Volcanoes - Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

AUCKLAND ENGINEERING LIFELINES PREPAREDNESS
A number of lifeline utility operators in
Auckland have joined together to form the Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group. The purpose of this group
is “to identify measures and coordinate efforts to reduce
the vulnerability of Auckland’s lifelines to hazard events
and to improve service reinstatement after a disaster, so
that the community is better able to recover.”
This group has undertaken the following:
• Volcanic hazard assessment: Identified
components of lifeline networks that are vulnerable
to volcanic activity, and estimated impacts and likely
recovery times (Auckland Regional Council, 1999;
Auckland Regional Council, 1997).
• Volcanic research: Observed and reported upon
the ongoing Sakurajima eruptions with the intent of
learning from other lifeline utilities how the impacts
of volcanic ash are managed (Durand, 2001);
Fig 2: Warning systems for the Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF). AVSN
(Auckland Volcano-Seismic Monitoring Network); CDEMG (Civil
Defence Emergency Management Group; Coalition of local authority
elected representatives); CEG (Coordinating Executive Group;
Provides advice to the CDEMG); EMO (Emergency Management
Office; Provides administrative support to the CDEMG); GNS
(Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences; national scientific
body responsible for monitoring geological hazards); SAG (Scientific
Advisory Group); TAG (Technical Advisory Group).
Have commissioned research which specifically
investigates the impact of volcanic ash upon lifeline
utilities (Auckland Regional Council, 2001b).
• Coordinated response plans – “Priority
Emergency Routes Project”: Undertaken hazard
assessment on major roads throughout Auckland
metropolitan area and identified roads least
susceptible to hazard damage (except where
impact area cannot be predicted). Roads of least
vulnerability that provide access to critical facilities
such as hospitals have been classified as ‘priority
routes’ which will be cleared or rebuilt first.
The location of priority routes has been widely
disseminated to emergency agencies and utilities in
Auckland (Auckland Regional Council, 2001a).
CONCLUSION
As the location of the next Auckland Volcanic
Field eruption is currently unknown, planning for this
event poses a unique problem. Auckland local authorities,
emergency services, and lifeline utilities have put in place
a number of preparedness measures; includng a volcanoseismic
monitoring network, a volcanic contingency plan,
and a number of research reports and plans that will aid
lifeline utility response and recovery.
These preparedness measures are intended to
minimise the impact of volcanic hazards on Auckland
and its inhabitants, by enhancing response to, and
recovery from, an Auckland Volcanic Field eruption.
REFERENCES
Auckland Regional Council, 2001a. Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group Priority Emergency Routes
Auckland Region, Auckland Regional Council Technical
Publication No. 145.
Auckland Regional Council, 2001b. Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Group Volcanic Ash Review, Part 1:
Impact on lifeline services and collection and disposal issues.
Auckland Regional Council Technical Publication No. 144.
Auckland Regional Council, 1999. Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Project, Final Report - Stage 1,
Auckland Regional Council Technical Publication No. 112.
Auckland Regional Council, 1997. Auckland
Engineering Lifelines Project, Stage 1 Report. Auckland
Regional Council, Technical Publication No. 116.
Durand, M. et al., 2001. Impacts of, and
responses to ashfall in Kagoshima from Sakurajima
Volcano - lessons for New Zealand. Institute of Geological
& Nuclear Sciences science report 2001/30. 53p.
Scott, B., 2001. The New Zealand Alert Level
system – its performance in recent eruptive activity.
Proceedings ‘Cities on Volcanoes 2’, February 2001,
Auckland, New Zealand.
Louise Chick (louise_chick@urscorp.com) is currently
a Risk Analyst with URS.
37
TEPHRA
June 2004