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4 - The Black Vault

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7. -V-W~ .<br />

THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

and other key personnel should have been the first to<br />

know of any act3 or incidents involving US or Vietnamese<br />

personnel.<br />

This would seem to be a clear ;-efutatinn from a source in a position<br />

to know, of claims regarding "war crimes and atrocities." However,<br />

Major Hays Parks, USMC, an expert on the laws of war notes:<br />

Only Article 3, com-on to all four of the 1949 Geneva<br />

Conventions, anticipated the then-developing problem wars<br />

of a noninternational character fought by or against<br />

unconventional forces. <strong>The</strong> resultant problem may be<br />

illustrated by the incident at My Lai wnere U.S. Army<br />

Forces on 16 March 1968 assembled and executeu several<br />

hundred unarmed, unresiscing men, women, and children.<br />

Despite the heinousness of the offense there was no<br />

violation of the Geneva Conventions inasmuch as the<br />

victims were citizens of the host country and U.S. Forces<br />

were present as an ally rather than as an occupying<br />

power.<br />

If even the worse assessment possible of the My Lai incident could not<br />

be construed as a contravention of the Geneva Accords, the IG finding<br />

in 1970 is certainly less significant that it at first seems. To<br />

avoid misleading information, some indication of the limitations of<br />

such measures as the Accords in the assessment of atrocities could<br />

valuably be included in such a statement. This extreme reticence<br />

regarding various 'problems' in Vietnam only serves to highlight the<br />

significance of the findings that the IG does bring out. See Major W.<br />

Hays Parks, "<strong>The</strong> 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1949,"<br />

in Naval War College Review, Fall 1978, p. 18,<br />

24. M.A.C.V. inspector General History 1964-1972, p. 30.<br />

25. See chapter 3 for a discussion of corruption in the context of Leadership<br />

and Ethics.<br />

26. M.A.C.V. I.G. History, pp. 56-7.<br />

27. MACIG Staffing Develepment Study, January 1972.<br />

28. <strong>The</strong> M.A.C.V. I.G. Hiscr" cites other reasons as well for this increase:<br />

a. Personnel turbulence resulting from the rapid increase in troop<br />

strengths.<br />

b. More freqLent visits to ;--its by MACV IG inspection teams threio'hout<br />

the Corps Tactical Zones. [<br />

4-48

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