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disbursement of funds and identify inefficiencies, overlaps and gaps that can be streamlined. This will allow APF to position itself more clearly as the primary partner of APSA. The box below illustrates this point with a case study where both RECs and the AU could have benefitted from closer co-ordination. Re-establishing a balance between the parts of APSA, making better use of resources allocated to the early-warning-early-intervention, mediation and conflict management functions. In the longer term, this may reduce the demands of funding of expensive conflict prevention and PSO interventions. APSA long-term policies and institution building have not received adequate prioritisation at the political level, perhaps hampered by the urgency of the need to fund PSOs. Key elements of APSA are not functioning as envisaged. Promoting cost-effective conflict management processes will strengthen AU and RECs as institutions contributing effectively to peace and security. NIP and APF. The evaluation recommends that the ‘slicing’ precedent of 1st APF should be re-introduced. By receiving an allocation from each AU MS representing a ‘slice’ of their NIP, the APF will bring greater African ownership to the Facility as the political will be generated from both AU and EU MS. This will involve negotiations and require commitment from all EU Delegations and AU MS. It will also strengthen AU member states’ ‘buy-in’ and link the AU officials in PSOD more closely to the political decisionmaking of the elected 15-nation PSC. AU MS commitment to APSA and to the AU can only be enhanced. A co-funding arrangement will free financial resources for the APF and ensure that regular and sustainable funds are available. That said, an issue needs to be considered if this option is pursued: What aid modalities and implementing procedures should the NIPs use to effectively support the regional aspects of APSA and specific peace and security-initiatives RIP and REC. APF coordination has been fairly effective with RIPs. Consultations with officials in the ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and EAC regions lead the evaluation to the conclusion that APF should focus on the AU and APSA, leaving the RECs to be funded by RIP. RECs currently appear well funded. The absorptive capacity of RECs may impose limitations to absorb all the financial resources at their disposal (including bilateral arrangements), whereas APF resources are over-stretched by the demands of PSOs. Moreover, APSA support should entail direct support to other actors than just the AU as mentioned elsewhere in the evaluation. Lack of Synergy between RECs and the APF Under the 10 th EDF a Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) was signed between the EU and the Eastern and Southern African Region - COMESA/IGAD/EAC/Indian Ocean Community(IOC). This is a grouping of RECs with many overlapping memberships. The RSP had two main focal areas: P&S and Trade, with a smaller component for Co-ordination and functional co-operation, making a total of €645m. €80m was allocated to P&S. IGAD took the lead in P&S. Responsibility is allocated to a REC based on regional capacity. Initially €5m of the P&S funding was allocated in the first phase, towards a ‘Regional Human Security Governance Programme’ led by EAC. None of the remaining funds have been used for to date, although IGAD has been preparing a programme on Maritime Security. Under the 9 th EDF COMESA had a component to deal with war economies. Pressured by outside actors, including the EU during the 10 th EDF, COMESA decided to do something on piracy. No research was done on this. The initiatives came from the EU. Page 46 of 49
Lack of Synergy between RECs and the APF Meanwhile IGAD already had a maritime strategy in place, and at the same time the IOC was under pressure to deal with piracy in the waters of Mauritius. Since the IOC had no capacity to do this they asked COMESA to take over. Individual member states were supposed to come up with additional ideas of what to fund in P&S. This demonstrates a situation where the APF has activities but struggles with funding, whilst the RECs have funds but struggle to find activities. The EU has funding instruments like APF and EDF, as well as IfS and CFSP, but struggles to define a coherent long-term policy into which they can all be integrated. Since the AU sits on the Inter-Regional Co-ordinating Committee (IRCC), it should know what the linkages are. Clearly a better mechanism is required for improved co-ordination, identification of activities, fewer overlaps and gaps. Instrument-led policy leads to poorly allocated funds imposing responsibilities on institutions that are ill-prepared to utilise the funds effectively. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/acp/dv/eastafrica_/eastafrica_en.pdf Institutions/ Instruments that could be created ATHENA - Africa Institutions/ Instruments that need legal framework or procedural modifications IfS Locating the APF after the 10 th EDF (2014- ) with possible funding sources UN UN MS Voluntary and Assessed Contributions, Military Equipment support to PSOs, Reimbursements to TCCs African Peace Fund Capacity Development Panel of the Wise Mediation Unit CB, ERM, ASF CEWS EWS AU RIPs NIPs AP EDF CB, Governance, Gender, Institutional Strengthening Centres of Excellence Liaison Offices, Mediation Streamlined Procedures Capacity Development Strengthening JAES Third Party Countries Centres of Excellence, Military Equipment support to PSOs, PSOs, CB, CDSP, CEWS, Governance, Gender Institutional Strengthening, Capacity Development, African Peace Fund, Peace- Building, DDR, SSR, Panel of the Wise, Mediation Unit EU MS Bilateral Fund Centres of Excellence, Peace Building, DDR, SSR, Governance, Gender CFSP AU MS and EU MS DCI ENPI Voluntary contributions, Military Equipment support to PSOs, Public Information, Liaison Offices Figure 3 IV.4.3 LONG-TERM OPTIONS FOR FUNDING APF If the EDF were incorporated into the EU budget (as some – but not all – EU MS suggest) then the funding of ‘military support operations’ would no longer be possible under existing EU rules, and Art.11 of the Cotonou Agreement would no longer apply (at least according to some legal interpretations of this hypothetical situation). Page 47 of 49
Page 1 and 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMM
Page 3 and 4: Contents Executive Summary.........
Page 5 and 6: EASBRIG East African Standby Brigad
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy
Page 9 and 10: The principle of subsidiarity shoul
Page 11 and 12: econstruction, relevant capacities
Page 13 and 14: ‣ Areas for further study and que
Page 15 and 16: II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II
Page 17 and 18: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount an
Page 19 and 20: AU, the relative limited focus on t
Page 21 and 22: European Parliament and NGOs contin
Page 23 and 24: It is argued by the military bias s
Page 25 and 26: III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI
Page 27 and 28: 3) “Political appropriateness”
Page 29 and 30: ‣ EEAS, because APF finances peac
Page 31 and 32: The need to respond quickly to peac
Page 33 and 34: APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 20
Page 35 and 36: Second, the main APF programmes (on
Page 37 and 38: aiming at allowing a fast and effec
Page 39 and 40: mechanism, EDF has its own decision
Page 41 and 42: The costs covered by ATHENA include
Page 43 and 44: RECs that might not qualify or for
Page 45 and 46: IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIO
Page 47 and 48: At first sight, the Instrument for
Page 49 and 50: In the short term, this evaluation
Page 51: The evaluation recommends earmarks
Page 55: IV.4.4 AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES

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