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part 1 of the african peace facility evaluation - European ...

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The costs covered by ATHENA include <strong>the</strong> maintenance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> operational headquarters,<br />

investments in <strong>the</strong> infrastructure made to support <strong>the</strong> operation, medical services, as well as<br />

‘Nation Borne Costs’ which include lodging, fuel, and similar expenses linked to <strong>the</strong><br />

mobilisation <strong>of</strong> national contingents. All <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r costs related to deployed personnel<br />

(allowances, salaries...) are borne individually by <strong>the</strong> State contributing to <strong>the</strong> operation in<br />

question. ATHENA does not intervene in <strong>the</strong> way each contributing State manages its<br />

operational costs. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> Special Committee may decide that <strong>the</strong> administrative<br />

management <strong>of</strong> certain expenditures, while remaining <strong>the</strong> responsibility <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Member State<br />

concerned, should be entrusted to ATHENA;<br />

ATHENA has shown flexibility, in that <strong>the</strong> mechanism has evolved over time: originally medical<br />

costs, transport etc. were not covered;<br />

ATHENA has been designed to become a very flexible, effective and efficient instrument for<br />

military operations in <strong>the</strong> field. It has <strong>the</strong> necessary legal identity to hold a bank account or<br />

property, to sign contracts and to be a <strong>part</strong>y to legal proceedings. It is not pr<strong>of</strong>it making. Any<br />

payment from ATHENA´s account only requires <strong>the</strong> joint signatures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> administrator and<br />

<strong>the</strong> accounting <strong>of</strong>ficer;<br />

Any joint action by which <strong>the</strong> Council decides that <strong>the</strong> EU will conduct a military operation, and<br />

any joint action or decision by which <strong>the</strong> Council decides to extend a EU operation, shall<br />

contain a reference amount for <strong>the</strong> common costs <strong>of</strong> this operation. The administrator shall<br />

evaluate this amount for <strong>the</strong> planned period – meaning that budgets are determined annually,<br />

which is not a definition <strong>of</strong> long-term ‘predictable funding’ as compared to <strong>the</strong> current<br />

objectives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> APF;<br />

ATHENA allows <strong>the</strong> EU MS to conclude ad hoc administrative arrangements with third States<br />

indicated by <strong>the</strong> Council as potential contributors to a specific EU operation, or as contributors<br />

to EU operations in general.<br />

This financial mechanism was established for military operations, inspired by NATO procedures, for<br />

<strong>European</strong>-led PSOs. Because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se features, ATHENA might be an inspiration to make APF a<br />

more effective and faster instrument to support PSOs. APF financial decisions might be taken more<br />

quickly. However, for A<strong>the</strong>na to serve as an operational model in Africa, substantial modifications<br />

would be needed to <strong>the</strong> original Decision. It should be also recalled that <strong>the</strong> APF has a limited budget<br />

for PSOs and that an “A<strong>the</strong>na-Africa” mechanism might be needed to replace APF PSO support, when<br />

or if, funding runs out. That said, it is questionable whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> EU member states have <strong>the</strong> political<br />

and financial interest to create such an additional mechanism.<br />

An oversight committee could be created for A<strong>the</strong>na-Africa (or A<strong>the</strong>na-APF), made up <strong>of</strong> AU/RECs<br />

toge<strong>the</strong>r with <strong>the</strong> EU and which would respect principles <strong>of</strong> African ownership and Africa-EU<br />

<strong>part</strong>nership. However, <strong>the</strong>se changes would not solve one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main problems for APF: <strong>the</strong> fact that<br />

most African armies lack sound administrative management systems. When efficient management<br />

systems must interact with o<strong>the</strong>r inefficient management systems, <strong>the</strong> interaction becomes inefficient.<br />

b. Differentiate between <strong>the</strong> various APF Components:<br />

The EU should separate <strong>the</strong> three APF components: PSOs, capacity building and ERM, to set up <strong>the</strong><br />

best decision-making procedures for each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m.<br />

IFS INFORMATION PROCEDURE<br />

In case <strong>the</strong> Commission retains its competence on APF, <strong>the</strong> <strong>evaluation</strong> recommends introducing <strong>the</strong><br />

IfS information procedure using written information notes from DEVCO to inform <strong>the</strong> PSC in Brussels<br />

and just give MS 48 hours to object, but without requiring written approval or any formal meeting <strong>of</strong><br />

Council committees or groups. This procedure is <strong>part</strong>icularly relevant for <strong>the</strong> non-PSO funding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

APF.<br />

Page 35 <strong>of</strong> 49

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