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Volu m e II - Purdue University Calumet

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It is important to realize that his example requires the existence of this something. If something did<br />

not change in Mr. Chase or Sanborn, then Dennett’s intuition pump would amount to the story of when<br />

Mr. Chase and Sanborn worked at Maxwell House and nothing happened to them.<br />

Both premises (a) and (b) must be true for proposition 1 to be true. It is also true that we cannot<br />

know which disjunct of premise (b) is true: we cannot know whether it was the qualia that changed or the<br />

standards of judging those qualia, and thus we can conclude no further fact from premise (b). Where<br />

Dennett errs is when he says that because we can extrapolate no facts from premise (b), we cannot<br />

extrapolate any facts from proposition 1. I have shown that we can know and must know from premise (a)<br />

that something has happened to Chase/Sanborn and this fact is necessarily present, but his argument requires<br />

the absence of facts from proposition 1. Thus Dennett’s argument is logically flawed because we know for a<br />

fact that something has changed with Chase/Sanborn and this something exists, and his argument rested on our<br />

inability to know this.<br />

However, let us take his example and see what we can make of it. I have established that something<br />

has changed in Chase/Sanborn and that it exists. Let us now analyze what this something must be. Focus<br />

again on premise <strong>II</strong>: this thing that changed was either the qualia or the judgments of those qualia. What<br />

changed cannot be a physical event, for by hypothesis the physical system is completely unaffected by the<br />

changes in Mr. Chase and Sanborn. This thing that was there to be changed can be seen as the experience of<br />

what the coffee tastes like; I cannot conceive what it would be otherwise. I will show that whether it was<br />

the qualia or his standards that changed does not matter, as both are still in the realm of the qualitative states<br />

Dennett is trying to deny.<br />

Obviously, the qualia disjunct in question fall under the umbrella of qualia. What may not be<br />

apparent is that the alternative disjunct “change of standard” is also under the umbrella of qualia. For this<br />

disjunct to be an option, at some point Chase and Sanborn have to compare the qualia of the old coffee with<br />

the current coffee. How do they do this? They introspect, asking themselves whether this or that quale is<br />

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