part 1 of the african peace facility evaluation - European ...

disbursement of funds and identify inefficiencies, overlaps and gaps that can be
streamlined. This will allow APF to position itself more clearly as the primary partner of
APSA. The box below illustrates this point with a case study where both RECs and the AU
could have benefitted from closer co-ordination.
Re-establishing a balance between the parts of APSA, making better use of resources
allocated to the early-warning-early-intervention, mediation and conflict management
functions. In the longer term, this may reduce the demands of funding of expensive
conflict prevention and PSO interventions. APSA long-term policies and institution building
have not received adequate prioritisation at the political level, perhaps hampered by the
urgency of the need to fund PSOs. Key elements of APSA are not functioning as
envisaged. Promoting cost-effective conflict management processes will strengthen AU
and RECs as institutions contributing effectively to peace and security.
NIP and APF. The evaluation recommends that the ‘slicing’ precedent of 1st APF should
be re-introduced. By receiving an allocation from each AU MS representing a ‘slice’ of
their NIP, the APF will bring greater African ownership to the Facility as the political will be
generated from both AU and EU MS. This will involve negotiations and require
commitment from all EU Delegations and AU MS. It will also strengthen AU member
states’ ‘buy-in’ and link the AU officials in PSOD more closely to the political decisionmaking
of the elected 15-nation PSC. AU MS commitment to APSA and to the AU can
only be enhanced. A co-funding arrangement will free financial resources for the APF and
ensure that regular and sustainable funds are available. That said, an issue needs to be
considered if this option is pursued: What aid modalities and implementing procedures
should the NIPs use to effectively support the regional aspects of APSA and specific
peace and security-initiatives
RIP and REC. APF coordination has been fairly effective with RIPs. Consultations with
officials in the ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and EAC regions lead the evaluation to
the conclusion that APF should focus on the AU and APSA, leaving the RECs to be
funded by RIP. RECs currently appear well funded. The absorptive capacity of RECs may
impose limitations to absorb all the financial resources at their disposal (including bilateral
arrangements), whereas APF resources are over-stretched by the demands of PSOs.
Moreover, APSA support should entail direct support to other actors than just the AU as
mentioned elsewhere in the evaluation.
Lack of Synergy between RECs and the APF
Under the 10 th EDF a Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) was signed between the EU and the Eastern and
Southern African Region - COMESA/IGAD/EAC/Indian Ocean Community(IOC). This is a grouping of
RECs with many overlapping memberships. The RSP had two main focal areas: P&S and Trade, with a
smaller component for Co-ordination and functional co-operation, making a total of €645m.
€80m was allocated to P&S. IGAD took the lead in P&S. Responsibility is allocated to a REC based on
regional capacity. Initially €5m of the P&S funding was allocated in the first phase, towards a ‘Regional
Human Security Governance Programme’ led by EAC.
None of the remaining funds have been used for to date, although IGAD has been preparing a programme
on Maritime Security.
Under the 9 th EDF COMESA had a component to deal with war economies. Pressured by outside actors,
including the EU during the 10 th EDF, COMESA decided to do something on piracy. No research was done
on this. The initiatives came from the EU.
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