4 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
indoctrination for newly arrived troops which
enhanced their orientation, acclimatization, and
knowledge of the rules of engagement.
Indoctrination programs conducted during 1970-1972
appear to have been ineffective. This was due in
large measure to the changing society and its
impact on the young recruit coupled with antiwar
sentiments expressed by the media and Congress
during the US drawdown. The services were slow to
acknowledge or recognize the changed situation and
to initiate remedial action. Training and indoctrination
alone could not be expected to produce
the desired results in combat; however, since
personnel policies often destroyed unit cohesion
through transfers designed to balance individual
rotation dates.
.LESSONS
Training, supervision of training, and teaching
subordinate commanders how to train is a command
responsibility which, if exercised properly, will
produce combat effective units. To carry out this
responsibility, field grade and general officers
must know their business and they must discharge
their training responsibilities aggressively and
enthusiastically.
Changes in formal school curricula tend to be slow
in coming and, therefore, are not always responsive
to the changing needs of commanders in the
field. Unit schools, or in-country training,1
therefore, constitutes the commander's best tool
for influencing the quality and readiness of his
unit. The quality of these schools is in direct
proportion to the experience and ability of the
personnel assigned to run the schools.
EX-5
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