Namibia country report

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Cabinet Minister who argued that the beginner or weaker farmers “should first start in thecommunal area, establish themselves there, and then qualify for resettlement”. Middle-classor aspirant farmers were left in-between weaker communal farmers and those who qualifiedfor an AALS loan. They did not want to farm in the communal areas and did not have themeans to buy a farm. “Therefore, a resettlement farm should be a place of empowerment,where somebody is put, not for 99 years but for a number of years, to establish himself andthen become commercial” (Minister W. Konjore in von Wietersheim 2008: 166). This lineof reasoning entails that resettlement farms provide the middle class with a cheap means toaccumulate capital.One must conclude that redistributive land reform is constrained by a resettlement modelthat focuses very narrowly on extensive livestock farming. For most of the land targetedfor redistribution, this is the only sustainable land use option, and indeed it is likely to benefitthose who want to farm with livestock. However, there are many poor Namibians who willnot be served by this model because they do not want land primarily for farming purposes.In other cases, planners in the MLR are waiving small parcels of irrigation land and largergame farms as the dominant resettlement model is not geared to crop and game farming.Little debate has taken place on additional options for resettlement and livelihoods onredistributed land. The PTT (2005a: 29) recommended that resettlement models be developedthat encourage beneficiaries to co-operate and accept joint responsibility for shared resources.Another possible model, entailing the purchase of commercial farms for communal areaexpansion, was rejected at a land reform workshop in 2001. According to Adams (2001: 2),an official in the MLRR said that “communal area expansion [is] unacceptable as a policyoption”. However, if the point of departure for successful land reform is improved livelihoodsfor the poor, resettlement models proposed in the past may need to be revisited with a viewto developing additional models.Apart from these concerns, the small-scale commercial farming model which was adoptedfor resettlement needs to be reviewed to establish whether it will achieve the formal andperceived objectives of land reform in its current form. For one thing, the model in itscurrent form is not likely to be economically and financially sustainable as allocated unitsare too small to generate sufficient income to sustain beneficiaries and finance depreciationand capital investment costs. To the extent that this is true, beneficiaries will continue todepend on financial inputs from the MLR to maintain and replace essential infrastructure.Apart from not generating sufficient revenues, the sizes of resettlement units make itimpossible for beneficiaries to ‘graduate’ from resettlement to an AALS loan. The minimumrequirement for an AALS loan is 150 LSU, which is double the livestock number that abeneficiary is able to keep on the minimum farm sizes allocated in the central and northernregions, and 50% more than can be kept in the southern regions.The final point on the current resettlement model is that it contains inherent inequalities.The minimum unit sizes in the south make it possible for beneficiaries to keep 40% morelivestock than is possible on the minimum allocations in the central and northern regions.36 ● Livelihoods after land reform: Namibia country report (2010)
2.7 Beneficiary selection criteriaThe selection of beneficiaries is a serious bone of contention in the land reform programme.The root cause of this contention is that the criteria for selecting beneficiaries do not includeany income-related criteria, which has resulted in well-off people such as PermanentSecretaries, Governors and senior civil servants benefiting from the programme.The National Resettlement Policy sets out three broad categories of potential beneficiarieswhich are defined by different asset bases: (1) people with no land, no livestock and noemployment; (2) people with no land and no income but some livestock; and (3) people withincome and livestock but no land. In addition, specific target groups were identified forresettlement: members of the San community; ex-soldiers; displaced, destitute and landlessNamibians; people with disabilities; and people from overcrowded communal areas (RoN2001: 3-5). The National Resettlement Policy also lays down other criteria, including: havinga background and interest in agriculture or other related activities on resettlement farms; andbeing prepared to hold the allocated land under leasehold and to adhere to the stipulationsof the lease agreement under threat of eviction in case of transgression (ibid.: 5).These criteria are so broad that it has proved difficult to apply them in a transparent andconsistent manner across the country. They are wide enough to give Regional ResettlementCommittees (RRCs) considerable space to recommend people who are not necessarily inneed of land. This led to land being allocated to people who might have been previouslydisadvantaged, but who have more than made up for that since Independence by, interalia, being appointed to well-remunerated government and parastatal posts. The currentGovernor of Omaheke Region, for example, has benefited from the resettlement programme,as have the Deputy Director of Land Use Planning in the MLR and other government officials.Beneficiaries of Bernafey group resettlement scheme in Hardap.Livelihoods after Land Reform: Namibia country report (2010) ● 37
Page 2 and 3: © Land, Environment and Developmen
Page 4: Leading the Fieldis a publication o
Page 8 and 9: AcknowledgementsThe three-and-a-hal
Page 17 and 18: 2 LAND REFORM ANDPOVERTY: NATIONALP
Page 19 and 20: Poverty in Omaheke.Poverty in Harda
Page 21: the concern was expressed that “i
Page 24 and 25: As will be discussed below, a numbe
Page 28 and 29: from Germany in 1907 (Werner forthc
Page 31: 2.4 Land reform and rural developme
Page 34 and 35: The Agricultural (Commercial) Land
Page 38 and 39: Policy (RoN 1998: 1). What defined
Page 40: The determination of a viable unit
Page 47 and 48: in Hardap criticised government for
Page 49 and 50: A farm in Hardap - enforcing privat
Page 51 and 52: The process from land acquisition t
Page 53 and 54: Herero traditional leaders ascribed
Page 55 and 56: Table 5: Institutions involved in l
Page 59 and 60: 3 REGIONAL CONTEXTS3.1 HardapSpanni
Page 61 and 62: Namibia as a whole has declined ste
Page 63: Plowing for crop cultivation at Sko
Page 69: Bernard bought a farm through the A
Page 72 and 73: All of the AALS farmers surveyed in
Page 74 and 75: Marketing channels for weaners in O
Page 78 and 79: The tight financial position of som
Page 80 and 81: 4.3 Typology of livelihood strategi
Page 82 and 83: he had about 600 in 2008. In additi
Page 84 and 85: The second stage of the ‘cyclical
Page 86 and 87: did not offer alternative land, but
Page 88 and 89: 4.4.4 The ‘broekskeur en vasbyt
Page 91: in town is too fast and one is not
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Table 9: Age and gender distributio
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Figure 1: Education levels in FURS
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Only two beneficiaries in the whole
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5.1.3 Settlers’ relationship with
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stated that they would be able to f
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cows of all three farmers were serv
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Table 19: Gross incomes of FURS liv
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stock theft there. The closest poli
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5.2.5 MarketingTable 21 summarises
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the remainder of the year, goats ar
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5.2.7 SkillsAlthough many FURS bene
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The most common crops grown were ma
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5.5 Livelihood trajectoriesBased on
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Previously a part-time farmer in a
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of the allocated unit, but the numb
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e accommodated by the National Rese
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6 GROUPRESETTLEMENTSCHEMESOfficiall
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Low levels of education further lim
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William did not really want to farm
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age, they decided that he had worke
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which was too far away to visit as
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Expenses for the group scheme farme
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phoned the MLR in Gobabis to send a
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they never learnt to save. They sho
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idea was to grow crops and sell the
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At Bernafey, 7 beneficiaries involv
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Housing at BernafeyHousing at Drimi
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6.3.2 Other livelihood strategiesBe
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6.3.2.3 Piece workWork on other far
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A shop at Drimiopsisshop as a livel
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When Alfons settled at Skoonheid in
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Farm workerLoses job / unemployedBe
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there. Instead, the MLRR advised hi
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the major issues identified in sect
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LaLR fieldwork at Bernafey.LaLR stu
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such external support was available
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formal lease agreement. Many people
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communal areas at minimal costs for
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study sample also complained about
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The National Resettlement Policy pr
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REFERENCESAbrahams, K. 1982. “The
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Namibia Agricultural Union. 2003. A
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Livelihoods after Land Reform: Nami
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Namibia country report

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