Hofstadter, Dennett - The Mind's I

Further Reading 471Jthese issues separate. Self-consciousness in animals has been studied experimentally. Inan interesting series of experiments, Gordon Gallup established that chimpanzees cancome to recognize themselves in mirrors-and they recognize themselves as themselvestoo, as he demonstrated by putting dabs of paint on their foreheads while they slept.When they saw themselves in the mirrors, they immediately reached up to touch theirforeheads and then examined their fingers. See Gordon G. Gallup, r., "Self-recognition inPrimates: A Comparative Approach to the Bidirection Properties of Consciousness,"American Psychologist (vol. 32, (5), 1977, pp. 329-338). For a recent exchange of viewson the role of language in human consciousness and the study of human thinking, seeRichard Nisbett and Timothy De Camp Wilson, "Telling More Than We Know: VerbalReports on Mental Processes," Psychological Review (vol. 84, (3), 1977, pp. 321-359)and K. Anders Ericsson and Herbert Simon, "Verbal Reports as Data," PsychologicalReview (vol. 87, (3), May 1980, pp. 215-250).Many robots like the Mark III Beast have been built over the years. One at Johns HopkinsUniversity was in fact called the Hopkins Beast. For a brief illustrated review of thehistory of robots and an introduction to current work on robots and artificial intelligence,see Bertram Raphael, The Thinking Computer: Mind Inside Matter (San Francisco:Freeman, 1976). Other recent introductions to the field of Al are Patrick Winston'sArtificial Intelligence (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1977), Philip C. Jackson'sIntroduction to Artificial Intelligence (Princeton, N .J.: Petrocelli Books, 1975), and NilsNilsson's Principles ofArticial Intelligence (Menlo Park,Ca.: Tioga, 1980). MargaretBoden's Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man (New York: Basic Books, 1979) is a fineintroduction to Al from a philosopher's point of view. A new anthology on the conceptualissues confronted by artificial intelligence is John Haugeland, ed., Mind Design:Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence (Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford, 1981), andan earlier collection is Martin Ringle, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on ArtificialIntelligence (Atlantic Highlands, NJ.: Humanities Press, 1979). Other good collections onthese issues are C. Wade Savage, ed., Perception and Cognition: Issues in theFoundations of Psychology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978) andDonald E. Norman, ed., Perspectives on Cognitive Science (Norwood, N .J.: Ablex,1980).One shouldn't ignore the critics of AI. In addition to Weizenbaum, who devotes severalchapters of Computer Power and Human Reason to an attack on Al, there is thephilosopher Hubert Dreyfus, whose What Computers Can't Do (New York: Harper &Row, 2nd ed., 1979) is the most sustained and detailed criticism of the methods andpresuppositions of the field. An entertaining and informative history of the birth of thefield