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Cryptology - Unofficial St. Mary's College of California Web Site

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248 CHAPTER 12. RSA<br />

12.11 Authenticity – Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> Authorship<br />

An important disadvantage <strong>of</strong> all private key cipher systems is that they do<br />

nothing to help solve the key management problem. How can we secretly exchange<br />

secret keys with people we’ve never met And how can we keep all these<br />

secret keys straight, let alone secret As we have discussed, a Public Key cipher<br />

takes care <strong>of</strong> these difficulties. To send someone a private message we don’t<br />

have to know them, or have met them, or have agreed on a key or a method.<br />

We just look up and use their RSA information from their Internet site.<br />

This leads to a problem: If anyone can send you a message, there is no direct<br />

way <strong>of</strong> knowing who sent you that message! It means little for an email to be<br />

signed “Bob” as anyone can type B-o-b. How can we be sure that the person<br />

whose name is at the bottom <strong>of</strong> the message really sent it With the knapsack<br />

ciphers this is a fairly difficult problem to overcome but with the RSA it’s easy.<br />

As usual, we’ll refer to the two parties exchanging messages as Alice and<br />

Bob. We will use a subscript A to denote “Alice’s”, so N A is the value <strong>of</strong> N in<br />

Alice’s system. Similarly, e B is the enciphering exponent in Bob’s system. Alice<br />

knows her d A but no one else does. Similarly only Bob knows d B . However,<br />

they both know e A , N A , e B and N B . When Alice sends a message to Bob she<br />

wants to make sure that only he can decipher it, and that he knows it is actually<br />

from her. So she writes her message M and then computes<br />

(<br />

M d A<br />

%N A<br />

) eB<br />

%N B , if N A < N B ,<br />

or (<br />

M e B<br />

%N B<br />

) dA<br />

%N A , if N B < N A ,<br />

and sends this ciphertext to Bob. (Unfortunately, while ( )<br />

M d eB<br />

( )<br />

A and M<br />

e dA B<br />

are equal, they may not be equivalent, that is, when working modulo N A and<br />

N B the order <strong>of</strong> the moduli matters.)<br />

Bob needs to be similarly careful when deciphering. If N A < N B , he undoes<br />

the e B exponentiation (using d B ) and then undoes the d A exponentiation (with<br />

e A ). When N A > N B , the order must be reversed.<br />

This is quite clever, and so let’s take a moment to see what each party now<br />

knows. Bob receives a ciphertext supposedly from Alice. Since he can look<br />

up her modulus N A he knows which order to apply d B and e A to decipher<br />

the message. So he can read it. Further, since only he knows d B , Bob is the<br />

only person that can decipher this message. Finally, since applying e A led to a<br />

readable message, d A must have been applied to the plaintext, and since Alice<br />

is the only person that knows d A , it really must have been her that sent the<br />

message. Alice can come to quite similar conclusions: Bob is the only person<br />

who can read the message she sent, and she knows he will know it was she who<br />

sent it. (Make sure you understand why she knows these things.) Finally, Ed<br />

the Adversary, even though he knows all <strong>of</strong> Alice and Bob’s public information,

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