operational costs on the farm. This implies that any new costs incurred, such as repairs towater installations, were covered by the sale of their only means of production. Unless theyreceive cash injections in the form of grants or cheap credit, beneficiaries in this categoryare likely to grow poorer and their farm infrastructure will gradually decay.Despite the various constraints on the more enterprising beneficiary, productivity on mostresettlement farms could be enhanced if beneficiaries are given appropriate support. Thealmost complete absence of post-settlement support gave rise to dissatisfaction. Most of therespondents said that they needed training in several areas of production, such as financialmanagement, general farm management and herd management. In addition they neededagricultural extension services. No such support measures were in place. While advice couldbe obtained from agricultural input retailers in urban centres, access to them depended onaccess to transport. Many beneficiaries who faced continual cash-flow problems expressedthe view that if government gave them access to loans and other assistance, they would bebetter placed to improve their livelihood. In the absence of any meaningful farming andfinancial support, they found it extremely difficult to farm sustainably.A number of beneficiaries who were generally satisfied with their situation commentedcritically on the ongoing absence of proper leasehold agreements. In some cases this hadreduced their control over the land on which they farmed, particularly against outsidersand government.These factors contributed to what this study has found to be a low level of productivityper hectare. From this finding it can be concluded that household incomes on average arefar lower than what was possible on the allocated lands. By no means does this imply thatmost beneficiaries lacked knowledge of livestock farming. This study has confirmed thatmost had previous farming experience on communal land and/or commercial farms, asfarmers or farm workers. However, resettlement farms pose their own challenges, at least inthe short term. These being located on freehold land, the expectation is that beneficiarieswill farm commercially, but this is not necessarily achievable. Unlike AALS farms whichbroadly replicate and reproduce existing commercial farming operations and practices,resettlement farms are a ‘hybrid’ farm model straddling the commercial and communalmodels. This model has communal features where water points are shared and wherecommunal grazing results from the absence of internal fences separating allocations. Wherethere are internal fences, resettlement farmers can exercise much better control over theirlivestock, which increases their chances of breeding livestock for sale and succeeding ascommercial farmers.Against this background, it appears necessary, firstly, to review the minimum sizes of farmunits allocated under the National Resettlement Programme, and secondly, to providepost-settlement support urgently to help ensure that beneficiaries utilise their land fully. Itappears that cash-flow problems constitute the single biggest constraint on their ability notonly to maintain existing infrastructure, but also to invest in the acquisition of productiveassets such as livestock. A proper leasehold agreement, registered in the Deeds Office, shouldbe the foundation on which these support measures are implemented.122 ● Livelihoods after land reform: <strong>Namibia</strong> <strong>country</strong> <strong>report</strong> (2010)
6 GROUPRESETTLEMENTSCHEMESOfficially, the MLR runs 14 group resettlement schemes across the <strong>country</strong>. Half of themare located in communal areas and the other half in the commercial or freehold sector.Three, namely Drimiopsis, Skoonheid and Donkerbos/Sonneblom, are in Omaheke Regionand two, Westfalen and Bernafey, are in Hardap Region (Meliczek 2008: 11). As opposed toother farms where large groups of people have been settled, group resettlement projectsof the MLR are defined in terms of specific official membership and by the fact that somehave project co-ordinators appointed by the MLR. At the time of field visit, Drimiopsis andSkoonheid had project co-ordinators while Bernafey and Westfalen did not. (Donkerbos/Sonneblom is outside the study area.) Where co-ordinators have been appointed, theirresponsibilities are limited to the resettlement projects; they have little knowledge and nomandates with regard to individual beneficiaries who may have been settled in the campsof a farm accommodating an official group resettlement project. An example of such a farmis Skoonheid where nine individual beneficiaries are farming independently of the groupresettlement project on land allocated to individuals.6.1 Characteristics of beneficiaries6.1.1 Social categories of beneficiariesA marked difference between the group resettlement schemes in Omaheke and Hardapis their ethnic composition. Beneficiaries on the Drimiopsis and Skoonheid schemes inOmaheke are almost exclusively of San origin, while the ethnic origins of those on Westfalenand Bernafey are diverse, i.e. Nama, Damara, Owambo, Kavango and Caprivian. This is duemainly to the fact that Omaheke has a relatively large San population.The 1 200 ha Westfalen resettlement scheme was started in 1997. Most of its beneficiarieshail from the north-central regions of <strong>Namibia</strong>. Seven of the official beneficiaries indicatedthat they were settled there after their applications for resettlement proved successful. Oneperson stated that he lived on the farm without the MLR’s permission but then applied tobe resettled and was permitted to stay there.The 3 730 ha Bernafey scheme was also started in 1997. When the MLR bought the farm,the farm workers there were allowed to stay and continue cultivating the existing gardens.Livelihoods after Section Land Reform: B ● 6. Group <strong>Namibia</strong> Resettlement <strong>country</strong> <strong>report</strong> Schemes (2010) ● 123