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From Vines & Middleton 2008 The institutional transformation of the OAU into the African Union offered new perspectives for Africa to take control of its future. According to all interlocutors, the EU has been the primary, most reliable and most generous funder of the APSA. The impact of the APF can be considered a huge success – and a successful political risk for the EU - achieved in a remarkably short period. Designed in some aspects on the EU, 19 the AU has nevertheless taken foreign policy integration much further and much faster than the EU, at least from a theoretical perspective. The legal framework of APSA, outlined in the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC protocol and the CADSP, 20 remains the most ambitious regional security architecture in the world, giving mandate to the AUC and sub-regional organisations to intervene within the borders of the member states. Largely thanks to the APF, APSA has started to become a reality: its regional ASF brigades are almost ready for action; interventions in CAR and Comoros were successful; mediations in Niger and Guinea prevented war; the AMIS and AMISOM operations in Sudan and Somalia are huge and important; collaboration with UN and EU is creating new synergies; innovative peace management approaches like early-warning, mediation and conflict management through the Panel of the Wise are exciting (even if they have not yet moved very far). However, the limited institutional capacity of the 19 The AU has a simpler control structure than the EU, without the different pillar competencies. The Pan-African Parliament, however, has very limited powers, and is not directly elected. The PAP has existed since 2004. The 265 representatives who serve in it are elected from within the national legislatures of 53 African countries. Unlike the EU, there are no economic or financial conditions for AU membership, so the divergence in ideologies is greater. The AU agenda and origins are more political and less economic than those of the EU. 20 Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), adopted in Maputo, in July 2003 Page 12 of 49
AU, the relative limited focus on the strengthening of the AUC/RECs relation as a key driver of APSA, and the fragility of its political consensus keep APSA weak. Nevertheless, there is no denying its importance, or the success of its first decade. At the same time, some of Africa’s regional organisations have also emerged as significant players in the field of peace and security. ECOWAS can claim success in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Niger and Guinea, and the 1998 Moratorium – now the legally binding Convention - on Small Arms is a seminal African experience. The MICOPAX intervention in Central African Republic is considered an ECCAS success. APSA’s success depends on the RECs and other regional structures, as well as the African Union. The notion of RECs as pillars of APSA is complicated by overlapping memberships, and differing roles in peace and security; and not all RECs are involved in the support to the African Standby Force 21 . Under the JAES, APF has evolved from a fund for PSOs, into the funding partner of APSA 22 under the logic and legal backing of the 2005 amended Cotonou Agreement; while APSA itself has the legal backing of the AU Constitutive Act and the AU Peace and Security Council. 23 Subsequent to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 25 March 2005, the JAES of 2007 sets out a new relationship between Africa and Europe based on a set of eight partnerships. The first of these is the Peace and Security Partnership, under which APSA falls. APSA has ambitions that concern both conflict management and conflict prevention within and among African countries. The evaluation sees that it would be valuable to look more closely at African systems of ‘conflict management’, which are frequently discussed in the literature in connection with internal conflicts: the role of States, traditional authorities and civil society in reducing tensions and avoiding violence. Using this shorthand, APSA might be more effective and less costly, if ‘conflict management’ systems were supported at the local level: ‘Conflict prevention’ involving outsiders such as the REC, AU or international community would not be necessary. Such an approach, which makes sense as a complementary measure within the APF, would require that the APF and APSA be fully implemented in line with the human security doctrine 24 . Concretely, this would entail that APF contracts should be signed with other parties than the AUC/RECs for such specific purposes and that a wider range of EU aid modalities are used in implementation of APF funds. APF has been fairly successful with low-cost interventions. In the conflict management area, the ERM stands out: 10 mediation missions were funded during 2010 and two additional during the first quarter of 2011, for no more than 6 months (the procedural maximum) and little cost. Using a ‘What If’ hypothesis for avoiding war, it is reasonable to surmise that several millions of Euros and the lives of hundreds might have been saved through successful mediations in Guinea and Niger. Among PSO experiences, the two Comoros operations stand out as APF success stories: they were short and effective, leaving the country stabilised after elections. On the other hand, synergy has been achieved on CB between APF and RIPs, as in the case of ECCAS, which has been very valuable to improve impact and avoid overlapping. The evaluation sees that an APF information and outreach strategy, disseminating Lessons Learned, could yield similar cost-effective benefits. 21 The Arab Maghreb Union cooperating with Egypt was initially designated to act as the regional organisation which would create and support the brigade. For some time, intra-regional differences prevented any progress at all. However, a new mounting body, the North Africa Regional Capability, has now been created to take on the role of the REC for Northern Africa 22 For this evolution see tables in the Executive Summary sections 1.1 and 1.2 above. 23 APSA’s structure is outlined in The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council Adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, 9 July 2002 24 The Barcelona Report “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe”, presented by the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, in September 2004. Page 13 of 49
Page 1 and 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMM
Page 3 and 4: Contents Executive Summary.........
Page 5 and 6: EASBRIG East African Standby Brigad
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy
Page 9 and 10: The principle of subsidiarity shoul
Page 11 and 12: econstruction, relevant capacities
Page 13 and 14: ‣ Areas for further study and que
Page 15 and 16: II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II
Page 17: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount an
Page 21 and 22: European Parliament and NGOs contin
Page 23 and 24: It is argued by the military bias s
Page 25 and 26: III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI
Page 27 and 28: 3) “Political appropriateness”
Page 29 and 30: ‣ EEAS, because APF finances peac
Page 31 and 32: The need to respond quickly to peac
Page 33 and 34: APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 20
Page 35 and 36: Second, the main APF programmes (on
Page 37 and 38: aiming at allowing a fast and effec
Page 39 and 40: mechanism, EDF has its own decision
Page 41 and 42: The costs covered by ATHENA include
Page 43 and 44: RECs that might not qualify or for
Page 45 and 46: IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIO
Page 47 and 48: At first sight, the Instrument for
Page 49 and 50: In the short term, this evaluation
Page 51 and 52: The evaluation recommends earmarks
Page 53 and 54: Lack of Synergy between RECs and th
Page 55: IV.4.4 AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES

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