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A similar impression emerges from funding for EWS: APSA requires the development of a fullyfledged Continental Early Warning System (and a concomitant process for local early-intervention when an early warning is given, which should mobilise EDF support through an ERM system at regional or country level). While PSOs are well-managed, the comparative lack of long-term strategic thinking for the rest of APSA within the AUC and RECs will weaken the long-term impact of APF if it continues to be implemented with a narrow focus on intergovernmental organisations rather than a wider range of relevant stakeholders. The 2010 APSA Assessment emphasised the need to focus on APSA policies, which are covered in MoU between the AU-RECs on APSA. 30 These policies may have been underestimated to the benefit of PSOs and military build-up. AU demands presented as APSA operationalisation, tend to see APSA pillars as objectives as such, rather than instruments to enable policy implementation. Such policies or corresponding initiatives should be the object of more targeted and specific APF support through, for example, the capacity building component (CB). Beyond the capacity building component, which should be granted sufficient strategic and political prioritisation, it appears that the police and civilian PSO components and training require more attention compared to the military side. A lot has been written about the operationalisation of the African Stand-by Force 31 and comparatively little about the other APSA pillars. The AUC is one key actor responsible for building APSA, but others exist. The APF should continue the necessary funding of the AUC and RECs but also consider whether APSA can be further strengthened via complementary funding of initiatives and stakeholders beyond the AUC. PSO funding may dominate AU requests to APF simply because the AUC is understaffed – notably the PSD which is very busy running PSOs, while lacking conceptual capacity. Actually, PSD is simply not able to devote the necessary management time for building APSA, and developing policies or doctrine. Nevertheless, the low ‘absorptive capacity’ that limits the growth of pan-African institutions might be overcome through deeper partnership. The analysis of Jean-Marie Guéhenno - former UN Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping seems particularly pertinent: ‘We have been used to balancing power with power, but we are ill-equipped to deal with weakness: fragile states may require military deployments of peacekeepers, but strengthening them or managing their collapse requires much more complex strategies, drawing heavily on civilian capacities. One would expect the European Union, supposedly the civilian power par excellence, to be at the forefront of this effort, and certainly well ahead of the US, which has often been criticised for a Pentagon-dominated approach. Yet the Americans are fast learning the lessons of their difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, and energetically building their civilian capacities. The Europeans, despite having set themselves ambitious “civilian headline goals” in 2004, are at risk of being left behind.’ 32 30 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Addis Ababa, January 2008. 31 The Stand-by Force suffers from a similar bias: its headquarters are dominated by military officials. Planning, training and operational exercises have demonstrated that military elements tend to be well staffed, while police and civilian elements are lagging behind. Training curricula stress the military aspects of PSOs. 32 Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s Foreword to Korski & Gowan 2009. He goes on to criticise ‘the unwieldy divide between the European Commission and the Council Secretariat in crisis situations’ and ‘the damaging consequences of excessively complex institutional arrangements, and of a dogmatic conceptual distinction between “security” and “development” issues that makes no sense in the kind of crisis situations that threaten fragile states.’ Page 16 of 49
It is argued by the military bias supporters that other EU instruments can fund police, civilian or mediation activities. IfS and RIP funds may be available, and NIP funds for P&S also need to be made available at the national level, but APF was actually created as a Peace Facility intended to fund PSOs, not as a ‘military’ fund. African critics of APF say that the current arrangement only treats the symptoms of African conflicts, without contributing to the resolution of the causes. 33 APF will be more effective – and its funding more firmly supported by its partners and stakeholders 34 in Europe and in Africa - if APF is able to show that it is strengthening the institutional development of APSA as a whole, rather than mainly funding the AUC/RECs and PSOs. II.5 SWOT ANALYSIS OF APF Strengths Generously funded, APF has become an important player in African PS politics. This has given AU and EU significant weight in Africa’s peace and security. Partnership and the JAES give APF and the EU a very strong and coherent political philosophy. African ownership is both a strong objective, and a partial reality (it needs strengthening). Good APF internal managers have developed creative ways to make inappropriate procedures work better and keep the instrument functioning. Innovative procedures in APF, IfS and ECHO have opened doors for future flexibility and efficiency. CFSP and ATHENA offer interesting possible new funding outside EDF or in complementarity with a ‘softer’ AP’. APF has broadened the debate and the commitment of EU MS towards P&S issues in Africa. APF has enabled AU MS to act on P&S, which encourages creative policies and instruments for supporting peace (some are still embryonic). APF’s position inside EDF allows to link PSO exit strategies with peace building and development, and potentially creates pan-EU MS synergies. The full range of APSA instruments will allow EU and AU to consider alternative conflict management entry strategies, before launching costly and unpredictable PSOs. Weaknesses AUC is developing lop-sided capacities, with only PSD showing real strength through PSOs. APF-EDF procedures are not fully adequate for PSO and crisis management actions. Short-term APF funding weakens the AU edifice, undermines AU staffing, does not build capacity, and diminishes the influence of EU and EU MS. The urgent funding of PSOs and APSA ’pillars’ has overtaken APSA policies: the AUC is instrument-led. AU staffing numbers under the Maputo organisational plan are not adequate for the ambitions of the AU; while the Maputo staffing quota is not even filled. AU management systems and procedures are weak – including the quality of staffing & recruitment - and APF’s CB approach has not built institutional strength. Short-term contracting misleads donors and AU MS, since PSOs are mainly managed by temporary staff that cannot build solid AU foundations or lasting institutional capacities. RECs have insufficient capacity, leaving APSA with weak pillars lacking political support from AU MS. APF in Brussels is too far from the action, especially from the numerous RECs: the role of EU delegations and RIPs should therefore be increased. Civil Society has not been engaged in PS in Africa (nor in Europe) yet CSOs are vital strategic partners. 33 Similar concerns were expressed, and a number of suggestions for the future APF were jointly approved, during the APF Joint Coordination Committee held in Addis Ababa on 4 February 2008; and again at the Annual AU- RECs Consultation on 13 June 2001, with G8 and other partners - Para 13: ‘While noting the progress made in the resolution of the conflicts facing the continent, the Consultation agreed on the need for continued and sustained efforts to consolidate peace where it has been restored, as well as prevent and resolve conflicts.’ 34 For example the Carlotti Report of the European Parliament expressed reservations about continued funding of APF by the EDF. http://www.jrseurope.org/Migration%20and%20Development/JRS- Europe%20web%20site%20LOG%20BOOK/EU%20documents/Carlotti%20report%20on%20migration%20and% 20development.pdf Page 17 of 49
Page 1 and 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMM
Page 3 and 4: Contents Executive Summary.........
Page 5 and 6: EASBRIG East African Standby Brigad
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy
Page 9 and 10: The principle of subsidiarity shoul
Page 11 and 12: econstruction, relevant capacities
Page 13 and 14: ‣ Areas for further study and que
Page 15 and 16: II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II
Page 17 and 18: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount an
Page 19 and 20: AU, the relative limited focus on t
Page 21: European Parliament and NGOs contin
Page 25 and 26: III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI
Page 27 and 28: 3) “Political appropriateness”
Page 29 and 30: ‣ EEAS, because APF finances peac
Page 31 and 32: The need to respond quickly to peac
Page 33 and 34: APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 20
Page 35 and 36: Second, the main APF programmes (on
Page 37 and 38: aiming at allowing a fast and effec
Page 39 and 40: mechanism, EDF has its own decision
Page 41 and 42: The costs covered by ATHENA include
Page 43 and 44: RECs that might not qualify or for
Page 45 and 46: IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIO
Page 47 and 48: At first sight, the Instrument for
Page 49 and 50: In the short term, this evaluation
Page 51 and 52: The evaluation recommends earmarks
Page 53 and 54: Lack of Synergy between RECs and th
Page 55: IV.4.4 AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES

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