part 1 of the african peace facility evaluation - European ...

In that case, one possible alternative funding solution for the APF would be the CFSP - the only
budget with ‘military support’ possibilities - with additional complementary funding from DCI for the
non-PSO and non-ASF parts of APSA. Nevertheless, under the CFSP as currently constituted, Africaled
operations appear problematic and current CFSP procedures seem unlikely to support the EU’s
African policy based on JAES partnerships and increasing African ownership.
If the EDF were to be absorbed under the EU budget, the APF could only fit into the CFSP, but this
would be tricky, even with complementary funding from DCI. For the APF to successfully fit into the
CFSP, while maintaining the JAES partnership strategy and respecting the Paris Declaration of 2005
and the Accra Agenda, would require the Council to adjust the mandate and tools the CFSP.
The European Council is a core institution for the CFSP, given that it defines its «principles and
general guidelines». Under the Amsterdam, Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties, the Council plays the
guiding role. The European Council adopts strategy documents such as the European security
strategy. The Council uses different planning processes than the Commission, which makes
coordination difficult. The Council would have to carefully consider in what way CFSP regulations
should be changed in order to accommodate the needs of APF and APSA, in line with the objectives
of EU foreign policy and the JAES.
Moreover there are financial constraints on the current EU budget, which may not increase by more
than 4% per year. This limit may hamper the inclusion of such a large fund as the APF into the budget,
at least all at once. This might very well lead the Commission, the Council and EU MS to reach a very
different conclusion on the destiny of APF.
For this and other reasons, EU MS could decide that APF should be made a separate Instrument, to
be implemented by the EC. A new financial instrument with its own procedures, following the
precedent created by the Athena Decision, could take into account the requirements on African
ownership and African led PSOs as established in APSA. The DCI, EDF, CFSP budget, and APF
would then be separate. That would require a Council Decision, but is definitely an option to be
considered for implementing the EU’s Africa foreign policy and the JAES that is currently built around
the construction of long-term pan-African institutions (AU, RECs).
Whatever the main EU instrumental and budgetary decisions, the opportunity for AU co-funding of
APSA appears to bear no disadvantages. The African Peace Fund may grow and may even be
incorporated into an African owned APF or – in the long term – APF might merge into the Peace Fund.
The EU should study ways to advance these long-term perspectives. The ongoing EU-AU political
dialogue is the forum for these ideas to be explored by the JCC.
At this stage, the option of UN funding - following the ideas of the Prodi Panel – appears to offer much
less sustainable funding than the APF, but entails no apparent political disadvantages. A new
discussion paper is expected from the Secretary General in the course of 2011, focusing on
‘comparative advantage and collective security’ in making and maintaining peace in Africa. Following
the publication of this paper, EU and AU MS will have a chance to discuss the mechanisms both for
implementing and funding African PSOs and the various elements of APSA.
Ensuring reliable funding for the African Peace Fund or – if that is the political decision – merging
different existing and potential funds, create alternative possibilities for the EU to support the AU. The
African Peace Fund and APF could be combined. It may ensure that African countries make a sincere
effort in a critical area to development, and tentative political discussions in this sense should be
engaged.
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