Hofstadter, Dennett - The Mind's I

Minds, Brains and Programs 364corresponds to a synapse in the Chinese brain, and the whole system is rigged up so thatafter doing all the right firings, that is after turning on all the right faucets, the Chineseanswers pop out at the output end out of the series of pipes.Now where is the understanding in this system? It takes Chinese as input, itsimulates the formal structure of the synapses of the Chin brain, and it gives Chinese asoutput. But the man certainly does understand Chinese, and neither do the water pipes,and if we tempted to adopt what I think is the absurd view that somehow t conjunction ofman and water pipes understands, remember that in principle the man can internalize theformal structure of the water pipes do all the "neuron firings" in his imagination. Theproblem with the b simulator is that it is simulating the wrong things about the brain. Aslo as it simulates only the formal structure of the sequence of neuron fin at the synapses,it won't have simulated what matters about the bra namely its causal properties, its abilityto produce intentional states. A that the formal properties are not sufficient for the causalproperties shown by the water pipe example: we can have all the formal property carvedoff from the relevant neurobiological causal properties.4. The Combination Reply (Berkeley and Stanford). "While each the previous threereplies might not be completely convincing by it as a refutation of the Chinese roomcounterexample, if you take all th together they are collectively much more convincingand even decisive Imagine a robot with a brain-shaped computer lodged in its cranialcavity imagine the computer programmed with all the synapses of a hum brain, imaginethe whole behavior of the robot is indistinguishable fro human behavior, and now thinkof the whole thing as a unified system a not just as a computer with inputs and outputs.Surely in such a case would have to ascribe intentionality to the system."I entirely agree that in such a case we would find it rational a indeed irresistible toaccept the hypothesis that the robot had intentionality, as long as we knew nothing moreabout it. Indeed, besides appearance and behavior, the other elements of the combinationare really irrelevant. If we could build a robot whose behavior was indistinguishable overlarge range from human behavior, we would attribute intentionality to t pending somereason not to. We wouldn't need to know in advance th its computer brain was a formalanalogue of the human brain.But I really don't see that this is any help to the claims of strong and here's why:According to strong Al, instantiating a formal pro with the right input and output is asufficient condition of, indeed constitutive of, intentionality. As Newell (1979) puts it, theessence of