One more last working class hero

88
Jasper:
DB:
Jasper:
I would have thought no. It’s [DRA] very much a thing now isn’t it, where as perhaps twenty years ago
it wasn’t? No I don’t.
(Brigade one, Leading Firefighter, 29 years’ service, age 52). [My insert]
You rely on other things?
Yeah, perhaps thirty years’ worth.
[My emphasis].
Jasper’s reliance on his thirty years experience is a confirmation of the importance of experiential knowledge (and their
own protocols) to firefighters. I asked Pete where his dynamic risk assessment card was:
Pete:
I think it is in my locker. It is something that we are all supposed to be aware of. Everybody seems to
have done in a roundabout way in the past. It’s written down now, it’s on paper.
There seems to be no escaping the confidence that firefighters have in their own abilities. They are quite certain they have
already taken into account what officers have now written down. Arnold suggests that despite being a principal officer,
some joint understandings remain:
Arnold:
Whatever label is put on it [DRA], we have always gone about it in the same way: getting off the
machine; sizing things up; making assessments; deploying. … The attitude was we are here to do a job,
get-in and put it out. … and get back to the station.
[My emphases and insert].
Arnold’s shared experience leads to him unwittingly supporting Pete and Jasper who have their own protocols for carrying
out a DRA. Significantly, Arnold’s shared experience could mean he is a sympathetic careerist (see Chapter 4, category
9) and this could prevent him from ‘chasing up’ watch officers to ensure that they manage the way firefighters get-in. It is
interesting to note that Arnold also remembers how important it is to firefighters to get back ‘on the run’.
5.4.3. Officers’ caution
However, it would be naive to believe that DRA is not having some impact on firefighters and there is evidence in Chapter
3 that this might result in some conflict with officers over getting-in. Firefighters also argue that DRA has made officers
more cautious and that this may also result in them being withdrawn from fires too early. Carl’s point of view could have
real consequences regarding fire damage:
Carl:
The JO’s are definitely more cautious now … So much more careful, they will withdraw you when you
think everything is fine. … It can be very frustrating, very frustrating. … If you can get into a building
and get stuck in, you can perhaps stop it. As a fire in one room might spread to the whole top floor if
you fight it from the outside.
(Served in two brigades, firefighter, 6 years’ service, age 24).
Could it be that Carl’s frustration is because officers are ignoring his skills? Jo is clearly angry about how officers ignore
her experience:
Jo:
Frustration … they have seen a crack and I know they are only taking our safety into their consideration,
but sometimes you wonder if they are taking our knowledge and our perception and our experience and
abilities .. expertise into account. Quite often you just stand with jets and you see the whole place go.
(Female firefighter). [My emphases].
Once crews are withdrawn, the fire can only be fought from outside and this effectively results in the loss of the building.
Chapter 1 explains that these situations might be difficult to assess: officers might be too safety conscious; firefighters
might be anti-officer. It may even be that by relying on officers to withdraw them, as opposed to making their own
decision to withdraw, firefighters can shift the blame for the loss of a building to the officers. Then firefighters do not
have to admit to being beaten by the fire; their image, at least in their own eyes and for those within earshot of their
criticisms of officers, is not tarnished. It appears that despite DRA being a safety issue, firefighters will still resist being
managed by BO’s, the FBU or the HSE regarding getting-in. Nothing, it appears, will prevent firefighters from helping
the public, or improving their own status.
5.4.4. BA Control