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PDF - Department of the Treasury

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IRS management agreed to consider<br />

alternative methods to forecast revenue.<br />

However, IRS management does not plan to<br />

use data that is more specific to <strong>the</strong><br />

initiatives, because it does not believe <strong>the</strong><br />

investment <strong>of</strong> time and resources needed to<br />

generate refined estimates would be a<br />

prudent use <strong>of</strong> resources. TIGTA does not<br />

believe <strong>the</strong> use <strong>of</strong> more specific data would<br />

require more effort.<br />

Report Reference No. 2005-10-159<br />

Security <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> IRS<br />

Homeland Security Presidential<br />

Directive/HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure<br />

Identification, Prioritization, and<br />

Protection dated December 17, 2003,<br />

established a national policy for Federal<br />

agencies to protect critical national<br />

infrastructure and key resources from<br />

terrorist attacks. HSPD-7 required all<br />

Federal agencies to develop plans to protect<br />

<strong>the</strong>ir critical infrastructure by July 31, 2004.<br />

The IRS timely provided <strong>the</strong> <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> <strong>Treasury</strong> a list <strong>of</strong> 19 critical assets that<br />

had been identified in <strong>the</strong> latter part <strong>of</strong><br />

1998, in response to The Policy on Critical<br />

Infrastructure Protection: Presidential<br />

Decision Directive (PDD-63), dated<br />

May 1998.<br />

Operational and technical controls for<br />

critical systems have not been adequately<br />

tested and prioritized. In addition, plans for<br />

correcting identified weaknesses are<br />

insufficient. TIGTA believes IRS<br />

management has been slow to accept<br />

responsibility for <strong>the</strong> security <strong>of</strong> its systems,<br />

and has not devoted sufficient attention to<br />

testing and correcting security weaknesses.<br />

The <strong>Department</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Treasury</strong> also<br />

required all bureaus to update <strong>the</strong>ir lists <strong>of</strong><br />

critical infrastructure by September 2005.<br />

At <strong>the</strong> time this audit was completed, <strong>the</strong><br />

IRS was still in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> performing<br />

<strong>the</strong> analysis necessary to identify its critical<br />

assets and expected to have it completed by<br />

<strong>the</strong> deadline. However, because <strong>the</strong> IRS<br />

does not have a process to regularly review<br />

its inventory <strong>of</strong> critical assets, TIGTA<br />

recommended that <strong>the</strong> IRS confirm at least<br />

annually <strong>the</strong> accuracy and completeness <strong>of</strong><br />

its critical assets list. The IRS agreed with<br />

<strong>the</strong> recommendations and will ensure<br />

corrective action is taken.<br />

Report Reference No. 2005-20-108<br />

Integrating Performance<br />

and Financial Management<br />

The IRS has made progress in improving its<br />

administration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Earned Income Tax<br />

Credit (EITC) Program. The IRS<br />

developed <strong>the</strong> EITC Reform Initiative to<br />

address backlogs <strong>of</strong> EITC Program<br />

examinations, minimize taxpayer burden<br />

during <strong>the</strong> audit process, enhance<br />

compliance efforts, and pilot a certification<br />

process for higher-risk taxpayers. The IRS<br />

also established long-term performance<br />

goals and measures to evaluate its progress<br />

in improving <strong>the</strong> Program, and appointed an<br />

executive to head <strong>the</strong> EITC Office.<br />

This executive however, faces <strong>the</strong> difficulty<br />

<strong>of</strong> holding accountable <strong>the</strong> functions that<br />

complete EITC Program work, since most<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se functions do not report to <strong>the</strong> EITC<br />

Office. The EITC Office developed<br />

Service Level Agreements that document<br />

12 April 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005

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