4 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
Each new generation repeated at a higher level the
er -'- of the previous one. or, as John Paul Vann is
said to have put it, "We don't have twelve years'
experience in Vietnam. We• have one year's experience
twelve times o,,er."1 40_/
Or, as Lt. Col.
David 4. Holmes elaborated on the same theme:
Extended practical experience and rapoort wis;h
indigenous counterparts is -equired to develop an
understanding of the political/p-ychological character
of paramilitary operations, to maintain the quality of
leadership required to uphold appropriate cthical/moral
standards and to acquire the particular small-unit
tactical skills involved in counterinsurgency operations.
Counterinsurgancy operations cannot, therefore,
be conducted effectively using peact-tim-e'business as
urual" personne-T policies.
Advisors, key noncommissioncd officers and commanders--partikularly
at company and battalion level--
should not be subject to the premature ro* -tion caused
by the short-tour concept. Frequent rest and recuperation--to
include respites ir. the Continental United
States--should be used to provide the required breaks
from battle. The short-tour palicy, which often
produced command tours as brief- as si months,--A
undoubtedly contributed to ithe Instances of mnutiny,
corruption, dIuQ abuse ab-d•ea i- 99fva gging." It -so probably
reinforced th ticet-punching" careerist syndrome
still visible in today's officer corps. (Emphasis
added.) 41/
There can he little doubt that at an operational as well as 3
personal level the short-tour policy figured centrafly in the American
experience in Vietnam. 42/ The long-term consequences of the rotation
system on combat effectiveness were, accurding to Moskos, difficult to
assess. When US involvw.•ent in the war was on the upswing it )robably made
a positive contribution to troop morale and performance;
but during the
drawdown it heightened anxieties about being t.e last man killed in d war
the US had given up on, thus hurting morale, discipline, and, of course,
combat effectiveness. 43/
Rotation
policies contributed to discontinuity in command and a
unit cohesion.
By encouraginq weak l3adership and inexperience
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