every officer in the fire service starts his or her career as a firefighter. Given that the Audit Commission (1995) accepts<br />
that Chief Officers successfully control their budgets, starting at the bottom does not appear to influence the financial<br />
efficiency of the fire service. However, successfully managing budgets is not the whole story. Government requires the<br />
fire service to be an equal opportunities employer (Straw 2000; see also Bucke 1994). The extreme way STEP restricts<br />
promotion to an internal labour market (ILM), locks the workforce to their employment (see Burawoy 1979), may reduce<br />
the cost of training, facilitate close evaluation of promotion candidates and normally gets workplace approval 172 .<br />
However, taken to the degree that it is in the fire service (where all officers must serve their time as firefighters and<br />
receive most of their training in-house), STEP isolates the fire service from outside influences (particularly in the<br />
management field) 173 . This encourages conservatism and the experience officers’ gain as firefighters is likely to influence<br />
their future decisions. In particular, it is likely to lead to a perpetuation of the status quo and an institutionally<br />
conservative organisation as senior officers choose their successors in their own image.<br />
In respect of masculinity and homogeneity, organisations that rely solely on ILM for promotion can become<br />
bastions of (white, heterosexual) male power (see Young 1991; Reiner 1992; Office for Public Management 1996; Owen<br />
1996; Corby 1999: 98-99). The fire service is clearly one of those organisations and its institutionally conservative<br />
practices have already been shown in regard to its recruitment policies. This it does by screening for masculine<br />
understandings in recruiting a predominantly <strong>working</strong> <strong>class</strong> male, able-bodied, white and heterosexual workforce: a<br />
situation where employing the stereotype only ‘proves’ the stereotype (see Chapters 1 and 4). As already argued<br />
institutional conservatism requires that leaders choose their successors in their own image and it should come as no<br />
surprise that fire service promotion can involve patronage 174 . Chris, a senior equal opportunities adviser to the fire<br />
service, explains:<br />
Chris:<br />
The Fire Service recruits from a narrow band of people, unlike the police and army. This is good for<br />
equality in that everyone gets a fair crack of the whip: no elite group or <strong>class</strong> provides the officers, as<br />
each person has a chance to achieve full potential. But can be bad in regard to patronage.<br />
Patronage, in the fire service restricts the promotion of “boat rockers” (Hart 1982: 159) who could challenge<br />
tradition and/or the abilities of current officers (see Dixon 1994 175 ) and can lead to the ‘Peter Principle’ (see Peters and<br />
Peters 1970; Buck 1997; Young 1991; Dixon 1994). Not unexpectedly, I found no officers who would argue against<br />
STEP. There are at least three reasons for this. First, it would allow existing civilian managers in the fire service (and<br />
outside managers) to compete with officers for their jobs. Second, outsiders with entrepreneurial/academic skills may<br />
challenge current officers way of organising the fire service (as they did in the health service, see Lucio and MacKenzie<br />
172 The ‘whole’ fire service support STEP (see Ord 1993; CFBAC 1994; Manuel 1999; Smith 1998; Thornton 1999).<br />
173 It may be that STEP is a questionable ‘genuine occupational requirement’ (see Lewis 1992: 36; Palmer 1992: 72), because it not only prevents<br />
suitably trained managers from joining the fire service at the appropriate level, it also denies access to people at those levels, who cannot meet the fire<br />
service’s medical standards and could never successfully apply for a job as a firefighter.<br />
174 Flanagan (1998), argues that 83% of Chief Officers admit to helping ‘suitable’ candidates.<br />
175 Dixon (1994) suggests that in the military, where he considers many officers have lacked intellectual abilities, officers restrict and stop the promotion<br />
of entrepreneurial officers who might be intellectually free thinking enough to challenge the system. Such a criticism might well apply to the fire service<br />
where officers often see critique as a personal criticism of them because they are responsible for the system.