part 1 of the african peace facility evaluation - European ...

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concerning P&S strategy. In the latter area, PSD has not been able to dedicate much time or energy, since PSOs take up most of the Director’s attention. Devolution of APF management to EU delegations might allow faster decisions in accordance with the situation at field level: for instance, when extra funding is needed in a crisis situation. Currently, all EC- AU communications are made through the EU delegation in Addis, but there is no real involvement from the Delegations in the daily management of APF contracts. According to ECCAS officers involved in APF, this means RECs wait longer without appropriate backstopping, and in most APF actions they consider that, for operational/financial management issues, it would be better to have a more efficient connection with the EC. Because of the support that can be provided by EU delegations on the ground, the evaluation concludes that generally speaking, RECs would be best funded from RIPs, except for PSOs. EU delegations helping and funding RECs, would need some form of P&S military or security expertise. This can often be found inside the embassies of EU MS who have military and/or police attachés and some formal or informal arrangements might be found for EU delegations to benefit from their advice. III.2.7 EU-AU/RECS STRUCTURAL PROCEDURES PROMOTION OF SUBSIDIARITY 49 WITHIN AU/RECS The EU should promote the principle of subsidiarity in the implementation of APF activities. In the case of CB and ERM under APF, RECs should have the administrative management of these activities at regional level in order to improve the African efficiency and effectiveness, in accordance with the general directives and common strategy decided at AU level. EU DELEGATIONS WORKING WITH APF In practice, EU delegations participate pretty well when they have adequate RIP funds to create synergy with APF, but more can and should be done to adjust procedures in favour of subsidiarity. The evaluators, in line with the APSA Road Map (Dec 2010), recommend the following in order to offer APF new opportunities for flexibility and enhanced value for money: Implementation of EU support to the REC APSA mechanisms and/or APSA related policies should be deconcentrated to the EU Delegations rather than centrally managed. That will require P&S expertise within the EU delegation in Addis for AU (and others for the RECs) and also a substantial change in the communication and outreach strategies of APF. Financial checks and monitoring should be managed by the EU Delegation close to AU/RECs. RECs (ECCAS and others) feel insufficiently supported by AU. For most APF operational and financial management issues, a direct connection with EU through the EU Delegation would improve performance. 49 The subsidiarity principle is one of the central principles in the EU context, laying down that political decisions in the EU must always be taken at the lowest possible administrative and political levels, and as close to the citizens as possible. Beyond the areas where the EU has exclusive competence, this means that the EU can only act if it is better to implement the legislation at stake at EU rather than national, regional or local level. Page 38 of 49
IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON ALTERNATIVE FUNDING Stakeholders almost everywhere in the world describe the APF as an appropriate and effective instrument. Although concerns about limitations, constraints and shortcomings are raised, APF is almost invariably qualified as the best existing instrument for continental and regional peace building in Africa. The APF should therefore be seen as the best available instrument, but also as a tool that can be further improved. A closer alignment of the funding instrument with political will and policy priorities may make it a more nimble funder, more often reflecting the reality behind the three objectives of the African EU Partnership on Peace and Security (i.e. the II Action Plan, 2011-2013) and encouraging a more reasonable division of labour between AU/EU, their respective MS and other relevant stakeholders. It is important not to see the APF as an isolated instrument, but to keep it at the heart of the full Africa- EU relationship. Likewise, it seems necessary to engage a broader range of relevant stakeholders and better link political decision making with quick delivery of specific initiatives. In a sense, EU member states may be reluctant to re-open the debate on APF funding at this stage. However, the world changes and the EU has a different legal and institutional set-up, which requires some adaptation. More flexibility, more predictability, more differentiation among APF components, implementation modalities and direct beneficiaries as well as more fluid procedures, adapted to military-type operational funding (including the possibility to fund a wider range of military costs) would increase effectiveness, results and value for money. To make meaningful recommendations on how improvements can be achieved, the nature and scope of funding sources must be critically evaluated. Links need to be made between what should be funded and the availability/suitability of future funding sources, by examining whether the right activities are properly funded. Although the scope of this evaluation does not include a detailed analysis, AMISOM does provide an example of a funding instrument intended for initiatives whose political dynamics is largely determined by other actors than the funding countries. A lack of constructive strategic discussion and political decision-making (for example, between UNSC, IGAD and countries with a stake in the future of the region) leaves the EU and AU with a blurred political situation. This makes sensible funding decisions and planning for the best use of available funds very difficult. This example also reminds political decision-makers and technical staff of the risks involved in peace and security interventions as well as the requirement to use integrated risk management strategies, including mitigating measures. The recommendations below are largely based on financial information and compliance with expected outputs as well as interviews achieved during the evaluation. The phase II of the evaluation will provide an adequate and comprehensive picture of the APF, performance of the respective organisations, or ability to create and sustain value. Page 39 of 49
Page 1 and 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMM
Page 3 and 4: Contents Executive Summary.........
Page 5 and 6: EASBRIG East African Standby Brigad
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy
Page 9 and 10: The principle of subsidiarity shoul
Page 11 and 12: econstruction, relevant capacities
Page 13 and 14: ‣ Areas for further study and que
Page 15 and 16: II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II
Page 17 and 18: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount an
Page 19 and 20: AU, the relative limited focus on t
Page 21 and 22: European Parliament and NGOs contin
Page 23 and 24: It is argued by the military bias s
Page 25 and 26: III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI
Page 27 and 28: 3) “Political appropriateness”
Page 29 and 30: ‣ EEAS, because APF finances peac
Page 31 and 32: The need to respond quickly to peac
Page 33 and 34: APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 20
Page 35 and 36: Second, the main APF programmes (on
Page 37 and 38: aiming at allowing a fast and effec
Page 39 and 40: mechanism, EDF has its own decision
Page 41 and 42: The costs covered by ATHENA include
Page 43: RECs that might not qualify or for
Page 47 and 48: At first sight, the Instrument for
Page 49 and 50: In the short term, this evaluation
Page 51 and 52: The evaluation recommends earmarks
Page 53 and 54: Lack of Synergy between RECs and th
Page 55: IV.4.4 AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES

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