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IV.1 EU FUNDING INSTRUMENTS Funding Instruments in the EU are numerous and varied. An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages to fund APF from other sources are considered below. Each instrument is summarised in Annex 2. A detailed summary of available EU funding instruments highlighting advantages and disadvantages for the APF is given in Annex 3. Several possibilities for the APF were considered: THE STATUS QUO: The status quo: 100% funding by EDF under the Cotonou Agreement Art. 11 and taking full advantage of the development-security nexus is analysed in Annex 3.2. The evaluation team considers this the best option until the end of 2013 when the 10th EDF comes to an end, and probably also beyond that date. A higher degree of creativity may be possible after this date, to make EU funding better fitted to the needs of African-led PSOs. THE NEW EEAS AND THE CFSP/ESDP BUDGET The new EEAS and the CFSP/ESDP budget might not replace or offer substantial funding to APF in the short run due to legal and other obstacles (such as African ownership, financial capacity, political willingness,). Apart from the APF, only CFSP provides an opportunity of EU funding to certain military costs. This highlights the originality of APF. Annex 3.3. provides detailed analysis. It is too early to know how EU foreign policy will evolve, but APF should certainly become a part of EEAS policy-making in Africa as soon as the new service shows clear added value. The EEAS may slowly move the ideas of MS in the direction of a CFSP modification that removes (substantial) PSO funding from the APF. In exchange for a less direct influence over the use of short-term funds, Council could approve longer-term funding in order to generate higher impact and better results in support to clear strategic objectives; and this could be part of a process for bringing Council and Commission planning systems into harmony. Funding African PSOs under the CFSP budget is possible, but it would require substantial modifications. One operational advantage emerges from this option: in theory at least, it may be easier to create synergies if all the EU instruments and budgets are brought into a single policy-making structure. However, officials admit that systemic synergies are unlikely to emerge even within the EEAS: cooperation and synergy inside the EU system are achieved through individual efforts and initiatives as well as goodwill of colleagues working with other instruments. Many of the opportunities for synergy are created at the regional or country levels (sometimes when officials from Brussels are visiting EU Delegations in Africa or vice versa); others emerge in Brussels, but most often when the same Division manages different instruments. The EEAS should bring greater coherence to the overall structure of foreign and CFSP policies. OTHER PARTS OF EU BUDGET: Other parts of EU budget, including DCI and IfS (and even ENPI in North Africa), could contribute small amounts of funding in specific cases, but none of these instruments is designed for a continental or regional programme in Africa, nor for African ownership and Africa-led military operations. They are discussed in Annex 3.6. Both the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the CFSP are fairly modest in size compared to the EDF. Even though the CFSP has more than doubled in size in the past five years, its current levels of funding would not enable to handle an instrument such as APF in terms of size. Even the larger IfS is only one tenth of EDF size and suffers from a number of legal constraints. The Cotonou Agreement and intergovernmental structure of the European Development Fund appear to involve a series of advantages. Page 40 of 49
At first sight, the Instrument for Stability seems to be a potential partner for APF. Yet, the analysis reveals too many legal and procedural discrepancies to make this feasible. IfS has grown to be more valuable, moving from the small, six-month Rapid Reaction Mechanism to a substantial instrument with crisis response capacity and 18-month (extendable) interventions. But the restrictions on time, its global mandate and the impossibility to fund anything but ‘military’ actions give the IfS a profile that is very different from the long-term, sustainable, pan-Africanist APSA and PSO-oriented APF. However, procedural innovations are developed by IfS, which, if applied to APF, would make it a more flexible and efficient instrument. These are explained in more detail in Annex 3.4. THE ATHENA DECISION, The ATHENA Decision presented in Annex 3.5, offers EU MS an innovative military funding mechanism outside the EU budget. It could possibly be adapted to create an Athena mechanism for Africa. However, significant changes to the existing model would be necessary to ensure ‘predictable funding’ (Athena is funded annually on a needs-basis) and allow for African leadership. The Athena Decision is the odd-one-out in the list, used by EU MS to create a mechanism outside the EU budget, for European-led military operation funding on an annual budget basis. Its potential magnitude, flexibility and military components make it an attractive option to fund or replace APF funding of PSOs, but it may be difficult to adapt it to African use because AU administrative management and control procedures are still weak. However, the Athena Decision demonstrates EU MS creativity in responding to security needs. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM EU MS Under annex II of the APF regulations, when one PSO requests additional APF funds, the EC can ask Member States for additional voluntary contributions. This has been done in the past, as an innovation under the 9 th EDF (when eight MS contributed to AMIS). By their very nature, however, AVCs cannot be considered as ‘predictable and sustainable funding’. The fact that several EU MS have established their own P&S funds (Italy, Spain, Denmark) points to the political nature of support to African Peace and Security efforts as well as a certain reluctance among certain EU member states to put all of their eggs in one basket. Coherence and synergy should start within the EU. The existence of small, rival, bilateral APFs seems inconsistent, now that the EEAS has been set in motion to bring coherence to EU foreign policy in Africa. This is discussed in Annex 3.7. MIXED OPTIONS: It would be possible to cobble together a combination of EDF financing of ‘soft elements’ (i.e. nonmilitary expenses) if EU MS decided to abandon the development-security nexus and refuse EDF funds for PSOs. In this case, some ad hoc CFSP funding (for military hardware and/or big PSOs) might be possible. However, no EU funding instrument, apart from APF, would include African ownership and African leadership in military peace operations. THE DCI BUDGET The DCI Budget of €16.9 billion for the period 2007-2013, is more substantial than other CFSP or IfS budgets. The APF could be included if the rules allowed DCI to fund APF activities and APSA. Yet, the PSO part cannot be covered under DCI rules. Actions such as capacity building (non-military), mediation, Early Response Mechanism, early warning, conflict management and the Panel of the Wise could possibly be funded under DCI, which can offer assistance in post-crisis situations and to fragile States and fund international organisations. It is unlikely that such a change would add any significant added value, however Annex 3.6. provides a detailed summary of the possibilities for DCI and Mixed Options. Page 41 of 49
Page 1 and 2: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EDF PROGRAMM
Page 3 and 4: Contents Executive Summary.........
Page 5 and 6: EASBRIG East African Standby Brigad
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EU foreign policy
Page 9 and 10: The principle of subsidiarity shoul
Page 11 and 12: econstruction, relevant capacities
Page 13 and 14: ‣ Areas for further study and que
Page 15 and 16: II. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE APF II
Page 17 and 18: Item in the APF budget 16 Amount an
Page 19 and 20: AU, the relative limited focus on t
Page 21 and 22: European Parliament and NGOs contin
Page 23 and 24: It is argued by the military bias s
Page 25 and 26: III. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATI
Page 27 and 28: 3) “Political appropriateness”
Page 29 and 30: ‣ EEAS, because APF finances peac
Page 31 and 32: The need to respond quickly to peac
Page 33 and 34: APF MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING In 20
Page 35 and 36: Second, the main APF programmes (on
Page 37 and 38: aiming at allowing a fast and effec
Page 39 and 40: mechanism, EDF has its own decision
Page 41 and 42: The costs covered by ATHENA include
Page 43 and 44: RECs that might not qualify or for
Page 45: IV. MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIO
Page 49 and 50: In the short term, this evaluation
Page 51 and 52: The evaluation recommends earmarks
Page 53 and 54: Lack of Synergy between RECs and th
Page 55: IV.4.4 AFRICAN P&S FUNDING POLICIES

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