Jamaica: Macro-Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment of ...
Jamaica: Macro-Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment of ...
Jamaica: Macro-Socio-Economic and Environmental Assessment of ...
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critical facilities. The high sediment content in river <strong>and</strong> spring water resulted in very high<br />
turbidity levels that could not be easily reduced at treatment plants, <strong>and</strong> some <strong>of</strong> them were<br />
temporarily taken out <strong>of</strong> operation. But the most significant factor was the lack <strong>of</strong> electricity that<br />
impeded the functioning <strong>of</strong> key components <strong>of</strong> the system, including pumping stations <strong>and</strong><br />
treatment facilities.<br />
Over 600 electricity-dependent facilities, including sewerage plants, were affected in one way or<br />
another. While waiting for the restoration <strong>of</strong> electrical service, the National Water Commission<br />
(NWC), under the Ministry <strong>of</strong> Water <strong>and</strong> Housing, made efforts to bring back into service those<br />
facilities that could be operated on available st<strong>and</strong>by generators, as well as those systems that<br />
could be operated through gravity flow distribution. Priority was assigned to hospitals <strong>and</strong> other<br />
critical facilities. As electricity flows were restarted <strong>and</strong> road access to facilities was restored,<br />
water supply was restored (see Figure 4-2).<br />
Figure 4-2<br />
Recovery Performance <strong>of</strong> Water Supply Services after the Hurricane<br />
100<br />
Recovery <strong>of</strong> service %<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
0<br />
1 2<br />
3 5<br />
Days after disaster<br />
7<br />
9<br />
14<br />
38<br />
After nearly 40 days after the hurricane struck, service has been restored in about 97 percent <strong>of</strong><br />
the entire system. Nevertheless, some locations are still suffering from low water pressure,<br />
intermittent water supply <strong>and</strong> even no water, in response to variations in pressure within the<br />
system. During the initial days <strong>of</strong> the crisis, the NWC resorted to distributing water in many<br />
localities through the use <strong>of</strong> tanker trucks, both from its own fleet <strong>and</strong> renting others from private<br />
companies. NWC personnel had to work long hours in order to, first, prepare systems for reenergizing,<br />
to rehabilitate damaged plants, <strong>and</strong> for emergency distribution <strong>of</strong> water. Increased<br />
filtering <strong>and</strong> treatment <strong>of</strong> water was made in order to guarantee a minimum quality <strong>of</strong> drinking<br />
water. Therefore, the utility enterprise has suffered from loss <strong>of</strong> revenue <strong>and</strong> increased<br />
operational expenditures over the time required for the resumption <strong>of</strong> normal activities.<br />
There exists partial information concerning the direct damage sustained by the system. Estimates<br />
were made <strong>of</strong> the losses in revenue that the NWC will sustain, based on the recovery <strong>of</strong> the<br />
34