Walmart-at-the-Crossroads-FINAL-06.04.15

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11. Warehouse & Food Distribution Industry Since Walmart has a global supply chain, the company requires a variety of transportation methods to ensure goods arrive properly at its stores worldwide. Walmart’s products move through numerous distribution networks via logistics contractors and warehouses located in various regions around the globe. Warehouses are usually located in logistically strategic areas, such as near shipping yards or airports. Walmart does not own the majority of these warehouses; instead, many are owned by different corporations that have been contracted by Walmart. Although Walmart supposedly controls its warehouse suppliers through inspections and regulations, each corporation, each warehouse, and perhaps even each floor manager has its own way of doing business. According to MWPVL International, a logistics and distribution consulting firm, Walmart’s labor strategy is to outsource warehouse management and product distribution to third-party logistics companies that often use temporary staffing agencies to hire warehouse employees. These temporary agencies do not provide workers with basic health and safety resources, holidays, vacation time, sick pay, or many of the other benefits to which Americans are accustomed. 404 Temporary workers have little job security and are often forced to work under extremely unhealthy and hazardous conditions. By using these logistic companies, Walmart is able to remove its trademarked name from accusations that it is mistreating workers. 405 Schneider Logistics and United Natural Foods, Inc. (UNFI) are two examples of Walmart warehouse and distribution contractors that have been found in violation of the most basic labor standards. UNFI in particular has also been cited for environmental concerns. The labor and environmental violations found within Walmart’s logistics and distribution system illustrate the need for a third-party monitoring system that includes workers and for increased transparency of its suppliers. A. Supplier 1: Schneider Logistics In 2012, Schneider Logistics operated two Walmart import distribution warehouses. One was located in Mira Loma in Southern California, and the other was outside of Chicago, Illinois in Elwood. 406 With almost 10,000 trucks, over 8 million square feet of warehouse space, and billions of Page !79
dollars in yearly revenue, 407 Schneider Logistics seems to be an excellent example of a model warehouse management company. This logistics firm has been named Walmart’s Intermodal Carrier of the Year multiple times, and, specifically in 2010, Schneider was honored by the Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Solutions Association as the best third-party logistics provider for its collaboration with Walmart. 408, 409, 410 Ken Braunbach, Walmart’s senior director of carrier relations, has even noted “the company’s overall dedication to customer service, operational excellence and ability to provide creative quality in the industry.” 411 Absent from all of these reported accolades, however, is any mention of how Schneider Logistics treats its workers. i. Labor In October 2011, California warehouse workers named Schneider Logistics in a class action lawsuit for the treatment they received at the company’s Mira Loma warehouse. 412 The workers alleged that they were “illegally underpaid, denied required overtime compensation, and retaliated against when they complained.” 413 Many “labored under a complicated and confusing piece-work system, didn't get mandatory rest and meal breaks, and sometimes were required to report to the warehouses but then were sent home without pay.” 414 According to court documents, “the Schneider facilities were fully dedicated to Walmart's business.” 415 In May of 2014, more than 1,800 people who worked at three Schneider facilities in Mira Loma from 2001 to 2013 won a $21 million settlement against Walmart and Schneider Logistics to compensate for unpaid wages, interest and penalties. Photo courtesy of Warehouse Worker Resource Center Page !80
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Walmart at the Crossroads The Envir
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Table of Contents I. Introduction:
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B. Supplier 2: Pilgrim’s Pride/JB
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supply chain practices have been re
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Labor II. Walmart’s Labor and Env
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• Handle, store and transport haz
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III. Overview of Walmart’s Record
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pay their workers unfair wages and
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energy consumption derived from ren
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V. Industry Reports Along with the
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A. Supplier 1: Monterey Mushrooms,
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C. Supplier 2: Giorgio Foods, Inc.
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2. Blueberry Industry Blueberries a
Page 27 and 28:
Table 2: Naturipe Facilities in the
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B. Profile: Wage Theft in the Blueb
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known for its devastating environme
Page 33 and 34: prominent supplier to Walmart, yet
Page 35 and 36: A. Supplier 1: Chiquita The United
Page 37 and 38: B. Supplier 2: Del Monte In additio
Page 39 and 40: iii. Environment In addition to hav
Page 41 and 42: 5. Packaged Salad Industry Packaged
Page 43 and 44: days even though he attributed this
Page 45 and 46: parts of their wages go to the empl
Page 47 and 48: Fred Penny is first vice chairman o
Page 49 and 50: product cost from wages if a distri
Page 51 and 52: A. Supplier 1: Cal-Maine Foods Cal-
Page 53 and 54: to roughly 10,000 cages in each bar
Page 55 and 56: no authority under the federal wate
Page 57 and 58: 8. Dairy Industry The dairy industr
Page 59 and 60: In 2010, the Obama administration d
Page 61 and 62: Nestlé’s issues with labor do no
Page 63 and 64: Walmart, including its subsidiaries
Page 65 and 66: United States. In fact, Joel was on
Page 67 and 68: cooperative joined the fluid milk b
Page 69 and 70: Another significant problem in the
Page 71 and 72: sectors. Common violations at poult
Page 73 and 74: during incidents at facilities in K
Page 75 and 76: the company in any of these cases.
Page 77 and 78: in getting the “Humanely Raised
Page 79 and 80: labor rights are violated. The adde
Page 81 and 82: chain. “Walmart has still failed
Page 83: B. Environment Besides troubling la
Page 87 and 88: i. Labor In December 2012, UNFI was
Page 89 and 90: money to non-profits “committed t
Page 91 and 92: Former Walmart President and CEO Mi
Page 93 and 94: 4. Does the price they receive, aft
Page 95 and 96: VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
Page 97 and 98: fact, Walmart’s business model ha
Page 99 and 100: 4. Establish a 40-hour minimum for
Page 101 and 102: Endnotes and Citations 1 “Our Loc
Page 103 and 104: 46 Stacy Mitchell, “Walmart’s A
Page 105 and 106: 89 “Memoria Anual Hortifrut S.A.
Page 107 and 108: 135 “Fresh Del Monte Produce, Cor
Page 109 and 110: 182 “Flowers Foods Investor Fact
Page 111 and 112: 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. 235
Page 113 and 114: 282 Ibid. 283 Dale Heberlig, “Off
Page 115 and 116: 332 “Tyson Fact Book,” Tyson Fo
Page 117 and 118: 377 “Seafood Statistics,”Statis
Page 119 and 120: 428 Ibid. 429 “United Natural Foo
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Walmart-at-the-Crossroads-FINAL-06.04.15

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