4 - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
and indoctrination to a marked degree. Mistakes were indeed made. Efforts
have since been made to identify and correct the mistakes. Many improvements
have been accomplished, but since training and indoctrination are not
static, the Army's leadership must continu" its self-examination, revis;on,
and upgrading of training methods to meet present day requirements.
Threats change.
Many valuable lessons were learned in the rice paddies and
jungles of Southeast Asia. These lessons must not be lost to future generations
which may find themselves in a similar environment.
G. SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND INSIGHTS
The following useful insights are derived from the foregoing discussion
of US training and indoctrination efforts ouring the Vietnam War.
0 Despite many obvious shortcomings, the Army's training effort
during the Vietnam War was a remarkable and comprehensive effort,
accomplished without mobilizing Reserve assets.
. The BCT, AIT, basic officer, and the scores of specialist schools
in the Army training system were generally responsive to requirements
worldwide and particularly to requirements in Vietnam.
Lessons learned in combat were fed into the system, with varyong
degrees of success in lesson assimilation.
* Units that trained and deployed as units generally performed far
better than those in which personnel were assigned as individuals.
The "train and retain" concept, while more expensive than
one in which individuals are assigned separately, pays off in
results, and irn the long run may prove to be cheaper owing to the
higher calibre of trained soldiers.
* Unit schools are essential, particularly in a comba. zone, and
brigades or divisions are the best equipped to conduct professional
unit schools.
0 The key trainers are company and battalion cormmanders because of
their experience, proximity to the troops, and the nature of
their tact 4 cal responsibilities. However, these commanders
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