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Regarding what scholars name “the conflict cycle” 25 , APF is open to help the AU and RECs to develop mechanisms to enable interventions at every stage of the ‘conflict cycle’ in the areas of peace and security: from the moment when the EWS picks up signs of a small conflict or the event that could ignite conflict, all the way through to post-conflict peace building and sustainable development – where EDF and the development-security nexus function. PSOs intervene in the middle of the conflict cycle, only if there is a failure of local authorities and CSOs, local police and mediation mechanisms, and AU MS governments’ own conflict prevention mechanisms working at the basis of the continental P&S infrastructure. It should be stressed that if national conflict management and prevention efforts prove successful, external intervention would become unnecessary. Consequently, a more effective coordination of all EU efforts at all levels, including RIPs and NIPs, and with other donors, is crucial for a successful APSA. On the other hand, it is logical to consider how the demand for PSO funding could be decreased if earlier and cheaper prevention interventions were privileged. Therefore, it could be also concluded that a stronger APSA conflict management might reduce future APF funding needs as a whole because costly PSOs would be less necessary. That assumption is important as, at present, APF Funding is largely consumed by PSOs not only because that is APF’s primary vocation, but also because the funds are available under APF to meet the high costs of peacekeeping missions. No other EU instrument is as convenient to fund certain military costs. In every nation, an option is to mobilise troops. Recruiting magistrates and policemen and coastguards for a PSO is more complex, due to their lack of availability. 26 Soldiers on the other hand, are instantly available and always keen to take on new challenges. Human security doctrine and state sovereignty both inform the legal and political framework of APSA: the argument developed during the 1990s in West Africa, according to which conflict is a development cost and preventing or managing conflict should therefore be considered a legitimate use of development funds is not the least important. The same conclusion was reached in Europe during the May 2003 Council debate culminating in the conclusions on Countries in Conflict and in numerous other documents. 27 The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was launched in 2003, emphasised the link between security and development both in Europe and Africa. 28 The same reasoning underlies the APF, the AU-EU peace and security partnership, and the JAES. Since APF is funded under EDF, the ‘security-development nexus’ is an important part of the intervention logic, supported by AU member States, and follows closely the doctrine of human security. The justification for using development funds for the prevention of conflict is both politically and legally very strong as it is fully embedded in the Cotonou Agreement that guides implementation of the EDF including the APF. The evaluation supports the underlying development-security nexus philosophy but some EU Member States and other European stakeholders including members of the 25 See annex 8 on conflict cycle. 26 ‘The EU’s “comprehensive approach” is supposed to ensure that the military and civilian components of overseas interventions complement each other. But struggles inside the Council Secretariat, the bureaucratic machinery used by the PSC, mean that, for now at least, the ideal of civilian-military co-operation remains just that.’ Korski, D & Gowan, R 2009: Can the EU rebuild failing states A review of Europe’s civilian capacities European Council on Foreign Relations, Cambridge, UK (Executive Summary) 27 For example : “Conflict prevention must be incorporated in cooperation programmes, since violent conflict rarely springs out of nowhere, but is the result of a gradual deterioration. Development policy and cooperation programmes are therefore effective instruments for dealing with the root causes of conflict. Their emphasis is on reducing poverty.” See also Commission Communication of 11 April 2001 on Conflict Prevention and EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/conflict_prevention/r12700_en.htm 28 The European Security Strategy considers that “security is a precondition of development”: A Secure Europe in a better world – European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2. Page 14 of 49
European Parliament and NGOs continue to question the rationale. The use of development funds was recently justified thus by the AUC Chief of Staff 29 : ‘… Of the many challenges facing our continent, the quest for peace and security is undoubtedly the most pressing. Issues of peace and security have always been at the core of the concerns of African leaders, for this is a prerequisite for the development of our continent and its peoples.’ II.4 APF AND JAES PARTNERSHIPS From its creation, partnership has been one of the key principles of APF. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is built on eight partnerships, replacing donations as the driving force of the EU’s long-term commitment to Africa. The first of these partnerships is Peace & Security and directly concerns APF as the AU’s primary partner for P&S. A JAES mid-term review in Addis on 14 October 2009 concluded that: ‘JAES needs to encourage more active participation and buy-in from individual Members States and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). It will also need to stimulate greater involvement of civil society and the private sector if the full potential of the partnership is to be realised. Likewise, attention should be paid to diversifying and expanding the resources available to the Joint Strategy in order to ensure that it has access to the funds needed to achieve its goals.’ APF came into the JAES P&S partnership as a flagship financial facility, but it should be assessed whether it fully responds to the needs of the JAES and the entire range of specific objectives outlined in the II Action Plan (2011-2013). The JAES and the Paris Declaration of 2005 reinforced concepts of African ownership, which had already been introduced into the APF with the NIP slicing mechanism. Nevertheless, even without NIP co-funding in the second APF, there is still some joint AU MS ownership of APSA and all the PSOs through the AU’s elected, 15-member, Peace and Security Council. Resources for the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa•EU Strategy (JAES) mainly come from the European Commission through the EDF. As said above, reluctance about development money funding PSOs might disappear if greater political attention was paid to the non-military aspects of PSOs and complementary actions involving conflict management and mediation actions. In part, this may also be a communication issue: APF instrument is not good in communication outreach or working with the relevant actors beyond the organisational secretariats in the AUC and RECs (inter alia civil society, specialised entities, research institutions, private sector or individual AU member states). The information contained in lengthy written reports is not easy to disseminate to stakeholders. The result is that the APF and APSA operationalisations are insufficiently understood outside the bureaucratic circles of a limited number of administrative services. In that sense, the increasing importance of ERM should be highlighted as essentially reactive. Its creation was an innovative move and it has proven a very valuable prevention tool. The weakness lies in the fact that ERM actions are not linked to any longer-term APSA capacity building or AU institutional building process, such as the Panel of the Wise. They are one-off missions and while the individual mediation mission may be a success, the process is not built into APSA and does not necessarily increase AU or REC institutional capacity for mediation. 29 Shinkaiye, Ambassador John K. 2010. Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa- EU Partnership, Chatham House Transcript, London, 27 October 2010. Page 15 of 49
Page 1 and 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMM
Page 3 and 4: Contents Executive Summary.........
Page 5 and 6: EASBRIG East African Standby Brigad
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy
Page 9 and 10: The principle of subsidiarity shoul
Page 11 and 12: econstruction, relevant capacities
Page 13 and 14: ‣ Areas for further study and que
Page 15 and 16: II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II
Page 17 and 18: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount an
Page 19: AU, the relative limited focus on t
Page 23 and 24: It is argued by the military bias s
Page 25 and 26: III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI
Page 27 and 28: 3) “Political appropriateness”
Page 29 and 30: ‣ EEAS, because APF finances peac
Page 31 and 32: The need to respond quickly to peac
Page 33 and 34: APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 20
Page 35 and 36: Second, the main APF programmes (on
Page 37 and 38: aiming at allowing a fast and effec
Page 39 and 40: mechanism, EDF has its own decision
Page 41 and 42: The costs covered by ATHENA include
Page 43 and 44: RECs that might not qualify or for
Page 45 and 46: IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIO
Page 47 and 48: At first sight, the Instrument for
Page 49 and 50: In the short term, this evaluation
Page 51 and 52: The evaluation recommends earmarks
Page 53 and 54: Lack of Synergy between RECs and th
Page 55: IV.4.4 AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES

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