4 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
* Firing principal infantry weapons;
* Squad and platoon tactics;
* VC mines and booby traps;
0 Road clearing operations;
* Dayl~gnt reconnaissance patrols; and
* Night ambush patrols.
These recommendations were integrated into US ir-country training
programs, primarily at the brigade and division 1 1, although some battalions
were also able to train their soldiers in these necessary skills.
Levels of effort varied, however, as did the quality of training received.
One
of the most perplexing and tragic illustrations ef poor
training and leadership was the 1968 incident at My Lai. The Peers inquiry
of the incident found that the manner in which the l1th Brigade was activated,
trained, prepared for overseas movement, and deployed to Vietnam had
some impact on the events at So, My and My Lai.
the situation as follows:
The Peers report described
llth Brigade elements underwent an accelerated training
program, received a substantial input of replacement personnel
shortly before deploying, and eventually deployed earlier
than originally had been scheduled. Shortly after
* arriving in Vietnam, planned makeup training was effected by
another infusion of replacements (to overcome a projected
rotation "humqY) and by ea.'1!, commitment of brigade elements
to active combat ooeration:. 40/
As a result, the troops received only marginal training in several important
areas, including the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the handling
and safegoiarding of civilians, rules of engagement,
and identificaJion of
and response to illegal orders. Those and other training deficiencies were
believed to have played a significant part in that fateful operation.
3. Major Changes ipy Yraining, 1965-p 8
At the Honolulu Conference in February 1966, Army Chief of Staff,
Harold K. Johnson informed Secretary of Defense McNamara that the Army was
shortchanging certain overseas areas to increase training cadres in CONUS.
He added that because of the effect on the Str-tegic Reserve resulting from
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