Hofstadter, Dennett - The Mind's I

Further Reading 478Two other recent attempts to provide empirical grounds for dualism have appeared in TheBehavioral and Brain Sciences (with the usual barrage of expert counterattack andrejoinder): Roland Puccetti and Robert Dykes's "Sensory Cortex and the Mind-BrainProblem," BBS (vol. 3, 1978, pp. 337-376), and Roland Puccetti, "The Case for MentalDuality: Evidence from Split-Brain Data and other Considerations," BBS (1981).Nagel addresses his musings on what it is like to be a bat against a "recent wave ofreductionist euphoria," and cites as examples: J. J. C. Smart, Philosophy and ScientificRealism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); David Lewis, "An Argument for theIdentity Theory," in Journal of Philosophy (vol. 63, 1966); Hilary Putnam,"Psychological Predicates," in Art, Mind, and Religion, edited by W. H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), and reprinted in Putnam'sMind, Language and Reality; D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); and Daniel Dennett, Content andConsciousness. On the opposing side of the issue he cites Kripke's "Naming andNecessity," M. T. Thornton, "Ostensive Terms and Materialism," The Monist (vol. 56,1972, pp. 193-214), and his own earlier reviews of Armstrong, in Philosophical Review(vol. 79, 1970, pp. 394-403), and Dennett, in Journal of Philosophy (vol. 69, 1972). Threeother important papers in the philosophy of mind are cited by him: Donald Davidson,"Mental Events," in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, eds. Experience and Theory (Amherst:University of Massachusetts Press, 1970),,Richard Rorty, "Mind-Body, Identity, Privacy, and Categories," in Review ofMetaphysics (vol. 19, 1965, pp. 37-38); and Nagel's own "Physicalism," in PhilosophicalReview (vol. 74, 1965, pp. 339-356).Nagel has extended his imaginative work on subjectivity in "The Limits of Objectivity,"three lectures published in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (New York:Cambridge University Press, and Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1980), editedby Sterling McMurrin. Other imaginative work on the topic includes Adam Morton'sFrames of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) and Zeno Vendler's"Thinking of Individuals," in Nous (1976, pp. 35-46).The questions raised by Nagel have been explored in many recent works. Some of thebest discussion is reprinted in Ned Block's twovolume anthology, Readings in Philosophyof Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: