Volu m e II - Purdue University Calumet

A third possibility could be where choosing needs only an effect and no cause. Sure, it is possible
imagine a world where things manifest into existence causelessly. Imagine where electronics, animals, or
paintings by Salvador Dali pop into and out of existence without consistency or order. These would still be
effects of some sort, being instances of changed states of affairs. But could this be true of our decisions?
How could we be held responsible for a decision appearing in our heads uncaused? Could we blame our
decision on its causeless, unpredictable nature? This seems as problematic as indetermism. There could not
be an explanation for why one thing happened over any other thing. Furthermore, in the known world,
there is not one other example of this type of causation (or should I say non-causation). If this could come
about inside our heads, why doesn’t it appear anywhere else? It seems that events in the universe do not
happen ex nihilo. I would not grant this possibility to decision making.
The fourth and final possibility I will discuss is self-causation, where cause and effect either happen
simultaneously, or they are identical. The problem with self-causation is that it contradicts itself. If
something were to cause itself to exist, it must exist at a time when it does not exist. It is impossible for
something to exist while it does not exist. Self-causation is not a possible explanation.
So far, I have attempted to show decision making governed by determinism, indeterminism, or
non-determinism does not allow for the real possibility of making different choices. In any of the cases
above, the agent cannot do anything other then causal laws govern, and in situations where they do, the
causal laws do not fit our world. So what happens to the problem of intuited freedom? Should we redo our
analysis as van Inwagen suggests? I think the logic expressed above is sound. Instead, we should disregard
the concept of metaphysical freedom.
Let’s look closer. How does van Inwagen come to the conclusion that freedom is intuitively
obvious? He does so by appealing to our sense of choosing between two possibilities, and our belief that we
have the ability to do either choice. Choices seem real to us, but it is possible that they are illusory. Our
perceptions are flawed in many ways; perhaps this is one of them. Consider color for example. It appears
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