Walmart-at-the-Crossroads-FINAL-06.04.15

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VI. The Impact of Walmart’s Local Food Purchasing Policies on Farmers The local foods industry is a $4.8 billion sector.* , 437 According to the 2008 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, for food to be considered a local product, it must come from within 400 miles of its origin or from the state in which it is produced. Although still a small segment of agricultural sales, recent findings by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) suggest that there is a growing market for local foods, especially in metropolitan areas where consumers are willing to pay more for these types of items. 438 Consumers have been increasingly willing to support local farmers who sell through direct-to-consumer arrangements, such as farmers markets and community supported agriculture (CSA), and direct-to-institution partnerships, such as farm to school and farm to hospital programs. As such, grocery retailers are responding to the growing demand for local foods by committing to offer these options to their consumers. For example, 7 of the top 10 grocery retailers advertise their commitment to offering local foods on their websites. 439 While small farms account for 81 percent of all farms reporting local food sales, large farms (those with gross annual sales over $250,000) captured 93 percent of the value of local food sales through intermediate channels. 440 Reflecting these trends, Walmart pledged in 2008 to buy more local fruits and vegetables. In 2010, Walmart announced it would sell $1 billion worth of local food in the following five years from small and medium farms in emerging markets and double sales of local produce in the United States. The plan to increase local food in Walmart stores includes four main targets: - 9% of all food sales in the United States to come from local farmers - 30% of all food sales in Canada to come from local farmers - 50% of all food sales in India to come from local farmers - Local food purchases in China to come from one million small farmers 441, 442 According to Walmart, small and medium farms must be less than 50 acres to qualify for the local purchasing policy in emerging markets. In the United States, however, the food is marketed as local only if it is bought in the same state it is sold; there are no size criteria. * This figure reflects direct-to-consumer sales and local food sales through intermediary channels (e.g. direct to grocer/retailer). Page !85
Former Walmart President and CEO Mike Duke claimed the reason that the company was making these commitments was because, “We’ll grow local economies by helping farmers expand their businesses and get more income for their products. At the same time, we’ll make a difference across a range of environmental issues and ensure a more sustainable food supply for the demands of a growing global population.” 443 Despite such claims, many question whether Walmart’s commitment to sustainability benefits farmers or whether this case is simply another example of corporate greenwashing. 444, 445, 446 Given Walmart’s global ambitions, the impacts of its local food purchasing policy will be felt not only by farmers in the United States, but also by those in China, India, Nicaragua, and Honduras. A look at scientific literature and journalist accounts raises a number of issues that should caution against the claims that Walmart’s commitment to increasing local food sales benefits farmers. A. Walmart’s Relationship to Small Farmers in the United States* Whether a behemoth such as Walmart can “scale-down” to meet the decentralized and placespecific values central to the local food ethic remains to be seen. 447 At the time Walmart announced its Heritage Agriculture Program, it explicitly stated it wanted to reduce “food miles,” a convenient framing that meets both the concerns of many local food advocates and the imperative to maximize profit through logistical innovation. There is significant doubt, though, that this profit-driven logistical transition benefits small farmers, another segment of labor in the food chain. “The implication for farmers is that they receive inconsistent prices for their produce depending on whom they work with” The first issue with Walmart’s goals to purchase local food concerns scale. Walmart requires consistently high volumes of food to fill its shelves and keep prices low; yet, the company claims that it does not want to be more than 25 percent of a small farm’s business. This desire creates dilemmas for farmers wanting to grow to meet the company’s sophisticated logistical demands. 448, 449 Producers have also found that Walmart has inconsistent practices for buying local produce. Some farmers sell directly * Also see the section on Dairy for another example of Walmart’s influence on corporate consolidation in its food supply chain and therefore its negative impact on farmers. Page !86
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Walmart at the Crossroads The Envir
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Table of Contents I. Introduction:
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B. Supplier 2: Pilgrim’s Pride/JB
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supply chain practices have been re
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Labor II. Walmart’s Labor and Env
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• Handle, store and transport haz
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III. Overview of Walmart’s Record
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pay their workers unfair wages and
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energy consumption derived from ren
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V. Industry Reports Along with the
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A. Supplier 1: Monterey Mushrooms,
Page 23 and 24:
C. Supplier 2: Giorgio Foods, Inc.
Page 25 and 26:
2. Blueberry Industry Blueberries a
Page 27 and 28:
Table 2: Naturipe Facilities in the
Page 29 and 30:
B. Profile: Wage Theft in the Blueb
Page 31 and 32:
known for its devastating environme
Page 33 and 34:
prominent supplier to Walmart, yet
Page 35 and 36:
A. Supplier 1: Chiquita The United
Page 37 and 38:
B. Supplier 2: Del Monte In additio
Page 39 and 40: iii. Environment In addition to hav
Page 41 and 42: 5. Packaged Salad Industry Packaged
Page 43 and 44: days even though he attributed this
Page 45 and 46: parts of their wages go to the empl
Page 47 and 48: Fred Penny is first vice chairman o
Page 49 and 50: product cost from wages if a distri
Page 51 and 52: A. Supplier 1: Cal-Maine Foods Cal-
Page 53 and 54: to roughly 10,000 cages in each bar
Page 55 and 56: no authority under the federal wate
Page 57 and 58: 8. Dairy Industry The dairy industr
Page 59 and 60: In 2010, the Obama administration d
Page 61 and 62: Nestlé’s issues with labor do no
Page 63 and 64: Walmart, including its subsidiaries
Page 65 and 66: United States. In fact, Joel was on
Page 67 and 68: cooperative joined the fluid milk b
Page 69 and 70: Another significant problem in the
Page 71 and 72: sectors. Common violations at poult
Page 73 and 74: during incidents at facilities in K
Page 75 and 76: the company in any of these cases.
Page 77 and 78: in getting the “Humanely Raised
Page 79 and 80: labor rights are violated. The adde
Page 81 and 82: chain. “Walmart has still failed
Page 83 and 84: B. Environment Besides troubling la
Page 85 and 86: dollars in yearly revenue, 407 Schn
Page 87 and 88: i. Labor In December 2012, UNFI was
Page 89: money to non-profits “committed t
Page 93 and 94: 4. Does the price they receive, aft
Page 95 and 96: VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
Page 97 and 98: fact, Walmart’s business model ha
Page 99 and 100: 4. Establish a 40-hour minimum for
Page 101 and 102: Endnotes and Citations 1 “Our Loc
Page 103 and 104: 46 Stacy Mitchell, “Walmart’s A
Page 105 and 106: 89 “Memoria Anual Hortifrut S.A.
Page 107 and 108: 135 “Fresh Del Monte Produce, Cor
Page 109 and 110: 182 “Flowers Foods Investor Fact
Page 111 and 112: 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. 235
Page 113 and 114: 282 Ibid. 283 Dale Heberlig, “Off
Page 115 and 116: 332 “Tyson Fact Book,” Tyson Fo
Page 117 and 118: 377 “Seafood Statistics,”Statis
Page 119 and 120: 428 Ibid. 429 “United Natural Foo
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Walmart-at-the-Crossroads-FINAL-06.04.15

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