4 - The Black Vault

BDM STHE CORPORATION
after the two world wars were anot being shot at, or killed or maimcd by
mines or booby traps. Whatever. political or strategic advantag3s were
gained from the US policy of withdrawing slowly (hoping to obtain a better
deal at the negotiating tab'je--whatever shape it
decent interval before the ultimate communist takeover),
this policy on the Armly we,'e catastrophic.
ended up being--and a
the effects of
The leadership task confronted
by Army officers became overwhelming when their subordinates eouated them
with the war effort, which as time went on became more-and-more manifestly
futile.
The war experience highlighted the developing problem of careerism
among the officer corps,
Similarly, it
a subject that has been discussed at length.
has been noted that the value.- and training necessary for
effective combat leadership are distinctly different than those required of
a commercial matiager. And yet the Army, perhaps as a manifestation of its
lo-.e-hate relationship with McNamaia and his "whiz kids," ,---s to have
moved
increasingly towards making the sU'•ls required of business leaders
those necessary for a successful militrry career.
Related to careerism and
this managerial ethic is tL•e pervasiveness of the "can-do" ethic. In some
cases, of which our Vietnam involvement ended up constituting an important
example, the Army and its leaders have to accept that it "can't do,"
whether this is because of military or political reasons. Somehow, too, it
must be internalized that it is not a sin to pass on bad news or even, wher.
unavoidable, to be responsible for a mistzike.
The Army as an institution
must accept that not even the best officer can actually have "zero
defects," and not punish those wh^ have the ethical fortitude or candor to
admit to being human.
More specific matters have also been discussed, each of which wls a
lump of sorts helping to throw the tire out of balance. The lack of unit
cohesion, for example, militated not only against primary-group identification
and ties, but against the creation and maintenance of a healthy
relationship between commanders and their troops. Policy changes in the
direction of rotdting units as a whole rather than individual soldiers
might have reduced this problem.
The problem inight also have been reduced
somewhat by extending the tour of duty, thuugh the net effect of such a
3-29