transport of dangerous goods and risk management - Kirilo Savić

ISBN 978-86-83059-06-5Editor-in-ChiefDr Marija VukićTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODSAND RISK MANAGEMENT"Kirilo Savić" Institute a.d.March 2011.

Publisher:"Kirilo Savić" Institute a.d.162705 Beograd-Voždovac51, Vojvode Stepe Streettel. +381 11 2469-147fax. +381 11 2469-514"UniCredit Bank Srbija" a.d. 170-378-44For Publisher:Prof. dr Miroljub Jevtić, "Kirilo Savić" Institute, BelgradeEditor-in-Chief:Dr Marija Vukić, "Kirilo Savić" Institute, BelgradeTechnical arrangement:Dr Marija Vukić, "Kirilo Savić" Institute, BelgradeMiodrag Mandušić, "Kirilo Savić" Institute, BelgradeCover design:Miodrag Mandušić, "Kirilo Savić" Institute, BelgradeInternational Editors:Prof. dr Nikola PanovFaculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Skopje, FYR MacedoniaDr Medžid MuhasilovićEPFL, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Laboratoire pourIngenieurie Numerique - LIN STI ISE, Lausanne, SwissReviewers:PhD Nedžad BrankovićFaculty of Transport and Traffic Engineering, Sarajevo, BIHPhD Dušan SakulskiUnited Nations University- UNU-EHS, Institute for Environment andHuman Security- Bones, GermanyCopies:200Printed by:KVARK, Kraljevo

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODSAND RISK MANAGEMENTINTERNATIONAL THEMATIC ISSUENo.1"Kirilo Savić" Institute a.d.

INTERNATIONAL THEMATIC ISSUE No. 1dedicated to Second international scientific conferenceTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENTTOMUR 2010Scientific CommitteeDr Marija VukićDr Miloš JelićDr Tomislav JovanovićProf. Dr Bojan ZrnićDoc. dr Zoran RajićProf. dr Dragoljub VujićDr Mirko BorisovProf. dr Goran MiloševićDoc. dr Dragan MlađanProf. dr Radovan RadovanovićProf. dr Boban MilojkovićProf. dr Slavica VučinićDoc. dr Nenad DimitrijevićProf. dr Ozren DžigurskiProf. dr Vojkan JovanovićProf. dr Nikola PanovProf. dr Nedžad BrankovićDoc. dr Dušan SakulskiDr Ištvan ValkarDr Medžid MuhasilovićDr Miljenko MartićProf. dr Snežana ŠtetićOrganizers of meeting„KIRILO SAVIĆ“ INSTITUTEMILITARY TECHNICALINSTITUTEMILITARY GEOGRAPHICALINSTITUTEACADEMY OF CRIMINALISTICAND POLICE STUDIESSupport:Ministry of Interior, RSMinistry of Defence, RSBelgrade Chamber of Commerce, Association of transport and telecommunicationsPlace of meeting: "Kirilo Savić" Institute a.d. Belgrade30-31.03.2010.

EDITORIALLand transport Pan- European corridor X intersects waterway corridor VII in the Republicof Serbia because of its ideal geographic location.For that reason, Republic of Serbia has a genuine commitment to make contribution,through many ways of regional cooperation, to solving problems that occur in previouslymentioned international traffic corridors on its territory, in which the problem of risk incase of emergency during the hazardous materials transportation is included.Research analysis of overloading the area of the Republic of Serbia with technicallytechnologicalaccidents with hazardous materials, which was conducted in Belgrade jointstock institute “Kirilo Savić” based on relevant information on firemen’s intervention, hasshown that there were 448 uncommon events with hazardous materials, in whichintervened 2044 firemen. 105 interventions were made in the open space and 114interventions on buildings (production facilities, warehouses, distributional and otherobjects). 229 interventions were made on traffic vehicles (road traffic – 109 interventions;railroad traffic – 113 interventions; airline traffic- 4 interventions and waterway traffic- 3interventions). Listed data indicate that for incidents with hazardous materials ontransportation infrastructure go 51% of all registered uncommon events, that leads us tothe conclusion that systematic approach to solving this problem in various areas of life isnecessary: from improving transportation infrastructure and vehicles to majorparticipation of science and use of contemporary technology in human and humanenvironment security areas.In purpose of improving regional cooperation in the area of solving problems concerninguncommon events during hazardous materials transport and more effective proactiveresponse to risks of this kind, joint stock institute “Kirilo Savić”, together with Scientific-Research Organizations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia(Academy of criminalistic and police studies) and Ministry of Defence (Military Technicaland Military Geographical Institute) is organizing for the second time the internationalscientific and professional conference „Transportation of hazardous materials and riskmanagement- TOMUR 2010“.This year, 79 researchers and experts from 11 countries took part in the Conference (59from Serbia and 20 from abroad) with two plenary lectures by invitation and 30 sectionalreports. Abstracts of all the writings are presented in electronic form (“Book ofAbstracts”) and 18 selected writings were completely printed in this thematic collection ofinternational importance.Selected works are the result of scientific research projects in the region, scientificresearches that resulted in defence of doctoral thesis of the conference participants orinternational cooperation of certain explorers.

In these writings are shown the results that contribute to: faster identification ofhazardous materials; effective qualification and characterization of hazardous materialsin the process of preparing for safe transport; predicting the chain of events in a tunnel incase of fire; integrated risk estimation during hazardous materials transport on the roadcorridor; quick detection and information about chemical accident on waterways andground transport infrastructure; establishing models and informational systems formanaging multimodal transport of hazardous materials and inter-departmentcoordination in emergencies; use of contemporary informational and communicationaltechnology in function of human security concepts realization in hazardous materialstransport zone; realizing the importance of information interoperability and safety inemergency; use of contemporary architecture GIS for making maps with optimal routsfor hazardous materials transport; realizing the importance of legal and security aspectof engaging intervention units in emergency.Selected works are important for the fact that presented results and experiences of theresearchers contribute to improving prevention system, risk and proactive response toemergency estimation during harmful materials transport. Certain authors offer evenoriginal technological solutions, developed models and informational systems necessaryfor establishing National situational centres for managing emergencies in certain ways ofhazardous materials transport and in multimodal transport, which is the priority of thecountries in the region.As the editor of this monographic publication i want to express my satisfaction withquality results of researchers in the region in the domain of prevention, risk estimationand proactive response to emergency, as well as the expectation of having importantresearch results in the domain of reparation of consequences of chemical accident inhazardous materials transport on the next conference “TOMUR 2011”.In the end, as the chairperson of the Scientific Committee, I wish to thank to allorganizers, members of Organizing and Scientific Committee of the conference, authorsof writings, consultants, reviewers, and specially to international reviewers of writingsfrom this collection, professor PhD Nedžad Branković (Faculty of Transport and TrafficEngineering, Sarajevo, BIH) and assistant professor PhD Dušan Sakulski (UnitedNations University- UNU-EHS, Institute for Environment and Human Security- Bones,Germany).EditorBelgrade,April 2010.PhD Marija Vukić,Senior Scientific Associate

Contents:INTEGRATED MODEL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENTOF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT ANDINTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONSMarija Vukic, Vladanka Presburger – Ulnikovic, Djukan Vukic, Uros Spruk ................................... 1CLASSIFICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF WASTE OIL IN THEFUNCTION OF SAFE TRANSPORTVladica Čudić, Predrag Petrović ....................................................................................................... 41THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATIONOF WASTE FROM VESSELS FUNCTIONING AS SAFE MULTIMODALTRANSPORTMarija Vukić, Ivana Kunc, Vladanka Presburger - Ulniković .......................................................... 48THE MODEL AND SLEDAT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR EARLYDETECTION OF CHEMICAL ACCIDENTS ON WATERWAYSMarija Vukic, Vojislav Rapajic, Radovan Stetin, Miroljub Jevtic, Uros Spruk, SnezanaMrmak ............................................................................................................................................... 84INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENTS METHODOLOGY OF TRANSPORT OFEXPLOSIVES ALONG THE CORRIDOR 10Zoran Keković, Nenad Komazec, Goran Glišić ............................................................................. 102IMPORTANCE OF REAL-CASE RESULTS FOR COMPUTATIONALINVESTIGATION OF TUNNEL-FIREMedzid Muhasilovic, J. Modic, M. O. Deville, J. Duhovnik ......................................................... 113INTEROPERABILITY AND SECURITY OF INFORMATION IN EMERGENCYSITUATIONSMiodrag Brzaković ......................................................................................................................... 132ROADWORTHINESS – AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN TRANSPORT OFDANGEROUS SUBSTANCESNikola V. Radovanović, Radovan V. Radovanović, Lazar D. Petrović, Ivana L. Petrović,Marijana M. Radovanović .............................................................................................................. 143

LEGAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF ENGAGEMENT OF THE MINISTRYOF INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN EMERGENCYSITUATIONSMarija D. Blagojevic, Zeljko Nikac ................................................................................................ 151THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT)AS A FUNCTION OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT REALIZATION IN ADANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORTATION AREADjordjević Ivica, Dzigurski Ozren ................................................................................................. 162THE MODERN ARCHITECTURE OF GIS AND CARTOGRAPHIC KEY ATTHE ENVIRONMENT OF WEB MAP SERVER FOR DETERMINATIONSAFETY ROUTS IN TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCIESMirko Borisov, Radoje Bankovic, Sinisa Drobnjak, Milos Jelic, Tomislav Jovanovic,Snezana Urosevic ............................................................................................................................ 175THE USE OF GIS TECHNOLOGY IN MONITORING OF TRANSPORT OFDANGEROUS SUBSTANCESDragoljub Sekulovic, Nenad Dimitrijevic, Ljubomir Gigovic ....................................................... 194TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE REGARDING CORRECTDETERMINING OF HAZARD DIVISION AND STORAGE COMPATIBILITYGROUPSZoran Bajić, Radun Jeremić, Radenko Dimitrijević ....................................................................... 203A MODEL OF A TRANSPORT COMPANY CHOICE FOR TRANSPORT OFDANGEROUS GOODS IN THE SERBIAN ARMYBoban Djorovic, Nenad Dimitrijevic, Srdjan Dimic ...................................................................... 210SAFE RAILWAY TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES -APPLICATION OF OLD AND NEW REGULATIONSGordana Andjelic ............................................................................................................................ 221MANAGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF TRAINING FOR WORK ON THE SHIPSCARRYING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESDragan Trifkovic, Radosav Nikolic, Svetislav Soskic, Ivana Atanasovska ................................... 227ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM AS A GROWING THREAT TO THEWORLD?Dejana Dimitrijevic......................................................................................................................... 240INTERPRETING/TRANSLATING – THE CASE OF ENGLISH V. SERBIANZoran Pavlovic ................................................................................................................................ 249

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1UDK:656.073.436:620.26351.777.5(497.11)INTEGRATED MODEL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUSSUBSTANCES MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT AND INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION INEMERGENCY SITUATIONS-A PLENARY LECTURE ON INVITATION-1 Marija Vukic, 2 Vladanka Presburger – Ulnikovic, 3 DJukan Vukic, 4 Uros Spruk1 ”Kirilo Savic” Institute, 51 Vojvode Stepe St., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia2 Union University, Faculty of Ecology and Environmental Sciences, 62-64 Cara Dusana St., 11000 Belgrade,Serbia3 Belgrade University,Agrifaculty, 6 Nemanjina Sreet, 11080 Zemun - Belgrade, Serbia4 USCOM, Ljubljana, SloveniaAbstract: An original integrated model for management of waste from the vessels on the waterways of the Republicof Serbia has been developed as a part of technological development project TR 21-037 1 . The model includes thesub-models for reception of solid and liquid waste from the vessel exploitation and the remains of the freight andthe further transport by road or railway infrastructure to the final sites for their treatment or disposal. The first partof the paper shows sub-models with the procedures for handling the stated hazardous waste in the port, preparationand marking (in accordance with the relevant national and foreign regulationss), with the aim of conducting the safetransport of hazardous freight. Integration of the developed sub-models provides the basis for establishment ofinformation system for monitoring the vehicles, for management of hazardous goods flow (i.e. multimodal transportof hazardous substances) and inter-departmental coordination in case of accident. In the process of modeldevelopment, it has been noted that implementation of safe and efficient procedures becomes somewhat difficult,even in case of routine operations in transport, if organizations cooperating in the procedure implementation do notinter-communicate systematically. The problem is even more pronounced in case of emergency situations caused bythe accident during the transport of hazardous waste from the vessel and of hazardous freight in general.Key words: hazardous substances, multimodal transport, risk management, management models, framework,linking of elements, information system, interdepartmental communication, data exchange, sending the documents.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2INTRODUCTIONThe primary goal of technological development project research is dealing with problems arising from vesselexploitation waste substances.The data from scientific references indicate that there are certain results from fragmentary research , which arechiefly related to the categorization of vessel waste substances, the environmental consequences of their outflowinto the water stream and the preparation of Plans for vessel waste substances management. However, the results ofsystematic and comprehensive scientific-research approach to the solution to the above mention problem aremissing. The European project WANDA (initiated by Austrian Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology)includes the development of system models for collecting ship waste for internal sailing (from 2007 to 2013)with the participation of the Danube valley countries. For that reason, the Danube Commission wants all theinterested Danube valley countries to send their suggestions as for the solution to this urgent problem of thenavigation corridor VII and send their experts to take an active part in meetings ‘Ship Exploitation Waste’ that areorganized in Budapest each year.The researches of technological development project have been Serbian representatives in these meeting in the lasttwo years, where three papers with projects findings were presented. Attending these meetings enabled us to put theresults of the technological development project at disposal to the international expert group and regional countries.Serbian Government Project (TR-21037) is more comprehensive projects than the European project and it involvesthe management of all types of ship waste substances and of the management of all activities, from theannouncement of waste substances transfer by the navigator to their acceptance, treatment, storage or disposal atriver terminal locations, industrial facilities or river bank waste piles. Besides, our project includes the problemsolution of solid waste substances pollution and raft-clubs’ and anchored ships’ waste waters as well as thepollution from amortized vessels.Additional contribution of our project is the module for efficient response of emergency teams in the event of anaccident due to small or massive outflow of hazardous waste substances in a river, locations of specialized riverterminals for waste disposal, river bank industrial facilities or along transport infrastructure during transport of thesubstances to the operator’s plant for the sake of their storage or treatment. All the modules and individual modelsfor the management of particular types of waste substances from active and amortized ships are a part of anintegrated model for monitoring and management of waste substances course, both in normal or emergencysituations in real time and space by the help of modern GPS and GPRS devices and GIS technologies.The advantage of the integrated model that we called ‘The Star’ is manifested in its multi-functionality anduniversality, since it can be applied for monitoring, coordination and briefing in the field of numerous activitiesrelated to the management of ship exploitation waste substances and different types of their transport. Owing to asoftware application, which has been developed in cooperation with a project participant, the monitoring of shipwaste substances course has been enabled, as a part of both domestic and international river navigation on screens atthe Center for Water Navigation Monitoring, as well as the control of the behavior of navigators and economicentities that will deal with management of this kind of waste.Thus, timely information on potential offences of all participants in the system of waste management as well as theaccidents are collected, which will provide the necessary information for taking effective steps against entities thatbreak the necessary procedures during the waste treatment, or a speedy, proactive response in case of an accidentalong a waterway or land roads.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 3THE SUBJECT OF THE RESEARCHThe project research was related to the solution of an urgent problem of the pollution of The Danube, the Sava andthe Tisa water streams by ship waste matters (solid waste and waste waters).The aim of the project research was the model development for the problem solution of ship exploitation wastematters in terms of the development of a universal, integrated model for the management of the abovementioned waste matters in real time and space along the navigation corridors and in the river bank areas tomeet the needs of the River Information Service (RIS), which, as far as we know, has not been developed, so far,nowhere in the world.In order to implement this task it was necessary to carry out numerous activities in the field with the aim ofcollecting the data important for the projects, in order to make the appropriate data bases, knowledge bases andmodel bases, as a basis for the development of a software application for the sake of management of navigators’activities and other entities in the chain of waste treatment, from the place where the waste is made to the place ofits treatment or disposal, including the activities in case of accidents.RESEARCH FINDINGSDuring a two-year research in the field of scientific achievements in this area and the fieldwork research, data havebeen collected which helped us create the needed data bases, as a prerequisite for the establishment of managementsystem of waste matters from both vessels (ships) or floating facilities.Database that is important for ship waste substances managementLaw regulations baseThe Law regulations base contains the international regulations (conventions and EU directives) and national acts oflaw referring to waste and hazardous substances management. For the needs of the developed model, an algorithmof relevant, international regulations has been made (EU directive on hazardous waste, transport regulations, wasteexport and import, special waste regulations and waste treatment regulations) shown in Figure 1.Database of infrastructural resourcesOne of the necessary bases for the establishment of ship waste management model is the infrastructural resourcesdata base. For that reason the data on the port fixed facilities, the machinery and equipment for the waste acceptanceand processing were collected. The analysis has shown that our ports and docks do not possess the adequateequipment for the vessel waste management, ordered by MARPOL convention 2 .The international organization IMO has made a list of devices which a port should have for the above mentionedpurpose. Besides, IMO 3 has prepared the Instructions for the adequacy of waste acceptance equipment in a port.MEPC 4 has ordered a form of equipment inadequacy for the acceptance of ship’s waste which is filled in by shipofficers if the equipment does not meet all the measures of the environment protection during the waste transfer in aport.The contents of this standardized form have been made pursuant to Act 4, Article 3 of the Directive 2000/59/EU 5 .Ports and docks which will be given a right to accept international vessels’ waste, have to be equipped with theordered devices for dealing with waste treatment with minimal impact on the living and working environment.

Figure 1. The Algorithm of International Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (M. Vukic).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 5Mobile facilities databaseThe waste matters management model contains a data base of mobile facilities in the Republic of Serbia, with thecoded numbers, which enables their tracking by a developed software application and software package of webservices Sledat. The data about the vessels have been obtained from the relevant institutions 6,7 . The analysis hasshown that there are no adequate mobile facilities specialized and equipped for waste acceptance on a river andwhich can be included in the vessel waste management system according to the developed model.Database on human resources in portsData base on human resources in ports has been made to meet the needs of the model for vessel waste mattersmanagement. The analysis has shown that ports do not have particularly trained staff for all manipulative operationswith the waste as well as for operating the adequate equipment.Database of economic entities for waste managementThe formed data base contains 176 economic entities which has the permission and equipment for adequatetreatment or transport of waste. The analysis has shown that the scope of their activities in this area is mainly relatedto the river bank area, and they do not accept the waste using mobile facilities on a river. Each of the mentionedeconomic entities has a permit to deal with specific types of waste (according to the European Waste Catalogue,EWL and National Waste Catalogue) 8-10 , which is important for the application of software application anddeveloped model, since the entity which has a permit for that type of waste is called based on the identificationnumber of the waste.Database of carriers and infrastructure usersThis database contains the data about companies that have their own fleet for goods transport such as ‘JRB’ 11 , ‘IvanMilutinovic’ 12 , ‘Istpoint’ etc. The data about ship agent houses have been collected.Database about goods transport, hazardous and waste substances along waterways of the Republic of SerbiaThis base contains the data of goods transport along waterways, obtained from The Statistical Office of Serbia 7 ,JRB 11 , Dunav Grupa 12 and Jugoagent.Database about ship waste mattersDuring the research we found out that in the Republic of Serbia there were no files kept on types and amounts ofship waste matters, so a methodology for the evaluation of the amount and certain types of waste matters wasdeveloped. Based on the data collected from ten ports 13 and the experience of the navigators, criteria for thecalculation of the amount of waste were defined 14,15 . Average annual amounts of waste oils, bilge waste waters,sanitary and fecal waste waters and solid ship waste were calculated. An estimate of the amount of waste waters andsolid waste from Belgrade raft-clubs was carried out 14 . So, the database of ship waste matters emerged.Database of the existing or planned landfilesWith the aim of making The Plan for managing ship waste matters an analysis of plan documentation for themunicipalities through which The Danube, The Sava and The Tisa flow was done, and the number of rubbish tipsthat could be available for the vessel sanitation waste disposal was determined. The database has been formed.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 6Database of the existing or planned facilities for the treatment of waste watersBased on the data from the Plan documentation surveys carried out, locations with the existing or planned facilitiesfor the treatment of waste waters were established, which can be included in the Plan for ship waste watersmanagement.Database of the existing or planned eco-centers for the treatment of solid wasteThe eco-centers database which can be used in the system of ship waste matters management has been formed.Database for the environment along waterwaysThis database has graphic base of the traffic infrastructure and digital base of the municipalities which responded tothe survey for the delivery of such bases to meet the needs of the project.Graphic base to meet the needs of the integrated model and GISIn order to form this base, a request to the authorized ministry was sent as to obtain a clearance to use geo-militarybases with a view of developing 3D integrated model for managing all the activities. A positive solution is expectedthat will grant access to the server of the relevant institution and legal use of such bases in order to enable the use ofGIS technology and monitoring of all the activities as well as the behavior of the entities in the system of shipwaste substances management, both in ordinary and emergency situations.The base of digital navigation mapsThis base contains digital navigation maps for the rivers of Danube, and Tisa, whereas, such maps for the river ofSava does not exist.Documentation databaseThe formed base contains a series of documents needed for the system of waste course and emergency management.Special attention is paid to different forms which should be completed in order to meet legal conditions for the safetransport of hazardous ship waste by rail and by road, from the waste acceptance terminal to the locations with thefacilities for waste treatment or the rubbish tips (in case a rubbish tip for the disposal of hazardous waste is built inthe Republic of Serbia) 16 . The base also contains the documents that accompany the beginning of the ship wastetransfer, waste acceptance as well as the documents on the movement of the waste 14, 16-18 . In addition, it has files onthe measurement of the redox-potential in the water (The Sava river), collected by a sophisticated, multi-functionalpollution measurement device in a natural, water environment, detection of accidental pollution, alerting accidentson the rivers, which was developed during the project realization 16,19-22 .Knowledge baseKnowledge base contains the key findings of the research – algorithms, models and procedures for: the identification and classification of waste matters,the treatment of waste matters in the port and during transport,waste courses with the evaluation of the impact on the environment,the selection of optimal processes of waste treating and the management of solid waste and waste waters,steps in case of emergency during transport or the treatment of waste substances.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 7The selected algorithmsThis paper presents only the selected, original algorithms, such as: types of ship waste algorithm (Figure 2) 16-18 ,an algorithm for the safety data list with 16 mandatory sets of information on hazardous matters (in thiscase, motor oil), but in the form that meets the needs of electronic card and information system for themonitoring multimodal transport of hazardous substances (Figure 3) 16-18 ,an algorithm of hazard classification system (links of danger classes, danger categories and risk level) forthe hazardous substances (Figure 4) 16-18 ,an algorithm of ship waste matters management in the port, according to MARPOL 73/78 convention witha table displaying the necessary equipment for the waste acceptance (Figure 5) 16-18 .Figure 6 contains an algorithm (model) of the courses of oiled solid waste from the originating point on the ship tothe final possible products of chemically-physical or thermal processing 16 . Evaluation of different technologicalprocedures for waste processing has been done in terms of their impact on people health and the environment, andan optimal way of waste inertization has been selected (MID – MIX solidification procedure (part of BATtechnology)).The impact of the evaluated processing procedure (recycling, incineration, pyrolysis, and accidental burning duringdisposal) was considered through emission of detrimental substances, and waste flows for these cases are shown inFigure 7 16 .Model baseFor establishing the model for ship waste material management, it is important that all international ports makeManagement plans, which should meet all the requirements shown by an algorithm in Figure 8 16 . Managementplans are primary prerequisite for efficient implementation of acceptance activities, temporary waste storage in theport area, waste distribution to authorized concessionaries who treat the waste.The following models have been developed as part of integrated model for ship waste material management: model for management on a ship and in the port area 14,16 , model for management of hazardous waste transport by land infrastructure 16-18 , model for an early detection and quick notification of an accident at any stage of waste flow 16-18 , model for management of proactive response to an accident along a waterway, road or rail corridors 16-27 , model for achieving inter-departmental coordination of all the entities in the proactive response 16 ,an integrated model for monitoring vessels and other means of transport, oversight of waste treatmentactivities and its transport, choice of safety routes for transport, efficient response to an accident, accidentdevelopment monitoring, field team activity control, notification, coordination and management 14, 16,23-30 .This paper contains description of certain parts of the above mentioned models.

Figure 2. Algorithm of Ship Waste Types (M. Vukic) 16-18

Figure 3. Algorithm of Security Data List16-18 (M. Vukic).

Figure 4. Algorithm of Hazard Classification System (Links of Hazard Classes, Hazard Categories and Risk Level) for the HazardousSubstances 16-18 (M. Vukic)

Figure 5. Algorithm of Ship Waste Matters Management in the Port, According to MARPOL 73/7816-18(M. Vukic)

Figure 6. Original Algorithm of Waste Streams and Evaluation of Modes of Oily Solid Waste Treatment from the Environmental ProtectionPoint of View 16-18 (M. Vukic)

Figure 7. Original Algorithm of Impact of Oily Solid Ship Waste Treatment Mode to Environment 16(V. P. Ulnikovic)

Agreement with contractors orequipment forRemovalDisposalМ.З.Hazardous waste:explosive properties harmful propertiesflammable properties toxic propertiesoxidizing properties carcinogenic propertiesirritating properties corrosive propertiesMODEL FOR PORT WASTE MANAGEMENTDatabase for regulationsEuropean CommissionDatabase of vessels- pollutersDatabase “Navigation Pollution”Connection with center (Agency)notifies port/ terminal on thearrival of waste reception shipWaste Management Plan forevery port/ terminalCreated by MCA(Agency)Local community plan forship waste managementArrangement for ship wastedisposalDirective 2000/59/ЕСDirective 91/689/ЕЕСEquipment in port for shipwaste and cargo residuesreceptionHazardous Waste DirectiveDatabase – information of surveys (andconsultations) results for users of services,port terminal operators, (leaders) (letters,questionnaires, contact with ship agents, localmunicipalities’ representatives)Part of the Ship WasteManagement PlanIn accordance with medicalservice in the portRevised by local PortAuthorityUnified WANDAsymbols for variouswaste typesMARPOL 73/78International Conventionalon the Prevention ofPollution from shipsMARPOL Annex IVFor waste reception andtreatmentGreat Britain regulationsAnimal Hralth By Product SRegulations (EC/1774/2002)Plant Health (forestry/greatBritain) Other 1993On risk due to woodenmaterial for goods packingEquipment required for watermen:International framework onfor storage of all types and quantities of wastesolving the ship pollutionfor special requests of watermenproblemLegal provision: ...“adequate reception of typeInformation for every port/ terminal:and quantities of shipquantities of every type of waste actually beinghazardous waste attaken over by the terminalterminal upon notificationquantities of every type of waste that shouldfrom the ship…”be receivedquantities of every type of waste stored on theship for waste reception in other ports/terminalsWaters from slop tanksFecal wastewaterwashingShip cargo residuesDangerous wasteHazardous wasteWaters from washing oilytanksDangerous liquidsubstances of A, B or CcategoryGarbage from foodstuffShip-generated wasteMedical wasteMinimum equipment for thesubstancesprotection of workers-Litter (food garbage,plastics, etc.)-oils (sludge, ballast waters,oily waters, etc.)Conditions:-oil mixtures (alsoMinimum impact on localcontaining chemicals)municipalities-limescaleMinimum risk of waste entering-sludge from purification ofthe watersship sludgeSuitable for users, compactorsand vesselsMinimum 30% of the total pricePrice of services:Quantity of the waste included is calculatedprice of waste receptiondepending on the users’ requirements for equipment waste treatmentdisposal of total wastethe ship type, size and categoryare taken into considerationCriteria (for a new terminal)expected amount of trafficplanned facilities for treatment atacceptable distanceexperience with similar equipmentMaximum expected quantities ofwastesWaste Management PreliminaryPlanVerificationFinal Management PlanEvaluation of economicjustificationThe location of equipment (fixedand mobile) clearly marked on themapClearly marked pathway of waste(which type of waste is sent towhich plant)Equipment for treatment in theport only if it is cost-effective (orcontract with contractors)Evaluation ofequipmentrequirementsFixed equipmentMobile equipment; barges, roadand rail tanks and waste receptionboatsDiagram of financing the use ofwaste, substances, grease and oilfrom ship exploitationUnified vessel equipment forwaste receptionPreparedness ofterminal to complywith the requests ofnational and(Marine Note)internationalMGN 253 and MGN 259regulationsEquipment at terminalEquipment for:oily waste receptiondangerous liquidControl Register of oils on shipssubstances receptiontanks washingslops washingJoint plans of several terminals orports for creation of local WasteManagement Plans (provided thatthey do not violate existingPlan for Wasteregulations)Management inthe PortInformation for all users of terminal (incorporated inthe Plan)(1) Short description of essential significance ofproper delivery of specified wastes(2) Diagram of locations with waste receptionequipment(3) List of the usually disposed specified wastes(4)List of contact points, operators and services(available)(5) Description of waste delivery procedures(collection and treatment of solid and liquid waste)(6) Description of discharge systems(7) Procedures for reporting the malfunction of thewaste reception facilitiesThe periodPlan revisionElements of the Planchanges asevery 3 yearsneeded(1) Assessment of requirement for waste receptionequipment with the aim of regular functioning in theterminal or port(2) Description of type and the capacity of the wastereception facility(3) Detailed description of procedures for collection anddisposal of specified waste types(4) Description of system for waste discharge(5) Procedures for reporting malfunction (errors) of thewaste reception facility(6)Procedures for current consultations with the terminalpersonnel, contracting parties for waste handling and withother concerned parties(7) Types and quantities of the specified wastes (receivedand treated)(8) Overview of the relevant rules/ regulations andformalities for waste delivery(9) Identification of persons in charge of WasteManagement Plan implementation(10) Description of equipment for waste pre-treatment;processes in port or terminal if any(11) Description of methods for evaluation (monitoring) ofactual degree of waste reception facility utilization(12) Description of methods for monitoring the quantities ofreceived wasteEcological steps for:-design-equipment or-operations-vessel garbage quantities(8) Facility inspection (inspectors from ministries andagencies)(9) Information forwarded to agencies (MCA)(13) Description of the method for disposal of the specifiedwaste typesIssuance of licenses for waste recycling and treatment12. Information that ship sends prior toentering the port:- list containing the data in accordancewith Directive 2000/59/EC requests-report on the equipment for IMO (price,category and type of equipment –display in form of table)(10) Information for IMO (type, capacity andregistration)(11) Description of procedures for: reduction, re-useand recycling of waste, composting, energygeneration(14) Organization of the collecting the ship cargo residuesand waters for cargo space and tanks washing(15) List of limit sizes for ship purification devicesFigure 8. Original Algorithm of Activities Related to Creation of Plan for Management of Ship Waste in the Port Area 16 (M. Vukic)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 15Management model in the port areaThe developed model encompasses all the activities that should be carried out from the moment of waste deliverynotification by a ship officer (using a standardized form) to a ship agent house, inviting the authorizedconcessionaries to take the waste over, taking care of or transport of the waste, summoning the authorizedlaboratory to take analysis samples and characterization of specific ship waste types, safe waste manipulation in theport area and a response in case of accident 14,16 .All the activities are done with the appropriate forms, which are in line with the requirements of the internationaland national regulations. All the mentioned forms are integrated in the model and are completed in the electronicform 16 . Owing to the developed model and software application 28,29 supporting it, the stated activities are done witha remote surveillance from The Center of Transport Management and its Center for Emergency SituationManagement in real time and space.The model was successfully presented to the scientific and expert circles on several occasions, and several times itwas evaluated on the spot, with direct link provided by Aluxom company (which is a project participant) to themonitoring of a hazardous material vehicle via information system Sledat on its way to Oil refinery in Belgrade.The model was tested when a ship carrying hazardous substances was monitored 16-21 (Figure 9).Figure 9. Ortophoto Snapshot of Route of Remote Monitoring of Ship Carrying Hazardous Substances 16-21In both cases, there are graphic records on the Internet (Figure 10, for ship graphic record).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 16Figure 10. Graphic Record of the Route of Ship Remote Monitoring on the Internet 16-21The model was presented at The Danube Commission counseling summit, dedicated to ship waste problem 14,23,30 .Model for the management of hazardous waste from ship exploitation transportModel for managing different types of hazardous matters transport (multimodal transport) includes responsibilitiesand activities of different entities in hazardous ship waste transport (and universality enables the application in caseof monitoring activities regarding other hazardous substances).This paper, as an example, presents, as elements of developed model, original algorithms of responsibilities andactivities of entities involved in hazardous waste transport by rail. Figure 11 shows the responsibilities of specialtransporter dispatcher (the army’s responsibilities toward the railway company) 16,28 , whereas the algorithm in Figure12 outlines the responsibilities of carriers by R.I.D in the field of transport requirement fulfillment 16,28 .One of important conditions is making of environment risk management program (Figure 13 algorithm), whichinvolves an obligatory hazard evaluation and hazardous substance risk assessment (Figure 14 algorithm).The responsibilities of other users by R.I.D are presented by algorithm in Figure 15 16,28 . Figure 16 lists the keydocuments for all the users of railway transport services (necessary licences: certificate for hazardous materialtransport, consignment note, instructions for special technical and protection safety measures, transport approval,licence for the insurance of hazardous substances, etc.) 16,28 .With remote surveillance of activities by software application and participants’ hardware and software, thefunctioning of the model was tested successfully 16,28 .

Figure 11. Original Algorithm of the Obligations of the Special Transports Consigner towards the Railway 16, 28 (M. Vukic)

ALGORITHM OF TRANSFER CONDITIONS FULFILLMENTCARRIER’S OBLIGATIONSOBLIGATIONS AS PER RIDENVIRONMENTPARAMETERSMONITORINGCARRIER’S RESPONSIBILITYFULFILLED CONDITIONS FOR DANGEROUSGOODS TRANSPORT (AS PER GOVERNMENTREGULATION)CHECK OF LABELS AND PRESCRIBED MARKINGSON THE CARSIN WORKING ORDERAPPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTCHECK OF POSSIBLE CARS OVERLOADPARAMETERS MONITORINGPROVIDES TRANSPORT SAFETYPROVIDES PERSONAL SAFETYOF STAFF, PASSENGERS ANDGOODSPRESCRIBED STRUCTUREMADE AS PER STANDARDSEQUIPPED AS PER STANDARDSPROPERLY MARKEDSPECIALLY TRAINED PERSONNELTRANSPORT PERMITSPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT INCASE OF REQUIRED ESCORTCHECK OF POSSIBLE EXCEED OF THE NEXTINSPECTION DATE FOR CARS, TANKS AND MEGC– RANDOM TEST OF CARS AND GOODS (ANDEQUIPMENT PARTS) UPON RECEIPT FROMCONSIGNERCHECK OF PRESCRIBED PAPERS ANDTRANSPORT DOCUMENTS OF THE CONSIGNERCOVERAGE OF ENTIRERAILWAY SYSTEMACCESS TO ALLRELEVANT BASESESTABLISHESPROGRAMSSAFETYPROTECTS LIVES ANDPROPERTY AT ITS LOCATIONDEPENDING ON THE DS QUANTITY,TYPE AND PROPERTIESPROTECTION PLAN AND ACCIDENT RESPONSEPROCEDURESTAKES PREVENTION MEASURES AND OTHERACCIDENT RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURESORGANIZES AND CONDUCTS ACCIDENTRESPONSE MEASURESCHECK IF THE DS IS ON THE RID LIST FORALLOWED TRANSPORTNON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSIGNMENT INCASE THAT RID REGULATIONS ARE NOT METPROHIBITION OF CONSIGNMENT FROMTRANSPORT UNTIL REGULATIONS ARE METPROPER DATA BASEPROGRAMAPPLICATIONSINFORMATICSAPPLICATIONPROVIDES SAFETY ANDPROTECTION EQUIPMENTPROVIDES INFORMATION ONCHEMICAL AND OTHERHAZARDSMAINTAINS COMMUNICATIONWITH GOVERNMENT AND ITSBODIESESTABLISHED CONNECTIONWITH NATIONAL NOTIFICATIONCENTERINTRODUCTION OF SAFEEQUIPMENT HANDLING TOWORKERSPROTECTION NETWORKS INCASE OF HAZARDOCCURRENCEGOALSTRAINING OF PERSONNEL CARRYINGDANGEROUS GOODSGENERAL PROVISIONS OF REGULATIONS ONDANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORTTASKS AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONNELTRAINING ON SAFETYTRAINING ON DOCUMENTATIONREFRESHMENT COURSESRESUMED TRANSPORT FOR THE REMAINDER OF FREIGHT,WITH THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY APPROVAL (WITHREGULATIONS FULFILLMENT)RESUMED TRANSPORT FOR THE REMAINDER OF FREIGHTWITH COMPETENT AUTHORITY ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT(EVEN WITHOUT THE LICENSE)REGULATIONS ONTHE CARRIAGE OFDANGEROUSGOODS BY RAILREGULATIONS OFOTHERTRANSPORTBRANCHESINJURY OR DAMAGE HAZARDS ATDANGEROUS GOODS LOADING,UNLOADING OR TRANSFERADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FROM THECOMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR LOADING,DESTRUCTION OR “NEUTRALIZATION OFGOODS” NOT DECLARED AS DSACCIDENTSCONSEQUENCESRISKSHEALTH ANDENVIRONMENTHAZARDSFigure 12. Original Algorithm of the Consigner’s Obligation in the Domain of Transport Conditions Fulfillment16, 28(M. Vukic)

Figure 13. Original Algorithm of the Risk Management Program Content16, 28 (M. Vukic)

ALGORITHM OF HAZARD EVALUATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT FOR A RID REGISTEREDSUBSTANCEEVALUATION OFDANGEROUSSUBSTANCE IMPACTIDENTIFICATION OFPOTENTIAL NEGATIVEEFFECTSLABORATORY TESTS AND FIELD OBSERVATIONSEFFECTSINDIVIDUALSEFFECTSPOPULATIONSEFFECTSECOSYSTEMSONONONDETERMINATION OF DSQUANTITIESLETHAL DOSESOVERSIGHTREPRODUCTIONINREDUCTION OFDIFFERENCE BETWEENSPECIESHAZARDEVALUATIONAND RISKASSESSMENTFOR EVERYRIDREGISTEREDSUBSTANCEEVALUATION OFEXPOSURE OFORGANISMS TODANGEROUSSUBSTANCES EFFECTMONITORINGPROCESSOFOF DANGEROUSSUBSTANCES RELEASEOF DANGEROUSSUBSTANCESTRANSPORTOFDSTRANSFORMATION INENVIRONMENTEND POINTSCONCENTRATIONLEVELENVIRONMENTININTAKE PER WEIGHTUNITINTEGRATION OF EFFECT ANDEXPOSURE ASSESSMENTASSESSMENTOF HAZARDPOSSIBILITYHAZARD EVALUATIONASSESSMENT OFHAZARDPROPORTIONSDETERMINATION OFHAZARD POSSIBLENATUREANDMAGNITUDECONSEQUENCES OFCHEMICALS RELEASEIN THE ENVIRONMENTEND POINTSNO-EFFECTCONCENTRATIONANTICIPATEDCONCENTRATIONSTHE ENVIRONMENTINCONCENTRATIONSCOMPARISONRISK EVALUATIONQUANTITATIVE EVALUATIONOF CLEARLY DEFINEDENVIRONMENT EFFECTSPROBABILITYEND POINTEVALUATION OF POSSIBLEREPRODUCTION IN THEPOPULATION NUMBERFigure 14. Original Algorithm of Hazard Assessment and Risk Evaluation for the RID Registered Substance16, 28 (M. Vukic)

Figure 15. Original Algorithm of Other Users’ Obligations as per RID16, 28 (M. Vukic)

Figure 16. Algorithm of the Documents Required for all Users of Railway Services in the Dangerous Substances Transport 16, 28 (M. Vukic)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 23Model for the management of emergency situationsModel for the management of emergency situations has been developed in case of an accident along a waterway,but due to its universality it can be applicable to accidents with other means of transport. What pose a specificproblem for the researchers was the development of a device with accompanying software support for measuringcontamination in natural, water environment, detection of accidental contamination and early alert of accidentaloutflows into a river.Model and system of an early accident alertThe model has been developed during an experiment which is still underway (for more than 7 months) on the Savariver, at the raft called ‘Ecocenter’. The model development is based on the primary assumption that for an efficient,proactive response in case of accidental hazardous substances outflow along a waterway, it is necessary to establishan adequate, rapid detection system and notification of the emerging emergency situation.The basic prerequisite for this is the existence of adequate equipment with sensors adapted to working conditions ina natural, water environment, as well as the information system for monitoring, surveillance, management andcoordination of activities of the proactive response to the accident 16-22,28 .An outline of the applied measurement equipment for measuring data and remote transfer to the control station,realized on TR21037 project as a new technical solution 22 , is presented in Figure 17.This system has to be connected with the Center for emergency situations.Model of the proactive response to emergency situations on riversIn proactive response to the risk it is necessary to establish functional integrations of all the parties of interest for thesake of efficient implementation of proposed activities as a part of ordered procedures and their monitoring in realtime from one center.During the implementation of technological development project TR 21037 a model of proactive response toemergency situation was prepared 16,28 (Figure 18). The model defines the activities of a ship officer after an accidenthas occurred (which was put across by a developed multifunctional device for an early accident detection (analarm)) in the domain of informing the authorized entities and the engaging of participants in the response to theaccident in case of small or extensive outflows of ship hazardous substances. In case of a serious accident withexceeding effects, it is important to notify the European headquarters for assistance seeking, via National contactpoint (National Disaster Center for emergency situations). Using the model, we integrated the system of informationexchange, between the entities at all levels. Owing to functional integration of all national capacities of integratedprotection with international networks and systems in proactive risk response in traffic sector, it is possible toorganize an efficient response in case of large-scale accidents. The procedures of sending assistance request arepresented in Figure 19 algorithm 22 .Model of the integrated proactive response in emergency situations in the land traffic infrastructureDuring the development of this model, the requirements of relevant institutions and international experience weretaken into account. The original algorithm in Figure 20 encompasses the requirements of The International HealthOrganization which countries should meet in the area of providing the adequate tools for a response to the accidentand the management of chemical safety at a national level 16,24,28 . During former research, project participants made,based on American experience, an original algorithm of integrated system of chemical accidents management,shown in Figure 21 16,24,28 .

Figure 17. Outline of the Equipment for Data Measurement and Long-Range Transmission to the Control Point16-22, 28(V. Rapajic, Aluxom D.O.O)

Figure 18. The original algorithm of model of proactive response to emergency situation was prepared 16,28 (M. Vukić).

BasesМonitoring2006NOBriefing aboutThe vessel and freight(comparison with thelicence)BaseBASES:1.Knowledge baseBaseBaseBase 4,YESAuthorized National Body for VS – Nationalcontact pointSituation expert team- Information on VS- VS monitoringYES National resourcessufficient?NORS government approval for the internationalInternational help – estimate depending onVS typeSending international help requestInternational help offers receptionResponse to international help offersInternational help deliveryNODeliveredAssistanceadequate?YESResponse to VSNOEndVSYESFigure 19. Report, estimate and updating ofdatabase 22Bases 1,2,3,11BasesBases4,5,7,8Bases 7,8Bases1,2,3,4,9,12.Resource base3Model base4VS operational base witha dynamic sub-base5.Agreement base(ADN...)6.Internationalorganisations base7.Law regulation base8.Contact points base9.Message base10.GIS base11.Base of experts forsituational responseSpecialists and subspecialistsAdequate institutionsReporting andmonitoringRed – works underway for the rail and river (for 9, collected message form models and possible forms of data administrating in ourcountry)Blue – almost completed; Grey – from the aspect of regulations not defined for OM transportAppendix: ’Blue border’ (The Law on Integrated Border Management) – river border crossings (a list of crossings where control is made)Regulation (In total: for water, waste, and regulation related to them, a list of necessary ship regulations)Table showing dynamics of draft water directive implementation (2000/60/EC)Source: modified UNEP OCHA references scheme (working material, MO)

Figure 20. Original Algorithm of Accident Response Instruments16, 24, 28 (M. Vukic)

Figure 21. The original algorithm of integrated system of chemical accidents management 16,24,28 (M. Vukić)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 29An essential part of that integrated system is the existence of adequate Action plan in case of an emergency duringhazardous materials transport (waste, chemicals…). Figure 22 presents an algorithm of requirements relating to theequipment and procedure in the event of small or serious outflows, hazardous substances spill-out 16,24,25 , etc. For anefficient response to an accident it takes intervention entities, which are shown in Figure 23 algorithm 16,24,25 . Forintervention team to take action, it is also necessary to prepare response-in-emergency-situation plans. Figure 24outlines the original algorithm of The General plan for medical team response 16,24 , whereas Figure 25 contains theoriginal algorithm of procedure for the mobile eco-toxicology unit of Belgrade 16,24,25 , which is most commonly thefirst to arrive at the place of an accident (after the police).All the above mentioned may help us infer that the project has developed models for efficient response of entities atall levels, and the procedures for the operation of certain intervention units in the republic of Serbia have beencollected. This has encouraged the development of software application to support the whole system of emergencysituation management in case of an accident in multimodal transport. The next assignment was to provide softwaresupport for the established models for waste treatment, models for monitoring hazardous freight transport, andprocedure as a part of proactive response to the accident. In cooperation with the project participant, thecompatibility of the developed model and Sledat information system was tested and proved that it was an excellentsupport for the developed models as a part of establishing an efficient system for monitoring proactive response andthe development of software application 16,28,29 for the action in emergency situations in the event of an accident as apart of multimodal transport of hazardous freight.Information system for managing multimodal transport and interdepartmental coordination in emergencysituationThe software package of web services was enriched with certain databases developed in the project, proving to becompatible with software system Sledat. Based on the notification model and the communication with the relevantusers of monitoring findings at a local, regional and national level, the development of software application for themanagement of emergency situations and interdepartmental cooperation was initiated 16,28,29 . The developed modelof the integral solution for data merging/exchange from the bases of different system entities and the making ofadequate information environment provides the dispatchers with sufficient data for rapid making of the rightdecisions.The essence of the solutionSledat, an evolved basic system, makes most of its potential by modern architecture and internet technologies. Theinternet character of Sledat system provides the flexibility of a rapid introduction into practical application andsystem distribution at multiple architectural levels. Each level is marked with a degree of aggregation or theintegration of data, messages or documents.The system is significant because it allows the flow of data from the lowest to the highest level, across severallevels, with possible controlling and interaction at every level. With the development of framework (organizationalframework) levels and procedures of data processing are defined, with a view of rapid data search at the highestlevel, timely decision making and decision implementation plan, and at an operational level, rapid and efficientwork with a large number of simultaneous events. Sledat system framework, by means of the integrated documentmanagement system and the integrated support for SOA/ESB, allows the introduction of other data sources, whichenables the combining of architecturally and technologically different information systems (such as IBM, Oracleand Microsoft – in terms of data), and in terms of transfer system, Sledat enables interfaces for the transfer viadifferent media (such as Internet/Extranet, copper or optical networks, dial-up, GSM/GPRS, TETRA, HF radio).Because of its flexibility, Sledat system easily supports PLAN-B, which, in case of crash of comfort transfersystems with higher broadband speed, it switches to the communication by limited media (such as TETRA, DMR,or eventually HF radio).

Figure 22. Original Algorithm of the Action Plan in Case of Possible Chemical Accident Emergency Due to Chemical Spill16, 24, 2 (M. Vukic)

Figure 23. Original Algorithm of Intervention Factors in the Process of Chemical Accident Management16, 24, 25 (M. Vukic)

Figure 24. Original Algorithm of Medical Teams Reaction Plan16, 24 (M. Vukic)

Figure 25. Original Algorithm of Action of Belgrade Mobile Eco-Toxicological Unit16, 24, 25 (M. Vukic)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 34The special importance of the suggested solution is its ability to be used in an equally reliable way for developingrespective information systems in the transport sector (for special types, multimodal as well), energy sector,industry (for managing production processes, raw materials and waste), civil sector (health, public transport, etc.),public order sector (the police, the army, judiciary, civil defence) and the supply sector, which are the entitiesimportant for emergency situation management. The proposed solution, by its features and architecture, makespossible the integration of all elements and entities – participants in the proactive response to the accidentalsituation and their interdepartmental coordination, that is, the establishment of an integrated information system tomeet the needs of Serbian National Disaster Center.With the help of Sledat system, interdepartmental resources activation and monitoring the cooperation of allparticipants in the field is easily achieved, as well as the monitoring of retreat operations after the completion ofactivities of repairing the damage of the accident on the river or on the ground. The greatest operational contributionof Sledat system is the shorter response time in accidental situations and more successful participants’ response inemergency situations. The advantage of this system is the possibility of statistical analyses that can be used topredict the costs of possible accident and cost analysis after emergency situations.Because of the possibility of monitoring resources in real time and space, response costs in accidental situations arereduced, control of material and human resources engaged in the proactive response is increased, risk and scope ofconsequences is reduced.For the development of the stated system of a river accident early warning and the possibility of its application as apart of the existing system elements in The Republic of Serbia were used relevant data about the state ofinfrastructural, material and human resources, obtained by the researchers of ‘Kirilo Savic’ Institute during theimplementation of national project for the development of a system for notification and management in case of achemical accident. It is also important that, as a part of the mentioned NIP (National Investment Plan) project 24 , allavailable equipment has been filed and the analysis on the state of the equipment was done. In addition to that, theprocedures used by some of intervention and rescue units during the proactive response to the accident have beendescribed, and some procedures not encompassed by the present management system have been proposed.It all significantly reduces the time for establishment of the integrated information system for National DisasterManagement Centre of the Republic of Serbia, in case that relevant state authorities show interest inimplementation of results obtained within the projects conducted by the researchers and experts of “Kirilo Savic”Institute, under consortium cooperation with the national and foreign experts.And more so, since integral system Sledat enables the projection of the rescue units activities with the aim ofobtaining information on possible radii of action, in accordance with the state of infrastructure and equipment and inaccordance with other important parameters such as: the time of access to the site of accident, capacity of humanresources, endurance of equipment, arrival of people and equipment to the site of accident and return from the site.The projection of procedures compatibility indicates the real possibilities of field cooperation.Efficiency analysis, i.e. listing and test projections provide the information on the adequacy of the number andgeographic distribution of resources, human resources and equipment. By means of exchange of information on thetraining and testing the knowledge of human resources, the possibility of safe and efficient cooperation ofintervention teams is monitored and adjusted. It defines the needs for adjustment of present procedures as well asfor the establishment of new procedures in the places where requirements for operation and interaction have not yetbeen fulfilled.A significant part of all procedures for resolving accidents relies on the information on the management ofdangerous substances that have caused the accident.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 35Availability of all the documents that provide the information for rescue teams for efficient and safe management ofthe said substances is also an important point for efficient dealing with the situation. It is therefore important thatrescuers have at their disposal: catalogues providing the instructions on the best way for neutralization of individualdangerous substances; fire schemes (zones of possible danger); evaluations of possible risk and consequences;evacuation plans and studies for neutralization in cases of accidents with major consequences to people andenvironment. This very part of the system is the most sensitive part of integral systems for coordination in case ofaccident. The Sledat is in that sense very modern - it has a developed system for documentaristics, where the dataon the documents and information important for prompt and efficient dealing with accidents are stored.Based on the experience of on the operational level, big picture was projected holistically, where a lack offunctionality was noticed in the field of interdepartmental data, message and document exchange.As a result of this research, we came up with an idea of gradual introduction of universal organizational Sledatframework to link the existing systems in the Republic of Serbia and for the support of security surveillance, and theefficiency of conducting professional and transport procedures.Studying the existing system elements for the management of emergency situations in the territory of the Republicof Serbia (developed in the Ministry of Defence, The Ministry of Internal affairs, and the Ministry of Infrastructure(RIS)), it was concluded that the application of the developed organizational framework Sledat would makepossible their functional integration and efficient data exchange in case of emergency situations.Thus, we would significantly increase the efficiency of the implementation of standard operational and safetyprocedures by different participants (inside a department or inter departments) during a proactive response to anaccident, which contributes to the increased efficiency of the environment conservation and the reduction of thepotential occurrence of accidental situations when transporting hazardous substances.THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCHThe project proposes activities and facilities which will reduce the contamination from vessels to the lowing levelpossible in the local areas, thus decrease the possibility of jeopardizing the neighboring countries. The requirementsof the Convention on the cooperation for the protection and sustainable exploitation of the Danube about an urgentbuilding of the plants for the waste waters processing are being fulfilled, with the aim of protecting both surface andunderground waters. Conditions that meet the requirements of the Convention on the protection and usage of crossborderriver courses and international lakes:the prevention, control and reduction of cross-border contamination from stationary and non-stationarysources,sustainable waters management, the conservation of water resources as well as the environment in itsentirety.the creation of conditions for establishing mutual monitoring and system for evaluating the state of crossborderwaters.The project findings contribute to:the creation of conditions for safe treatment of solid, liquid and hazardous ship waste (acceptance,classifying, separation, recycling, processing, purification, storage and elimination of hazardous substances)and the building of specialized terminals with optimal equipment for these purposes on the waterwayCorridor VII and the rivers of Sava and Tisa;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 36the management of the recycled raw materials and by-products of the technological process of theprocessing vessel and port terminal waste matters as well as shipwreck waste;the definition of the locations of the terminals for providing new services (ship fuel supply and wasteacceptance);the solution of an urgent ecological problem on national and international waterways of the Republic ofSerbia;integrated management of all the activities relating to acceptance, transport and treatment of ship waste andwaste waters, as well as the steps in emergency situations;the establishment of coordination between all the interested entities (subjects) responsible for resolving thementioned problem (from ship transporters to government institutions and the local community);water preservationpeople protection and the environment conservation in the impact area of water traffic on the statedwaterways;the increased level of navigation safety and vessel safety;the completion of the existing national RIS and the development of computer-literate society;In addition, conditions for the integration of the above mentioned information system into the EU informationsystem will be created as well as for the use of their databases and information on international transporters andvessels, for the service users on the waterway Corridor VII.CONCLUSIONDuring the implementation of the technological development project, an integrated model for monitoring andcontrol of waste material vessel, possible accident on the waterway and waste substances transport to the treatmentsite or their disposal in real time and space, was developed. The development of the model is based on theobjectives of CEFIC Association, known as 3K (quality, quantity, continuity (of services)).This model creates conditions for the integration of water traffic into logistic system networks, with the aim ofcreating a unique, functional, logistical service network at a national and regional level (according to SEETOprinciples for traffic monitoring). The model would make possible the improvement and upgrading of the existingRIS, that is, the involvement of services of the local communities and economic entities in the ship waste materialmanagement system.The findings of TR 21037 project, also, offer concrete steps for the reduction of the level of contamination in caseof unintentional, accidental outflow of liquid, hazardous and waste substances, in the form of the attachment of asensor to the outer side of a ship for a prompt identification of the leaking hazardous matters and automatic andelectronic registration of the accident/emergency in the ship’s control room. It is proposed to install the stations withearly warning accident sensors 22 to the National control center for emergency situations in the field of water trafficat the sites marked as the riskiest on the waterways and with the largest number of emergencies in water traffic.Since it takes a lot of time and effort to introduce the integrated system at the national level, the authors of thispaper propose the establishment of the information system for early detection and prompt notification of a riveraccident, which was tested during the mentioned research, as a pilot – information subsystem for the managementof emergency situations with this type of transport, at a relatively short period of time.Bearing in mind that the significant part of the research findings were dedicated to the development of aninformation system for risk management when transporting ship’s hazardous waste, from the acceptance terminalon the river to final destinations for their further treatment or disposal all over Serbia (by road or by rail), the nextstep would be dedicated to the establishment of information system in the two mentioned types of transport, thussolving the problem of risk management in the traffic sector, as one of the most important sources of accidental, thatis, technical and toxicological accidents in the country.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 37Together with these activities, it is important that all the interested legal entities and associations commence theactivities of registering the resources for entering the data into Sledat system, thus creating the ground for runningtests and doing exercises which will truly show to what extent the defence system for emergency situations isoptimized, pragmatic and efficient.The proposed Sledat system, based on its characteristics and possibility for involving a large number of entities(subjects) in the system of prevention, early notification, coordination and proactive response relating to chemical(and other) accidents on stationary and linear infrastructure on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, presents agood solution for the improvement of the existing emergency situation system.The system also gives the possibility that present exchange of voice information be replaced in future with digitaldata and digital communication, for only this kind of communication enables journaling of proceduresimplementation as a base for system subjects operation analysis. Increasing availability of JMS, XML and WEBAPI interface for data exchange also accomplishes functional exchange that is technologically simple andorganizationally feasible, with no further increase of current business costs.A significant part of all procedures for resolving accidents relies on the information on the management ofdangerous substances that have caused the accident. Availability of all the documents that provide the informationfor rescue teams for efficient and safe management of the said substances is also an important point for efficientdealing with the situation. It is therefore important that rescuers have at their disposal: catalogues providing theinstructions on the best way for neutralization of individual dangerous substances; fire schemes (zones of possibledanger); evaluations of possible risk and consequences; evacuation plans and studies for neutralization in cases ofaccidents with major consequences to people and environment.This very part of the system is the most sensitive part of integral systems for coordination in case of accident. TheSledat is in that sense very modern - it has a developed system for documentaristics, where the data on thedocuments and information important for prompt and efficient dealing with accidents are stored.Note: The authors of this paper express their gratitude to the Ministry of Science and Technological development ofthe Republic of Serbia for the support and funding of the technological development project TR 21037, this paperbeing a part of it, as well as to the Ministry for Infrastructure, The Department for Water Traffic and SafeNavigation for the support and staff participation in the project implementation.Thank you note: The researchers of „Kirilo Savić“ Institute and Aluxom express their gratitude to Mrs Vesna DeVinča for making it possible to use her „Ekocentar“ raft for research within TR – 21037 Project.BIBLIOGRAPHY1. Marija Vukic et al.: The technological development project TR – 21037: ‘The Development of IntegratedManagement System of Ship Waste Substances on Waterway Corridors of the Republic of Serbia’, funded by theMinistry of Science and Technological development of the Republic of Serbia, 2008 – 2010.2. MARPOL 73/78, International Convention of Sea (Waters) Protection from Ship Contamination, 1973, amendedand complemented by the 1978 Protocol, with all the later amendments and complements3. IMO – International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org4. MEPC-The Marine Environment Protection Committee of the International Maritime Organization, July 18-22,2005

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 385. Directive 2000/59/EU, 2000.6. Jugoregister – Serbian ship register, A report for the requirements of the project TR 21037, Belgrade, 23.02.2009,1-217. The The Republic of Serbia Statistical Office, A report for the requirements of the project TR 21037, Belgrade,2010, 1-268. European Waste Catalogue (EWC list), Decision 94/3/EC9. Council Decision 94/904/EC10. Code on Terms and Procedures of Division, Packing and Preservation of Secondary Raw Materials (of Waste),‘Official Gazette, of the Republic of Serbia’, No. 55/2001 [Pravilnik o uslovima i načinu razvrstavanja, pakovanja ičuvanja sekundarnih sirovina (otpada), Sl. glasnik RS, No. 55/2001]11. Report of the Jugoslovensko Recno Brodarstvo a.d., Engineering and Maintenance Sector in the Traffic Sector,No. 6581 dated December 21 st , 2009, Belgrade12. Bagersko Brodarsko Preduzece Belgrade Report, e-mail dated October 30 th , 200913. Register of Questionnaires Files, Port Authorities, 200914. Мария Вукич и сот.: Развитие интегральной модели управления сбором, транспортировкой иутилизацией отходов с судов на сети водных путей Республики Сербии, Пленарный доклад во имяделегациии Сербии, Совещание группы экспертов „Отходы от эксплуатации судов“, Дунайская Kомиссия,CD, Будапешт, Венгрия, 14-15 января 2009.г. и сайт Дунайской Комиссии: www.danubecommission.org15. Marija Vukic, Ivana Kunc, Vladanka Presburger – Ulnikovic: Classification of waste occurring duringexploitation and maintenance of vessels with the aim of safe multimodal transport, The second internationalscientific conference “Transport of dangerous goods and risk management – TOMUR 2010”, Book of Abstracts,Belgrade, March 30th-31st, 2010, page 816. Marija Vukic, Vladanka Presburger – Ulnikovic, Snezana Urosevic, Uros Spruk: Integrated model andinformation system for management of dangerous substances multimodal transport and interdepartmentalcoordination in emergency situations, A plenary lecture on invitation, The second international scientific conference“Transport of dangerous goods and risk management – TOMUR 2010”, Book of Abstracts, “Kirilo Savic”Institute,Belgrade, March 2010, Pages 1-417. Marija Vukić, Saša Kostić, Pavle Galić, Mirko Borisov, Radoje Bankovic, Uroš Spruk: Softverski paket zaupravljanje transportom opasnog otpada nastalog pri eksploataciji plovila, Predavanje po pozivu, Stručno –privredni skup, Udruženje saobraćaja i telekomunikacija Privredne komore Beograda, oktobar 2009.18. Marija Vukić, Miodrag Mandušić, Radovan Štetin, Vojislav Rapajić, Uroš Spruk: Softverski paket zaupravljanje transportom opasnih materija u urbanim sredinama, Predavanje po pozivu, Udruženje inženjeraBeograda i Udruženje urbanista Beograda, Book of abstracts, 2009, 7919. Vukić Marija, Jevtić Miroljub, Spruk Uroš, Rapajić Vojislav, Štetin Radovan: Sistem za praćenje zagađenjavodotoka usled nekontrolisanog ispuštanja otpadnih voda sa plovila i splavova, Časopis «Poljoprivredna tehnika»,Beograd, Broj XXXVI, 2009, 69-81

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 3920. Marija Vukic, Vojislav Rapajic, Radovan Stetin, Miroljub Jevtic, Uros Spruk, Snezana Mrmak: The Sledatinformation system for early detection chemical accident on waterways, The second international scientificconference “Transport of dangerous goods and risk management – TOMUR 2010”, Book of Abstracts, “KiriloSavic” Institute, Belgrade, march 2010, Pages 15-1921. Marija Vukic, Miroljub Jevtic, Uroš Spruk, Vojislav Rapajic, Radovan Stetin: System SLEDAT for RemoteTracking of Vessels During Transport of Dangerous Goods and Fast Notification on Accidents, InternationalSymposium on Certification of GNSS Systems & Services “CERGAL 2010”, Rostock, Germany, 28-29 April 201022. Marija Vukic, Miroljub Jevtic, Vojislav Rapajic, Radovan Stetin: Sofisticirani multifunkcionalni uređaj zamerenje zagađenja u prirodnoj akvatičnoj sredini, detekciju akcidentnog zagađenja, alarmiranje i ranu najavuakcidenta na rekama, Technical Solution, “Kirilo Savic” Institute, April 2010, Belgrade, pages 1-1923. Мария Вукич и сотр.: Имитация модели сбора и транспорта отходов с судов, Пленарный доклад попризыву вo имя делегации Республики Сербии, Совещание группы экспертов „Отходы от эксплуатациисудов Дунайская Kомиссия, CD, Будапешт, Венгрия, 20-21. января 2010. г. и сайт Дунайской Комиссии:www.danubecommission.org.24. Vukic M. et al. The Development of the System for Notification and Management in case of Chemical Accidenton the Territory of the Republic of Serbia, NIP project, no. 13600606, The Faculty of the Protection at Work, Nisand ‘Kirilo Savic’ Institute, Belgrade, 2008.25. Marija Vukić, Snežana Urošević, Zdravka Bojić: Emergency response models in case of liquid waste hazardrelease (Modeli za postupanje i odgovor u vanrednim situacijama pri izlivanju opasnih otpadnih materija), Thesecond international symposium «Environment protection in industrial areas», Kosovska Mitrovica, 28-29 April2009, 313-32026. Dragan Trifkovic, Radosav Nikolic, Svetislav Soskic, Milica Puzic: Management of the system of training forwork on the ships carrying dangerous substances, The second international scientific conference “Transport ofdangerous goods and risk management – TOMUR 2010”, Book of Abstracts, “Kirilo Savic”Institute, Belgrade,March 2010, Page 2727. Snezana Uroševic, Marija Vukic, Suzana Graovac: Advantages of disaster management centres in trafficregarding the maintenance of operational continuity and in case of emergency situations, The second internationalscientific conference “Transport of dangerous goods and risk management – TOMUR 2010”, Book of Abstracts,“Kirilo Savic”Institute, Belgrade, March 2010, Page 3228. Marija Vukic, Radovan Stetin, Vojislav Rapajic, Snezana Urosevic, Vladanka Presburger-Ulnikovic: Softwareapplication for management of dangerous substances multimodal transport and interdepartmental coordination inemergency situations (Softverska aplikacija za upravljanje multimodalnim transportom opasnih materija imeđuresornu koordinaciju u vanrednim situacijama), Technical Solution, “Kirilo Savic” Institute, April 2010,Belgrade, pages 1-3129. Marija Vukic, Dusan Sakulski, Ivana Atanasovska, Jelena Popic-Novaković: Software solutions for disaster riskmanagement, The second international scientific conference “Transport of dangerous goods and risk management –TOMUR 2010”, Book of Abstracts, “Kirilo Savic”Institute, Belgrade, March 2010, Page 3630. Мария Вукич и сотр.: Идентификация, классификация, характеризация и обозначение отходов отексплуатации судов, Пленарный доклад по призыву вo имя делегации Республики Сербии, Совещаниегруппы экспертов „Отходы от эксплуатации судов“, Дунайская Kомиссия, CD, Будапешт, Венгрия, 20-21.января 2010. г. и сайт Дунайской Комиссии: www.danubecommission.org

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 4031. Radoje Banković, Mirko Borisov, Zora Đorđević, Jelena Popić, Saša Kostić, Miodrag Mandušić: Digitalizedmap sheets in chemical accident emergency management system (Digitalizovane mape prostora u sistemuupravljanja hemijskim udesima), The second international symposium «Environment protection in industrial areas»,Kosovska Mitrovica, 28-29 April 2009, 489-49532. Mirko Borisov, Radoje Bankovic, Sinisa Drobnjak, Zora DJordjevic-Dancevic, Miodrag Mandusic, SashaKostic: The modern architecture of GIS and cartographic key at the environment of web map server, The secondinternational scientific conference “Transport of dangerous goods and risk management – TOMUR 2010”, Book ofAbstracts, “Kirilo Savic”Institute, Belgrade, March 2010, Page 44

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 41UDK:656.073.436:665.6/.7628.3:665.6/.7CLASSIFICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF WASTE OIL IN THE FUNCTION OFSAFE TRANSPORTVladica Čudić 1 , Predrag Petrović 21 Institute of Public Health, Avenue Despota Stefana 54a,11000 Belgrade, Serbia, vladica.cudic@zdravlje.org.rs2 Institute Kirilo Savic, 51 Vojvode Stepe Street, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, mpm@EUnet.rsAbstract: Action to reduce waste, either by encouraging material efficiency, reducing the generation of waste, orenabling the recovery and reuse of discarded material is a element of sustainable development. Waste oils’ meansany mineral or synthetic lubrication or industrial oils which have become unfit for the use for which they wereoriginally intended, such as used combustion engine oils and gearbox oils, lubricating oils, oils for turbines andhydraulic oils. All waste oils are characterisated as dangerous. It is important to determine what dangerousproperties the oil possesses.This will ensure that anyone who participates in the transfer of waste to be aware of all risks and liability in case ofpossible accidents on the traffic infrastructure.Waste oil can run the dangerous characteristics: ecotoxic H14, H5 Harmful and /or H7 carcinogenic, and becausethese containers of dangerous waste must be properly marked, as a basic prerequisite for adequate treatment duringthe operation of manipulation.The composition of the used oil varies extremely widely depending on the sources, mixes and processing that takesplace.This paper presents the results of which were conducted in the period since 2003. by 2009. year.The motor oil was mainly contaminated with Pb and Zn. The highest concentration of metals in used motor oil were4110mg Pb/kg, 1260mg Zn/kg. The highest concentration of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons(PAH) was 148,7mg/kg. In general lead concentrations have decreased (following the withdrawal of leaded petrol)and there has been a corresponding increase in zinc. This may be due to an increase in the use of aluminium-zincalloys in engine componentry. It is also likely that although lead is no longer used in petrol, it will continue to bepresent in used oil, due to its use in engine components.Cars, trucks, agricultural machinery and boats require regular replacement of oil. Inadequate treatment of containersfor storage of waste oils in their transport, and disposal of used oil the wrong way, can lead to a chemical accidentand pollution of land and water.In order to reduce possible risks is necessary classification and characterization of waste oil, as the basis for theselection of the optimal measures to prevent and protect people and the environment in all phases of care for thistype of waste.Key words: waste, oil, motor oil, characterisatin, classification, transport

INTRODUCTIONTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 42Waste oil is in use for many years, ever since the thirties of the 20th century when it was organized recycling ofused lubricating oils from motor vehicles. Under the waste oils to include any mineral or synthetic lubricants andindustrial oils which have become unfit for use for its original purpose, such as used oil mechanical and burningexchange, lubricants, turbine oils and hydraulic oils.In the context of this paper the term used oil means any semi-solid or liquid used product consisting wholly orpartially of mineral oil or synthesized hydrocarbons (synthetic oil), oil residues from tanks, oil-water mixtures andemulsions. They derive from industrial sources and neindustrijskih where the use of lubrication, the hydraulictransport or transfer heat as electrical insulators (dielectric) or for other purposes, and whose characteristics havechanged during use and thus become Non-use in purpose they were originally intended.Synthetic oil can cover a wide range of chemicals, but they usually are: synthetic hydrocarbons, hydrocarbon esters,phosphate esters, glycol; chlorine hydrocarbons, silicone oils and others.Synthetic hydrocarbons are similar in composition to those found in the base oil, but were synthesized using achemical process in which the combined basic elements, carbon and hydrogen. Hydrocarbon reaction products areesters of organic acids and alcohol, and include a wide range of products. Phosphate esters of the products obtainedby reaction of phosphoric acid and alcohol. Esters are used in lubricants and are usually heat stable. Glycol arepolihidroksilovani alcohol, and esters, contain oxygen, and cover a wide range of compounds including ethyleneglycol, which is used to lower the temperature freezing 2 .Management of used oils is particularly important because large amounts of which are globally generated, becauseof their potential for direct reuse, treatment, regeneration and because the improper handling of used oils may causeadverse consequences for the environment. Used lubricants and other oils are an important part of the amount oforganic liquid waste generated worldwide and the terms of the three most important aspects of used oils: the contentof impurities, the energy value and content of hydrocarbons.Used oil contains primarily hydrocarbons. Also, do not contain additives (eg. plumb) and dirt due to physicalcontamination and chemical reactions that occur during its use. Contamination of used oils may originate frommixing with other oily fluids or liquid waste, which can seriously affect the processes of recycling or re-utilization.Reducing the use of additives that contain lead in gasoline is a highly effective way to reduce, over time, lead inused motor oil. This is a very important and effective way to reduce risk in the management of used motor oil,especially when used for burning used oil in order to obtain power with a significant lead emissions into theatmosphere.In order to provide safe handling of waste oils by the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning, Republic ofSerbia defined the Regulation on management of waste oils, including: collection, transport, storage, treatment andcontrolled disposal of the remains after treatment, reporting, compensation for management, costs, tariffclassifications, transitional and final provisions, and determine measures to prevent and reduce harmful impacts onthe environment and health people 6 .CLASSIFICATION, CHARACTERIZATION AND CATEGORIZATION USED WASTE OILWaste oils used are classified catalog of waste disposal is a summary list of the origins of his creation,Regulations on the conditions and manner of classification, packaging and storage of raw materials,Official Gazette 55/01, as follows:• waste lubricant oil to be classified in group 13, 05 01, 12 01, 08 03 19*, 08 04 17*, 19 02 07*, 19 08 10* or 20 01 26* and the dangerous waste, as shown in table 1.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 43Table 1. Types of waste lubricating oil05 WASTE OIL REFINING, PURIFICATION OF NATURAL GAS AND PYROLYTIC TREATMENT OFCOAL05 01 Wastes from petroleum refining05 01 02 Sludge from desalination05 01 03 Sludge from the bottom of the tank05 01 04 Sour-base mud05 01 05 Oil Stains expired05 01 06 Oily sludge from the plant maintenance procedures and equipment .....08 03 WASTE OF PRODUCTION, FORMULATION, SUPPLY AND USE PRINTING INK08 03 19 Dispersed oil08 04 Wastes from production, formulation, supply and use of adhesives and sealants (includingwaterproof products)08 04 17 Oil terpentinske resin12 WASTE FROM SHAPING AND PHYSICAL AND MECHANICAL SURFACE METAL AND PLASTICPROCESSING12 01 Wastes from shaping and physical and mechanical surface treatment of metals and plastics12 01 06 Mineral oils containing mechanical halogen (except emulsions and solutions)12 01 07 Mineral oil machine that does not contain halogen (except emulsions and solutions)12 01 08 Machining emulsions and solutions containing halogen12 01 09 Machining emulsions and solutions that do not contain halogen12 01 10 Synthetic machining oils12 01 12 Spent waxes and fats13 WASTE OF OIL AND THE REST OF LIQUID FUELS (except edible oils and those in chapters 05, 12and 19)13 01 Waste hydraulic oils13 01 01 Hydraulic oils containing RSV13 01 04 Chlorine emulsion13 01 05 Nochlorine emulsion13 01 09 Mineral oil hydraulic nochlorine13 01 10 Mineral oil hydraulic nochlorine13 01 11 Synthetic hydraulic oils13 01 12 Immediately biodegradable hydraulic oils13 01 13 Other hydraulic oils13 02 Waste engines oil, gear oil and lubrication ....19 02 Wastes from physical/chemical treatment of waste (including dehromiranje, decijanizaciju andneutralization) dechromium plating, decyaniding, neutralization19 02 07 Oil and concentrates from separation19 08 Wastes from the plant from waste water treatment that are not otherwise specified19 08 10 Mixture of grease and oil separation from oil/water containing different from those mentioned in 1920 MUNICIPAL WASTE (household waste and similar commercial, industrial and institutional wastes)including separately collected fractions20 01 Separately collected fractions (except 15 01)20 01 26 Oils and fats other than those mentioned in 20 01 25

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 44• Waste cooking oil belongs to the group of 20 to the catalog of waste (20 01 25) and a harmless waste (unlessprovided for disposal to the environment-deposit, upon the ground, the dump or discharge into waterways).Waste used oils are categorized in the Republic of Serbia under the Regulation on management of waste oils(Official Gazette 60/2008) in the following categories:• 1. category - waste oil mineral halogen content below 0.2% and total polychlorinated bi-and terfenilima below20mg/kg. This oil can be processed and re-used for the production of fresh oil.• 2. categories - waste mineral oils, synthetic and plant origin halogen content above 0.2% and below 0.5% andtotal polihlorovnim bi-and terfenilima above 20 mg/kg and less than 30 mg/kg. This oil can be used as fuel inenergy production facilities and equipment installed power greater than or equal to 3 MW or in furnaces for theproduction of clinker in cement.• 3. categories - waste oil of unknown origin and all other waste oil with a halogen content above 0.5%, totalpolychlorinated bi-and terfenilima above 30 mg/kg and the ignition temperature below 55°C. This oil must beburned in furnaces for burning of dangerous waste a minimum efficiency of 99.99%.• 4. categories - poliglikoli/oligoglikoli, waste oil on the basis of poliglikola/oligoglikola nemešavanja that workswith other oils 1 and 2 categories and special requests in the process of removing the need to collect separately.Regulation has prohibited mixing different categories of waste oil, and allowed the mixing of waste oil only 1 and 2category if they are designed for heat treatment.Characterization of waste oil used is done in the study used waste oil management for further proceedings. Wasteused oils are tested on different physical-chemical parameters such as: net caloric value, the contents of PCB-b, thecontent of toxic heavy metals and arsenic content of fuel viscosity, the content of easily volatile compounds,chlorine content of Cl, with sulfur, fluorine F, bromine, etc. No.Waste oil can be dangerous following characteristics:- H5 harm (R65): total concentration of hydrocarbons (C8-C40) in the trash 25% or more (250000mg/kg(ppm));- H7 canceration - for waste oils which are basically used to fuel canceration category 3 (1%), while for otherwaste oils and lubricants used canceration category 2 (0.1%)a) if the content of hydrocarbons, C6 - C10 (gas fraction), 0.1% (1000 mg/kg) or more or a diesel fraction,C10 - C25, 1% (10000mg/kg) or more;b) If the waste contains hydrocarbons 0.1% (1000mg/kg) or more if the Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons(PAH) concentrations greater than 1%.- H14 ecotoxicity (R51/53): if the total fuel concentration 2.5% (25000mg/kg) or more, or if the totalconcentration of hydrocarbons 25% (250000mg/kg) or more;- H13 can each way, after the delay, for example squeeze through produce any of the above features (BaselConvention) or H15 Directive 2008/98/EC: the total hydrocarbons 20 000 mg/kg, total hydrocarbons in theliquid waste 100 mg/l, respectively through of liquids 1000mg/kg dry weight.Depending on the characterization and content of dangerous components in waste used oil or solid waste that iscontaminated with oil is determined by the method of transport.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 45In Table 2 there is an example of the classification of certain wastes which comprise or contain or are contaminatedwith oil. Classification is made according to international regulations for road transport - ADR (EuropeanAgreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road - European agreement oninternational road transport of dangerous goods) 3 .THE TYPE OF WASTEUSED OILOther motor oils, gearoils and lubricationTable 2. Classification of waste used oil and wastes that contain oil transportWASTECHARACTERINDEXNUMBEROF WASTEADRCLASSPACKINGGROUPUNNUMBERdangerous waste 13 02 08* It is not classified according to ADRCast waste oils, mixturesof dangerous waste oilWaste oil emulsion, saltemulsionSolid waste contaminatedwith oildangerous waste 13 08 99 3 III 1993dangerous waste 13 08 02 It is not classified according to ADRdangerous waste 15 02 02 4.1 III 1325The remains of fuel dangerous waste 13 07 03 3 III 1202Of oil filters dangerous waste 16 01 07 4.1 III 3175Contaminated waste oilpackagingPackaging waste washedfrom the oildangerous waste 15 01 10 3 III 199315 01 04INVESTIGATION OF WASTE OIL USED IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIATesting of waste oil used in the Republic of Serbia for their classification are carried out since 2002. year. Thecomposition of used oils extremely varied depending on the source, and mixing and processing procedures.Samples of waste used motor oil, observed during the 2003rd by 2009. years were analyzed, the total concentrationof 8 heavy metals (Cr, Cu, Zn, Ni, Cd, Pb, Ba, As) of which As, metalloid. Heavy metals are defined as elementsthat show the properties of metals (ductility, conductivity, stability as cations, etc.) and atomic number greater of 20They are important environmental pollutants and many of them are toxic even at very low concentrations.Samples of waste used oil is extracted, by 1 gr. oil is treated with 10cm³ in the ratio of 1:1 HNO 3 . The sample isheated with reflux from 10 to 15 minutes without boiling. After cooling, 5 cm³ concentrated HNO 3 , added to, andcontinues with heating by reflux for 30 minutes. Mixture evaporation to about 5 cm³. The sample is cooled, afterwhich it is added to water 2cm and 3cm³ 30% H 2 O 2 . The vessel is covered with sahat glass and heated again tobegin the reaction of peroxide. After cooling, H 2 O 2 (30%), added in 1 cm³ solution.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 46The sample is then heated at 50°C ± 5°C, 2 hours. After cooling, 10cm³, concentrated HCl is added to the samplecontainer and cover sahat glass. This mixture is heated with reflux for 15 more minutes 3 .This digestion, acids dissolve almost all elements that are available in the environment. To determine the content ofCr, Cu, Zn, Ni, Cd, Pb and Ba using a flame atomic absorption spectrometry (FAAS), an instrument Varian SpectraAA-200, as well as kuplovana induced plasma, optical emission spectrometer ICP - OES, VISTA-PRO Varian.Metalloid; as hydride technique is analyzed on the instrument VGA-77, + Spectra AA20, Varian, Australia.RESULTS OF TESTING OF WASTE OIL USEDDuring the period since 2003. by 2009. in the Republic of Serbia there was a adoption of new legislation in the fieldof waste used oils. The types of analyzed parameters were changed over the years. Thus, the release of theRegulation on management of waste oils (Official Gazette RS 60/2008), started testing of waste oil and glycolcontent, and fuel, and setting up a trial system using waste oil as an alternative fuel is introduced as a mandatoryparameter and net caloric value. Given that during the said period of examination was carried out uneven, and thatthe examination of content of heavy metals and As, carried all these years, that these parameters are selected fordisplay in their work. Test results are shown in table 3.Table 3. Results of waste motor oilIdentificationof samples11-08611-22311-40811-16511-12911-15011-74611-11911-01011-13611-35711-97911-00611-303Year 2003 2003 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2007 2008 2008 2009 2009Metals content (mg/kg)Plumb (Pb) 1830 4110 5 5 5 9 100 20

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 47CONCLUSIONNo matter, as in all European countries (except in Serbia) is no longer used gasoline to tetraethylplumb, to preventdetonativnog combustion, will lead because of its characteristics continue to be present in used motor oils.Data are collected in the period since 2003. by 2009. showed that the concentration of metals is very variable,showing diversity of motor oils that are present in the market. Motor oil was mainly contaminated with lead andzinc. You should continue with further investigations in order to monitor the situation in the minimization of wasteused oil and dangerous characteristics of waste themselves of used oil.Used oil pollution is a current problem, and is particularly pronounced when the owners of cars, trucks, agriculturalmachinery, and other mobile and stationary machines, you uncontrolled use and store used oil. Waste used oils aredangerous waste, and their proper management, preventing possible environmental pollution caused by theirimproper disposal, processing or transport, and possible highlighting. In most cases it is not enough to determinewhether the waste oil used dangerous waste due to the presence of hydrocarbons, even if the oil content makes itdangerous waste. All dangerous waste characteristics must be identified later for those who delay or re-utilizewaste, and may do so in a safe manner.BIBLIOGRAPHY1. Environment Agency HWR08: “How to find out if waste oil and wastes that contain oil are Hazardous”, Version3.1, Bristol, Jun 2007.2. European Commission, „Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council“, of 19 November2008. on waste and repealing certain Directives, Official Journal of the European Union L 312/3, 22.11.2008.3. Reports on the Examination of the City Institute of Public Health, No. 11-086/2003; 11-223/2003; 11-408/2003;11-165/2003; 11-150/2004; 11-129/2004; 11-746/2005; 11-1190/2005; 11-010/2006; 11-136/2007; 11-357/2008;11-979/2008; 11-006/2009; 11-303/2009.4. P. Petrovic, N. Mićović "Contamination, Pollution and the Possibility of Applying Rerafinata Used MineralMotor Oils" (International Scientific Conference "Environment Today, 21-23. 04th 2008g., Belgrade, DomEngineer Nikola Tesla, K. Miloš 9, Magazine "ECOLOGICA.5. "Regulation on Conditions and Manner of Classification, Packaging and Storage of Raw Materials," OfficialGazette RS, 55/01.6. "Regulation on Management of Waste Oils", Official Gazette 60/2008.7. UNEP (2005) - Technical Guidelines on Used oil Re - refining or other Re - uses of Previously Used Oil,Geneva, 2005.8. P. Petrovic, N. Mićović: "The Problem of Used Mineral Motor Oils, 11 International Conference "Qualityand Reliability "ICDQM-2008", Belgrade, jun.2008, Competitive Engineering, pp. 650-655.9. Petrovic P. "Excerpts from the Belgrade Declaration to the Sixth Ministerial Conference" Environment forEurope "(Scientific magazine ECOLOGICA - No. 51, Belgrade, 2008, Scientific-Technical Society forEnvironmental Protection of Serbia, pp. 65-70.10. P.Petrović: Interaction of Engines and Motor Oils (Tribology, Contamination, Maintenance, Ecology,Standards), Monograph, 2007g., Belgrade.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 48UDK:656.073.436:620.26628.4THE METHODOLOGY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF WASTE FROMVESSELS FUNCTIONING AS SAFE MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT1 Marija Vukić, 2 Ivana Kunc, 3 Vladanka Presburger - Ulniković1 Kirilo Savic Institute, 51 Vojvode Stepe Street, Belgrade, Serbia2 Danube Commission, 25 Benczur, Budapest, Hungary3 Union University ,Faculty of Ecology and Environmental Protection, 11000 Belgrade, 62–64 Cara Dusana Street,11000 Belgrade, SerbiaAbstract: With an aim to note the amount and structure of waste from the exploitation of vessels, as well as safetransport from a specialised waste disposal terminal for the reception of the abovementioned waste to finaldestinations for its treatment and disposal, it is necessary to identify and characterise waste. Starting from the factthat the research results in this field can hardly be found in the literature, in this paper, we will preset themethodology for conducting identification, classification and characterisation of the stated waste materialsfunctioning as safe multimodal transport which was developed during the realisation of a technologicaldevelopment project. The types of waste materials which are formed during the exploitation and maintenance ofvessels, their state of matter, a degree of danger to people and the natural environment, as well as a method oftreatment have been identified. An algorithm for a simpler connection between danger classes and danger categoriesand a risk range, i.e. a degree of danger, has been devised. Moreover, a method for labelling receptacles fortemporary storage on a vessel and a terminal for the reception of waste at the riverside, as well as containers fortheir transport by road and rail traffic, has been analysed, which contributes to an efficient and safe treatment ofwaste materials from vessels in multimodal transport. The results have been shaped into a set of original tables andalgorithms, formatted according to the requirements of the developed integrated model for managing wastematerials from vessels, and a software solution for managing their transport to final destinations for treatment anddisposal.Key words: vessels, waste, methodology, waste classification, characterisation, risk range, labelling, multimodaltransport of waste, tabulated items, algorithmsINTRODUCTIONCertain types of waste from vessels are treated at the very place of their development (in the engine rooms of avessel). Other waste materials, which are received at a harbour, quays or specialised terminals, undergo a furthertreatment or disposal. For that purpose, waste materials are transported to pre-determined destinations with adequateplants for recycling, incineration, temporary storage, waste composting, filtering of waste water or to depositingunits. In the literature, the aspects of identification and classification of waste materials formed in this way have notreceived due attention, together with labelling for the purposes of selecting and storage on a vessel itself and theirfurther transport by rail and road infrastructure.In this paper, we will present the results of the research conducted during the realisation of the technologicaldevelopment project TR 213037 1 , which provide a complete frame of the types of waste materials which aredeveloped during the exploitation and maintenance of vessels, state of matter, a degree of danger to people and thenatural environment, as well as a method of treatment. One of the significant research aims was the development of

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 49the methodology which contributes to a fast and efficient realisation of activities related to identification, selection,classification and adequate labelling of packing or containers for temporary storage of waste on the deck of a vesseland waste disposal terminal for the reception of waste at the riverside, together with good preparation and adequatefurther labelling of the receptacles with waste for further transport by road and rail traffic. In the paper, thismethodological approach has been illustrated with the example of two types of waste materials (waste oil, and wasteincluding mercury, a dangerous element of its content).METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CHARACTERISATION OF WASTE MATERIALS FROMVESSELSThe suggested methodology for implementing a fast preliminary characterisation of waste from vessels for thepurpose of an efficient and safe mode of proceeding on a vessel itself, a safe and fast delivery at reception points –terminals (with a minimal stay of a vessel), a quick selection of concessionaires for waste collection and transport,accurate labelling of waste packing for the purpose of using different means of transport, as well as theminimisation of hazardous effects on working and natural environment, includes several key steps:1. the selection, identification, preliminary classification, choice of waste treatment on a vessel and selectionof designating packing and receptacles for temporary storage of waste from the exploitation of a vessel onthe vessel by means of using original tables developed in the project (for non-hazardous and hazardouswaste);2. rapid evaluation of a further mode of proceeding and treatment of certain types of waste with an aim ofselecting a concessionaire who needs to be invited to the reception of waste in a harbour and its collectionfor the sake of transport to the final destination by implementing the same tables;3. a fast and detailed classification and preliminary characterisation of the hazardous waste features (unless itis the case of a mixture of various hazardous materials) by means of applying the original tables, alsodevised in the project);4. a fast preliminary estimate of danger categories and a risk range for particular waste materials and dangerclasses – according to the original algorithm;5. getting familiar with possible courses of waste materials quickly, from the place of development on a vesselto “the end of the life cycle” in the place of processing or disposal – according to the original algorithmsdevised for the hazardous materials by which certain types of waste become dangerous in nature;6. a rapid realisation of possible emissions and risks to the working and natural environment – by means ofemploying the tables from the literature 2 which have been complemented by the authors of this paper; and7. getting familiar with the manner of labelling packing and recpectles with certain types of waste (not only ona vessel but also for the land transport).With a set of tables and algorithms, certain data can be obtained for the purpose of making efficient estimates anddecisions related to the activities of selection, identification, classification and characterisation of waste (except forthe cases when it is necessary to engage an accredited laboratory), danger estimates and the estimates of possibleharmful effects on the natural environment, as well as the data on labelling the waste packing for the purposes of theutilisation of other means of transport for rail and road traffic.The development of tables and algorithms for the identification and classification of waste from theexploitation of vesselsIn order to develop standardised tables for an efficient identification and classification of waste from theexploitation of vessels, it was necessary to conduct the identification and classification of waste from vesselsbeforehand, in accordance with the relevant international and national regulative. During the process, we took intoaccount the existence of the two basic categories of waste from vessels – hazardous and non-hazardous waste.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 50We also took into consideration the fact that a rough classification of non-hazardous waste (litter/ utility waste) andsecondary raw materials (paper, wooden panels, glass, waste plastic, metal etc) and hazardous waste should beconducted, and also to set the procedures for the treatment of all types of waste in the stage of temporary storageand to prepare appropriate receptacles with adequate labels for a fast delivery of waste to the expert teams inharbours and efficient preparation for different means of transport (road and rail).For that reason almost all types of waste materials from vessels have been identified, and the results of furtherresearch, gathered in accordance with the European and National Regulative, have been incorporated into theoriginally devised tables, which served as a basis of the proposed methodological approach for this stage of theabovementioned waste treatment.The tables include a sequence of the data on waste types from vessels and the labels for labelling waste on a vessel.Within the tables there are six-digit waste codes (EWC codes) from European 3 (and National 4 ) Waste Catalogue, thephysical condition of waste, together with possible methods for waste treatment (recycling, burning, biologicaltreatment and disposal). In normal functioning conditions of a vessel, and with an aim to meet the international andnational regulation requirements, the tables should be supplemented with a column including a recorded amount ofsecondary raw materials and hazardous waste (for the sake of recording delivered amounts of waste in harbours).For the purpose of labelling waste receptacles or packing on a vessel itself, the symbols selected are beingreconciled between the experts of the sub-Danube countries 5 and the representatives of the European projectWANDA 6 at the Danube Commission Counselling 7 . The tables have not been presented at the stated counselling butthey are present on the Danube Commission website, and up to now there has been no negative response from thescientific or expert public. In the literature, there is no report with such a level of detailedness in the case of theclassification of waste material developed during the exploitation of a vessel, which leads to the conclusion that theexistence of such a comprehensive tabulated data illustration is justifiable, the data which is necessary for the stageof waste management on a vessel itself.Identification and classification of non-hazardous wasteThe waste without hazardous materials (non-hazardous waste) does not have a harmful effect on the naturalenvironment and people’s health.In Table 1, the results of a detailed identification of non-hazardous recyclable types of waste from vessels (wastepaper, plastic packing, metal packing, transparent and stained glass) have been summarised, wheareas Table 2includes the data on non-hazardous utility waste. Some methods of treatment of certain types on a vessel 6 and afterthe reception in a harbour 7 have been suggested, as well as the labels for labelling the packing of certain groups ofwaste 6 .Identification and classification of hazardous wasteThe same methodology has been applied to the identification and classification of hazardous waste from theexploitation of vessels and the results are presented in Tables 3–3g. In the stated tables, the results of a detailedidentification and classification of the following types of waste materials from the exploitation have beensummarised: oiled and greased waste (sloughs, various waste oil and grease, liquid fuel waste, oiled filters, wastematerials from oil/ water separators on a vessel, oiled cleaning cloths, and the other problematic waste).Possible procedures and effects of hazardous waste processing from vesselsMore data on possible operations and procedures of processing certain types of hazardous waste from Tables 3–3g,varying according to the state of matter of waste, as well as the realised effects of the treatment, can be found inTable 4.

Table 1. Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels – recycled wasteGroupsforselectioRecyclable WasteSubgroups of waste and thename of waste1. Waste Paper:Paper, newspaper,magazines, brochuresPaper containers(e.g. for food)2. Plastic packingPlastic bottles (e.g. fordrinks, other food, detergentsand substances for cleaning,hygiene).Note: it doesn’trefer to plastic containersmade of dangerous waste:e.g. engine oil and other)3. Metal packing- Tin cans for food- Lids for the jars- Aluminium foil (withoutmetal containers ofhazardous waste – e.g. ofgrease or oil)4. Transparent GlassNon- stained glass (bottlesand jars)EWCID byEWCState ofmatterCharacteristicsof waste20 01 01 S NWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentIt is collected into paper bags or boxes;Put into containers;Handed over into containers in a harbourlabelled with:Measures and possible ways of managing the waste15 01 01 S N + +RY; CPPDSRW; legal entityIt is collected into paper bags (sacks);Put into containers on a ship;Delivered into containers in a harbour labelledwith:S N15 01 02+ +15 01 04 S N15 01 07 S NRY; CPPDSRW; legal entity, commerceIt is collected separately into plastic boxes;The boxes are emptied into containers on aship; Delivered into containers in a harbourlabelled with:RY, legal entityIt is collected separately into plastic boxes;The boxes are emptied into containers on aship;Delivered into containers in a harbour labelledwith:MIN R REC B D+ + + + ++ ++ +Paper andcardboardfactoryPlant forprocessingplasticmaterialsPlant forprocessingmetalGlasspackingfactory++5. Stained GlassStained glass containers(bottles and jars)15 01 07 S NRY; CPPDSRW commerce and legal entityIt is collected separately into plastic box;The boxes are emptied into containers on aship;Delivered into containers in a harbourlabelled with:+ + GlasspackingfactoryRY; CPPDSRW, commerce and legal entityLegend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID –Waste Identification Number; S – Solid Waste; N – Non- hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; CPPDSRW –Company for the purchase,processing and distribution of secondary raw materials; МIN – Minimising; R – Reuse; REC – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Disposal; E – Evaluation

Table 2 Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels – other solid non-hazardous utility wasteGroups for selectionSubgroups of waste and thename of wasteEWCIDbyEWCState ofmatterCharacteristics of wasteWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentMeasures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B D Bio F/HHazardous waste from vessels1. Other solid (nonhazardous)utility wasteExcluding:- Recyclable waste- Problematic waste- oil and oiled waste- load relicts1.1.Biodegradable and kitchenwaste (litter, food remains..)-to be collected separately (e.g.in plastic sacks)-To be disposed with the sackinto the container on the vessels-To be dispatched to a containermarked with:20 01 08+S N + +C1.2. Light bulbs 20 01 36 S N + + C1.3. Waste tyre 16 01 03S N-RY,+Competent tyrecollector’swarehouse; C1.4. ceramics 17 01 03 S N-competent collector,+ + +1.5. Textile 20 01 11 S N + + + F/H +1.6. Small instruments20 01 36 S N-commerce+ + + +, C1.7. Plastic (except for plasticbottles from Table 1.)20 01 39 S N + +1.8. Metal (except for metalpacking from Tab. 1.) 20 01 40 S N + + +1.9. Glass (except for glassbottles from Table 1.)20 01 02 S N + + +1.10. Small electricalequipment/ parts (except forproblematic materials from20 01 36 S N + + + +, C +Table 3.)1.11.Wood different from theone listed in 20 01 37 20 01 38 S H- To be collected separately- Procedure of delivery:+ + + +2. Large-volume solid materialsNа) give notification to theharbour personnel(waste) from the vesselsb) deliver to the harbourSpersonnel or20 03 07c) deliver to the Collectingcentre marked with:+ +, C++Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID –Waste Identification Number; S – Solid Waste; N – Non- hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; CPPDSRW –Company for the purchase,processing and distribution of secondary raw materials; МIN – Minimising; R – Reuse; REC – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; E – Evaluation, H– hazardous waste

Table 3 Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups forselectionSubgroups of waste and thename of wasteEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwasteWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentMeasures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B DBioF/HHazardous waste from Vessels1. Oiled and GreasedWasteProcedure on a ship:1.1. Sloughs are collected in engine room inthe bottom of the vessel+ + +1.1. Sloughs1.2.Waste oil and grease :16 10 01 L H 1.2.Old and other oils:Collected in specially sealed containers witha) ship oils from shipmentL H13 04 01the label:Way of delivery:b) ship oils from drainageTo announce waste delivery to the personneltanker on the weir 13 04 02 L Hof the harbour/terminal* * CC-- -++c) hydraulic waste oilsComplete waste delivery to the personnel ofcontaining RSV 13 01 01 L H the harbour or in centre for wastecollection with the following label:* +, C - - +d) other hydraulic waste oils13 01 13 L H * * +e) mineral chlorine engineTaking slough waste from vessels in harbouroils, gearbox oils and grease 13 02 04 L His performed by using the equipment* * +responding to demands of Europeanf) mineral non- chlorinestandards EN 1305 and EN 1306, as well asengine oils, gearbox oils and 13 02 05 L H the demands of local regulative.* * +greaseg) synthetic engine wasteoils, gearbox oils and grease 13 02 06 L HNote:The price of admission for muddy waters islearned from the harbour personnel;Waste oils are delivered in the harbour to the* * +competent oil collector in the area;h) other engine oils, 13 02 08 L HThe mixture of oils is examined in an* * +gearbox oils and greaseadequate laboratory before delivering to thei) mixture of oils containingcompetent concessionaire.chemicals 13 08 99 L H C +Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Disposal; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possible treatment;H– hazardous waste; F/H - phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3а: Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionSubgroups of waste and thename of wasteEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwasteWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentMeasures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B D Bio F/H1.3. Waste from liquid fuel:а) waste from fuel and diesel а) 13 07 01 L HProcedure on a ship :To be collected in specially sealed containerslabelled with:* . +б) waste from other fuels(including mixtures) 13 07 03 L H * +Hazardous waste from vesselsв) mud from fuel oil13 08 99Way of delivery:purificationS HTo announce waste delivery to the personnelC +1.4. Oiled filters1.5. Waste from oil/waterseparators on the vessel:16 01 07 S Hof the harbour/terminalComplete waste delivery to the personnel ofthe harbour or in collection centre of wastewith the following label:* * Cа) solid matters from the 13 05 01 S H * . Crooms for waste andoil/water separatorsb) mud from the separatorsS13 05 02 , HRemarks:* C CМRemains of the fuel or oiled liquid, solid orc) oils from the separators13 05 06 L H muddy waste are delivered in the harbour to thecompetent oil collector in the area;d) oiled water from* * +oil/water separatorse) mixtures of waste fromthe rooms for waste andoil/water separatorsf) absorbent- active coal13 05 0713 05 08LL,SHHThe mixture of oils is examined in anadequate laboratory before delivering to thecompetent concessionaire for the purpose ofidentification, classification, characterizationand categorization.Waste is delivered in the harbour to the**CC Ccontaining dangerousrepresentatives of competent collector orcharacteristics15 02 02 S H processor in the area, and it is placed into(contaminated with oils)competent collector’s repository.* + +Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H - phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3b Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionHazardous waste from vesselsSubgroups of waste and thename of waste1.6. oiled waste fromwashing and cleaning thereservoirа) oiled waste water fromwashing the reservoir(slops)b) oiled scale and mud fromthe process of cleaning thereservoir1.7. oiled materials fromcleaning (cloth)1.8. oiled ballast waterEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwaste13 08 02 L HWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentIn specially sealed containers marked with:Way of delivery:Measures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B D Bio F/H* C C +To announce waste delivery to the personnel ofthe harbour/terminal16 07 08 S H + +15 02 02 S HComplete waste delivery to the personnel ofthe harbour or in collection centre of wastewith the following label:* + +16 10 01 L HNote:The mixture of oils is examined in anadequate laboratory before delivering to thecompetent concessionaire for the purpose ofidentification, classification, characterizationand categorization.+Waste is delivered in the harbour to therepresentatives of competent collector orprocessor in the area, and it is placed intocompetent collector’s repository.Oiled ballast water is sent into competentcollector of waste water’s cistern.Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H - phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3c: Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionSubgroups ofwaste and thename of wasteEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwasteWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentMeasures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R REC B D Bio F/H2.1.1. Batteries:а) Leadbatteries16 06 01 S HProcedure on a ship :To be collected in specially sealedcontainers labelled with:* * C * +b)Nickelcadmiumbatteries16 06 02 S H * * C * +Way of delivery:Hazardous waste from vesselsc) Batterieswith mercuryd) Alkalinebatteriese) Otherbatteries16 06 03 S H To announce delivery of waste to the * * C *personnel of harbour/terminal16 06 04(except16 06 03)S HComplete waste delivery to thepersonnel of the harbour or in * C +collection centre of waste with thefollowing label:16 06 05 S H * * +f) Householdbatteries(batteriesincluded in a),b) and c) andnon-classifiedbatteriescontainingtheseNote:20 01 33 S H Waste is delivered to representativesof recycling yard (RY) in the harbour,or to commerce representatives in thearea, and it is placed into competentcollector’s repository.+ +Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H- phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3d: Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionHazardous waste from vesselsSubgroups of waste and thename of waste2.1.2. Waste from smallelectrical and electronicequipment (devices/parts):а) waste equipmentcontainingorcontaminated with PCB(except transformer andcondenser)b) waste equipmentcontainingchlorofluorohydrocarbonHCFC,HFCc) waste equipmentcontaining free asbestosEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwaste16 02 10 S H16 02 11Way of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentProcedure on a ship :To be collected separately intospecial plastic bags orcontainers.Way of delivery:Put the bags with waste into acontainer in harbour with theappropriate label:Measures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B D Bio F/H* + +S H * + * +16 02 12 S H * Cd) waste equipmentcontaining dangerouscomponents differentfrom those given in 16 0209 to 16 02 12e) waste equipmentdifferent from those givenin 16 02 09 to 16 02 13Notes:16 02 13 S D This waste includes tubular * + C +lamps;Waste is delivered to16 02 14 S Hrepresentatives of recycling yard(RY) in the harbour, or to thecompetent collector in the area,* * + Cafter which pretreatment is done.Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H- phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3е: Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionSubgroups ofwaste and thename of wasteEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwasteMeasures and possible ways of managing wasteWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environment MIN R Rec B D Bio F/HHazardous waste from vessels2.1.3. fluorescenttubes (lamps) andother wastecontainingmercury2.1.4. Waste fromusing coats (paintsand varnishes),adhesives, devicesfor sealing andprinting inkа) Waste paintsand varnishescontaining organicsolvent or otherdangerousmaterials.b) Waste paintsand varnishes thatare not listed in 0801 11в) Contaminatedcleaning clothsand brushesг) Cans andcontainerscontaminated withthese materialsand other remains20 01 2108 01 11and(20 0127)08 01 12SHProcedure on a ship :(for waste listed in 2.1.3. 2.1.4.):To be collected in specially sealedcontainers marked with:L H * * + * +Way of delivery:To announce waste delivery to theharbour/terminal personnelComplete waste delivery to the personnelof the harbour or in collection centre ofwaste with the following label:L H * + CNotes:15 02 02 S H1. Waste is delivered to the* + * +representatives of competent collector inthe area, and it is placed into competentcollector’s repository.2. Thermal processing of wastecontaining RSV is followed by15 01 10 S H producing dioxin so it is necessary tohave appropriate devices on the plantsfor waste incineration because of airprotection.* + +C +Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H- phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3f: Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionSubgroups of waste and thename of wasteEWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwasteWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentMeasures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B D Bio F/H2.1.5 Waste solvents andorganic- materials solventwastea) solvents 20 01 13 L HProcedure on a ship :(for waste listed in 2.1.5 - 2.1.7.):To be collected in specially sealedcontainers labelled with:* + +Hazardous waste from vesselsb) other halogenated solventsand solvent mixturesc) other solvents and solventmixtures2.1.6.Waste medicines andmedical products14 06 02 L H C +14 06 03L H + +Way of delivery:20 01 32 S HTo announce waste delivery to theharbour/terminal personnelComplete waste delivery to thepersonnel of the harbour or incollection centre of waste with thefollowing label:* + C +Notes:1. Waste is delivered to therepresentatives of competent2.1.7. Antifreeze containingcollector in the area, and it isdangerous materials 16 01 14 L H placed into competent collector’s * * + . +repository.2. Thermal processing of wastecontaining RSV is followed byproducing dioxin so it is necessaryto have appropriate devices on theplants for waste incinerationbecause of air protection.Legend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H- phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

Table 3g: Classification of waste that originates from exploitation of cargo vessels– hazardous waste from the vesselsGroups for selectionSubgroups of waste and thename of waste2.1.8. Gases in containersunder pressure containingdangerous materials (aerosol,halon…)EWCID byEWCState of matterCharacteristics ofwaste16 05 04 G H2.1.9. The tree containingdangerous materials 20 01 37 S HWay of collecting:Ship/harbour/environmentTo be collected in specially sealed on the vessellabelled with:To be delivered in a harbour to special competentlegal entity for particular treatmentTo be collected in specially sealed containers onthe vessel labelled with:Measures and possible ways of managing wasteMIN R Rec B D Bio F/HSPECIAL TREATMENT* + +Hazardous waste from vessels2.2. Waste sanitary water andsewage2.3. Harmful liquid materials(category А, В or С)а) liquid waste based on watercontaining harmful materialsb) liquid waste based on waterdifferent from those listed in 1610 0116 10 01 L HWaste water is collected in two separatedcontainers on the vessel. Waste is delivered fromthe vessel in harbour using the equipmentresponding to demands of European standards EN1305 and EN 1306, as well as the demands oflocal regulative.1.If harmful materials contain oils and grease-in specially sealed containers labelled with:16 10 01 L H+Notes:16 10 02 L HThey are put into containers of the competentliquid waste collector+ +2.If they don’t contain oils and grease.c) concentrates based on watercontaining harmful materials 16 10 03 L H ++г) concentrates based on waterdifferent from those listed in 1610 03They are put into containers of the competent16 10 04 L H + +liquid waste collectorLegend: EWC – European Waste Catalogue; ID – Waste Identification Number; L –Liquid waste; S – Solid waste; N – Non-hazardous waste; RY- Recycling Yard; MIN – Minimising; R –Reuse; Rec – Recycling; B – Burning; D – Depositing; „-„ – processing not recommended; „ + „ processing recommended; C – conditioning necessary; М – mud waste; * - possibletreatment; H– hazardous waste; F/H- phisico-chemical treatment; Bio – biological treatment;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 61Table 4 Operations and proceduresof treating (processing) harmful wasteTypes ofOperation/process Achieved effects *waste**State ofaggregation***Physical treatmentAeration Se 1, 2, 3, 4 LProcessing with ammonia Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4 LHydrogen sorption Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 5 L, GConfiguration Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LDialysis Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 5 LDestilations Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 5 LElectrodialysis Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 LEncapsulation (enclosing into a capsule) St 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 L, SEvaporation (drying) Vr, Se 1, 2, 5 LFiltration Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 L, GFlocculation (purification) Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LFlotation Se 1, 2, 3, 4 LReverse osmosis Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 LSedimentation Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LThickening Se 1, 2, 3, 4 LVapor precossion by scrubber Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4 LChemical treatmentKaleinovanje (turning into powder byheating)VR1, 2, 5 LIon changes VR, Se, De 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LNeutralization De 1, 2, 3, 4 LOxidation De 1, 2, 3, 4 LPrecipitation Vr, Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LReduction De 1, 2 LSolvent extraction Se 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LSorption De 1, 2, 3, 4 LHeat TreatmentBurning (combustion) Vr, De 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 S, L, GPyrolysis Vr, De 3, 4, 6 S, L, GBiological TreatmentDeAvtive muds De 3 LAeration lagoons De 3 LAnaerobic dissolution De 3 LAnaerobic filters De 3 LDripping filters De 3 LLakes for waste stabilization De 3 LLegend for the table:*Effects: VR – volume reductionSe – separationDe – detoxicationSt – storage** Types of waste: 1 – inorganic chemical, heavy metals free2 -inorganic chemical, containing heavy metals3 – organic chemical, heavy metals free4 – organic chemical, with heavy metals5 - radioactive6 - biological7 – inflamable and8 - explosive*** State of waste: S - solidL - liquidG - gas

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 62Classification, characterisation and labelling of waste for the purposes of multimodal transportHazardous waste from the exploitation of vessels, after the reception on behalf of expert teams in a harbour, istransported by road or rail transport to the final destination for their treatment or disposal. For that reason, it isnecessary to carry out the preparation of waste which has labels for vessel labelling on the received containers orpacking (Tables 3 – 3g). Drawing on the fact that the national regulations on hazardous materials transport need tobe mainly in line with the international regulations ADN 8 and IMDG 9 (internal and maritime navigation), ADR 10(land transport) and RID 11 (rail transport), it turned out that it was necessary to conduct a classification for all theabove-stated dangerous waste materials, to determine the methods of labelling and to define the conditions oftransporting these materials, in accordance with the requirements of these regulations. Apart from that, it isnecessary to fulfil the requirements of other international institutions (the OECD, the UN, and the EuropeanCommission), conventions (the Basel Convention 12 , the MARPOL 73/78 Convention 13 ) and Decisions. Apart fromthe classification of hazardous waste, it is necessary to determine the categories of waste to be checked 12 , dangerouscharacteristics of waste and national waste labels.An additional problem is connected with different labels for labelling vehicles for transporting hazardous waste incertain types of traffic and packing for hazardous materials, which is particularly noticeable in the case of combined(multimodal) transport. National regulations in certain countries in the field of labelling waste materials are notreconciled with the stated international regulations, which additionally complicates the preparation of hazardouscargos for transport. That is why the adoption of universal labels for labelling packing according to GloballyHarmonised System of Classification and Labelling Chemicals for hazardous materials (GHS) 14 should be aspiredto.Legal claim for the classification of waste materials from the exploitation of vesselsIn the project, a thorough classification of waste was performed according to the following regulative:the list of waste from Annex VIII (List A) or Annex IX (List B) of the Basel Convention 12 and theEuropean Commission Regulations, which were transferred into the Law of the Republic of Serbia 16 ; the OECD lists (Green, Amber and Red) pursuant to No 1999/816/EC and the Decision of the Council C,the Amendments to this Decision, as well as the Code of the Republic of Serbia 4 ;European Catalogue of Waste (EWC List) 8 , in line with the Decision of the European Commission 19 , theRider to the Decision 2000/532/EC on the waste lists 20 , the Regulations of EC No 1013/2006 21 and theCode of the Republic of Serbia 4 .Additional classification in terms of the types of danger and labelling (through R-phrases for warning and S-phrasesfor announcement) was carried out pursuant to the EU Directives (Annex I B Directive 2001/59/EC 22 and Directive67/548/EEC 23 ) and the National Regulative 24 .According to the stated Regulative, there is a List with warning signs (of risk) R1 – R64 and the List with thepossible combinations of warning signs (in total 57 signs for all possible combinations). The warning signs R50 –R53 refer to the danger to aquatic organisms (R50 – very poisonous to aquatic organisms; R51 – poisonous toaquatic organisms and R52 – hazardous to aquatic organisms), whereas R53 and R58 indicate potential long-lastingundesirable effects on the aquatic, i.e. natural environment.With this Directive 23 the List of Chemicals was established (Chemical Legislation) of the European Union whichincludes the data for over 2500 substances on the degree of toxicity, risk, eco-toxicity, physical characteristics etc.In that way the following data on hazardous materials can be obtained:

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 63the R phrases – the degree of risk,the European code of hazardous materials,toxicity for the reproduction and degree of toxicity,mutagenicity and the category of mutagenicity.These data, together with the determined per cent content of a hazardous substance in waste (according to theanalyses) and the data on the burning point (from the data on safety lists), represent a basis for the successfulcharacterisation of hazardous waste.The List with announcement signs includes the signs S1 – S62. The List with the possible combinations ofannouncement signs is comprised of 17 signs in total, for all possible combinations.Legal claim for the categorisation of waste materials from the exploitation of vesselsThe categories of waste to be checked (Y List of the OECD) were determined pursuant to Annex I of the BaselConvention 12 and the Law of the Republic of Serbia 16 . The categories of waste, from the perspective of the activitiesfor operating waste, were determined according to the OECD Lists Q, D and R, which are included in Annex I (QList), Annex IIa (D List – with the labels of waste disposal procedures D1 – D15) and Annex IIb (R List – with thelabels of procedures for the reuse of waste R1 – R13) of the Directive 75/442/EEC 25 .Legal claim for the characterisation of waste materials from the exploitation of vesselsThe characterisation of Waste, i.e. the identification of the hazardous characteristic of waste, on the basis of H Listof the OECD (IWIC List) from Annex III of the Basel Convention 12 and H List from Annex III of the Directive91/689/EEC 26 , the Law of the Republic of Serbia 16 and the Code of the Republic of Serbia 27 . The waste ingredientswhich make waste dangerous were determined according to C List from Annex II of the Directive 91/689/EEC 28 . Inthe list, there are signs for 15 dangerous characteristics (H1 – H13). The sign H12 refers to eco-toxic wastecontents, and the sign H13 refers to waste which can, after disposal (e.g. drying), produce some of the dangerouscharacteristics of the previous 14.Identification and classification of waste materials, goods and waste according to Dangerous Goods List of theUNChemicals in transport, when on the market, i.e. when they are in transport, have their identification numbers. Forthe materials on the market the CAS Numbers are applied – the numbers of known substances from the register ofchemicals abstracts 29 (Chemicals Abstract Service).Certain lists for hazardous materials do not include raw materials and waste, hence, for the identification, we haveused the UN list of Dangerous Goods in Transport which is published by the Expert Committee for DangerousGoods Transport 29 under the auspices of the United Nations, which covers all types of dangerous goods andmaterials, regardless of the type of danger which they carry and the field of their application. The identificationnumber UN and the Class UN were determined according to the recommendations of the UN for the transport ofdangerous materials (recommendations of the UN for the transport of dangerous goods –the Model ofRegulations 30 ). This document defines and classifies the goods which are considered to be dangerous and regulatesthe safety and technical requirements in terms of packing, labelling and their manipulation. The document is thebasic instrument for the harmonisation of numerous international and national regulations on dangerous goodstransport. The European Accord on Transport of Dangerous Goods by land (ADR 10 ), rail (RID 11 ) and watertransport (ADN 8 ) completely adopted its structure and incorporated all its requirements. The main part of thisdocument is the list of dangerous goods, divided into nine classes, according to the type of basic danger.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 64Each material (goods) is assigned the following from the list: official name, identification UN number (four-digitnumber), class label for additional danger (if any) and a number of specific requirements (primarily in terms ofpacking). The UN number for one dangerous material (goods) is the same no matter the means of transport.The items of the stated list can be pure chemical materials, compounds, solutions, mixtures, almost all products orgroup matter or products having similar characteristics. In some cases the same substances, in differentconcentrations (in a mixture) or in a different state of matter, receive different UN numbers, which indicates theirdifferent hazardous features.In the UN List of Dangerous Goods, hazardous materials and articles which are not included in the first eight dangerclasses, are included as other hazardous materials within class 9 as materials which can be dangerous to the naturalenvironment.Identification and classification of hazardous goods on the basis of the directives in the sector of dangerousmaterials transportThe Council Directive 94/55/EC 32 on reconciliation of the law of the member states in relation to the hazardousgoods transport by road (ADR 10 ) and The Council Directive 96/49/EC 33 on the reconciliation of the law of themember states in relation to the hazardous goods transport by rail (RID 11 ) constitute the documents which withinAnnex define in details the types of hazardous goods, general requirements (according to classes), conditions,transport equipment, packing etc. The directive does not provide the member states with the right to establishspecific safety requirements for the national and international transport of hazardous goods by rail or road. Incomparison to the SEVESO Directive 34 , the stated directives do not leave enough space for national legislation inthat area. There is a similarity between the ADR 10 and RID 11 and SEVESO Directive 34 . However, the level ofprecision (details) of these directives gives an advantage to the content of national documents, which should be theresult of the SEVESO Directive 34 (together with by-laws).As early as 1956, the Report of the competent committee of the UN was adopted, which referred to theclassification and labelling of hazardous materials. Later, the duties of this committee were taken over by theEconomic – Social Council of the UN 35 – ECOSOC (United Nation ECOnomic and Social Council) with theheadquarters in Geneva.Further activities on solving the problem of international regulations of hazardous materials transport were taken byorganisations and commissions which are specialised in certain types of transport and passing enactments withinthis domain.RID 11 is a set of international regulations on hazardous materials transport by rails. These regulations representAppendix 1 of the International Convention on Transport of Goods by Rail – CIM 36 . Working further on theelaboration of the regulations on hazardous materials transport is entrusted to the expert committee – OCTI 30 , withthe headquarters in Bern.ADR 10 is a European Accord on international transport of hazardous materials in road traffic. For furtherelaboration of this Accord the competent UN Commission for Europe, UN – Committee for Internal Transport –Working Party for the Hazardous Goods Transport – UN – ECE 37 , with the headquarters in Geneva, is in charge. Atthe same time, while reconsidering the regulations on hazardous materials transport on roads, the EuropeanEconomic Commission (ECE 36 ) reconsidered the problem of hazardous materials transport on the internal navigablewaters.ADN 8 is a European Accord on international transport of hazardous materials by internal navigation. For theinternal navigation, the classification of goods that is accepted is the same as that for the RID – system, with thebordering numbers from 6000 – 7999 being reserved.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 65Whether the transport of poisonous materials should be carried out according to the ADR and RID regulations canbe checked in the Safety List 38 in paragraph relating to transport (Paragraph 14).Legal claim for determining national waste labelNational labels for waste from the exploitation of vessels are determined pursuant to the Code of the Republic ofSerbia 39 , on the basis of List 1 – Hazardous Waste (Appendix 1 of the Code) and List 2 – Non-hazardous Waste(Appendix 2 of the Code).The Results of classification and characterisationThe results of the performed classification and characterisation, which were performed during the research, arepresented in Table 5 and Tables 6 – 6c.Table 5 includes the results of a thorough classification and characterisation for waste materials from vessels forwhich it was established to be cadmium and its compounds, components which make them hazardous waste and inline with the abovementioned international and national regulative.Tables 6 – 6c include the results of the classification and characterisation of hazardous waste materials from theexploitation of vessels which are presented in Tables 3 – 3g.This table is particularly significant because the data on hazardous materials which make waste from vesselsdangerous is connected to the types of waste materials from vessels that are presented in Table 3 – 3g. Besides, thetable includes the data very important for the preparation (packing and labelling of packing) of the received wastematerials from vessels in a harbour for the transport by road or rail traffic (i.e. very important for a safe multimodaltraffic functioning). In the literature, there is no record that anyone, in the whole world, has ever made such athorough classification and characterisation of waste materials from the exploitation of vessels which could be used,by means of applying the set of developed tabulated items, by all teams for managing the above-stated wastematerials from the place of development (on a vessel), in a harbour, in the process of transport to final locations forwaste treatment and disposal.This set of tabulated items is complemented with the tabulated items with packing labels (package, container etc) ofhazardous materials for the purposes of delivering them to transporters by the expert team in a harbour.Those tabulated items include the familiar labels from the literature and legal regulative. Since the segment ofmanagement is very important for a complete methodology, which is suggested for the management of hazardouswaste materials from vessels, in the next section we shall explain in details the requirements which must be met inthe domain of labelling packing with hazardous waste (labels for labelling packing with caution signs, warningsigns (R) and the announcement signs (s)), labelling the vehicles which transport dangerous goods – waste (labels ofdanger and standardised boards).

Table 5 The results of classification according to relevant documents and law regulativeWaste typeWaste groupName of the harmful wasteNationallist RS 1List 1-harmfulwasteEuropeanandnationalwastecatalogue-EWC 2 andRS 3List АAnnex VIIIOECD, The Baselconvention 4And the law RS 5List BAnnex IXThe results of classification according to relevant documentsOECD 6 and OECD,RS 3Y – listAnnex IGreen listOchre listRed listUN 7 EU directives 8,9Baselconvention 4And theH-listIdentification numberКласа опас.CategoryR phrasesConcentratiS phrasesEUDirective 10C - listOECD, EUDirective 11,12METALS AND WASTECONTAINING METALALLOYSCd and Cd - compoundsW15-4-AA070-A1010/A1020/Y2612 01 03and 12 01 04Waste cat.Q Annex IDAnnex IIaRAnnex IIbA1020Y26AA070H6UN 25706.1Carc.Cat 3 R40, T,R 48/23/25Xn 22-40-48< 23/25-53c>10% T; RS: (1/2) 22-36/37-45-61C11R4Legend:1) Code on the Data Filed With the Request for a Permit Issue of Export, Import and Transit of Waste. ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia’, No. 69/99 [Pravilnik o dokumentaciji kojase podnosi uz zahtev za izdavanje dozvole za uvoz, izvoz i tranzit otpada]2) European Waste Catalogue (EWC list), Decision 94/3/EC3) Code on Terms and Procedures of Division, Packing and Preservation of Secondary Raw Materials (of Waste), ‘Official Gazette, of the Republic of Serbia’, No. 55/2001 [Pravilnik ouslovima i načinu razvrstavanja, pakovanja i čuvanja sekundarnih sirovina (otpada), Sl. glasnik RS, No. 55/2001]4) Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Dangerous Waste and Its Disposal, 19895) Confirmation of the Basel Convention Act on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Dangerous Waste and Its Disposal, ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia, InternationalAccords, No. 2/1999 [Zakon o potvrđivanju Bazelske Konvencije o kontroli prekograničnog kretanja opasnog otpada i njihovom odlaganju]6) OECD Council C(98) 202/FINAL and Decision of the Council C(2004)20 from 9.03.20047) United Nations, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations, 15th revised edition, New York, 2007,http:/www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev15/15files_e.html8) Commission Directive 2001/59/EEC, 6 August 2001.9) Council Directive 67/548/EEC – The Dangerous Substances Directive, 27 June 1967.10) Directive on Hazardous Waste 91/689/EEC, Annex III, 199111) Directive 75/442/EEC, Annex I (Q list), Annex IIa (D list) and Annex IIb (R list)12) Directive 2006/12/EEC, 2006.

Table 6 Classes of the compounds that make waste from the vessels harmful (with the information necessary for transport in any other kind of traffic)(Engen arctic marine diesel; material safety data sheet, Revision Date : 27.05.2008)

Table 6a.Class of compounds which make waste from the vessels harmful (with the information necessary for transport in any other kind oftraffic) - sequel 1

Table 6b Classes of the compounds that make waste from the vessels harmful (with the information necessary for transport in any other kind of traffic -sequel 2CFC 114; Oiled cotton waste; Oiled cleaning cloth; rechargeable NiMh – Varta, MSDS 2.001.002 NiMH button, http://www.omega.com/msds/msds.pdf/msds2001.pdf; battery for vehiclesand equipment – part 3 waste classification directive –hazardous waste list; *http://environmentalchemistry.com/yogi/hazmat/table/bu/3144%7C3258.html,http://fscimage.fishersci.com/msds/04965.htm; lithium metal batteries (LiMnO2)http://www.acrelectronics.com/hazmat/MSDS-32.pdf; DANGEROUS GOODS LIST, SPECIALPROVISIONS AND EXCEPTIONS, Part 3; The Basel Convention, 1992.;Bibliography for the Table 6b: Ćumur – Charcoal MSDS, Fisher scientific, CFC 114

Table 6c Classes of the compounds that make waste from the vessels harmful (with the information necessary for transport in any other kind of traffic) –sequel 30

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 71Labelling hazardous materials in transportThe criteria and labels for labelling hazardous materials and vehicles are defined according to the abovementionedEuropean Accords, as well as the National Regulative 40, 41 and the Decision on Labelling Poison in Transport 42 ,based on which the List of Poisons 43 was formed. One of the changes with a change of a means of transport isdifferent labelling of side numbers.Labelling (and classification) through side numbersThe regulations on hazardous materials transport include their classification and labelling as well. From the aspectof the preparation of goods for transport by different means of traffic, the research is directed to distinguishingdifferences which exist in the international regulations, owing to he fact that a uniform classification has not beenadopted yet (they differ for rail (according to the RID 11 system – which is in line with the regulations of ADN 8 andADR 10 ) and maritime (according to the UN system and IMDG – regulations 9 ) traffic). We should point out that theside numbers, which correspond to a determined class, have been introduced so as to enable discovering certainhazardous materials more easily in the Lists of the stated systems for classification. The side numbers are dividedby hundreds for certain classes of hazardous materials, where the numbers from 1 – 1999 are reserved for RID (railtransport), from 2000 – 3999 for ADR (road transport), and from 6000 – 7999 for ADN (river transport). In theactual case it means that the side numbers, which belong to the stated lists, are preceded by the digit 2, forhazardous waste from vessels transported by road vehicles, whereas for the transport by rail the side numbers fromthe literature are preceded by the digit 1. Transport of ship waste by some other vessel must be followed by a sidenumber preceded by the digit 6. In particular, according to the side numbers in line with the RID classification theside numbers for the ADR (road transport) can easily be found, by placing the number 2 in front of the stated sidenumber, i.e. for the ADN classification (river transport) by placing the number 6.Labelling of hazardous materials packageIn order to avoid every undesirable contact with hazardous waste from the exploitation of vessels, the packageswhich contain these materials are marked in a convenient way. For that purpose, two labelling systems are applied:1. labelling of individual hazardous materials packages (packing), and2. labelling hazardous load in different means of transport.Labelling individual packages of hazardous materialsLabelling of individual packages of hazardous materials is performed by caution labels with stylised signs ofdanger. According to the ADR regulations, there are 27 labels 44 . The labels take the standard format A5 (148 x 210mm). According to the classification, and the recommendation of the European Commission for Europe (ECE) 37 ,standardised labels with stylised signs of danger were adopted. The prescribed label dimensions for radioactivematerials are 10 x 10 cm. The dimensions of labels for smaller packages are 74 x 105 mm. The labels are placed onthe outside of the package, i.e. packing, in such a way that the symbol is placed upwards.According to the national by-law 42 , inner packages (packing) with poisons are marked with caution signs, inparticular for: preparations or substances which are: very poisonous, harmful to health, corrosive (corroding),irritant, explosive, oxidative, flammable, and inflammable, dangerous to the natural environment. For that reasonthere are ten caution signs, as presented in Figure 1. By means of comparing these signs (Fig 1) with the signswhich exist in the field of traffic (10 signs from Fig 2, which differ), as well as with the signs proposed by the GHSsystem 14 , which tends to get all the signs related to labelling of hazardous substances and mixtures (signs in Fig 3)reconciled, what can be noticed is that in this part a problem can arise with labelling the packing of hazardous wastefrom vessels. There are nine GHS signs, among which there are three newly introduced that summarise dangerouseffects on people (two signs) and the natural environment (one sign). The sign which relates to danger to the naturalenvironment has been introduced into the Regulative of the Republic of Serbia 42 .

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 72Strong poison Poison Harmful to healthIrritant Highly flammable FlammableOxidative Corrosive (corroding) ExplosiveDangerous to the environmentFigure 1. Caution signs in the Regulative of the Republic of Serbia 42

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 73Number 1 Number 1.4 Number 1.5 Number 1.6 Number 2.1Number 2.1 Number 2.2 Number 2.2 Number 2.3 Number 3Number 3 Number 4.1 Number 4.2 Number 4.3 Number 4.3Number 5.1 Number 5.2 Number 6.1 Number 6.2 Number 7ANumber 7B Number 7C Number 7D Number 7E Number 8Number 9Number 11Figure 2. Caution of signs lists models in the doimain of traffic

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 74Figure 3Caution signs according to the GHS System 14

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 75Labelling of dangerous loads in different means of transport (vehicles)Labelling of dangerous loads in different means of transport must include labelling of appropriate caution signswhich are placed on a vehicle, on the front and rear side (in the case of road transport). The prescribed caution signtakes the shape of a 30 x 40 cm rectangle. The colour of the background is bright orange, and the field is divided bya horizontal line into two parts. In the upper part it reads a numeric caution sign (2 to 3 digits), and in the lower fileda hazardous material sign (4 digits).The numeric material sign appears in the UN list of Dangerous Goods which are normally transported 45 , whichenables the hazardous material to be identified or to determine the group name of products possessing certainfeatures. It is necessary to underline that labelling of load with hazardous waste from vessels in rail transport is thesame as for road transport, rectangular boards of the same size, but without the brightly coloured orangebackground.Other Provisions in terms of other activities in hazardous materials transport are not reconciled and they areperformed in accordance with the national regulations. It is expected that uniformed caution signs following theGHS system will be adopted, the process on which a number of experts are working: from the OECD, ILO, UNCommittee for hazardous materials transport, as well as numerous experts from America, Europe, Asia andAustralia.Estimate of the influence on the natural environmentTabulated items of the influence on the natural environmentOne of the vital steps in the proposed methodological approach to the classification of hazardous materials ispreliminary consideration of the effects of waste materials from the exploitation of vessels on working and naturalenvironment. For that reason, the researchers have improved a tabulated review of possible influences from theliterature 2 by thoroughly reconsidering potential influences presented in a set of tables. In this paper, the tables forthe first two groups of the typical hazardous materials from vessels have been presented: for metals (Table 7) andfor waste oil and fuels (Table 8).Algorithms for the estimate of the influences on the natural environmentDuring the phase of the realisation of the project, the researchers assigned particular importance to the estimate ofthe influences of hazardous waste and dismantling of ships on the natural environment. Thus, a whole set of originalalgorithms for the circulation of waste has been developed, with the estimate of potential emissions into the naturalenvironment in the processes of treatment and disposal of certain types of waste.For the purpose of this paper, original algorithms of metal circulation have been selected: for waste with mercury(Figure 4), and oiled solid waste (Figure 5) from which we can easily notice possible influences of certain processesin the circulation of waste on the natural environment.

Hazard.materiasM e t a l sTable 7. Typical hazardous waste materials formed during the process of dismantling of the vessel and possible influence on natural environment- metalsHazardouscomponents Metals(containingtoxin/coversof toxicmaterials:-PCB,-dioxin-asbestos-organiccovers) Heavymetals:-leaden,- mercuryEtc.)Identificationsources-Anodes and-Anodes withgreat degree ofcorrosion.- Metal partsmixed with nonmetalmaterials-Parts of theengine,- batteries,Generators,-Pipelines,-Cables,-Paints,-Thermometer,-Electricalswitches,-Lamps etc.Processes and generatedand hazardous wasteProcesses- Cutting the parts of thevessels with open flameWaste-Metal vapours (e.g. ofleaden, with the cover ofcadmium, iron oxide, zincoxide, chromium andcertain paints);-Particles and sawdustformed during the processof cuttingPossible emissions/risksPossible emissionsExtracting greatamounts of vapour,smoke and particles(that contain magnan,tin, chrome, iron, andleaden) during theprocess of cutting withthe open flameRisks1. Risks on workplacebecause of exposingthe workers to thehazardous vapours2. Risk for naturalenvironment (due to airpollution, pollutedwater and ground withvapours from metals orwaste containingmetals)Type of emission 1and quantityreleasedmaterials 2Type of emission:w/g, a*Quantity ofreleased materials:+++++Influence on workingand natural environmentInfluence on workplaceThe influence ofdangerous vapours frommetals and otheraccompanying hazardousmaterials on microclimatein workplaceInfluence on naturalenvironment1. influence on air qualityin the are- away from thesource (due to dispersionof hazardous vapours wideinto the air);2. Influence on the ground(due to improper storageand keeping products andwaste containing metals)Effects of theinfluenceInfluence on humanhealth1. Toxic influence onworkers andpopulation: - due toinhaling vapours frommetals and otheraccompanyinghazardous materials inworking and livingenvironment;- due to consumingcontaminated aquaticpopulation ( a particularproblem in settlementsnear to the locationwhere vessels aredismantled)2. Cancerous influenceon humans:- due to consumingwater and fishcontaminated with oil,oils from differentorigins and oiled sloughInfluence on flora andfaunaEndangering herbs andanimals in water and onland.Legend 7: 1 : w/g – water/ground; a – air; *: particles freed during cutting metals, containing leaden and other metals; 2 : released materials are ranked onlyby quantity in which relative risk wasn’t taken into consideration

Table 8. Typical hazardous waste materials formed during ship dismantling and possible influence on natural environment- oils and fuelsHazard.materialsOils and fuelsHazardouscomponentsIdentificationsourcesProcesses and generated andhazardous wastePossible emissions/risksType ofemission 1 andquantityreleasedmaterials 2Type ofemissionInfluence on workingand naturalenvironmentEffects of the influenceProcessesEmissionsInfluence on workplace Influence on human Carbon -Pipelines,health1. Vessel cleaningInfluence of hazardousdioxide2. Engine washing (majorvapoursand 1. Toxic influence on-Tanks,1.Waste oilsrepairs or vital repairs)accompanying hazardous workers and population: Sloughemissionsw/g, a**3. Floor washing in thematerialson-Barrels,- due to inhaling organicworkshop2.Oiled solid wastemicroclimate at Heavycompounds vapours and4. Oil change on vessel (at leastmetals -engineeringemissionworkplace in normal andonce a year on after a hundredQuantity ofother accompanyingaccidental conditionsworkshops,3.Oiled wasteworking hours of the engine)releasedhazardous materials in Chemicals5. Waste water purification inatmospheric water materials: Influence on natural working and livingfor treating -tankers forseparatorsemissionenvironment environment;fuels and oils carrying load,6. Oiling of precipitation onInfluence of emitting - due to consumingmanaging area-shiphazardous materials can contaminated aquatic7. Leaking of mineral oils due Cleaners, warehouses,+++ be spread over natural population ( a particularto engine failureenvironment through the problem in settlementssolvents -ship engines,air, water and ground. near to the locationandRiskswhere vessels arespreads notWasteEspecially undesirabledismantled)usedinfluences are:-managing area 1. Oiled waste from the processduringof cleaning the vessel, 1. Fire and explosion- fuels and oils,2. Cancerous influencemaintenanc2. Waste water from enginedanger- sediments that are on humans:eremoved from ship fuelswashing,2. Risks at workplace- due to inhaling vapoursand lubricating oils by3. Waste water from washingand consuming water and Explosivefloor and workshop areas; 3. Naturalcentrifugal separationfish contaminated withvapours4. waste oils from oil changing, environment risks(Has the same effect onoil, oils from different5. Mud from grease and oil (direct pollution ofenvironment as crude oil)origins and oiled sloughseparators and reservoirs for water, air and ground- mud from separatorship fuel and lubricating oil, during accidental-chemicals with which Influence on flora and6. Oiled precipitation from situation after contentfuel and oil are treatedfaunahandling areas.leaking during-oiled waste waterEndangering herbs and7.Mmineral oils leakage transport or spraying)- cleaners(environmentallyanimals in water and onunfriendly)land.Legend 8: 1 : w/g – water/ground; a – air; **: volatile organic compounds; 2 :released materials are ranked only by quantity in which relative risk wasn’ttaken into consideration

Figure 4- Transformation of Hg in aquatic environment

Figure 5.- Life cycle for oiled solid waste

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 80CONCLUSIONDuring the realisation of the development project TR 213037, the thorough observation of the issue of wastematerials from the exploitation of vessels was required. Starting from the fact that a large number of waste materialsare generated on vessels, it was vital to perform the identification and classification of waste, with an aim ofconsidering possible risks to the natural and working environment and the selection of an optimal method oftreatment of certain types of hazardous waste.Taking into account the fact that some types of hazardous waste from vessels must be transported by landinfrastructure to the locations inlands, the researchers had to reconsider ways of safe transport by different means oftransport, with a minimal risk to people and the natural environment. In order to establish an integrated model ofmanaging waste materials from vessels, a methodology was devised for the identification, classification,characterisation of waste, evaluation of the influences of waste on working and natural environment, preparationand labelling of package for transport and an optimal method of processing, which proved successful in the project.As the result of the undertaken methodological steps for multidisciplinary observation and solution of the issues ofthese particular types of waste, numerous algorithms which present the basis for designing a manual were devised inorder to help expert teams on a vessel and in harbours at home and abroad. It is reasonable to expect designing of aworking tabulated items in the form of a manual for daily work, which contributes to a more efficient training ofworking parties for specialised working procedures and to the establishment of an efficient system of managing thistype of waste in the international navigation routes, in accordance with the requirements of the international andnational Regulative.Finally, we should emphasise that the presented tables and algorithms served as the basis for the development of asoftware application for managing waste materials from ships, and also for managing risks in the event of anaccident in navigation routes that can be used by all harbours, which is the major contribution of the results of thewhole TR 21037 project.Acknowledgements: The authors of this paper would like to thank the Ministry of Science and TechnologicalDevelopment of the Republic of Serbia for the support and financing of the technological development project TR21037, within which this paper was developed.BIBLIOGRAPHY1. Marija Vukić et al: The Development of An Integrated Model for Management of Waste Materials from Ships inthe Navigable Corridors of the Republic of Serbia [Razvoj integrisanog modela za upravljanje brodskim otpadnimmaterijama na plovnim koridorima Republike Srbije], The Project of Technological Development (ref. no: 21037),Kirilo Savić Institute, Belgrade, Serbia 2008 – 20101a. Мария Вукич и ост.: Развитие интегральной модели управления сбором, транспортировкой иутилизацией отходов с судов на сети водных путей Республики Сербии, Пленарный доклад передделегациии Сербии, Совещание группы экспертов „Отходы от эксплуатации судов“, Дунайская Kомиссия,CD, Будапешт, Венгрия, 14 – 15 января 2009.г. и сайт Дунайской Комиссии: www.danubecommission.org2. Basel Document on Dismantling of Ships3. European Waste Catalogue (EWC list), Decision 94/3/EC

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 814. Code on Terms and Procedures of Division, Packing and Preservation of Secondary Raw Materials (of Waste),‘Official Gazette, of the Republic of Serbia’, No. 55/2001 [Pravilnik o uslovima i načinu razvrstavanja, pakovanja ičuvanja sekundarnih sirovina (otpada), Sl. glasnik RS, No. 55/2001]5. Унифицированная символика для сбора отходов грузового судоходства на Дунае (ДК – РД IV.2.2 (09))6. Publication – flyer, the WANDA Project, Vienna, Austria, 20087. Мария Вукич и ост.: Идентификация, классификация, характеризация и обозначение отходов отексплуатации судов, Пленарный доклад перед делегациии Сербии, Совещание группы экспертов „Отходыот эксплуатации судов“, Дунайская Kомиссия, CD, Будапешт, Венгрия, 20-21 января 2010. г. и сайтДунайской Комиссии: www.danubecommission.org8. ADN –European Accord on the International Transport of Dangerous Merchandise in the Internal Navigation.The original name of the document (in French): Accord europeen relatif au transport international des marchandisesDangereuses par voie de Navigation interieure. The official abbreviation: ADN9. IMDG - International Maritime Dangerous Goods – Code. The official abbreviation: IMDG10. ADR – European Accord on International Transport of Dangerous Merchandise on Roads. The original name ofthe document (in French): Accord european relatif au transport international des marchandises dangereuses parroute. The official abbreviation: ADR.11. RID – International Regulations Concerning Transport of Dangerous Merchandise by Rail. The Original text (inFrench): Reglement international concernant le transport des marchandisces dangereuses par le chemin de fer. Theofficial abbreviation: RID12. Basel Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Dangerous Waste and Its Disposal13. MARPOL 73/78, International Convention on Sea Protection (Waters) from Pollution from Ships, 1973, withmodifications and riders to the Protocol from 1978 and all later changes and riders.14. Globally Harmonized System for Classification and Labelling of Hazardous Chemicals – The GHS:www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs.html;15. Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 of the Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006. on Shipments of Waste16. Confirmation of the Basel Convention Act on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Dangerous Wasteand Its Disposal, ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia, International Accords, No. 2/1999 [Zakon opotvrđivanju Bazelske Konvencije o kontroli prekograničnog kretanja opasnog otpada i njihovom odlaganju]17. Decision of the Council C (2004)20 as of 9 Mar 2004 (Council Amendment to the Decision of the Council C(2001)107/FINAL on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Waste Destined for Recovery Operations)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 8218. Amendments to Appendices 3 and 4 of OECD Decision C(2001)107/FINAL on the Control of MandatoryMovements of Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations, C(2005)141, Organisation CO-operation andDevelopment, 26 Oct 200519. Decision of the European Commission, as of 16 Jan 200120. Rider to the Decision 2000/532/EC on the List of Waste (2001/118/EC)21. REGULATION (EC) No 1013/2006, 14 Jun 200622. Directive 2001/59/EC, Annex I, 200123. Directive 67/548/EEC – The Dangerous Substances Directive, 196724. Decision on Labelling Dangerous Poison on the Market, ‘Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia, No.38/97 [Odluka o obeležavanju otrova u prometu]25. Directive 75/442/EEC, Annex I (Q list), Annex IIa (D list) and Annex IIb (R list)26. Directive on Hazardous Waste 91/689/EEC, Annex III, 199127. Code on Methods of Treatment of Refuse With Characteristics of Hazardous Waste, ‘Official Gazette of theRepublic of Serbia, No. 12/95 [Pravilnik o načinu postupanja sa otpacima koji imaju svojstva opasnih materija]28. Directive on Hazardous Waste 91/689/EEC, Annex II, 199129. Register of Chemicals Abstracts – Chemicals Abstract Service (CAS)30. Experts Committee, with the headquarters in Bern. The official name of the Committee: Office Central desTransports Internationaux par Chemins de Fer – Commission d’experts du RID. The official abbreviation: OCTI.31. United Nations, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations, 15th revisededition, New York, 2007, http:/www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/unrec/rev15/15files_e.html32. Directive of the Council 94/55/EC (as of 21 Nov 1994)33. Directive of the Council 96/49/EC (as of 23 Jul 1996)34. SEVESO Directive35. United Nation ECOnomic and SOcial Council - UN – ECOSOC, Geneva36. International Convention Concerning Transport of Goods by Rail. The original name of this convention (inFrench): Convention internationale concernant le transport des marchandises par la chemin de fer. The abbreviatedname of the convention: CIM.37. Economic Commission for Europe, UN – Committee for the Internal Traffic – Working Party on the Transportof Dangerous Goods – UN – ECE, with the headquarters in Geneva. The official abbreviations: ECE.38. Safety List – Material Safety Data Sheet – MSDS, Paragraph 14

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 8339. Code on the Data Filed With the Request for a Permit Issue of Export, Import and Transit of Waste. ‘Gazette ofthe Federal Republic of Serbia’, No. 69/99 [Pravilnik o dokumentaciji koja se podnosi uz zahtev za izdavanjedozvole za uvoz, izvoz i tranzit otpada]40. Dangerous Goods Transport Act, ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia’, No. 24/94, 28/96, 21/99, 44/99and 68/02 [Zakon o prevozu opasnih materija]41. Production and Transport of Poisonous Materials Act, ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia’, 15/95, 28/96,37/02 and ‘Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 101/05 [Zakon i proizvodnji i prometu otrovnih materija]42. Decision on Labelling Poison in Transport, ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia’, No. 38/97 [Odluka oobeležavanju otrova u prometu]43. List of Poisons Divided into Groups, ‘Gazette of the Federal Republic of Serbia’, No. 12/00 [Lista otrovarazvrstanih u grupe]44. Manual for Customs Officers for Preliminary Control of Trans-boundary Transport, the Ministry of Science andProtection of the Environment, Environmental Protection Administration, Belgrade, Mar 2007, p. 16 [Uputstvo zacarinske službenike za preliminarnu kontreolu prekograničnog prometa otrova]45. UN – ‘List of Dangerous Goods Most Commonly Carried’

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 84UDK:502.51(282):502.17(497.11)502.51(282):504.5(497.11)THE MODEL AND SLEDAT INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR EARLY DETECTION OF CHEMICALACCIDENTS ON WATERWAYS1 Marija Vukic, 2 Vojislav Rapajic, 2 Radovan Stetin, 1 Miroljub Jevtic, 3 Uros Spruk1 Snezana Mrmak1 “ Kirilo Savic” Institute, 51 Vojvode Stepe St., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia2Aluxom Ltd., 78 Vojvode Baćevića St., 11000 Belgrade, Serbia3 USCOM, Ljubljana, SloveniaAbstract: A model and a system for early detection and prompt notification on the chemical accident on the riverhave been developed as a part of technological development project TR – 21037. The basic element of the system isthe probe that monitors the changes in concentration of relevant pollutants and oxidation-reduction potential innatural aquatic environment, placed in special protective carrier constructed for the purposes of research andmounting on the raft at the Sava. Other elements of the system, hardware and software solutions for monitoring,registering and filing the measurement results (yielded by means of the probe), have been developed during the 6month experiment.The test results have shown that the specially constructed probe, acting as a sensor for detection of pollutants,together with other information-communication system elements functions undisturbed and gives prompt responseto changes of oxidation-reduction potential in water due to accidental spillage of dangerous substances.The paper shows characteristics of the multi-function measuring device and other elements of the system, hardwareand software and the model of information and communication with relevant users of monitoring results at a local,regional and national level.This provides the basis for reaching an integrated solution for merging/ exchange of data from the bases of varioussubjects of the system and creating adequate information environment that gives sufficient data to the dispatchersand enables them to promptly make the right decision.Key words: river, chemical accident, monitoring, sensor, hardware, software, early notification of the accident,model, information system.INTRODUCTIONThe Protocol for Prevention of Pollution of the Sava River obligates all the signing countries, including Serbia, tocreate conditions for the formation of appropriate organs and services responsible for carrying out obligations in thefield of prevention, control and reduction of pollution caused by cargo ships, as well as control of water quality,vessel inspection and taking administrative measures to sanction the violation of the established waste treatmentrules.Creation of Joint Action Programme for all countries on the Sava bottomland as well as the establishment of acommon information system based on the Protocol is also demanded.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 85The main prerequisite for the achievement of this common goal is creating the model and system of early detectionof pollution, notification and management of accidental situations on the river, i.e. the information system formanaging the above mentioned emergency situations on the territory of member states. That is the reason why animportant segment of research within the Technological Development Project was the development of the modeland system of early accident notification.RESEARCH RESULTSWithin the integrated model of management of ship-generated waste, developed in the above mentioned project , amodel for the management of accidental spillage on waterways was also developed. The model stipulates the use ofappropriate measuring devices, hardware and software necessary to establish the system of notification,communication and coordination between all the relevant subjects of the proactive response to accident, which hasalso been developed for this project.Development of sophisticated multi-function measuring deviceTo create a sophisticated multi-function device for measuring pollution in natural aquatic environment, detection ofaccidental pollution, alerting and early notification of the accident, it was necessary to develop some functionalparts of the device, which are combined with the suitable equipment of renowned manufacturers. The functionalelements of the device are:stationary coastal measuring device,GPS antenna,GPRS antenna,server with suitable hardware and software.All the elements of the developed device are shown on Figure 1.Stationary coastal measuring deviceStationary coastal measuring device consists of the following parts: standard measuring equipment for collecting data about water pollution temperature probe special measuring equipment for different kinds of pollution depending on the type of production in anindustrial site (if the device is used to control the river pollution caused by factories located on thebottomland) ; buoy with a set of measuring probes , flexible mechanical connection between the buoy and probes as well as the riverbank.; universal battery powered distribution box used for power supply of the measuring unit from differentelectrical sources; coastal measuring telecommunication unit for processing data gathered by measurements and their trensferto the server, solar panel for alternative electric power supply.Stationary coastal measuring device is shown on Figure 2.Parts of this device are described in detail later in the text.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 86SERVERINFORMATIONUSERSGPRSantennaINTERNETCENTRALUNITNATIONAL LEVELMinistriesNational centreInstitute «Kirilo Savić»RedoxprobePower supply220V 50 HzREGIONAL LEVELRegional informationcentresb š jLOCAL LEVELPort captaincyLocal civil protectionFigure 1. Schematic of sophisticated multi-function device for measuring pollution in natural aquaticenvironment, detection of accidental pollution, alerting and early notification of accidents on rivers (V. Rapajic)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 87Figure 2. Schematic of stationary coastal measuring deviceMeasuring equipment for collecting data by means of temperature probeMeasuring equipment for collecting data consists of the probe for measuring oxidation-reduction potential in thewater (Redox probe GE 105), shown on Figures 3 and 4.Figure 3. Redox probe GE 105Figure 4. Redox probe in protective pipeDue to the mechanical sensitivity of the measuring probe, special carriers protecting the probe from mechanicaldamage have been designed and produced, which is shown in pictures 4 and 5.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 88The metal pipe enables the probe to stand vertically at the pricisely determined depth, in the conditions of changingwater level even when the influence of water currents is significant. The perforated appendage mechanicallyprotects the probe from objects floating in the river and, at the same time, allows the flow of water around it.1200140 16 22Figure 5. Technical drawing of mounting Redox probe into the pipeThe probe is connected to a converter, which transforms the pollution data into adequate electric potentials, whichare processed and remotely transferred.Temperature probeThe accuracy of the displayed measurement data depends on the water temperature. That is the reson why thedevice contains a temperature probe which constantly measures and shows the water temperature (with the aim tofacilitate the calculations of the concentration of different pollutants in the water based on the measured redoxpotential in the water).Buoy with a set of measuring probesThe stationary set of measuring probes is located on the specially designed buoy (Figure 1) which enables the sondsto be at the appropriate depth, according to the manufacturer's recommendation. On the submerged part of the buoythere is a perforated protective metal sheet which protects the set of probes from mechanical damage, but allows theflow of water around them, so that the chemical parameters can be measured.Control measuring set of probesFor stationary systems, located on the riverbank, there is supposed to be another control measuring set of probes,placed upstream from the industrial site – the potential polluter of the waterway. In the event of an accident therewould be a difference between the measurements of these two sets, which would initiate alarm. In that way the timeof the accident, approximate location, the type and source of pollution (controlled industrial site or some otherpolluter upstream from it) can be established.Flexible mechanical link with the riverbankThe buoy is connected with the riverbank by means of a flexible mechanical link so that the position of the buoycan be adapted to the changing water level. An electric cable transferring the data to the coastal measuringtelecommuniction unit is led through the mechanical link to the riverbank.Universal battery powered distribution box with solar panelThe power supply of the coastal measuring telecommunication unit requires direct voltage between 9 and 40 V. It isadvisable to use standard direct voltages between 12 and 24 V. The universal battery powered distribution box isshown on Figure 6.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 89Figure 6. Schematic of universal battery powered distribution boxThis part of the device facilitates the power supply of the coastal measuring telecommunication unit from differentpower sources:supply from network single-phase voltage of 220 V, 50 Hz, over the rectifier which produces directvoltages of 12V and 24 V. At the same time, this voltage is used for recharging batteries, as reserve powersupply. The switch behind the rectifier is used to select the voltage of 12V or 24 V, whereas it is placed inthe „0“ position when there is no network supply;supply from solar panel with the voltage of 12V or 24V, if there are no other power sources. A voltageregulator led from the solar panel is placed inside the distribution box. At the same time, this voltage is usedto recharge the battery;supply from gel battery, with the voltage of 12V or 24V and capacity of 15-40 Ah. The battery is used asreserve power supply , and with solar panels, it is used for charging the device during the night. Gel batterydoes not require any special maintenance and it does not cause any damaging vapours which could erodethe electric parts inside the box;supply over external source of 12V or 24V (if one exists) which is facilitated by the connection built in forthis type of power supply.Inside the distribution box there are diodes which are used to protect certain systems from destruction caused by thechanges in polarity of the supply voltage or emptying of the battery due to the short circuit in any part of the device.Coastal measuring telecommunication unitExternal and internal view of the coastal measuring telecommunication unit are shown on Figures 7 and 8.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 90Figure 7. External view of the coastal measuring telecommunication unitFigure 8. Internal view and parts of the coastal measuring telecommunication unit1-Redox probe, 2-power supply 220V, 50Hz, 3-switches - automatic fuses,4-rectifier, 5-Redox - measuring transducer, 6-GPS/GPRS terminal device,7-GPS antenna - 20 channel receiver , 8-GPRS antenna

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 91Description of the functioning of measuring telecommunication unitRedox-measuring transducer unit (5) receives the measurements from the probe(1), transforms them intoappropriate electric sygnals and transfers them to GPS/GPRS terminal device (6). Similar transducers are necessaryfor other types of probes (including temperature probe) in order to be used to convert the measurements into electricpotential.It can be concluded that the processing of all the collected data is carried out in this device. Those data do not comeonly from the Redox probe, but also from the GPS antenna-receiver, if the object is mobile (a vessel, for example).At the same time, data can be received from the temperature sensor as well as the other necessary sensors. Bymeans of the GSM network (GPRS antenna) the data are transferred to the internet, the server of ”Aluxom”company, where they are available to the researchers working on the project, who are familiar with the Usernameand the Password. Potential future users of the system can also be included in a similar way.GPS antenna – receiver (7) is used to establish a software connection between the position of the coastaltelecommunication unit and the meteorological satellite and radar image of the meteorological situation in the area,so that the dispersal of damaging substances in the event of an accident could be predicted. This is the essential partof the device and it is the original technical solution of the researcher – the author of the paper.In the GPS/GPRS terminal device (6) all the collected data are processed and transferred by means of the mobiletelephone network (through the GPRS antenna (8)) and the internet network to the server.Server with hardware and softwareThe multi-function device is connected with the server and software Web Service Package Sle Dat , whose author isa programmer from “Aluxom” company, which makes it unique. Its main advantage is the fact that it is notnecessary to install it on one’s computer. The use of this software web service package is possible via the internet,directly from the server of the above mentioned company – a participant in the project. During the realization of theproject the researchers are enabled to monitor the results of the measurements on the Sava as well as the functioningof the multi-fuction device in the research centre, using the company’s account, with the familiar Username andPassword.Software web package Sle Dat facilitates: monitoring of the measurement data from the measure point in real time, with the maximum delay of 5seconds,simultaneous display of data from a large number of measure points. The number of measure points is notlimited;display of measurement history in any time period, starting from the moment of installation of themeasurement station up to the present moment, including relevant statistic data;setting the level of pollution and alarm activation if the measurement data surpass the permitted limit ofwater pollution;sending alarm notifications and other relevant information to mobile phone numbers and e-mail addressesset by the user;the availability of the information on the server and the number of its users can be determined by the personin charge of the organization and management of the pollution control system.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 92Software web service package Sle Dat can be expanded, on request, and provide other services:simultaneous monitoring and memorizing of other necessary parameters from measure points, for example,water and air temperature, wind speed, air pollution etc. – depending on the needs and requests of thesystem users in the event of a chemical accident. All the expansion options for displaying and monitoringdata depend on measuring probes that are connected to the existing measuring telecommunication unit,which has several separate inputs;possible installation of the system on mobile objects in water and road transport with the aim to monitor theircurrent position, their route and other activities connected with the transport and storage of dangerousmaterials and pollution of the environment.Results of experimental measurementsExperimental measurements were carried out in the following phases:1. choice of location on the Sava river, suitable for testing of the measuring device and the softwareapplication for the transfer of data to the server, their registering, processing and analysis;2. the preparation and adaption of the elements of the measuring device to the requirements of the experimentand measurements in the natural aquatic environment;3. designing and making of the special sensor carriers for measuring redox-potential and temperature;4. mounting of the designed equipment on the raft;5. experimental measurements carried out in the period starting from October 14, 2009 up to now (they arestill being done);6. monitoring of the functioning of the equipment on the raft as well as software application;7. analysis of experimental data;8. testing of the possible application of the software web service pack SleDat in monitoring the vesselscarrying dangerous substances.Choice of research locationA location on the left bank of the Sava river, a few hundred metres from the confluence of the Sava and the Danube,with the „Ekocentar“ raft (Figure 9), was chosen for the experimental research.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 93Figure 9. The raft where the probe was installed 4.Preparatory operationsThe most important part of the preparatory activities was the choice of the location of measuring equipment on theraft. The aim was to get the most reliable results of measurements and minimize the adverse effects of thesurroundings, water currents and mechanical damage of the measuring device sensors.Designing and making of the special sensor carriers for measuring redox-potential and temperatureIt has already been explained that, in order to provide mechanical protection, the redox probe was placed into ametal tube – the probe carrier. The lower part of the tube is perforated (with 8mm holes), so that water can flowfreely around the probe.Mounting of the designed equipment on the raftThe probe is located on the left side of the raft, near the stern. The measuring equipment is installed inside the raft.(Figure 10).Figure 10. Place where redox probe is attached to the raft.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 94Figure 11 shows (central) coastal measuring telecommunication unit which has been on the raft for more than 6months, for the purpose of the experiment. It is located inside the raft and it does not take up much space.Picture 11. Coastal measuring telecommunication unit inside the raftPerforming experimental measurements and problems connected with themOver a six month period the values of oxidation-reduction potential in the water and water temperature weremonitored with the minimal effort of the researchers. The functioning of sensors and measuring equipment in theresearch centre was also monitored with a minimal number of interventions on the spot.The working principle of the redox probe is based on the established connection between the platinum andreferential hydrogen electrodes within the probe, which is then placed into the medium (river water, in this case)containing the pollutants that are supposed to be measured. Depending on the composition of water the process ofoxidation or reduction takes place, which is the basis for the calculation and monitoring of the changes inconcentration of pollutants in the water. Redox probe GE 105 represents this process as electric potential between -2000 mV and +2000 mV. These values are relative and they depend on the temperature, pH factor and pressure. Theworking temperature of this probe ranges from 0 to 80° C. Calibration of the probe was carried out before use.Accurate measurements require temperature correction according to the probe manufacturer’s table. That was thereason why a temperature probe was installed during the experiment. The values of this probe diverged from theHMZ temperature probe located on the other bank of the Sava, near Branko’s Bridge, by 0,5 0 C at the most.In the above mentioned research period there were only two interruptions, which were dealt with in our previoswork 4 .The first interruption was due to the reduction of water level on the Sava. A part of the raft was stranded so that theprobe on the other end partially emerged from the water. The irregularities in its functioning and measured valueswere noticed immediately at the control research centre. A team of researchers and their co-workers from Aluxomwent to the location and shortly afterwards they re-installed the probe at the appropriate depth.The second system failure was due to the interruption of data transfer caused by problems in GSM Network of MTSmobile operator. This time, no field work was necessary to re- establish the system. The device was re-activatedremotely, from the command research centre.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 95After both short interruptions the entire system continued working without any negative consequences. The abovementioned problems only confirmed the reliability of the whole system as well as its resistance to external factors. Itturned out to function well in all meteorological conditions (nice weather, rain, snow, low temperatures were allpresent during the measuring period) and withstand both the elements and the changes in the river flow. Theinterventions caused by the interruptions were quick and simple.The problems which cannot be avoided are mostly connected with occasional interruptions and failures in thefunctioning of the Internet and mobile phone networks, which can cause temporary failure in data transfer. Asimilar problem occurred only once during the research.Analysis of experimental dataMeasurement results of redox potential in the waterSo far, the research has shown that the designed system for measuring water pollution in the Sava river by means ofredox probe and the data transfer by GPS/GPRS terminal GB3011 function reliably and flawlessly. The data aretransferred in real time with a maximum delay of 5 seconds.The diagram in picture 12 shows the changes in the redox potential in the water over a two month research periodfor the selected number of 629 measurement results out of the total of 37679 results (sent to the Research centre upto that moment) 4 . The probe detects the values of redox potential every minute, which has resulted in the continualdiagram of the condition of water pollution, which cannot be shown on a single picture in this paper, for technicalreasons.That was the reason why the diagram (Figure 12) with values of redox potential for every single hour during 24hours, over the entire period of probe and system testing, was constructed. The minimal value of redox potentialduring that period is 174mV, the maximum value is 539 mV and the average value is 314mV.On the diagram we can also notice the first failure in the functioning of the system which occurred on October 20,2009 when the probe partially emerged from the water due to the low water level. After the intervention, thecontinual functioning and detection of the changes in redox potential ranging from 100 to 170 mV in the course ofthe day, were reestablished. In that period there was no significant accidental pollution and, for that reason, thetesting of the probe and system is continuing in order to examine their functioning in accidental situations. So far,the functioning and registering of measurement data have indicated the reliability of the system elements andjustified its use in monitoring water pollution in rivers as well as accidental pollution. The latter will be monitoredby means of the developed equipment installed in vessels, floating machinery or check points – stations on locationswhere emergency situations connected with dangerous fluid spillage on waterways are most common.During the six month period there were no break-downs on the (central) coastal measuring telecommunication unitand it transferred about 430.000 data to the server over this period.Development of the model of proactive response to chemical accidents on riversDuring the realization of the project 1 a model of proactive response to accidents on rivers, i.e. a model ofinformation, coordination and communication with the relevant users of monitoring results on the local, regionaland national level. The results of interviews with commanding officers of ships and port captains as well asexperiences of other researchers were used to develop the model. The original algorithm of the model, developedfor the concrete human resource capacities in The Republic of Serbia, is shown on Figure 13.The developed data bases and this model were used as foundation for the software application of the informationsystem for managing proactive response to accidents.

Eh (mV)6005004003002001000‐100‐200‐30014‐1015‐1016‐1017‐1018‐1019‐1020‐1021‐1022‐1023‐1024‐1025‐1026‐1027‐1028‐1029‐1030‐1031‐101‐112‐113‐114‐115‐116‐117‐118‐119‐1110‐11DaniFigure 12. Overview of results of the two month measurements of oxidation-reduction potential in the water

Figure 13. Original algorithm of the model of proactive response to accidents (Authors: M. Vukić and V. Rapajic)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 98Development of the information system for early notification of accidents on riversSledat system consists of the hardware and software parts:An important task in this project 1 was to carry out the following activities in the domain:adaption of the hardware part of the system to Sledat requirements for the transfer of data about earlydetection of river water pollution,creation of the organizational scheme of information and notification in the event of a chemical accident, bymeans of Sledat system, both horizontally and vertically on national, regional and local level);development of software applications for presenting appropriate measured parameters,designing software for horizontal and vertical notification of interested institutions as well as alarm in caseof an accident, accompanied by adequate documents in electronic form;making an electronic archive for storage of data referring to the situation before the chemical accident, allthe activities during the chemical accident as well as diminishing consequences of the chemical accident;development of documents in electronic form referring to the notification of the chemical accident and theprocedures used by certain intervention and rescue units within the proactive response to the accident;upgrading software for monitoring and prediction of the possible spreading of the accident to neighbouringareas, based on the meteorological data;development of software application for locating accident sites and monitoring the distribution of humanand material resources used for diminishing and elimination of the consequences of the accident;examining possibilities of the application of software web service package SleDat for monitoring vesselscarrying dangerous substances.The fact that Sledat is a reliable system for remote data transfer has helped to carry out the above mentioned tasks.The basic idea was that the hardware part of the system should be universal, so that, with slight modifications, itcould be used not only on vessels for different purposes (e.g. ships carrying dangerous chemical cargo, tankerscarrying liquid fuel, rescue ships, ships transporting chemical waste to collection and recycling sites, police andmilitary river patrol boats, etc.), but also on vehicles in road and railway transport involved in the process ofprevention and diminishing of consequences of the accidents as well as the transport of dangerous chemicalsubstances.Hardware part of Sledat systemThe hardware part of Sledat system consists of measuring probes, central data collection and transfer unit, GPSsystem for locating the position of the object and meteorological data collection, GPRS system for data transfer tothe server, server for collecting, processing and distribution of data via the Internet network as well as theworkplaces in charge of monitoring, reporting and managing in case of a chemical accident.

Software part of Sledat systemTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 99The software part is devised to have several levels of notification about the situation on the spot as well as severallevels of responsibility. The basic data collected by Sledat system, by means of measuring probes, can be availableto all interested levels. In the event of a chemical accident, local levels can collect additional information andforward it in the electronic form to both higher levels of management and manaced neighbouring local levels. Thatinformation (report) should be sent by means of Sledat system on accurately designed forms in electronic form,which would contain: name of the sender, place and time of the accident, code of the type of accident, themagnitude of the accident, material damage, number of casualties, prediction of further spreading of the accident,necessary assistance, etc. On the other hand, higher levels send documents in electronic form to give orders andmanage the lower levels. Those documents should be as automated and simplified as possible, in order to be filledin easily and quickly and sent immediately.Sledat system should provide quick inter-department communication in emergency situations as well asinternational communication in case of possible spreading of the chemical incident over the borders.All electronic documents are archived permanently on the server. After the elimination of the consequences of theaccident, the idea is to follow the chronology of the events , analyse them and, using the concrete experience,improve the methodology of reacting, reporting and procedure.IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCHDuring the research, a system of measuring equipment with accompanying hardware and software was established.During the six month experimental period it proved to be suitable for monitoring and remote control of river waterpollution in normal and accidental situations, with the adequate equipment installed on the floating machinery -raft.Changes in water pollution are registered by means of a redox probe used for detection of changes in oxidationreductionpotential of water on a certain location, which is the easiest way to check the functioning of the producedequipment and devised system of remote monitoring and control of river water pollution.The results of the experimental research have shown that it is possible to build a reliable system of remote controlof river water pollution, with very short response time and minimal number of operators in the control centre.The devised system and experimental results of the research create the conditions for the establishment of thesystem of simultaneous remote control of river water pollution on all locations where uncontrolled discharge ofwaste water and other hazardous fluids from vessels, floating machineries on the riverbank, or industrial sites on thebottomland are common. It should be carried out from one centre, under the supervision of responsible stateinstitutions. In addition, the characteristics of hardware and software make it possible to widen the scope of thesystem to simultaneous remote supervision of dangerous cargo transport in the waterways of the Republic of Serbiaand early detection of changes in river water pollution due to accidental spillage of hazardous substances into rivers.The number of measure points (mobile and stationary), which can be monitored within the system from one centre,is not limited.The establishment of the network of measure points and system of remote monitoring of river water pollutionenables responsible state agencies to:monitor the movement of vessels carrying dangerous cargo;receive prompt notification of accidental spillage of dangerous materials in rivers and locate the emergencysite accurately and

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 100provide timely action of the intervention team which could take water samples and establish the cause andtype of the pollution as well as the polluter and take measures to diminish the consequences of theaccident.The reliability of the system has been established and the working life of the electrodes inside the probe (which,according to the manufacturer, is 6 months) in the polluted natural aquatic environment will be checked in theupcoming part of experimental research. The research will be carried out in order to test the functioning of the probemounted on the mobile vessel and platform used for vessel repair and washing tanks which transport hazardousliquids.The application of the system for high quality continual monitoring of river water quality in Serbia, early detectionof accidental pollution and prompt notification of The Emergency Centre for Water Transport will contribute to thediminishing of the scale and effects of waterway pollution, protection of aquatic flora and fauna as well as healthprotection of the population.POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS IN INDUSTRYDue to its universality, the sophisticated multi-function device for measuring pollution in natural aquaticenvironment, detection of accidental pollution, alerting and early notification of accidents in rivers can also beused:1. in industrial plants with media in which some pollutant parameters should be monitored and uncontrolledemission of pollutants in the river in case of an accident that can cause damage in the surrounding aquaticenvironment.2. in industrial plants for monitoring, control, prevention and notification of chemical pollution in plants usedto carry out technological process;3. for monitoring transport of dangerous substances and early notification of the accident on the railway androad infrastructure, with technical modifications of certain elements of the device (adequate sensors fordetection of chemical pollutants in the air and power supply sources), adapted to new conditions andrequirements.CONCLUSIONConsidering the fact that it will take a long time to introduce an integrated system for early notification of accidentson the national level, the authors of this paper suggest establishing an information system for early detection andprompt notification of accidents on rivers, which was tested during this research. It would be a pilot – informationsubsystem for managing emergency situations in this type of transport and it could be established in a relativelyshort period of time.Note: This paper was written as a result of the research done within the technological development project TR –21037: «Development of an integrated system of managing ship-generated waste onwaterway corridors in theRepublic of Serbia », financed by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic ofSerbia , 2008-2010Thank you note: The researchers of „Kirilo Savić“ Institute and Aluxom express their gratitude to Mrs Vesna DeVinča for making it possible to use her „Ekocentar“ raft for research within TR – 21037 Project.

BIBLIOGRAPHYTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1011. Vukić Marija i sar.: Razvoj integrisanog sistema upravljanja brodskim otpadnim materijama na plovnimkoridorima Republike Srbije, Projekat tehnološkog razvoja, ev. broj TR-21037, Institit „Kirilo Savić“ a.d, Beograd,2008-20102. Protokol o sprečavanju zagađenja voda prouzrokovanog plovidbom uz okvirni sporazum o slivu reke Save,Savska komisija, Zagreb, 20093. Вукич Мария и сотр.: Развитие интегральной модели управления сбором, транспортировкой иутилизацией отходов с судов на сети водных путей Республики Сербии, Пленарный доклад, Совещаниегруппы экспертов „Отходы от эксплуатации судов“, Дунайская комиссия, ЦД, Электронная форма и website: www.danubecommission.org, Будапешт, 20094. Vukić Marija, Jevtić Miroljub, Spruk Uroš, Rapajić Vojislav, Štetin Radovan: Sistem za praćenje zagađenjavodotoka usled nekontrolisanog ispuštanja otpadnih voda sa plovila i splavova, Časopis «Poljoprivredna tehnika»,Beograd, Broj XXXVI, 69-815. Marija Vukic, Miroljub Jevtic, Uroš Spruk, Vojislav Rapajic, Radovan Stetin: System SLEDAT for RemoteTracking of Vessels During Transport of Dangerous Goods and Fast Notification on Accidents, InternationalSymposium on Certification of GNSS Systems & Services “CERGAL 2010”, Rostock, Germany, 28-29 April 20106. Marija Vukić i sar.: Projekat «Izgradnja sistema za obaveštavanje i rukovođenje u slučaju hemijskog udesa nateritoriji Republike Srbije», Projekat NIP-a, broj 13600606, Institut «kirilo Savić» a.d, Beograd

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 102UDK:005.334:[656.073.436:620.26(497.11)INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENTS METHODOLOGY OF TRANSPORT OF EXPLOSIVES ALONGTHE CORRIDOR 10Zoran Keković 1 , Nenad Komazec 2 , Goran Glišić 21 Fakultet bezbednosti, zorankekovic@yahoo.com2 Vojna akademija, nkomazec@gmail.com; gglisa@gmail.comAbstract: The certain legislative stipulate the obligation and the manner of risk assessment in various areas(transport of hazardous materials, protection from fire and explosion, environmental protection, protection fromchemical accidents, etc.), in reference with the transport of explosives, but there is no methodological guide thatintegrates assessment of all risks regarding the transportation of explosive substances that endanger people, culturalproperty and the environment. Because the transportation of explosive materials is carried along the transportcorridor with the vulnerable infrastructure, it is obvious that a wide spectrum of risk have negative impact on thesafety of people, their property and critical infrastructure. The paper describes the methodology of risk assessmentof transportation of explosive substances for which the basis of estimates is taken by existing law and moderncriteria and ways of calculating the level of risk as well.Key words: risk assessment, explosive substances, transport, corridor 10INTRODUCTIONOne of the main problems in complex systems is a problem of effective and efficient risk management. Intensiveproduction and more intensive transport of dangerous goods requires strategic solutions, at the first place in theprevention of risks. In addition to the fixed system with a risk of technical / technological accidents, there is thetransport of dangerous substances which can be realized in different ways and different means. During thetransportation of hazardous substances, time and place of accident is unpredictable, as well as the consequenceswhich can be disastrous and long lasting. Just these facts gives legitimacy to the need for the creation anddevelopment of the concept of risk assessment which would enable, first of all, a thorough and complete review ofall facts relevant to the transport of hazardous substances and then determination the probability of events andconsequences that may arise.This paper presents the original model of risk assessment methodologies in the transport of explosive materials withemphasis on the road transport. The methodology is designed to manage risks in any kind of transport and even themanipulation in the production, by precise and profound insight of input data defining the context of the problem.The special value of the methodology is elaborated criteria for the analysis and assessment of risk which allowsimple and thorough adoption of measures to control, eliminate or reduce risks in an organization.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 103TRANSPORT OF EXPLOSIVES ALONG THE CORRIDOR 10Dangerous goods have become a necessity in the production of various products for the human purposes. As thevarious hazardous materials are produced in different parts of Europe, their transport is required to the factorieswhere they are used as basic and necessary resources to work. Transport is carried out in different ways, by land, airand water. The most frequently road in Europe for the transport of hazardous materials is The Transport Corridor10. Road transport corridor 10 (Figure 1) is the largest pan-European corridor that passes through a number ofdifferent countries. His total road length is 2300 km.Figure 1. Pan-European corridor 10Transport of explosives by Corridor 10 is an activity that has to be viewed in terms of the impact of various factorsfor a precise insight into the security conditions under which the transportation of explosive substances are carriedout 6) . Along The Corridor 10 transport is affected by different factors related to the people, infrastructure,environment, etc.Features of Road Corridor 10 can be viewed at the following:going through a number of different countries;various quality and standard of the road route;different population;the existence of critical infrastructure (Paracin‘s pasture, etc.) near the road;different terrain topography;diversity of the traffic legislation;different cultures and habits of the population;climatic diversity;different social and economic map andthe vulnerability of different countries regarding the terrorist attacks.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 104INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENTS OF TRANSPORT OF EXPLOSIVESRisk assessment should enable consideration of all factors affecting the safe transportation of explosive materialsalong The Coridor 10 to define an effective system of prevention and preparedness, as well as a comprehensiveplatform to make the process of recovery and business continuity 7) . Complete and complex understanding of allfactors (Figure 2) that affect the safe transportation of explosive materials can provide integrated analysis of allpotential hazards and their combinations.Source: U. Hinterscheid, Thesis, 2008, WuppertalFigure 2. Chart of impact of potential hazardsRisk assessment, prevention and preparedness are elements of the emerency management before the eventhappens 1) . The estimated risk should be comparable to criteria for acceptable risk and treated by risk measures, butthis does not eliminate all potential risks. Unacceptable risks should be treated by the certain measures. All riskscannot be prevented. The risks that are not initially treated or reduced by prevention are covered by thepreparedness measure. Therefore, the preparedness measures are applied to the so-called residual (remaining)risks 2) .THE PROTECTED VALUES AND APPLICABILITY OF INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENTIntegrated risk assessment should enable simply and completely understanding of impact factors both on theprotected values (Table 1) 4) of organization which transports explosives and environmental values as well. Throughthe integrated risk assessment, organizations looks at the environmental factors that can be affected by the transportto prevent risk and to be prepared for postemergency situation 3) .Table 1. List of protected valuesNumber Protected values Areas of risk impact risk on protected valuesBusinessof Efficiency, the achievement of goals, continuity of work process,1organizations that continuity of management, disruption of the work process, theprovide transportation indicators of working characteristics2SecurityHuman life, impact on the health, the extent of damage to theresources, the environment3Financial performance The operating budget state, external financing, unanticipated costsand/or losses4Regulatory/legal Violations of legal regulations, legal resistance to disturbancerequirements5 Reputation Relationship between the media, public relations, public trust6The interested parties Negative impact on government agencies or employees, employee’smorale, impact on stakeholders and interested partiesNOMINALVALUENON-NOMINALVALUE7 Environment People, natural resources, technical resources

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 105Risk management can be linked to "an individual organization, enterprise or community," horizontallydifferentiated organization, a network of public transport or more communities within the region and “verticallydifferentiated organization”, a system of local, regional or national responsibility 7) .IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL HAZARDSAnalysing of characteristics of The Corridor 10 shows that the lots of activity related to the transport of explosivematerials is exposed to a large number of potential hazards. The potential hazards of transportation of explosivesubstances can be grouped according to the following 4) :1. failure to comply with legal regulations related to the transport and handling of explosive substances (Europeandirectives, the Law on transport of dangerous goods, Regulation on the transport of dangerous goods in roadtraffic);2. inadequate preparation for the transport of explosive material (people, equipment, explosives);3. technical characteristics of the road (importance of the road, the quality of roads, the places for the rest, a placeto stop for the services, traffic density, bridges, tunnels);4. topographic features of the route (the amount of the land, vegetation, location of settlements, accessibility ofthe road section to the other roads, the proximity to water, the existence of objects with other hazardoussubstances);5. meteorological conditions during the transport (summer, winter, fog, rain, ice, number of windy days);6. terrorist acts (road attacks, robberies on the road, raiding)7. inadequate handling of the explosive substances (inadequate loading and unloading, moving to and from themeans of transport, the use of combustible resources, the use of inappropriate vehicles)8. transport insurance (transfer of liability to a third party-insurance house)9. the combination of these factors.Grouping of potential hazards is very important in terms of the need for a preliminary risk analysis 3) .The information on existence of hazards is not of the great importance if we do not have tha data about the size ofthe hazards and the possible effects of actions on the protected values. In order to determine the requiredinformation it is necessary to define the criteria (Table 2) 4) for determining the size of the potential hazards 3) 10) .Number1Request for theassessment of potentialhazardsFailure to comply withlegislationTable 2. Determining the size of the hazards – An exampleSize of the hazardsMaximum Large Medium Small Minimum5 4 3 2 1In the past, In the past, In the past,the the theorganization organization organizationhad more had less than had less thanthan 15 10 cases of 5 cases ofcases of noncomplianccomplianccompliancenon-non-with with withlegislation legislation legislationIn the past, theorganizationhad more than20 cases ofnoncompliancewithlegislationIn the past,theorganizationhad no casesof noncompliancewithlegislation

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 106A preliminary hazard analysis should enable the determination of the potential hazards that has the greatest negativeimpact on the protected value at a given moment or at estimated time 5) . Preliminary hazard analysis should result inthe graph (Figure 4) that allows visual monitoring of the size of risk. (Sizes in the horizontal section relates to thenumber of potential hazards in Table 2) 4) .Figure 3. The results of the preliminary hazard analysisRISK ANALYSISRisk analysis refers to the understanding of potential dangers (hazards). Methodology of integrated risk assessmentprovides a complete and accurate developed criteria for determining the probability of occurrence of the negativeevents and the size of the impact it can cause.Starting from the definition that risk is the likelihood that potential danger (hazard) will turn into a potentiallydangerous event and cause negative effects on protected values, it is necessary to establish criteria for determiningthe probability and consequences of events 8) .Probability (P) is a combination of the frequency of certain events and the vulnerability of the organization 5) bysome potential dangers (Matrix 1.).Gradation of probability is done as follows:1 - Impossible, 2-Unlikely, 3-Likely, 4 - Almost certainly, 5 - CertainlyThe probability is determined by the form: P = F # V .................................................................................... (1)Frequency (F) refers to the repetition of negative events in a specific time period (T1) or to the time exposure ofthe protected value to the potential danger in a particular time (T2) 4) .Gradation of frequency is done as follows:1 - Very rarely, 2 - Occasionally, 3 - Often, 4 - Predominantly, 5 - Very often - T1 or1 - Negligible, 2 - Occasional, 3 - Long, 4 - Predominantly, 5 - Permanent - T2Vulnerability (V) is the current state of protection of the organization or sensitivity to the potential danger of theorganization 5) .Gradation of vulnerability is performed as follows:1 - Very large, 2 - Large, 3 - Average, 4 - Small, 5 - Very Small

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 107Vulner.Matrix 1. Determining the probabilityVery large Large Average Small Very smallFrequency1 2 3 4 5Very rarely 1 3 2 1 1 1Occasionally 2 4 3 2 2 1Often 3 5 4 3 2 2Predominantly 4 5 4 3 3 3Very often 5 5 5 4 3 3Example:Company registered for transport of goods performs transport of explosive by trucks on relation Serbia (Belgrade) -Greece (Thessaloniki). The potential danger: Poor quality of road on the territory of Serbia.Determining the likelihood of negative events:1. FREQUENCY:due to the bad roads, score of the accidents in the last 5 years is 10 - OCCASIONALLY oraproximately 50% of the highway through Serbia is of poor quality, therefore, the time exposure of theburden to the potential danger is about 50% of the total time of transport through Serbia –OCCASIONALLY;2. VULNERABILITY:Vehicles are equipped with electronic suspension control system by which shocks and movement of freight arereduced – SMALL.Using Form (1) and matrix 1., the determination is: PROBABILITY = 2 = UNLIKELY.Conclusion: The probability that the perceived danger is becoming a potential negative event is very small.3. CONSEQUENCES:Consequences (C) are (Matrix 2) the effects of the negative events on the protected values and are manifestedthrough the size of the loss in relation to the critical protected values 5) .Gradation of result is done as follows:1 - Minimal, 2 - Small, 3 - Moderate, 4 - Serious, 5 - CatastrophicConsequences are determined according to the form:C = L # Cr.................................................................................................................................................. (2)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1084. DAMAGE:Damage (D) is a measure of the protected value damage 3) 10) .The gradation value of damage is done as follows:1 - Very small, 2 - Small, 3 - Average, 4 - Large, 5 - Very large5. CRITICALITY:Criticality (C) is a measure of value/the importance of protected values for an organization or a measure ofsensitivity of the organization in terms of harmful effects of events on the protected values 1) .Gradation of the criticality is done as follows:1 - Very large, 2 - Large, 3 - Average, 4 - Small, 5 - MinimumCriticalityMatrix 2. Determining the consequencyVery large Large Average Small Very smallDamage1 2 3 4 5Minimum 1 3 2 1 1 1Small 2 4 3 2 2 1Average 3 5 4 3 2 2Large 4 5 4 3 3 3Very large 5 5 5 4 3 3Example-continued: Transport is carried out in Serbia through populated areas with arable land and river flows.Determination of the possible consequences of negative events:1. DAMAGE:Possible loss - damage and destruction of property, delay in delivery, damage to the trucks and cargo – MEDIUM.2. CRITICALITY:Ffinancial losses, a smaller impact on the reputation, the criminal proceedings – MEDIUM.Using the form (2) and matrix 2, the determination is: CONSEQUENCES = 3 = MODERATE.Conclusion: If the potential danger resulting in negative event, the consequences of protected values will bemoderate.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 109Risk analysis results in determining the level of risk (Matrix 3) 1) .The level of risk is determined by the pattern:RL = P * C .......................... .................................................. .................................................................. (3)ConsequencesMatrix 3. Determining the level of riskMinimum Small Moderate Serious CatastrophicProbability1 2 3 4 5Impossible 1 1 2 3 4 5Unlikely 2 2 4 6 8 10Likely 3 3 6 9 12 15Almostcertainly4 4 8 12 16 20Certainly 5 5 10 15 20 25Based on the level of risk the size and degree of risk is determined (Table 3) 7) .Table 3. Determining the size and level of riskCategories of risk The degree of risk Size of risk Level of riskFIRST 1 Very small, negligible 1 and 2SECOND 2 Small 3, 4 and5THIRD 3 Moderate large 6, 8 and 9FOURTH 4 Large 10, 12,15 and 16FIFTH 5 Very large 20 and 25Example - continued:Using the form (3), matrix 3. and Table 3., the determination is: RL = P *C = 2 * 3 = 6 (MODERATELY LARGE).According to previously defined criteria, determines the size of the possible consequences for all protected values:1. Business: Violation of normal operations;2. Safety: Injuries of people, damage to resources, environmental pollution;3. Financial performance: paying compensation;4. Regulatory / legal requirements: violation;5. Reputation: violation of the reputation of an organization;6. Stakeholders: negative impact on the attitude of contractors;7. Environment: disruption of life and health, violations on natural resources.Using Table 3. The determination is: RISK CATEGORY = 3.Using Table 4. The determination is: ACCEPTANCE = UNACCEPTABLE .

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 110Based on all the conclusions (taking into account other indicators), the decision maker in the organization decideson the treatment of specified potential danger:IT IS RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT DIRECTION OR TRANSPORT BY RAILWAY ONCONTESTABLE SECTIONS.RISK ASSESSMENTThe aim of the risk assessment is to help in making decisions based on the results of risk analysis about which risksshould deal with and about the priorities of risks treatment. Risk assessment includes a comparison of level of riskthat is found during the process of analysis to criteria for risks that are identified in the course of reviewing theentire context 5) .Risk assessment includes:classification of risks in certain categories;determination of the acceptability of risk,determination of the priority for risk treatment.Acceptability of risk (Table 4) is determined in relation to the level of risk.Table 4. Determination of the acceptability of riskThe acceptability of riskLevel of riskACCEPTABLE 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5UNACCEPTABLE 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 20 and 25Prioritization for risk treatment is determined by the size of the level of risk. Prioritizied risks are treated with thehighest level.TREATMENT OF RISKRisk treatment involves taking of one of the following strategies 3) 10) :1. Risk avoiding;For the treatment of risk by applying risk avoidance strategies organizations need to make exchange an initiatedactivities by alternative without violating the projected goals.For example: the decision maker concludes to make transport by alternative route.2. Reducing risk by modifying the procedure;For the treatment of risk by applying risk reduction strategies organizations need to revise the way-processimplementation of critical activities without violating the projected goals.Example: Transport of explosive materials by railway in one part of the section.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1113. Reducing the probability of events;For the treatment of risk using the strategy of reducing the probability of realization of potential threats,organizations need to implement measures that will reduce the frequency of events or time exposure of protectedvalues to the potential dangers and introducing new or increase existing protection of critical elements of theorganization.Example: reducing the frequency of transport by railway.4. Reducing the consequences of potential hazards;For the treatment of risk using the strategy of reducing the possible consequences of potential hazards organizationsshould take measures to safe protected value of possible damages on the basis of knowledge of the characteristicsprotected values and elements of the organization, as well as reducing sensitivity to the potential dangers.Example: load transported in several parts.5. The division of risks;For the treatment of risk using the strategy of risk sharing the organization need to transfer all or part of the risk tothe organization of risk insurance, in accordance with business policies both of the organization itself and insuranceorganizations.For example: damage caused by the explosion to ensure the insurance company.5. Retention or acceptance of risk;For the treatment of risk by applying risk retention strategies the organization should keep all the organization'sactivities or events that do not present the current danger to the unacceptable level of risk. The acceptance of risk byan organization is only performed when there is cost-benefit justification.Example: management decides that the risk is acceptable and there is no any changes according to the existingplan.Applying the proposed strategy should be observed by the organization through an analysis of feasibility optionsand cost-benefit analysis.CONCLUSIONIntegrated risk assessment, prevention and preparation for responding to accidents in the transport of explosivematerials are the backbone of business continuity management of organizations that provide transportation ofexplosive substances. Only a comprehensive, fair and fully analyzed and assessed potential hazards and risks thathave the potential to grow in adverse event and cause negative effects on protected values are the assumption ofsuccessful protection of the organization values and the environment.Non-taking into account, skip or neglect of any group of potential danger or risk exclude them from further analysis,thus creating the conditions for the existence of hidden or uncontrolled hazards. The dangers that are not identifiedat the start of the risk assessment may be the cause of the appearance of other dangers or even increase their effect.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 112Assessment of risks and taking measures for the treatment of risk does not end the process of controlling andreducing influence of the dangers, but also creates conditions for effective and efficient preparedness and businesscontinuation proces of an organization. In fact, despite all the measures taken to treat the risk, a part of the residualrisk cannot be removed but is accepted as part of the business.If the potential hazards after risk treatman result in harmful consequences, we must take action based on preparedplans for the rehabilitation of the consequences of explosion and recovery and continue operations.BIBLIOGRAFY1. Baranoff E., Risk Management and Insurance, Wiley, Danvers, USA, 2004.2. Drennan, L., McDonell, A, Risk and crisis Management in the public sector, Poutledge, London and New York,2007.3. ISO TC 223/SC, 31000: Upravljanje rizicima - Uputstvo o principima i implementaciji upravljanja rizicima4. Keković, Z., Komazec, N., Glišić, G.: Pristup metodologiji procene rizika, BNP-Žurnal za kriminalistiku i pravo,broj 3, str 103 -115, 2009.5. Keković, Z., Kešetović Ž., (2006), Krizni menadžment I – prevencija krize, Fakultet bezbednosti:Beograd6. Pravilnik o metodologiji za procenu opasnosti od hemijskog udesa i od zagađivanja životne sredine, meramapripreme i merama za otklanjanje posledica ("Sl. glasnik RS", br. 60/94 i 63/94 - ispr.)7. Regester, M. and Larkin J. (2005), Risk Issues and Crisis Management / A Casebook of Best Practice,3 rd edition,Chartered Institute of Public Relations:London/Sterling, VA.8. Savić, S., Stanković, M.: Teorija sistema i rizika, Fakultet zaštite na radu u Nišu, Niš, 2009.9. Savić S., Anđelković B., Stanković M. Specifičnosti sistema upravljanja rizikom u vanrednim situacijama, 33.SYM-OP-IS 2006. 03-06. 10. 2006. Banja10. Savović, I., Arsovski, S.: Dodatni zahtevi ISO 13485:2003, zahtevi za menadžment rizikom, 32. Nacionalnakonferencija o kvalitetu, Kragujevac, 2005

UDK:614.83:624.21TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 113IMPORTANCE OF REAL-CASE RESULTS FOR COMPUTATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF TUNNEL-FIRE1 Medzid Muhasilovic, 2 J. Modic, 1 M. O. Deville, 2 J. Duhovnik1 Ecole Polytechnique Féderale du Lausanne, STI LINISE, Station 9, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerlandmuhasilovic@gmx.net, michel.deville@epfl.ch2 Mechnanical Engineering, University in Ljubljana, Aškerčeva 6, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, jurij.modic@fs.uni-lj.siAbstract: A Computationally-Based investigation of the a confinced-combustion was performed in a road-tunnel,pointing to an emerging importance to understand these large-scale reacting complex-flows. The consequences ofthe flame and the impact gaseous products of such non premixed combustion (NPC) depend on the geometricalcharacteristics of such closed-objects. The accuracy of the computational tool we compared with conditions in realcaseexperiment. Further, applying the the RANS (k- model) for treatment of turbulence through out the appliedCFD-approach, we observed the bifurcation-zone (road-junction) in such enclosed space. Taken together, thisinvestigation; both comparison with the experimental data of compartment large-scale fires and subsequent CFDapproachin exploring; will set further mosaic stone in a map of the crosstalk between the large-scale confinedcomplex flows and the geometry of the area, where they occur.Kay words: road-tunnel, large-scale fires, gaseous products, real-case experiment, bifurcation zoneINTRODUCTION AND INVITATION TO RESEARCHDue to the already occurred accidental fires in enclosures, but also due to the novel “non-simply-made”underground traffic facilities – one can see an on-growing need to undertake the scientific research, aiming at betterunderstanding in behaviour of the (reacting) gaseous flows during mentioned accidents. Additional benefits asresults of such investigations are proposing properly designed ventilation not only in case of accidental-event butalso for the usual maintenance of the air-quality in traffic-enclosures (tunnel road) 1,2 .The field models for CFD-research on fires in enclosures do report on good capability of the computationalapproaches used in treating these reactive flows 3 . Supporting (in the beginning of the Computational BasedResearch) a few-thousands-cells-domains 4,5 and in spite of these limiting conditions, those models were giving verysatisfying results in both validating 6-10 of software tools and aimed CFD-prognoses for particular explored cases offluid phenomena 1,11,12 . Modern field-models (the mechanism we applied here) that are engaged in CFD-researchwithin the last decade and a half, supported by powerful hardware, can cope with domains made out of severalhundred thousands cells. Those codes applied 2,13 for research on fires in traffic enclosures 3 , (assuming simple onestepchemistry for combustion modelling), employed mostly 14 the k-ε model for turbulence-treatment. This isaccompanied by conservation equations for mass, momentum, energy, species, and termfor effect of buoyancy inturbulent mixing gaseous fluid 15 , what was our decision in presented approach as well, being suitable for situations

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 114where rate of reaction is controlled by the comparatively slow mixing of fuel with oxidant (air) – one of acharacteristic of large-scale non-premixed combustion.What is indeed “provoking” to computationaly aided research of confined combustion within a large-scale domainis the simple geometry of the arbitrary tunnels in computational research attempts thus far 16 . Responding to statisticson accidents in covered-road traffic 3 , aim of our study is the exploration of the consequences of large-scale fires insuch a tunnel that turns up as an element of modern traffic roads. In corelation with the aim set is the performedvalidation of the used computational research-step against the real-case scenarios 17,18 . Subsequent, the simulation oflarge-scale fire in a newly constructed tunnel of “Sentvid” with a bifurcation zone, treated possible accidentalscenario 17 .OBJECT OF INTERESTThe explored left tube of the tunnel »Sentvid« is 1470 m long with unidirectional traffic and optional artificiallongitudinal ventilation in eight zones, having at it´s entrance 3 lane-road. After bifurcation zone (at the 720 th meterof it´s length) and the change of the cross-section surface from 82m² to 56 m 2 (3 lanes to 2 lanes) main tunnel-line(2-lanes) is exiting towards higher-positioned local road.. On the distance of cca 250m after the tunnel-junction isan pedestrian crosspassage for escape (between the exit-line and the continuing main tunnel-line). The longestpedestrian escape-way is about 250m, estimated according to normal speed of walking.Figure 1. Schematic model of left tube in IDA-SoftwareFire simulation pointLocal roadMain roadLocal roadMain roadLEFT TUBE‐2.20%2 lanes – 56 m 2 3 lanes – 82 m 2RIGHT TUBE+2.20%2 lanes – 56 m 2 3 lanes – 82 m 2Figure 2. Gradient of tunnel »Sentvid«

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 115From Figure 2 one can see, that the left tube is disadvantagues because of negative gradient which will causebuoyancy of the gases against the traffic flow.Fire simulation point in the computational approachVentilat. section DL= 450 m1459 mLeft Tube40 MW+0.90%Fire in 3 sections40 MWA= 82 m 2100 100 1503 lanes-2.2%120 90 90 90Ventilat. section A Ventilat. section B Ventilat. section CH40 MW-0.50%Fire in 3 sections3 lanes40 MWRight Tube +2.2A= 82 m 2124 189 150120 90 90Ventilat. section EVentilat. section FVentilat. section GFansFire points1487 mFigure 3. Road-traffic plan of tunnel with experimentally positioned fires placeTherefore, the left tube of the “Sentvid”-tunnel that is passing under the Slovenian Capital of Ljubljana, was takenas object of interest – both in physical simulations and computational approaches (with the fires sized as 1,5MWand 3,5MW) as well as in the subsequental computational-only experiment of the 40MW-fire. The tunnel itself,with the slope of 2,2 %, has two major main-curves of a Radius of 4000m and 1500m with both “horse-shoe”-cross-section and rectangular- cross-section, where first one is determining first 1080m of the tunnel. Starting as athree-lanes-tunnel, after the bifurcation in “Sentvid” (on the 720 th meter of it´s length) the “main stream” of the“horse-shoe-shaped” tunnel is “continuing” as two-lane traffic communication, the “horse-shoe-shaped” form isexiting and elevating to the point about 12m above road-level of the “main stream”, having the length of further400m and changing from a one-lane to the two-lane “horse-shoe-shaped” cross-section. So, the Aspect-Ratio waschanging in this tunnel: for three-lanes part Ap =1,707 to the rectangular and other horse-shoe-shaped part withtwo lanes with Ap = 1,32.TURBULENCE TREATMENT WITHIN THE CFD-BASED APPROACHThe flow phenomena within the object of interest are computed by the Reynolds Averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS)equations, with the turbulence k- model 19 , representing the major characteristic of the applied CFD-investigationtoolwith the FLUENT. Observations show the Mach Number to be of the order of 0.035 and such a flow can beassumed as incompressible 20 where the combustion makes no impact onto flow-velocity 3 . Further assumption, tohave a planar propagation front of combustion in a motionless fluid, applies here the Boussinesq approximation 21,22without external forces 23 obeying the incompressible Navier-Stokes equation 24 with a temperature-dependent forceterm 23 where the temperature-change describes the advection-reaction-diffusion equation:

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 116vxjj 0 (1);T Tvj T 1 R Tt xj x jcp x j zvv 1 p1vi i j ij giTt x x xj i j(3)(2)Here videnotes the average velocity component, T the mean local temperature, p the pressure, the density, tthe time and xithe space coordinates. The R(T) = ¼ T (1 – T) stands for reaction rate 23 where the reciprocal valueof reaction time-scale is represented by z, is the thermal conductivity, c p is the heat capacity at the constantpressure. TemperatureT will be used as expression for reaction-progress-variable as well, whose purpose is todistinguished burned, unburned and partially burned state, providing an easy interpretation of flame propagation.The term gi T denotes buoyancy, treated according to the Boussinesq approximation, where T is differencebetween local and reference temperature. The g stands for gravity and defines thermal expansion. The stresstensor model 25 , ijis related to the local strain rate: ij ( ij )N ( ij )T(4)Here we distinguish between the Newtonian stress ( ) 2Sfeaturing molecular viscosity; and the turbulentij N ijReynolds stress ( ij )T 2T Sij, since the stress rate tensor Sijis defined as:2kand the turbulent viscosity: T C (6)1 viSij 2 xjvxji(5)The applied k- model 26 is a two-equation eddy viscosity model 27-29 , where one equation governs the local kineticenergy k of the fluctuating motion and the other one yealds the energy dissipation rate 30 . The constants are given:2 2k k kC 1 =0.126, C 2 =1.92, C µ =0.09, C =0.07 : C k C Pd Gbt (7)2 k 2C CkP1 d C3vN C2(8)t kThe energy term is modelling the buoyancy effects, where Pr t denotes turbulent PrandtltGb giTPrtNumber (which is of the order of unity).The combustion – the chemistry development is explained by fast chemistry assumption including the prePDF 31 andin the ideal stoichiometric conditions the reaction runs as follows:CH 11 O 3, 76N 7 CO 8HO 41, 36N H (9)ignitionenergy7 16 2 2 2 2 2

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 117NUMERICAL STEP WITHIN CFD-APPROACHFor our transient simulations, the governing equations of the applied mathematical model are discretised in bothspace and time 28,32 . In choosing the numerical method, we rely on the standard of the finite volumes 3,20,32,33 . Thespatial discretisation of time-dependent equations employed a segregated solution method. Since we took a cellbasedcomputational method, the linearised equations result then in a system of linear equations for each cell in thecomputational domain, containing the unknown variable at the cell centre as well as the unknown values insurrounding neighbour cells. In sequential procedure of the segregated solver, the continuity equation is used as anequation for pressure as well 28 , where the SIMPLE-family 32 of algorithms. This is introducing pressure into thecontinuity equation (by a co-located cell-centred scheme for pressure and velocity) and in this way supports thepressure-velocity coupling though the algorithm for the unsteady flows 28 .Boundary conditions for computer-simulationsThe estimation of the boundary conditions was supported by some previous studies 3,34,35 . So the tunnel-entrance andexit , as well as the exit after the tunnel junction, were characterised as open (pressure) boundaries with pressurediscrepancy of 16Pa at the flow-in or flow-out areas, respectively (as estimated in performed experiments) 17 . Thefuel “pool” – the simulated fire-place, has been determined by the constant max flux rate of 0,4545kg/m²s 36 havingsurface of 2m² for a 40MW-heptane fire 37 . According to this, the 3,5MW and 1,5MW fire (performed in physicalexperiment in the tunnel Sentvid) were simulated in the tunnel within the same surface of 2m² using the heptanefluxof 0,03977 kg/m²s and 0,0170kg/m²s, respectively 38 . Tunnel-entrance as open (pressure) boundary was used forinitializing computational values for the velocity and pressure in the whole domain since the global temperature wasset to the 293K. The tunnel housing, tunnel road and tunnel walls as well, were presumed to be heat-transparentwith a heat conduction coefficient taken as middle-value of a 2.1W/mK according to the type of a RC constructionand the area-soil, where-through the objects of interest was constructed 38 . This decision was based on realityorientedinvestigation on modern tunnel-construction knows for the thermal conductivity of a rock where through atunnel was built. Particularly for the “Sentvid”-tunnel, that was built in the carst-area, the specific thermalconductivity of such limestone ( =2,3W/mK) 39,40 must be configured in the boundary conditions in furtherinvestigations.Discretized space within the computational domain - MeshingDescretizing 3 the space within the computational domain, the choice of the characteristic cell-shape and finally theirdistribution is actually always deferring from the one to another to computational domain and respects theconditions of the type of fluid flow. The applied solver within the FLUENT-software package is tolerating all majorcell-shapes and therefore we were free while crossing over from one part of the investigated object to that areawhere we expected decisive flow-occurrences.According to the explained, in three major numerically investigated scenarios, within the geometry-types of thetunnel in the computational were displaced 3’731’398 cells (where additional exit, after bifurcation, to theCelovska-Street was not constructed and rest of the tunnel was situated in the computational domain). With3’946’565 cells the numerical investigation was performed in the whole tunnel with the planned bifurcation withindomain. Finally, in shorthand domain, where the impact of the tunnel exit-line (after junction) was investigated, the2’633’325 cells were distributed.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 118Entrance in „Sentvid“ at thehigher geodetic positionExit to a local roadExit towards NorthBifurcation zoneFire simulation pointFigure 4. Computational domain: The 1470m long left tube of the “Sentvid” with (to-be-constructed) exit to theCelovska-street that runs above the tunnel. Upper side is entrance from Ljubljana (from the south)Figure 5. Increasing the mesh-density towards the region where more fluid-dynamics´ phenomena are to beexpected: The tunnel bifurcation zone with the continuing tunnel-direction and the begin of the exit line towardsCelovska-street. Different characteristics of the single-cells were applied in order to achieve mesh-independency inone stroke and save computing-time.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 119COMPUTATIONALLY-BASED RESEARCHPhysical experiments as validation-basis for the computational approachIn the physical experiment, performed in left tube of the tunnel “Sentvid”, the position of the fireplace (calloricsizes: 1.5MW and 3.5MW) was at the 1130 th meter of length from the south entrance, in that two-lanes tunnel-part(after the bifurcation zone) where the cross-section is the rectangular one. The established velocity-field at about50m away from the fire place, as one of the measured entities in the physical experiment, was recorded in 4different heights (2,5m, 3,5m, 4,5m and 5,5m) above the tunnel-road and served as a referent value for thevalidation of the CFD-approach.Table 1. Velocity of the air-movement in Sentvid-tunnel during an physical experiment of a 3.5MW-fire usingnatural ventilation onlyMeasurementNo.Measurement height(m)Measured(m/s)velocity1. 3,50 1,72 12:0512h, 4min +Time of themeasurement2. 2,50 1,71 12:073. 2,50 1,86 12:084. 3,50 1,83 12:08Figure 6. CFD-estimated air-velocity at about 50m away from fire-place in “Sentvid”-tunnel in the event of3.5MW-fire

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 120Having uncertainties due to the exact composition of the inflammable hydro-carbon-liquid that was used in theexperiments – the CFD approach was conducted using the heptane – a most common fuel for (physical) firescenariosimulation and fire-fighting tests and exercises. Obeying the exact data on surface of the fire-place, themass-flux of the heptane was set so (in the boundary-conditions) to produce firstly 1.5MW and then 3.5MW fires.These fires “burned” during the computational simulation as well as during the experiment for 120s as well.Generally, the fire-plume’s properties differ as one “goes along” the approximated flame trajectory set within threemajor regions 41 of a large-scale combustion: continuous flame region, intermittent flame region and the plumeregion – all the general zones of the large-scale fire that we can observe at the pictures, recorded both in visiblelight-range and in IR-spectrum, in the “Sentvid”-tunnel during the physical experiment.The letter thermographs we used as one of the validation basis for the computational approach, where one canobserve qualitative correnspodence of the experimentaly recorded and computationally estimated results. Due to thenatural draft, both experimental as well as computational investigation-approach demonstrated transport of gaseouscombustion products towards lower geodetical position of the tunnel-exit (Figures 7 and 8).Figure 7. The thermographic image in the 119th second of the 3.5MW-fire during the physical simulation in the“Sentvid”-tunnel. Recognizable is direction of the fire-plume “going” towards the “Sentvid”- south-exit

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 121Figure 8. CFD-estimation of the temperature-fields during the 3.5MW-fire. The fire-fronts are directed to the“Sentvid”-south exit – as same as it in the physical simulationsComputational experiment of the 40MW-fire-equivalent within the fully completed left tube of tunnel“Sentvid” (with a 400m-exit line)In some previously performed investigations 41,42 , treating developement of a large-scale flame, we found anadditional confirmation for our chosen CFD-approach, applying the suggested conditions 43,44 having the influenceof longitudinal-air-velocity balanced by the upward (buoyancy-driven) hot current. We noticed well correlating ofthe results coming out of both CFD-based investigation with the physical simulations 17 , with the same conditionsboth in case of 1.5MW- as well as in case of 3.5MW-fire. However, due to the strict regulations on tunnel-service inRepublic of Slovenia 45 , this wanted physical experiment could not be performed in this new tunnel with an internaljunction, where additional tunnel-exit could act like a ventilation port or even as a deformed chimney. Therefore wedare to investigate and to predict the movement of the air, air-pollutants, gaseous products and distribution of thetemperature fields of an accidental combustion in “Sentvid”-tunnel in the case of 40MW-fire, performing this taskby the computer-aided approach 28,45,46 . So, for simulating the caloric power, equivalent to a 40MW-fire over thesame surface (of the fire-place) like in the physical and numerical approaches earlier (investigating the 1.5MW and3.5MW “fire-size”) we choose the value of 0,4545kg/m²s as a representative mass-flux for heptane, relying onresearch reports 47 and proven table-values 36 . The 40MW-fire is simulated in left tube (Figure 9.).The air velocity measured in “Sentvid” -physical experiments, before any fire-event, was positive (allong thetraffic-flow in this tunel-tube). In the case of (computationally) investigated 40MW-fire-scenario, the direction ofair/smoke velocity is negative. Relatively strong thermal gradient between gaseous combustion-products andsurroundng air interfering with buoyant forces causes such development (Figure 10.).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 122Figure 9. Air-velocity in “Sentvid”-section with 3 lanes during the 40 MW-fireFigure 10. Air-velocity in the tunnel-section with 2 lanes after the tunnel-junction

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 123Figure. 11. Air velocity in the “Sentvid”-exit-line during the 40 MW-fireAir temperatures estimated by the computational investigation during the 40MW-fire accident.Figure 12. Highest air temperature along the 2-lane tube with 40MW- fire

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 124Figure 13. Temperature-field – Due to the longitudinal (air) movement towards the heigher geodetical position ofthe tunnel, one can notice the displacement of the hottest zone within the tunnel central lineDISCUSSION OF THE OBSERVED PHENOMENAOne of the most dangerous occurrences during the accidental fires within an object (built up out of RC construction)is so-called concrete-spaling 48 that is orchestrated by the (combustion-) irradiative heat impacts and finally, by thetemperature distribution onto the some concrete inner-body. Distinguishing two major groups of the flame-shapes inenclosure: the ones, that impinge on the tunnel roof and the others that, influenced by the longitudinal (even natural)(air)stream, do not; during the computational-investigations in tunnel “Sentvid” we recognise the latter ones in theresults of our research on 40MW-fire-scenario.Having established flame front, we noticed such behaviour both of the flame and of the gaseous products ofcombustion, where axis of the flame is pushed away, because of the interference of the buoyancy and longitudinal(air) movement 49 that was of a natural kind in the 120s of the computational experiment. As one moves further ofthe fire-source, the buoyancy gains on the strength due to the increased temperature 49 .The velocity field is “discovering” also the place where “Sentvid”-tunnel changes the shape from the rectangular- tothe “horse-shoe”-shaped one (Figure 14, Figure 15). The velocity field is here more intense near ceiling of thetunnel – since on the flat-ceiling the smoke-stream is distributed fairly equally, where more “channeled”- ceiling ina narrowed space amplifies the velocity.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 125Figure 14. Look from below: The 7 th second of the 40MW-fire where velocitiy field is obeying the tree-shaped formpointing at the distribution of the gaseous combustion productsFigure 15. Velocity field is not only pointing to the area with an increased buoyancy in the zone of the flame, but itis also “descovering” the place where the tunnel is changing it´s cross-section-shape (from ractangularshape to a“Horse-shoe”-shape)

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 126Additional impact of irradiance and temperature is given through viewing at the central-line through the Sentvid(crossing the middle of the fire-place, Figure 15).On the places with the most developed irradiance, one can notice the places with the highest temperature (hotspots),occurred, due to the fluctuations in the combustion. And this especially is the case of constructive interference ofthe buoyancy with the slow longitudinal natural flow (towards the higher geodetic position, according to the tunneldenivelation of 2,2%), wherever the buoyant forces are stronger than convection of the fire plume and the hot gasstream,which is above the fire-place and near-fire-area.These occurrences do present in this phase of the fire-development already a dangerous point for the construction ofthe tunnel body. Therefore, in such fire scenario it would be recommended that two couples of fans ought to beswitched-on and in this way all the velocities (computationally estimated) according to the traffic-direction arepositive (Figures 16-18): In a 3-lane-tube, 1.63 m/s; in a 2-lane- tube differs from 0.10 up to 0.31 m/s; and in an 1-lane-tube, 2.60 m/s.Figure 16. Air velocity, tube with 3 lanes – fire 40 MW, with applied artificial longitudinal ventilation of twocouples of fans

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 127Figure 17. Air velocity, tube with 2 lanes – fire 40 MW, two couples of fans employedFigure 18. Air velocity, exit-tube with 1 lane – fire 40 MW, two couples of fans employedThe earlier-recognised trend in experimental approaches 17,20 was base for the explanation of these recordedmoments in our computational-simulation. However, the buoyant or “chimney”-effect of the additional exit-line (tothe local road) was weaker then expected in first 120s of the fire-event, judging on the velocity-field. So, an impactof the tunnel-bifurcation did not appear as expected and velocity-field stayed in alignment with the main tunneldirection.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 128CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOKThe specific geometry of the object of interest –this traffic road-object that is undergoing the Slovenian Capital ofLjubljana– was “tempting enough” to conduct this research, expecting new answers due to the possible impact of areality-oriented enclosure (computational domain) onto large-scale fire and escorting occurrences.However, the bifurcation of this three-lane tunnel, it´s general curvature of 4000m-bow and the changes of the“horse-shoe”-shaped to rectangular cross-section was obviously leaving no significant trace onto the propagation ofthe combustion consequences in the first two minutes (that was the duration of the physical experiments in thistunnel with however unfinished bifurcation traffic-line). So has the propagation of the gaseous products “followed”the major traffic-line in tunnel and expected smoke-evacuation through the exit (after the junction of the road)accompanied by the decrease of the distribution of the soot, temperature or irradiance in major traffic-line, was notto be observed.Computationally estimated temperature-distribution and velocity of gaseous-movement were compared against themeasured values of built-in sensors in real-case experiments with 1.5MW- and 3.5MW-fire. Therefore we were ableto rely on computational-investigations for estimation of temperature of air in “Sentvid”-tunnel in case of 40MWfire,that show us longitudinal temperature gradient as well.As expected, that flame-deviation stands in corelation with air-movement. That is why, the temperature in verticalplain over flame is lower than the highest measured temperature, what is consequence, firstly of slow counter-flowof fresh air and combustion-gases underneath the rim of tunnel and of the propagating of this large-scale confinedcombustion – so-called flame-rolling.By performing this study on only one object of interest of the given geometric characteristics (road-tunnel “Sentvid”in regime of natural ventilation), our investigation on the accidental fire was conducted according to the bothstandard i and novel experimental 31,42,44,50 and computer aided 51-53 research 54,55 performed by far.By trying to give the next step to the entire urge in the community, which is researching on large-scale confinedfires,we intend to address also the civil-engineering sector 56,57 and enlarge data-base for the medical healthprotection58 as well.Acknowledgement: Dr. Medzid Muhasilovic, Dipl.-Ing. and Ass. Prof. Dr. Jurij Modic, et al. do thank to Mr.Zibert, ELEA, Slovenia and to Mr. Persahlin, EQUA, Sweden for their significant contribution in acomplishing thisinvestigation.BIBLIOGRAFY1. S. Bengston G. Holmstedt, H. Tuovinen, Sensitivity Calculations of Tunnel fires Using CFD. Fire SafetyJournal, 1996. 1: p. 99 - 119.2. S. Kumar S. D. Miles, R. D. Andrews. Validation of a CFD model for fires in the memorial tunnel. in FirstInternational Conference on Tunnel Fires. 1999. Lyon, France.3. M. Deville M. Muhasilovic, Tunnel-Curvatire´s influence on the propagation of the consequences of largescaleaccidental fire - a CFD-investigation. Turkish Journal of Engineering and Environmental Sciences,2007. 31: p. 391.4. G. Cox S. Kumar. Mathematical Modelling of Fires in Tunnels. in 5th International Symposium on theAerodynamics & Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels. 1985.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1295. G. Cox S. Kumar. Radiation and Surface Roughness Effects in the Numerical Modelling of Enclosure Fires.in Fire Safety Science - 2nd International Conference. 1988.6. P. Chasse. Sensitivity Study of Different Modelling Techniques for the Computer Simulation of Tunnel Fire:Comparison with Experimantal Measures. in First CFDS International User Conference. 1993. Oxford,UK.7. P. Chasse H. Briollay, Validating and Optimazing 2D and 3D Computer Simulations for the OffeneggTunnel Fire Test. 1994, Centre d´Etudes des Tunnels: Bron Cedex.8. G. Cox S. Kumar, Mathematical Modelling of Fires in Tunnels - Validation of JASMINE. 1986, Transportand Research Laboratory Contractor: Crowthorn, UK.9. H. Tuovinen, Validation of Ceiling Jet Flows in a Large Corridor with Vents Using the CFD CodeJASMINE. Fire Technology, 1994. 32.10. J. P. Kunsch, Simple model for control of fire gases in a ventilated tunnel. Fire Safety Journal, 2002. 37: p.67-81.11. D. Drysdale A. Beard, P. Holborn, S. Bishop, Cofiguration Factor for Radiation in a Tunnel ar PartialCylinder. Fire Technology, 1993. 29.12. http://www.tunnelfire.com.13. S. D. Miles, About JASMINE, D.M. Muhasilovic, Editor. 2006: Edinburgh, Essen.14. S. Kumar S. D. Miles. Computer modelling to assess the benefits of road tunnel fire safety measures. inInflam 2004. 2004. Edinburgh, Scottland, UK.15. B. H. Hjertager B. F. Magnussen. On mathematical modelling of turbulent combustion with specialemphasis on soot formation and combustion. in 16th international symposium on combustion. 1976.Pittsburgh, USA.16. S. L. Liu P. Z. Gao, W. K. Chow, N. K. Fong, Large eddy simulations for studying tunnel smokeventilation. Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, 2004. Vol. 19(Issue 6): p. 577 - 586.17. J. Modic, Porocilo o meritvah pri pozernem preizkusu v cestnem tunelu SENTVID. 2008, University inLjubljana, Mechanical ENgineering: Ljubljana, Slovenia.18. M. Wehlan, On "Memorial Tunnel Experiments" (personal communication). 2006: Washington(USA),Podgora (Croatia).19. R. E. Britter M. K.-A. Neophytou, A simple model for the movement of fire smoke in a confined tunnel. Pureand Applied Geophysics, 2005. 162: p. 1941.20. J. H. Ferziger M. Peric, Computational Methods for Fluid Mechanics. 2001, Berlin: Springer Verlag. 423.21. S. L. Liu P. Z. Gao, W. K. Chow, N. K. Fong, Large eddy simulations for studying tunnel smokeventilation. Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, 2004. 19: p. 577.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 13022. et. al. H. R. Baum. Gravity-current transport in buildings fires. in International Conference on FireResearch and Engineering. 1995. Orlando, Florida, USA.23. N. Vladimirova, Model flames in the Boussinesq limit. 2006, ASC / Flash Center, Dept. of Astronomy andAstrophysics, The University of Chicago, IL 60637: Chicago, USA.24. J. S. M. Li W. K. Chow, Case study: vehicle fire in a cross-harbour tunnel in Hong-Kong. Tunneling andUnderground Space Technology, 2001. Vol. 16(Issue 1): p. 23 - 30.25. T. Jongen T. B. Gatski, Nonlinear eddy viscosity and algebraic stress models for solving complex turbulentflows. Progress in Auerospace Sciences, 2000. 36: p. 655.26. C. Leupi, Numerical modeling of cohesive sediment transport and bed morphology in estuaries, in Lafaculte sciences at techniques de língenieur. 2005, Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne: Lausanne.27. et. al. W. Zhang, Turbulence statistics in a fire room model by large eddy simulation. Fire Safety Journal,2002. 37: p. 721.28. http://www.fluent.com.29. R. E. Britter P. J. Woodburn, CFD-simulations of a tunnel fire - part one. Fire Safety Journal, 1996. 26: p.35.30. M. R. Malin N. C. Markatos, Mathematical modelling of buoyancy-induced smoke flow in enclosures.International Journal of Heat Mass Transfer, 1982. 25: p. 63.31. O O. Megret, Vauquelin, A model to evaluate tunnel fire characterisrics. Fire Safety Journal, 2000. 34: p.393.32. W. Malalasekera H. K. Versteeg, An Introduction to computational fluid dynamics. 1995, London:Longman Group Ltd.33. C. Hirsch, Numerical Computation of Internal and External Flows. Vol. I. 1988, Chichester BrisbaneToronto New York: John Wiley & Sons. 515.34. http://lin.epfl.ch.35. M. Muhasilovic, CFD-approach in investigation of consequences of accidental large-scale fires in roadtunnels with natural ventilation, in STI-ISE-LIN. 2007, EPFL: Lausanne, Switzerland.36. V. Babrauskas, Estimating large pool fire burning rates. Fire Technology, 1983. 19: p. 251.37. et. al. I. Vela. Scale Adaptive Simulation (SAS) of heat radiation and soot amount in a large-scale turbulentJP-4 pool fire. in DECHEMA Tagung. 2006. Wiesbaden, Germany.38. http://www.elea.si.39. http://www.also-natursteine.de.40. http://lmr.epfl.ch.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 13141. Y. Oka H. Kurioka, H. Satoh, O. Sugawa, Fire Properties in Near Field of Square Fire Source withLongitudinal Ventilation in Tunnels. Fire Safety Journal, 2003. 34(4): p. 319 - 340.42. J. Modic, Fire Simulation in Road Tunnels. Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, 2003. 18: p.525 - 530.43. Y. Oka H. Kurioka, H. Satoh, H. Kuwanna, O. Sugawa, Properties of the Plume and Near Fire Source inhorizontally long and narrow spaces. Journal of Construction Engineering, 2001(546): p. 151 - 156.44. H. Ingason, Correlation between temperatures and oxygen measurements in a tunnel flow. Fire SafetyJournal, 2007. 42: p. 75.45. M. Zibert J. Modic, ....On fire calloric size in physical experiment.... M. Muhasilovic, Editor. 2009:Ljubljana, Slovenia.46. http://www.equa.se/.47. T. Yumoto H. Koseki, Air entrainment and thermal radiation from heptane pool-fires. Fire Technology,1988. 24: p. 33.48. H. Mang, ...on thermal-caused damage of RC-constructions, M. Muhasilovic, Editor. 2008, A.Ibrahimbegovic at the NATO ARW conference: Sarajevo.49. Y. Oka H. Kurioka, H. Satoh, O. Sugawa, Fire properties in near field of square fire source withlongitudinal ventilation in tunnels. Fire Safety Journal, 2003. Vol. 38(Issue 4): p. 319 - 340.50. O. Megret O. Vauquelin, Smoke extraction experiments in case of fire in a tunnel. Fire Safety Journal,2002. 37: p. 525.51. Y. Wu O. Vauquelin, Influence of tunnel width on longitudinal smoke control. Fire Safety Journal, 2006.41: p. 420.52. R. E. Britter P. J. Woodburn, CFD Simulation of a Tunnel Fire - part two. Fire Safety Journal, 1996. 26: p.63.53. S. F. Jagger G. B. Grant, C. J. Lea, Fires in Tunnels. Philosophical Transactions: Methematical, Physical,Engineering Sciences, 1998: p. 2873.54. H. S. Ryou S. R. Lee, A numerical study on smoke movement in longitudinal ventilation tunnel fires fordifferent aspect ratio. Building and Environment, 2006. 41: p. 719.55. A. N. Beard R. O. Carvel, P. W. Jowitt, The influence of longitudinal ventilation systems on fires in tunnels.Tunneling and Underground Space Technology, 2001. 16: p. 3.56. L. A. Bisby V. K. R. Kodur, M. F. Green, Experimental evaluation of the fire behaviour of insulated fibrereinforced-polymer-strengthenedreinforced concrete columns. Fire Safety Journal, 2006. 41: p. 547.57. et. al. F. Wald, Experimental behaviour of a steel structure under natural fire. Fire Safety Journal, 2006.41: p. 509.58. et. al. F. Lestari, An alternative method for fire smoke toxicity assessment using human lung cells. FireSafety Journal, 2006. 41: p. 605.

UDK:351.78:004614.8005.334TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 132INTEROPERABILITY AND SECURITY OF INFORMATION IN EMERGENCYSITUATIONSMiodrag BrzakovićAgencija za konsalting i inženjering «INICIJATIVA», 11080 Zemun, Karlovačka 29e-mail: m.brzakovic@inicijativa.rsAbstract: Analysis of response in emergency situations in the world, and with us, points to weaknesses, both inorganization and in the methodology for response and management in emergency situations of all subjects, theirmutual cooperation, which among other things, points to the problem of their interoperability.The term interoperability, in general, involves the ability to establish a system of two cooperating, coordinateactivities in process management and interchange mutually understandable information.The main aim of this paper is to present the research results of the interoperability problem management system inemergency situations, with special emphasis on organizational, technical and semantic aspects and a general modelfor achieving the required level of integration and interoperability.Keywords: interoperability, security of information and information systems, emergency situation, management inemergency situationsINTRODUCTIONVarious challenges, risks and threats relating to the possibility of occurence of accidents, natural catastrophes,technological catastrophes, and any other form of danger that complex phenomena with devastating effects onpopulation, material and cultural goods, may induce in an area, all that calls for an integral organization and plannedrealization in all phases of management in emergency situations of any sort nad shape.Papering in the conditions of emergency situations is characterized by the following features:Danger – The level of endangerment in an emergency situation may be different (e.g.: from direct humanlife endangerment to certain forms of diseasea);Time deficit – one of the key limitations in an emergency situation;Task fulfillment organization and specifics – dealing with an emergency situation demands a largenumber of phusical and intellectual activities;Emergency situation effect on behavior during its cours and in the aftermath –Coordinating behaviorwith the demands of existing emergency situation acknowledging all the specifics of the activities beingdone to the end of eliminating its source and effects;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 133Methods of and measures for eliminating an existing emergency situation – The unity of method andmeasures implementation in the process of eliminating the existing emergency situations with the neededlevel of interoperability within the organization itself as wel as within the framepaper of mutualcolaboration with the environment.Basic problems in making decisions during the process of emergency situation management are ambiguous andincomplete information, time deficit and limited resources (human, material, and financial). Due to this state ofaffairs, information integration of all participant organizations in the system of emergency situation managementand their services for responding in emergency situation is one of the key processes of resolving the mentionedproblems.The complexity of a situation such as emergency situation demands the existence of a quality information andcommunication system that ensures an efficient relevant information flow in within the system of emergencysituation management. New technologies and the development of modern information and communicationtechnology facilitate and meet the specific demands of the conditions of functioning in emergency situations.The paper presents a revue of the research and the attempt made in the field of determining the importance ofinteroperability and defining a global information-communication infrastructure as the function of securing anappropriate information-communication support in the conditions existing in an emergency situation. The revue ofthe research findings is presented and a refferential model with a special refference to perceiving the emergencysituation specific features, and the relevance of information and measures as the function of securing the necessarylevel of introperability.EMERGENCY SITUATION – the conceptInability of science to always and completely predict an emergency situation, events and consequences, as well asuntimely preventive acting and inefficient organizing to the purpose of effect eliminating call for a clear definitionof the content of emergency situation concept and the recognition of the border values of parameters that define:probability of emergency situation occurence, as well as the kind of emergency situation, its intensity, and flow orfurther development.In view of the conclusion that: We do not expect emergency situations, but they happen, there is a need for adequatepreparations and planing to the end of enabling a community to reduce possible destruction and the number ofcasualties in an existing emergency situation. A conceptual clarification regarding the sources, development andeffects of an emergency situation, and the institutional framepaper for management it is important for a betterunderstanding of the problem, as well as for the creation of conditions for unified approaching the resolving of allissues relating to this set of problems. In accordance with that, a short review of some of emergency situation (ES)definitions are presented in htis part of the paper.Different emergency situation definitions most often are made according to concrete needs. One of such definitionsreads: emergency (чрезвычайная ситуация in Russian) is a state that points to a possible disturbance or biggerdisturbance of natural ballance or environment , which produces social disturbance and results in taking measures,actions, or interventions 1 .The following definition is adopted in the Republic Serbia (RS) Emergency Situation Bill: Emergency Situation isthe state in which the risks and threats, or effects of a catastrophe, special events and other jeopardy the population,environment and material goods are exposed to are of such scope and intensity that their existence or effects is notpossible to prevent or eliminate by regular actions of organs and services in charge, but to alleviate and eliminatethem it is necessary to take special measures and use special forces and means in an increased paper regime 2 .

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 134INFORMATION AND SECURITY OF INFORMATIONIn an emergency situation, information is the basic resource of finding an efficient solution. The focal activityreflects in a timely acquiring information as one of the key resources because, in this way, one of the basic problemsthat, as a rule, occurs in emergency situations in the form of untimely or incomplete information is resolved.As the degree of predicting an emergency situation os often very low, a deficit of time for realization usuallyoccurs at the moment of receiving the information. This points to an apparent paradox: on the one hand, in anemergency situation, there is the expectation to secure the reception of an accurate and reliable information for thesake of finding an efficient solution, and on the other, there is a very frequent situation in which, due to differentsources of instability in the transmission of information it is uncertain and untimely.From a wider point of view, information are gathered as the result of certain procedures that involve collecting,procesing and examining the phenomena and processes in nature and community (organization). These processesare a perpetual interchange of matter, energy and information that are detected and recognized by means of ourfaculties. Owing to these abilities, the information as the key resource may be the means of being informed about allpossible objects, phenomena, and processes 1) .There is a need to point out that one should bear in mind the unpredictability and specific features characteristic foran emergency situation. In its early stage taking certain measures is being prepared in case of any danger. Thosemeasures are obviously of general nature and ought to be coordinated with a concrete organization. For a specificapplication, a detailed information needs to be converted into a cocorresponding value and this demands theexistence of elasticity and adaptivity of the system that enables the reduction of danger and great losses in case anemergency situation occurs, and the losses are the greatest in the early stage of the emergency situation occurance.For a sucessful functioning of data interchange system it is necessary to meet the demand for providing an adequateinfrastructure for the realization of interoprability. This means a gridlike infrastructure (hardware and software),but also people, the organization and activities, regulations and codeboks necesary for creating conditions forinteroperability and information interchange. In most cases, such infrastructure is is in charge of organizations thatmake decisions in all stages of emergency situation so that it is the rezult of engagement of all levels of thedecision-making system. This engagement will enable the interchange of information by means of using standardcommunication protocols.One of the factors relevant for the fulfilment of tasks that is of special importance in organizations is security ofinformation and information system, as a vaucher for establishing a high level of trust and security level insidethe system with information flows. Exceptionally important is the demand for standardization to the end ofuninterrupted communicating with the environment, at the same time keeping the demanded level of safety of oursecurity systems, and the needed level of interoperability with the systems in the environment 3 .INTEROPERABILITY IN AN EMERGENCY SITUATIONGenerally speaking, interoperability relates to the ability of two systems to interchange information and use them 4 .Interoperability demands a certain level of compatibility between the systems that are interchanging information sothat the transformations necessary for the realization of data interchange process could be reduced to minimum, andalso to secure the prerequisites for an acurate interpretetation of interchanged data. It would be perfect if thesystems that take part in interoperability were in accordance with the interchange domain standards, which is verydifficult, and often impossible to attain in practice. There is a lot of obstacles on the road to achieving the goal of1) Winner, N., the creator of Cybernetics says: Living actively means being always well informed.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 135introperability. It is conditioned by solving problems such as the speed of technological changes and a bigindependence of the systems and the lack of standards that would be accepted as universal regulationss.Interoperability may also be presented as information and communication system and business process ability ofsupporting the data flow and enabling information and knowledge exchange. In order to meet these demands inpractice, introperability must be secured on organizational level (business goal defining, business processmodeling (organizing), and establishing colaboration between different organization structures), technical level,(regulations and standards for linking computer systems and services), and semantic level (meaning of data andinformation) in compliance with national and international standards and regulations implementation.To the purpose of more detaiiled analysis, along with the three key interoperability aspects a more detailed approachto the analysis of interoperability level development is given, presented in Figure 1 by levels of development:Level 0: No operability – the worst case scenario;Level l: Technical operability – The level of technical operability demands completely defined communicationprotocols of information exchange between the systems that take part in the information exchange process. Thiskind of operability depends on infrastructure and standardization of protocols that are fully defined a priori;Level 2: Syntax interoperability – Syntax operability is the applied general data format. Data structure is definedand content exchange between several software components is taken care of on this level the language of theirimplementation and other technological differences notwithstanding;Level 3: Semantic interoperability – The level of semantic interoperability is defined if the meaning of data isdefined. Semantic operability is governed by knowledge that enables the entities of a specific organization toovercome semantic conflicts arising from the differences in implicit meanings and suppositions that rule the dataand business processes in a heterogeneous environment)Semantic operability presumes a conversation between the business processes so there is no need for humanintervention during a business process, or this intervention is reduced to minimum by applying the cutting edgesolutions i.e. intelligent information systems (intelligent agents – software solutions, ontology, target, data, etc.);Level 4: Pragmatic interoperability – Pragmatic operability is reached if and when the methods and proceduresare fully applied to the purpose of getting an interoperable system, in other words, in order to use the data and putinto practice their interoperability, it is necessary to comprehend the systems that participate in the process of dataexchange as well as information flows;Level 5: Dynamic interoperability - To reach dynamic operability a system must be able to understand the state ofchange. This level gains an extra weight in comprehending big and sudden changes that appear in times of anemergency;Level 6: Conceptual interoperability – Is the highest level of operability based on the methods of engineering andtheir practical implementation.In accordance with the stated interoperability dimensions three basic aspects are examined to the end ofpresenting the possibility of their realization through:organizational interoperability - overcoming the complexity of system organization that rises from theirheterogeneousness and distributiveness;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 136technical interoperability – that presents information and communication interoperability, which depend oninfrastructure and standardized protocols a priori defined in full detail;semantic interoperability – is being established by the knowledge that puts in practice the overcoming ofconflicts rising from the differences in meaning in a heterogeneous environment, even when it is the case ofidentical items.All three stated levels are subjects of detailed analysis in the research:Nivo 6 ‐ Conceptual InteroperabilityNivo 5 ‐ Dynamic InteroperabilityNivo 4 ‐ Pragmatic InteroperabilityModeling /abstractionNivo 3 ‐ Semantic InteroperabilityNivo 2 ‐ Syntactic InteroperabilityNivo 1 ‐ Technical InteroperabilityNivo 0 – No InteroperabilitySimulation /implementationNetwork /connectionFigure 1: A detailed presentation of interoperability developmentOrganizational interoperability as a function of management in emergency situationSuccessful management in emergency situation demands full interoperability of all organizational parameters of theparticipants in the system of management or interested parties. In this case, under the expression fully interoperableorganization we presume the existence of such an organization that is capable of efficient exchanging informationwith other interoperable organizations in the environment, in that way bettering the quality and scope of knowledgegenerated on the basis of identified links between the new and the existing data, to the end of timely and reliablecommunications and information exchange.Organizational interoperability is defined as being the key management area in emergency situations. It is the basisof defining tasks and by fulfilling these tasks the desired security of the citizens and their property is achieved.Regarding the fact that in this day and age we face permanent security risks the development of management inemergency situations should go in the direction of organizing a unique system that would come into being throughuniting different parts of the system in a modern system by different kinds of integration (organizational, technical,etc.).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 137In accordance with the defined concept of organizational structure in emergency situations, three levels areobserved: strategic, operative, and tactical. However, organizational operability is a dynamic process, which meansthat authorization may be assigned and revoked both horizontally and vertically. Elements and other factors of thisstructure may be stationary and movable. The stationary elements are mainly a part of the strategic level, while themovable elements are a part of operative and tactical levels.In the direction of establishing the demanded organizational interoperability, the goals are set among which themost important ones are:designing normative and other acts in compliance with laws, actual regulations, and standards (domestic,and international).creating institutional, organizational, and personal conditions for the implementation of managementcriteria in emergency situations.establishing bodies that coordinate the paper of different structures on different levels of organizing, andstrengthening the ability to be mutually cooperative;updating training methods and techniques, and making well trained t performers of all kinds of tasks withinthe process of taking measures and complying to procedures in emergency situations;developing the most efficient ways of responding in emergency situations, as well as developing skills;preventing and reducing the damage sustained in emergency situations to the smallest possible measure;regulating the rights and obligations of all participants in emergency situations;defining the obligations of special purpose structures, and designing scenarios for specific situations;creating conditions for an uninterrupted information flow;designing evacuation plans, taking care of the needy and giving them support;creating conditions for an active international collaboration.The basis of organizational interoperability is the system of management in accordance with the objectives thatstem from the activities in the field of realizing politics and fulfilling the tasks that the management subjects set inthe field of management in emergency situations. It is a permanent process of gathering data, analyzing them,making decisions, assigning tasks and making an insight in the achieved results.A management process that is carried out through five interchanged and interdependent functions is analyzed. Thefunctions are: planning, preparation (organizing), activities (management, implementation), coordination, andcontrol 5 .Technical interoperability for management in emergency situationsTechnical interoperability poses as asset of exceptionally important demands that are met by developing andmaintaining an interface between different systems. Technical architecture is the basis of interoperability betweenthe strategic, tactical, and elementary – basic information and communication systems. It differs by thestandardization of data processing and transmitting, message standardization and user interface and computer on alllevels (man, means, and information-communication system).In the attempt to find optimal technical interoperability, the key mechanisms of this aspect are analyzed: norms,standards, integration, and data exchange, open exchange (open systems implementation options), services(telecommunication and web services), and communication software and information security measures 6 . At thebasis of all these standards there are standards and national infrastructure. By meeting the demands of mentionedmechanisms, the needed level of technical interoperability is achieved. This level should facilitate: quick adjustment to special conditions and demands; to produce available information where and when it is need, and facilitate the timely reception of those and in the right form so that they can be used.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 138In such state of affairs, the fundamental demand is to have critical and relevant information in the right place thatwill enable the management forces to take opportunities and find optimal solutions in different emergencysituations.All relevant technical and operative demands must be coordinated between the development carriers and systemusers. These relations are constantly developing and adjusting to the demands in newly established conditions, andthis calls for permanent perfection and improvement. Some of the transformation parameters from the existing tothe forthcoming are presented in Figure 2.Criteria for the realization of needed technical interoperability are defined depending on the set demands and plansfor designing information-communication systems with special reference to computer grids. The criteria shouldserve to make assessment of capability and ability to satisfy the designing of goals, having in mind the complexityand diversity of technical-technological movements the criteria fall in: functionality, scalability, multiservice andmultimedia, multiprotocol, capacity and speed, flexibility, redundancy, adaptability, manageability, quality,security, effectiveness, reliability, and availability that make available the time of usage within the framework of asystem.The main axis of this infrastructure is the integrated telecommunication-computer grid that does the transmissionand distribution of information and services from the source to the user.Current stateFuture stateStacionaryFlexible / mobileEducationLearningIntrusive (visible) technology Invisible (sophisticated)technologySmall tech supportThe technology that supportsIndividual competenceIntegrative competenceDefenders of the crisisDefense StrategyHardware FeatureUser in focusLocal OrganizationsGeneral presentInformation chaosCentralized knowledgeControlThe focus on trainingStandardizationOpen standardsIsolated solutions (solutions)InteroperabilityFigure 2: Relationship between the existing and forthcoming stateSemantic operability for emergency situation managementWithin the framework of the process of improving semantic operability and procedure coordination of any type ofemergency situation in the conditions of enlarged and accelerated data exchange, it is necessary to provide thedemanded level of semantic interoperability with the support of universal national data exchange model, dataexchange language in emergency situation, and general protocol in case of emergency.Procedures for obtaining semantically intelligible information that demand a permanent development and providingof standards as a function of interoperability of information, and the implementation of information service anduniversal and timely information about the emergency situation providing community improvement are especiallyanalyzed. In the context of emergency situation management, semantic interoperability infers the need for making

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 139agreements on universal definitions and understanding of data that would be exchanged in a heterogeneous system7 .Within the research, the framework of semantic interoperability services and information recommendations in thecontext of emergency situation management is determined, such as:1. proposition of designing a model of data exchange antiona information system that should be alignedwith the emergency situation data exchange protocol and universal protocols used in case of emergency;2. universal address books for as easy as possible data research;3. providing the access to universal address books that are the core of the service for making trained teamsfor the need of responding and coordination in emergency situation management system;4. universal data bases on the real status as a function of timely and completed report designing,5. providing interface agents for accessing the parts of knowledge base that should be the cornerstone ofautomated question (response) generating in accordance with vocabulary and concepts of commonknowledge bases usage in compliance with ontological and semantic model specifications.On the bases of existing standards and services analyses, it may be concluded that semantic interoperabilityalmost never can be achieved completely (or be absolutely certain) with respect to the data change speed inemergency situation circumstances.This perception is significant because it simultaneously demands from all relevant factors to make sure that theactivity on building and improving the procedures of obtaining a stable and intelligible information must be in anuninterrupted coordination of all participants in responding to a certain situation.PRESENTATION OF THE MODELIn designing the proposition of an emergency situation management model, the methodology of data integration isgiven.The analysis is made through a special research model (referential model) by the name of Dynamic Model ofManagement in Emergency Situations (DMMES) that consists of eight modules, as follows: Resource Module,Monitoring Module, Information-Communication Support Module, System Interoperability Module, KnowledgeBase Module – for the analysis of situation flow, and decision making, Standards and Regulations Module, SystemReengineering and Development Module, and Report Module, as shown in Figure 3 8 :

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 140MODULERESOURCESMODULE FOR1MONITORING2MODULE INFORMATION ‐COMMUNICATIONSUPPORT3INTEROPERABILITY MODULEFOR SYSTEMMODULE FOR RE‐ENGINEERING ANDDEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMThe dynamic model ofmanagement inemergency situationsMODULE STANDARDS ANDLEGISLATION4 6 stage ‐ before ES during ES after ESKNOWLEDGE BASE MODULEREPORTING MODULE7 8Analysis of the flow of eventsand decisions5Figure 3: Dynamic Model of Management in Emergency Situations (DMMES)Interoperability parameters according to emergency situation management stages are presented in Table 1, withinthe framework of dynamic model of emergency situation management general presentation.The proposed model is based on the conception of defining an emergency situation management model, andcontains all important features relevant for an integrated system functioning. The solution for such system should beexpressed through the following shapes: measure of prevention, early warning, timely responding, and informationand communication system interoperability.Realization of the research as a function of designing a proposition of the model was carried out in the followingdirections:examination of the existing frameworks for interoperability in the domain of emergency situationmanagement and their demands;analysis of the existing technologies and their interoperability, and examining the possibility of theirimplementation in emergency situation management;the possibility of open systems implementation and securing as a function of system interoperability andacknowledging the respective level of information security;possibilities in overcoming the problem of system heterogeneousness with the help of certain aspects(organizational, technical, and semantic);

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 141INTEROPERABILITYFRAMEWORKORGANIZATIONALINTEROPERABILITYTECHNICALINTEROPERABILITYSEMANTICINTEROPERABILITYTable 1: Interoperability ParametersBefore ES During ES After ES- development strategy-regulations and methodology- plans and scenarios-establishment of professionalservices- training / exercises- reports- modernization oftechnical support- supplement materialresources- ceating interface- integration- openness- monitoring- standards- procedures/instruction- establishment of commondatabases and knowledge- activation plans- the use of transmissionroutes- control and monitoringplans- uniqueness of the system- coordination andmanagement- reports- plans informacioneengagementandcommunication equipment- monitoring- establishing an integratedinformation transfer system-compatibility of equipment- open system- protocols- forms / patterns- expert knowledge- recovery plans- plans supplement-update databasesand knowledge- reports- supplement andmodernization- integration oftechnical support- standards-protocols/guidelines- forms / patterns- expert knowledgeExamination of the possibility of modern technological solutions implementation in the systems of emergencysituation management and the possibility of intelligent systems development necessary for accessing, integrating ,and accepting information from distributed heterogeneous data sources, as well as automatic interoperabilityestablishing between heterogeneous systems with the implementation of ontologies 1 , intelligent agents, wirelesssensor grids, etc.CONCLUSIONThe research work presented in this paper relates to the methodology, tools, and platform for information systemsinteroperability and openness realization. Those systems find their implementation in emergency situationmanagement. This research work is founded on the realization of a platform for business processes integrationbased on intelligent information integration, and implementation of intelligent system technologies and ontologiesto the end of achieving the necessary level of system interoperability.The proposition of methodology of emergency situation management in all stages of its origin bears in mind theprocess heterogeneousness and distributiveness, and also the generalization of environments and demands for theirinteroperability along with defining general and dynamic model of emergency situation management.It is perceived and noted that there is no universal architecture the usage of technology that can satisfy the demandsof interoperability and system openness notwithstanding. The solution must be scalar and open. In accordance withthat, the basic (referential) model, adaptable to the needs and demands, depending on the existing emergencysituation is presented.1 Ontologies today are very present in all fields of Internet technology implementation, with special reference to solvingsemantic heterogeneousness.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 142BIBLIOGRAFY1. Государствениый стандард Российской Федерации: Безопасность в чрезвычайных ситуациях, ГОСТР22.0.06-952. Zakon o vanrednim situacijama, "Službeni glasnik RS", br. 111/2009.December 29. 2009.3. Series of standards ISO/IEC 2700X4. Halaris G. Hadzilakos T.:“Interoperability and the definition of a national standard for geospatial data“,International Journal of Applied Earth Observations and Geoinformation, pp. 120 -128, 2000.5. APCO International ltd.:“Homeland Security White Paper on Domestic Praparedness“, www. nemaweb.org,Oktobar, 2001.6. Chawathe S., Garcia-Molina H., Hammer J., Ireland K., Papakonstantinou Y., Ulman J., Widom J.:"TheTSIMMIS Project: Integration of Heterogeneous Information Systems", In the Proceedings of ISPJ Conference,Tokyo, Japan, October 1994, pp. 7-18.7. Guarino, N.: "Formal Ontology in Information Systems". In N. Guarino (ed.) Formal Ontology in InformationSystems. Proceedings of FOIS'98, Trento, Italy, 6-8 June 1998. IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp.3-15.8. Brzaković M.: Doctoral disertation “Interoperabilnost i bezbednost informacija u organizacijama od strateškogznačaja u vanrednim situacijama”, FB, Belgrade, October, 2009.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 143UDK:656.073.436:620.26ROADWORTHINESS – AN IMPORTANT FACTORIN TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESNikola V. Radovanović 1), Radovan V. Radovanović 2), Lazar D. Petrović 2) , Ivana L. Petrović 3)Marijana M. Radovanović1 MoI of Republic of Serbia – Directorate for Police Education, Professional Training, Development and ScienceE-mail: nikola.radovanovich@gmail.com2 Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, Belgrade3 Salmont Ltd, BelgradeAbstract: The paper addresses the latent problem related to malfunctions of motor vehicles intended for thecarriage of dangerous materials (armament) and consequently an ever present incident risk in the course oftransport. The paper points to unused possibilities (also in respect of regulations) of technical inspection of vehiclesand to insufficient proactive work of transport users, carriers, inspection services and government bodies. Thepurpose of this paper is to demonstrate the possibilities of achieving internationally standardised procedures whichour practitioners would be able to verify in short time.Key words: dangerous substances, armament, transport, incidents, vehicles, proceduresINTRODUCTIONTransport of dangerous substances and articles containing dangerous substances, according to the EuropeanAgreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road – ADR 6 , has to be performed underspecific, precisely defined requirements.Substances that may, due to negligent and/or unprofessional work, or an incident occurring in the course ofmanufacture, stowage, transport or handling, cause detrimental consequences for health and the environment areconsidered dangerous substances. Raw materials used to produce dangerous substances and residues that have thesame properties as such substances, are also considered dangerous substances. When a dangerous substance isinside an adequate means of transport, i.e. inside an adequate packaging, it is defined as dangerous goods.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 144Dangerous substances are grouped in 9 classes in accordance with ADR, depending on their chemical properties,state of matter and level of hazard.The Law on the Transport of Dangerous Substances envisages that means of transport used for the carriagedangerous substances have to be roadworthy, constructed, equipped and marked in compliance with specialrequirements (need to have plates and labels). The vehicles have to be specially designed and have to meet therequirements laid down by the relevant Law and European Agreement concerning the International Carriage ofDangerous Goods by Road – ADR.The purpose of this paper is to point up the importance of roadworthiness of vehicles used for the carriage ofdangerous substances (armament) and its correlation with inspection controls and education in this area.ROADWORTHINESS OF VEHICLES INTENDED FOR THE CARRYAGE OF DANGEROUSSUBSTANCESAccording to ADR 6 , depending on the properties of the dangerous substance to be transported, vehicles of differentcharacteristics are used. Before taking a closer look at vehicle classification according to ADR, we would like todraw attention to the most important aspects, in our opinion, regarding operation of vehicles intended for thecarriage of dangerous substances.Operational and technical characteristics of vehicles imply a complex of interlinked characteristics that thesuitability of vehicle for use under certain conditions depends on. With the change of conditions of vehicleoperation, the operational and technical characteristics of vehicles also change.The main operational and technical characteristics of vehicles are: dynamics, cost-effectiveness, reliability,operating life, capacity, overall comfort, safety, ability to pass obstacles, and maintainability of vehicleconstruction. Given the fact that all these characteristics are interlinked, it is necessary to keep a balance betweenthem since the improvement of one characteristic implies deterioration of one or more of other vehiclecharacteristics. It is imperative to make a choice of vehicles whose operational and technical characteristics producebest results during operation under specific/current conditions related to climate, transport and road. In that respect,only some vehicle characteristics will be covered below.Reliability is one of the main indicators of the quality of vehicle. It is expressed as the capacity of vehicle to retainits operating features, within allowed limits, under specific conditions of operation during its entire operating life.Insufficient reliability of the vital parts of vehicle, braking and steering systems in particular, may cause disastrousconsequences. Furthermore, in case of low reliability, operating costs can be much higher than the purchasing pricedue to increased maintenance costs. These are just some of the reasons due to which in all stages of the vehicle lifecycle (design – manufacture – operation) a special attention is paid to vehicle reliability.The optimal period of vehicle use is one of the main issues to be considered in the course of the design,procurement, and operation of vehicle and its parts. A number of factors determine the moment when the vehicleshould be put out of service. When creating a mathematical model for calculation of optimal operating life, thecriteria and restrictions related to costs are usually the starting points. One should bear in mind that the value of theperiod of vehicle operation is mostly determined by the design, quality of manufacturing, operating conditions,construction and power-related materials and manner of maintenance. These factors have a direct impact on theintensity of degrading processes – wearing, corrosion, creep, ageing and fatigue – which shorten the period ofvehicle operation. Among the measures applied to increase the period of vehicle operation the following may besingled out: adequate structural and technological solutions in the production of parts, assemblies and theircouplings; adequate surface protection of vehicle parts; adequate maintenance; adequate fuels, lubricants and other

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 145technical fluids; quality purification of fuels, lubricants and other technical fluids; fast attaining and subsequentretaining of stable engine working temperature, etc.Vehicle safety implies quality requirements related to the degree of safety of vehicle operation from the point ofview of its user and the environment. While operating, the vehicle should have the least adverse impact possible onparticipants in traffic and the environment. The vehicle should be so constructed that the likelihood of an accidenttaking place is minimised, and if it does, the vehicle should ensure maximum protection for participants in traffic.Depending on the way they affect overall vehicle safety, safety parameters are divided into active, passive andcatalytic ones.In order to define more easily the requirements related to the vehicles intended for the carriage of dangeroussubstances and articles containing dangerous substances, we point to the classification of such vehicles:1. FL vehicles – vehicles intended for the carriage of liquids with a flash point of not more than 61°C(with the exception of diesel fuel, gas oil and light heating oil – UN no. 1202 – with a flash point ofmore than 61°C) or flammable gases, in tank containers, portable tanks or multi element gas containers(MEGCs) of more than 3000 litres capacity, fixed tanks or demountable tanks and battery vehicles ofmore than 1000 litres capacity intended for the carriage of flammable gases;2. OX Vehicles – vehicles used for the carriage of Hydrogen Peroxide, stabilised, or Hydrogen Peroxide,aqueous solution stabilised, with more than 60% Hydrogen Peroxide (Class 5.1, UN no. 2015) in tankcontainers or portable tanks of more than 3000 litres capacity, or in fixed tanks or demountable tanks ofmore than 1000 litres capacity;3. AT vehicles – vehicles other than those of type FL or OX, intended for the carriage of dangeroussubstances in tank containers, portable tanks or multi element gas containers (MEGCs) of more than3000 litres capacity, fixed tanks or demountable tanks and battery vehicles of more than 1000 litrescapacity, other than those of type FL;4. EX/II (EX/III) vehicles – vehicles intended for the carriage of explosive substances Class 1 (except incase of the carriage under the “small quantity” regime).The type of vehicle has to be stated in the vehicle certificate, which is directly related to the quantity of thedangerous substance that can be transported per transport unit.The vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances which do not belong to the types above and whichare registered after 30 June 1997 have to comply with the technical requirements ECE 13 (need to have ABS). Allvehicles with a maximum mass exceeding 12 tonnes registered after 31 December 1897 have to comply withtechnical requirements ECE 89 concerning the speed limitation device.Regarding vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances, it is necessary to pay attention to the presenceand functioning of parts listed in Table 1.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 146Table 1-Parts of vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances 4Type of vehicle →Part of vehicle ↓EX/II EX/III AT FL OXElectrical equipmentWiring Battery master switch Batteries Tachograph Permanently energized circuits Electrical installation at rear of cab Braking equipment Anti-lock breaking system Endurance breaking system Prevention of fire risksVehicle cab (material) Vehicle cab (thermal insulation)Fuel tanks Engine Exhaust system Vehicle endurance braking Combustion heaters Speed limitation device Vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances should also meet special requirements, complying withthe legislation in force 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 and ADR regulations in respect of the braking system, electrical equipment,prevention of fire risks, speed limitation device, coupling device of trailers, side and rear underride guards, marking,necessary equipment and devices.Hazard placards and orange-coloured plates are used to mark the vehicles carrying dangerous goods in the mannerprovided for by ADR.Prior to the transport of dangerous substances and articles containing dangerous substances, it is necessary to obtaintransport-related documentation which is issued by the competent authorities. The documentation has to be valid atthe time of transport, and its validity is checked through controls. The following documents shall be on the cab ofthe vehicle carrying dangerous substances:certificate of approval for vehicles carrying dangerous substance(s) of certain class which is (are) to betransported;driver’s training certificate (drivers have to attend a special training course and pass the exam for drivers oftransport units intended for the carriage of dangerous substances);bills of lading for all dangerous substances being transported;instructions in writing in the event of incident, for each dangerous substance being transported;permits authorising the transport in question.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 147In compliance with regulations in force, it is mandatory to inspect motor vehicles and trailers intended for thecarriage of dangerous substances for the purpose of issuing approvals and certificates, which is a proof that thevehicle in question is roadworthy and equipped for carrying a dangerous substance. The methodology of inspectionof vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances is primarily based on the properties of the dangeroussubstance to be transported and legislation in force.During operation, the motor vehicle, as a complex technical system, is under the influence of a number of factorswhich may result in a number of breakdowns. The causes of vehicle malfunctions leading to breakdowns are evenmore numerous. In that respect, it is necessary to analyse how to remove such malfunctions. Vehicle malfunctionsare manifested in different ways. The percentage of the causes of breakdowns is the following: fatigue failure 18%,creep 26%, wearing 40%, temperature-induced breakdown 12%, and other reasons 4%. Generally, breakdowns arepredominantly influenced by design faults, type and quality of the materials used, inadequate technology ofmanufacturing vehicle parts, and operating conditions. Proper and timely maintenance is an important prerequisiteof breakdown delay, quality enhancement and extension of operating life. This is crucial in prevention of disastrousconsequences, notably in case of the vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances.Roadworthiness is an important factor in traffic safety. Only a roadworthy vehicle is safe in traffic, therefore it isone of the main requirements for the registration of vehicles.Technical inspection, as a model of periodical and preventive maintenance of vehicles, is performed withinprescribed periods in a prescribed manner, pursuant to the relevant legislation 1, 3, 7, 8 , but it can be done if the needarises or upon request of the user or competent authority.Technical inspection involves checking soundness of the following systems and subsystems of the vehicle: steeringand brake systems, lighting and light-signalling devices, sound-signalling devices, parts of vehicles enabling clearview, controls and switches, exhaust system, coupling devices, support system, car body, engine, transmission,wheels and tyres, and vehicle equipment. The purpose of technical inspection is to check whether dimensions andmarks comply with manufacturer’s documentation and the type-approval certificate.Vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances, whether complete or completed for that purpose, aresubject to mandatory technical inspection, pursuant to the regulations concerning carriage of dangerous substancesby road 3 . Vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances have to meet all the requirements prescribedfor specific class and category of vehicles, as well as additional requirements under ADR which are directly relatedto the dangerous substance to be transported by that vehicle. Strict observance of all national provisions concerningsuch vehicles as well as all ADR provisions is mandatory 4 .In our country there is an ever-present risk of incidents the cause of which is malfunction of certain parts of motorvehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances. Owners and drivers of such vehicles, the companiesperforming technical inspection and consignors of dangerous substances are all obliged not to engage the vehicleand use it for the carriage of dangerous substances if it is not in good working order. Despite this, breakdowns ofmotor vehicles still occur. The reasons are the following: low level of accountability and competence of the abovementioned parties in the transport of dangerous substances; too long period between regular periodic technicalinspections of motor vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances; presenting false documents provingroadworthiness along with the application for authorisation of transport of the dangerous substance, and similar.The possible solutions may be to intensify inspection control mechanisms, to pass and apply new legislation, and toengage in more substantive cooperation between relevant ministries regarding specific dangerous substances.One of the solutions to the malfunction problem could be a shorter period between regular periodic technicalinspections of motor vehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances, which is now six months, asenvisaged by the current Law on Road Traffic Safety (the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no 41/2009).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 148Also, applicants for the authorisation of transport of the dangerous substance should submit to Serbian MoI,Emergency Management Sector (which is the authority in charge of granting the said authorisation), originaldocuments proving vehicle roadworthiness and fitness in respect of equipment and construction characteristics forthe carriage of dangerous substances.INSPECTION CONTROL OVER THE TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESInspection control over the transport of explosive substances, armament, weapons and ammunition is done by theMinistry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia (Emergency Management Sector) and partly by the Border PoliceDirectorate. Inspection control involves issuing a permit authorising the transport of the dangerous substance andsubsequent control whether all participants in the transport of the dangerous substance act pursuant to the permit.An improvement in this part would be to conduct inspection control in the field concerning implementation of legalmeasures. Another improvement would be to provide border crossing points with scales for weighing lorries andarticulated lorries and X-ray devices for checking cargo. These two solutions for improvement of performance areparticularly interesting having in mind the fact that smuggling of arms, ammunition and armament is among themost profitable criminal activities worldwide and that the permit authorising the transport is not a sufficient measureof control of trade and transport without inspection control conducted according to such permit. Ultimately, suchmeasures would be a significant contribution to our country’s counterterrorist action. The third improvement ofperformance would be a non-selective inspection of the level of competence of persons handling dangeroussubstances.EDUCATION OF PARTICIPANTS IN TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESMost can be achieved in the area of education of all participants in the transport of dangerous substances. It isnecessary to deliver training and organise knowledge tests for all persons handling dangerous substances (personshandling dangerous substances during their loading and unloading). Also, it is necessary to provide morecomprehensive and substantive education of MoI Traffic and Border Police Directorates staff in the field oftransport of dangerous substances. The presence of personnel and checking the presence of personnel in companiesthat deliver training for persons handling dangerous substances during their loading and unloading and personsdriving motor vehicles are very important education-wise. It may happen that such companies have only onelecturer while, according to current legislation, they need to have 4 lecturers – of legal, mechanical engineering,transport engineering, chemical, chemical engineering, or occupational safety vocations (pursuant to Article 11 ofthe Regulation concerning technical requirements to be met by the companies providing professional training fordrivers of motor vehicles carrying dangerous substances and other persons involved in the transport of suchsubstances, the Official Journal of SFRY, no 76/90). Another important aspect is technical capacity and itsinspection in the companies that deliver training for persons handling dangerous substances during their loading andunloading and persons driving motor vehicles. It is immensely important to introduce oral examination while testingthe level of competence of all participants in the transport of dangerous substances. At the moment, the level ofcompetence is examined only through written tests. There is also a need for MoI personnel responsible for thetransport of dangerous substances to more actively participate in the events and symposiums related to this matter.It should be particularly pointed out that not one company in our country that delivers training for persons handlingdangerous substances during their loading and unloading and persons driving motor vehicles has a training groundwhere the course participants can be instructed what to do in case of a specific incident which may arise in thecourse of handling and transport of dangerous substances. The current training system includes only presentation offilms and verbal description of an incident, which is insufficient for full and comprehensive training. The trainingground and its equipment would provide conditions for realistic presentation of an incident.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 149A major problem is a lack of equipment (scales for weighing lorries and articulated lorries at border crossing points)and insufficient competence of the MoI Border Police staff to inspect cargo, which is one of the chief itemscontained in the permit authorising the transport of goods. By simple weighing the total mass of a motor vehicle andcomparing the data obtained with the data concerning the mass of the cargo which are contained in the permitauthorising the transport of goods and the data concerning the mass of the motor vehicle carrying goods, it is simpleto determine whether the vehicle carries some other cargo which is not covered by transport documentation.One of such measures may be updating the list of explosive substances which can be sold and bought in ourcountry, which is needed pursuant to Article 13 of the Law on the Trade in Explosive Substances (the OfficialGazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 101/2005). Currently, in our country none of the government bodies involvedin issuing permits for trade in explosive substances (MoI, Ministry of Economy and Regional Development, BIA)has this register, which, in turn, creates big problems for institutions when issuing accompanying documents.CONCLUSIONSFuture legal solutions should contribute to raising the level of safety of transport of dangerous substances. Some ofthe solutions are highlighted below:adopting regulations that would shorten the period between regular periodic technical inspections of motorvehicles intended for the carriage of dangerous substances;submitting original documents to MoI (Emergency Management Sector) proving roadworthiness and fitnessof motor vehicles in respect of equipment and construction characteristics for the carriage of dangeroussubstances along with the application for authorisation of transport of the dangerous substance;building adequate parking lots for motor vehicles carrying dangerous substances, having in mind the factthat there is not a parking lot in our country which complies with international regulations in the field oftransport of dangerous substances;adopting a regulation pursuant to which transport of a dangerous substance has to be escorted by aprofessional who is qualified to handle the dangerous substance being transported and to address anincident which may take place during transport. Current legislative provisions (Article 26 of the Regulationconcerning the manner of transport of dangerous substances by road, the Official Journal of SFRY, no82/90) only states that the transport of a dangerous substance may be escorted by the MoI Traffic PoliceDirectorate, shipper’s, consignor’s or consignee’s escort. In practice, escort is usually provided by the MoITraffic Police Directorate. It is necessary to improve the competence of the MoI Traffic Police Directoratestaff to address an incident;adopting a regulation pursuant to which transport of a dangerous substance has to be implemented by atleast two persons. The reason for doing so is the fact that the action to reduce the consequences of anincident would be much more effective if two persons (driver + escort) were engaged, compared to theengagement of only one person (driver). An example would be erecting a barrier against spilling of adangerous substance leaking out of the motor vehicle;defining escort of armament, weapons, ammunition and dangerous substances in the border area. This iswhere a terrorist attack on the vehicle may occur as well as the theft of the goods being transported.Namely, it has been observed that armed escorts employed by the company which applied for authorisationof the transport leave the means of transport carrying goods before they reach the border area.Consequently, the goods are left unprotected until it passes both border crossing points;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 150introducing control of the declared quality-wise characteristics of the entire quantity of the pyrotechnicgoods to be imported. Namely, prior to importing pyrotechnic goods, it is examined on a number ofsamples, and if the goods are faultless, a trade permit is issued. When goods are imported in final importquantity, the consignor may consign faulty goods instead of good ones. Faultlessness of the sample that wasexamined when issuing trade permit should be verified with each import of the goods concerned;harmonising the procedure for obtaining transport documentation by transit countries. At the moment, itmay happen that the transport is discontinued before entering the country whose authorities did not issuetransport permit. In such situation everyone loses (applicants for transport authorisation, dealers,manufacturers of dangerous goods, buyers of dangerous goods, as well as the inhabitants of the area wherethe goods are stopped (due to the incident likelihood));establishing a network of centres equipped and qualified to reduce the effects of pollution caused byincidents which may occur while transporting dangerous goods. The centres should be distributed based onthe assessment of the possibility to equip them and their timely action to reduce the effects of pollution. Thecentres should have the following equipment: first aid kits, human decontamination agents and equipment,fire-fighting equipment, fog generating equipment, tank-covering foils, neutralising agents, air curtaindevice, etc.BIBLIOGRAFY1. Закон о безбедности саобраћаја на путевима, Службени гласник РС 101/2005.2. Закон о експлозивним материјама, Службени лист СФРЈ 25/70.3. Закон о превозу опасних материја, Службени лист СРЈ 68/2002.4. Крстић Б., Млађан Д., Безбедност коришћења возила за превоз опасних материја у друмскомсаобраћају, Машински факултет, Крагујевац, 2007.5. Правилник о техничким условима које морају да испуњавају предузећа која врше стручнооспособљавање возача моторних возила којима се превозе опасне материје и других лица којаучествују у превозу тих материја, Службени лист СФРЈ 76/90.6. Restructured ADR, applicable as from 1 January 2005, European Agreement concerning the InternationalCarriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Volume I, Economic Commission for Europe, Inland TransportCommittee, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2004.7. Службени гласник Републике Србије 41/2009.8. Службени гласник Републике Србије, 101/2005.9. Службени лист СФРЈ 82/90.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 151UDK:351.78:004(497.11)614.8(497.11)005.334(497.11)LEGAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF ENGAGEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF THEREPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS Marija D. Blagojevic 1 , Zeljko Nikac 11 Academy of Criminalistic and Police Studies, BelgradeAbstract: There are a large number of different forms of threats to the modern world, ranging from natural disastersand accidents, to the war destruction, terrorism, technological accidents and other security challenges and risks.Peacetime emergencies caused by natural or anthropogenic factors, require the involvement of (social) communityand the rapid response of all forces in preventing these phenomena, rescuing of endangered persons and propertyand removing the consequences. In order to overcome the disproportion between the acute need for protection andrescue and the available capacities, besides the organised protection subject (regular services), the state broadens thenet of protection and rescue subjects.Place, role and tasks of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia in emergency situations is of security andstrategic importance, from the aspect of protection of life, personal and property safety, as well as protection ofother social values. The paper points out the crucial role of the Serbian police in emergency situations, and providesa review of legislation in this area and points to the involvement of the Sector for Emergency Management as aspecialized line of work. The authors emphasize the need for strengthening the integrated system of riskmanagement in emergency situations, for the purpose of protection of life and environmental security.Key words: emergency, risk prevention, regulations, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, EU.OPENING REMARKSAfter the end of World War II and the appearance of nuclear weapons there was a further development of scienceand technology, and the scientific achievements are used for both peacetime and armed (war) purposes. Members ofthe winning coalition, primarily the U.S. and the USSR (Russia), developed their nuclear and other resources to aclimax, as well as several state allies in the newly established military blocs, which only deepened the gap andincreased the mutual distrust. In the years of the Cold War that followed there was a further polarization in theworld and the number of atomic and other accidents increased, so the emergency situations as a rule occurred inalmost all parts of the globe. Numerous wars and armed conflicts were the cause of many disasters and emergencysituations, while in peacetime conditions there causes were different, such as natural disasters, accidents and others. marija.blagojevic@kpa.edu.rs

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 152Hazardous materials, their exploitation and transportation occupy a special place among the risks in peacetimeconditions, because due to their nature and consequences they cause they represent the extraordinary securitychallenges and carry great risks. Furthermore, they can lead to technical and technological accidents and otheremergency situations that could have far-reaching consequences, often for whole regions and continents. These arethe reasons why the countries take measures at both the national and international level to prevent and combat thesephenomena, with a special emphasis on the prevention and elimination of risk factors as much as possible. In termsof the content, there are normative-legal and operational activities, while the activities based on the scope andnumber of participants cover bilateral, regional and multilateral contacts.After the fall of the "Berlin Wall" in the last decade of the 20 th century there was a process of transition and socialreform in the countries of the former socialist bloc, which further affected the territory of the former SFRY andother countries. After the end of the conflict in the region, the Republic of Serbia has taken the path of democraticchanges and reforms, and among other things, it has initiated a process of reorganization of state administrationtowards the concept of public service and within a united administrative area of the EU. In this context, there is areform of the police to a modern service of citizens with the police Directorate for the performance of the traditionalpolice-security jobs as a central part, while other work is performed by specialized services and lines of work withinthe Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia (MoI of the RS). The Department of Emergency Situations is anewly established organizational units and as a specialized line of work for rescue operations, fire-fighting andother related tasks, which we shall use to make reference to legal and security aspects of the engagement of the MoIof the RS in this field .GENERAL ON THE EMERGENCY SITUATIONSThe concept known as the emergency situations is not uniformly described either in doctrine or practice, and it iseven identified with categories such as state of emergency and the like that are legally governed mainly by the stateor some other international entities. As for our legal system, a state of emergency is generally mentioned in theConstitution of the Republic of Serbia as a special legal regime on the whole or a part of the state territory, duringthe immediate threat of war or emergency internal events. 1 According to Article 4, paragraph 6 of the Law onDefense, the state of emergency is more specifically defined as a "state of public danger which threatens thesurvival of the state or its citizens, which is a consequence of military and non-military challenges, risks andsecurity threats". 2 Emergency situations as categories are in some way similar to the aforementioned condition,which is not regular, but they are not identical, and in addition to legal there are many other differences betweenthese categories.In a broader sense of emergency situations may be determined in a relatively general way as the state and thesituations which cause or may cause human and material losses. In the narrow sense according to Article 8 of thenew Law on emergency situations of the Republic of Serbia, the term emergency situations refers to, paraphrase, acondition where the risks and threats or the consequences of disasters, special events and other threats to thepopulation, environment and material assets are of such scope and intensity that their occurrence or consequencesare not possible to prevent or eliminate by the regular activities of the competent authorities and services, which is itis necessary to use special measures, forces and resources with the enhanced work mode for their alleviation orelimination. 3 Also, emergency situations include any unexpected situation that may cause death or significantinjuries of employees, users or general population, close or discontinue business operations, significantly damagematerial and natural resources, or threaten the financial condition or reputation of the company. 41 “Official Gazette of the RS“, No.98/06, Belgrade 2006.2 “Official Gazette of the RS“, No.116/07, Belgrade 2007.3 “Official Gazette of RS“, No.111/09, Belgrade 2009.4 Davis, H.,Walters M., Do all the crisis have to become disasters? Risk and risk mitigation-disasters prevention andmanagement, 1998,New Jersey Academy, Vol. 5, pp. 112.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 153Model of global social development contributes to the avoidance of emergency situations primarily theenvironmental ones, but also those of technogenic character and it also contributes to the achievement ofenvironmental safety. The sustainable development is at the heart of the concept and it includes economic,technological, social and cultural development harmonized with the requirements of the protection andimprovement of the environment. In order to avoid the risk, it is necessary to have mutually harmonizeddevelopmental supports: economic, social, cultural and the environment. However, it requires a different attitude ofa man and society towards the nature as well as the updated understanding of the role of a man in solving globalproblems related to population and development, economy, armament race, food, energy, social issues, theenvironment and science and technology, and the solution of these problems contributes to global security of theplanet. It is also necessary that there exist the consciousness, individual and collective, of avoiding the riskyactivities, but also of the appropriate action at the time when the extreme events and emergency situations occur,whereas special attention must be directed to research of the behaviour of the individuals who are professionallyinvolved in such situations.Sociology as a general social science must address the research of the emergency situation as a social category,exploring the causes of action of specific social groups, particularly the political elite in emergency situations,which is how it would contribute better and more to the achievement of security in a society. 1EMERGENCY SITUATIONS MANAGEMENT AS A SPECIAL FORM OF RISKThe risks, as probable or possible events in social, technical and ecological spheres can lead to a decline in thequality of life and are one of the most topical problems of modern civilization, so that risk prediction, minimizationand management become the subject of research of many sciences. Regardless of whether the risks are of natural orsocial character, they represent a potential danger of violating the balance in the system society-nature, and theycondition the appearance of unfavourable situation, extreme events or emergency situations. If we take into accountthe causes of emergency situations (natural disasters, technical accidents and disasters, the application of means ofmass destruction and the anthropogenic actions on the nature) but also the consequences (loss of lives, violation ofhuman health, pollution, degradation or destruction of the natural components of the environment), the standpointthat the global security is a priority task and aim at both global and national levels is beyond any doubt.It cannot be disputed that risks today are increasingly taking a global character and their scope is constantlyincreasing as well as the number of potentially endangered people, material resources and territories of potentialdisturbance of ecological balance. Emergency situations represent a special kind of risk because of their possiblesignificant consequences, which can be divided by their nature to cumulative and accidental, anthropogenic andnatural, and so on. Risk management is an organized process of identifying and measuring risk, selection,development and implementation of options for risk management and monitoring. Considering that emergencysituation is a special type of risk, risk management includes the management of emergency situations. 2The process of risk management related to the occurrence of extraordinary situations, as a specific manifestation,includes the following stages: risk identification, analysis of consequences, risk assessment, planning of measuresfor the prevention of emergency or risk reduction, organization of preparedness measures to respond to the situationarose and planning of recovery measures. 3 In order to eliminate, control or minimize the causes of risks andpotential effects of hazardous events, the risk must be managed. Management systems, aimed at planning, controland reduction of risk are the most reliable models of risk management.1 Blagojevic, M., "The role of special units of the MUP RS in terms of peacetime emergencies", MA thesis, Faculty of Security,Belgrade 2009., pp. 23-26.2 Ibid.3 More in: Savic, S., Andjelkovic, B., Stankovic, M., Specific risk management systems and emergency situations, Proceedingsof the Symposium on Operational Research, SYMOPIS-06, Faculty of Organizational Sciences, Belgrade 2006.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 154Planning is an important aspect of risk management, especially in emergency situations since an emergencysituation per se is a special kind of risk. On the one hand, planning prevents wrong actions, and on the other hand, itreduces the number of unused options, which is of great importance in the process of managing emergencysituations.Planning for emergency situations is the process of adopting and implementing procedures to identify predictableemergency situations using system analysis, preparation, testing and revision of the plan of response to anemergency situation. 1Risk management involves a set of policies and procedures of prevention, preparedness, response to accidents, aswell as the remedy of consequences of the accident in order to reduce risk and create the conditions under which therisk may be acceptable.Prevention (Mitigation) is a set of measures aimed at the prevention of emergency situations, reduction of theprobability of occurrence and minimization of the consequences. In the prevention stage, the priority role belongs tostrengthening legislation and harmonization with the EU legislation, and therefore further activities are proposed toeliminate the possibility of an emergency situation occurring, so that the risk was acceptable. This includesundertaking the preventive measures as well as defining the contents of plans of protection from emergencysituation, while making plans for the protection provides for the organization and preparation of all subjects,equipment and technical support for an adequate response with minimal consequences.Preparedness (Preparedness) is aimed at undertaking the necessary measures in case of activities related to thestage of prevention yield no results, especially when there is a real danger of an emergency situation occurring. Thisstage generally involves several important actions: putting the response plans into use, training agencies andauthorities (fire-fighting brigades, the Centre for Control of poisoning, mobile toxicological laboratories, centres forinformation and other institutions or their parts related to the response to an emergency situation), activation andtesting of alarm systems, deployment of standby teams of emergency medical assistance and the like.Response includes activities related to the risky situation, and the task at this stage is to isolate, and stop or limit thesecondary or subsequent effects of an emergency situation and to minimize the consequences. The procedureincludes a set of measures and actions taken based on the results of the stages of analyses of vulnerabilities and riskassessment in accordance with the plan of protection. The response procedure begins when the first pieces ofinformation about the accident are received, the information about the place and time of accident, type of hazardoussubstances present, as well as the estimates concerning the course of accident, risks for the environment, scope ofaccident and consequences and other important data. The accident response procedure must be conducted inaccordance with the situation on the ground and according to the predetermined plan of protection at the scene ofthe accident, and therefore the definition of stakeholders (relevant authorities and institutions) in this stage is a verycomplex issue and requires rather a serious approach.Recovery includes a set of activities for elimination of consequences caused by emergency situations, as well ascustomizing the space affected by accidents to its original purpose. Various operational services are involved in therecovery stage, which on the basis of relevant projects and plans made by the professional institutions perform therecovery of the terrain and bring it to its original purpose or some other purpose, depending on the type and level ofthe accident. 21 Independent Study Course 1: Emergency Manager: an orientation to the position, Federal Emergency ManagementAssociation, http://www.fema.gov2 Again cited in note 5, pp. 25-26.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 155The role and tasks of law enforcement agencies in emergency situations are of security and strategic importanceboth in terms of the protection of lives, personal, proprietary and any other safety of people and the protection ofother social values. In extraordinary situations, the organization and tasks of law enforcement agencies result fromthe solutions that are provided for by the Constitution, laws and regulations which set out the competencies andscope of work of these bodies.The main tasks of the police units in case of emergency, in order to protect the civilian population, material andcultural assets consist of the following:achieving the security of citizens, in other words carrying out police activities in the maintenance andprotection of public peace and order;protection of lives and property by combating crime;carrying out other tasks of public security by which various forms of danger and threats to civilians,material and cultural goods are observed and suppressed;participation in the implementation of protection and rescue tasks, providing assistance to citizens and stateorgans, and establishing cooperation, coordination and interaction with other subjects of security, defence and other. 1LEGAL REGULATIONS COVERING EMERGENCY SITUATION MANAGAMENT IN THEREPUBLIC OF SERBIABy adopting a set of laws governing the field of emergency situations, the problems of outdated legislation whichhas led to anomalies in the functioning and lack of coordination of services in response to emergency situation hasbeen overcome. Previous experience in this area has shown that the existing organizational framework of protectionand rescue in the Republic of Serbia was governed by a large number of anachronistic rules which provided forcontradictory decisions and for the implementation of which in practice a large number of various governmentbodies has been in charge.The “heap of rules” in this area further resulted in dispersion of energy and power it included, and there was anetwork of dysfunctional organs, bodies and units set which was insufficiently operational within the system.Namely, in addition to jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defence was also incharge of the civil defence as defined in Chapter VII of the Law on Defence of the RS.Furthermore, the field of flood protection was in charge of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and WaterManagement, and within the Ministry the Directorate for water management, while the protection from thechemicals, waste and harmful substances in the production, trade, transport, storage and disposal was theresponsibility of the Ministry of Environment and Regional Planning – the Administration for the Protection ofNatural Resources and the Environment within this Ministry.1Talijan M., Keković, Z., „Internal Affairs and preventive evacuation“, Proceedings of the Faculty of defense and protection,Belgrade 1999, pp. 131.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 156In order to overcome the resulting interregnum and achieve the more efficient organization, taking into account thepositive experiences in the world in this field, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia has defined thenew field of work entitled "The protection and rescue."The main objective is to integrate all activities aimed to protect life, health and property of citizens, to preserve theconditions necessary for life and to prepare for coping with the situation in terms of fires, natural disasters, theeffects of hazardous substances and other conditions of danger. In this way, the responsibility towards the citizensand their representative bodies for the state of protection and action in these situations is also defined.Further specification followed the adoption of the Decision of the Government of the Republic of Serbia datedMarch 05, 2009, in which it was decided to change the internal organization of the Ministry of the Interior of theRepublic of Serbia and to form a united Department of Emergency Situations. It is an organizational unit of the RSMinistry of the Interior established by merging the Administration of the Emergency Situations of the Ministry ofDefense and the former Department for the protection and rescue of the Ministry of the Interior, which nowrepresents a special-purpose service for the efficient and adequate response in case of floods, fires or other naturaldisasters. The purpose of establishing of the Division is in coordination of activities and united action with otherpublic bodies in order to achieve better results. 1Internal legal sources are certainly the most important legal basis for the work and actions in each specialized area,and can be considered within the context of presentations on emergency situations management and preventiveaction. 2The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia is undoubtedly the highest and most general legal act of the country,according to which the jurisdiction of the Republic has been established in Article 97. Thus it stipulates that theRepublic of Serbia regulates and provides for, among other things, the following questions:sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Serbia and its international position and relations withother countries and international organizations,the exercise and protection of freedoms and rights of a man and a citizen,the constitutionality and legality,defence and security of the Republic of Serbia and its citizens,measures in case of state of emergency,the system of protection and improvement of the environment, the system of protection and improvement of plant and animal life, etc. 3Bearing in mind that the emergency situations are a special security problem, the regulations determine the tasks oflaw enforcement agencies related to the protection of life, personal and proprietary safety of citizens (the preventionand remedy); the activities of protection from fire, explosions, spills of hazardous substances; combatingenvironmental crime; security and inspection of manufacturing, trading and transportation of explosive substances,1Conclusion of the Government of the RS, March 05, 2009. Number officially.2 Nikač Ž., „Legal protection of the safety regulations in emergency situations“, Law life No.9 /06, Belgrade 2006, pp. 312.3 „Official Gazette of RS“, No.98/06, Belgrade 2006.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 157flammable liquids and gases, traffic safety, criminal and technical investigation of accidental events, maintenance ofpublic peace and order; offering assistance to relevant authorities in the execution and implementation of measuresfor protection from accidents and repair consequences of accidents.Legal regulations which are of primary importance in the field of management in emergency situations and detailsgoverning this area are:Law on Ministries,Law on Police,Law on Emergency Situations,Law on Protection from Fire,Law of Explosive Materials, Inflammable Liquids and Gases,Law on Transfer of Explosives,Law on the Transport of Dangerous Substances, and others.In the Republic of Serbia the Ministries are responsible for the work related to state administration established bylaws and regulations adopted under the laws. They apply laws and other regulations and general acts of the SerbianParliament and Government, as well as general acts of the President of the Republic of Serbia, manage theadministrative matters, carry out administrative supervision over the performance of delegated tasks and others.Internal affairs tasks are the tasks determined by law the performance of which the authorized republic bodiesachieve security of the Republic of Serbia and its citizens and ensure the realization of the Constitution and otherlegally established rights of citizens.Law on Ministries of the Republic of Serbia 1 defines that the Ministry of the Interior conducts affairs of stateadministration with regard to “protection of life, personal and proprietary safety of citizens, providing assistance incase of danger, traffic and transport of weapons, ammunition, explosives and certain other hazardous substances,examination of small firearms, devices and ammunition, fire protection.” This law has enabled the establishing ofthe Ministries, their specific organization and scope of work. Also, this law stipulates that state administration lineof work related to the assistance in case of emergency and fire protection is carried out by the Ministry of theInterior (Article 5). In addition to this, in connection with these activities the Ministry of the Interior carries outother works related to trade and transport of weapons, ammunition, explosives and certain other hazardoussubstances.Law on Police 2 is designed so that the police operations are carried out as united in the Republic of Serbia. This lawcreates the legal assumptions for further reform of the police which are consistent with the best European traditionand contemporary international and comparative legal sources underpinning the police in a democratic society.By passing this law the conditions have been created for establishing new concept of public security and the legalcommitment to provide security protection for all who are at the territory of the Republic of Serbia, not only for itscitizens (citizens of Serbia). This protection is broader and more diverse and is based on the provision of severaltypes of assistance, the introduction of rescue functions, and other human interventions.Law on Police stipulates the obligations regarding the cooperation with all stakeholders in the interest of safety ofpersons and the self-organized individuals to protect the lives and safety of people at all times. Thus, police officersprotect public safety regardless of whether it is a risk to human life and property caused by natural disasters,epidemics and other forms of danger or the suppression of a criminal offense. Police operations in terms of concept1 „Official Gazette of RS“, No. 65/08, Belgrade 2008.2„Official Gazette of RS“, No.101/05, Belgrade 2005.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 158and type are determined in accordance with Article 10 of the Law on Police. Police matters relating to the executionof other tasks stipulated by law and regulations issued under the authority of the law are carried out in accordancewith Article 4 of the Law on Police; these tasks are performed by police officers who use their police powers(authorized officers), as well as those employed at special and specific duties whose activities are directly related topolice work and activities and include fire protection.The Ministry of the Interior has special rights and obligations related to the provision of performance management,professional, administrative and operational work in protection and rescue. The establishing of the modernDepartment for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of the Interior in terms of both technology and personnelcontributes to timely and effective response in emergency situations, rapid elimination of consequences, organizedand strong preventive action.The need for rapid, organized and effective action requires that the Department of Emergency Situations is managedfrom one center, and the need for quality logistics needs of civil society in emergency situations, as well as thefocus of the public and media on virtually all types of these situations, determine the organization of the Departmentfor Emergency Situations within the Ministry of the Interior.Complementary comparative analysis of the organization and work of the services for emergency situations in boththe EU countries and countries in the region, confirms this commitment and legal solution. The implementation ofpolicies and planning actions for the purpose of training for action in cases of accidents, natural disasters andtechnical incidents is in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior in most European countries.The Department of Emergency Situations within the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia is de factoproceeded with the continuity of use of the infrastructure and logistics of previous organizational unit of theMinistry (fire-rescue units, the communication system, helicopter units, divers, Gendarmerie, etc.).The Department has a close cooperation with all neighboring countries and participates and organizes regional andinternational seminars, specialist training, courses and workshops in the field of emergency situations as well asreducing the risk of emergency situations. All this suggests that important developments and measures areundertaken in this field, which further encourages international cooperation. The fact which supports this is that theDepartment participates in the activities of international institutions and organizations, such as EUROPA of theCouncil of Europe, the Initiative for the prevention of and preparedness for emergency situations (DPPI) of theCouncil for regional cooperation with the region of Southeast Europe, the International strategy to reduce theconsequences of emergency situations of the United Nations (UNISDR), the United Nations Development Program(UNDP), the UN Office for Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), Civil-Military Emergency Planning, Partnership forPeace PFP, the Balkan Fire Sports Federation (BFSF), the USAID, the OSCE and others. It is certainly necessary tocontinue the initiated international cooperation in the field of teaching, training, simulation exercises, such asprotection and rescue in case of fire, chemical accidents, floods, disposal and destruction of unexploded lethalweaponry.The Law on Emergency Situations 1 is certainly the most topical in this field, especially as its adoption startedtowards the systematic provision of the security of citizens, material and cultural heritage and environment. TheLaw determines precisely the obligations and rights of government and other agencies, companies and other legalentities and citizens in emergency situations.The same regulations set the initial assumptions for timely response to emergency situations, which significantlyreduces the risk of the emergency situations and provides for better system of protection and rescue both in terms oforganization and functioning.1 „Official Gazette of the RS“, No.111/05, Belgrade 2009.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 159The completion and merging of the appropriate materials in the Law has created the basic normative prerequisitesfor harmonious and timely response of many government bodies and non-state entities in emergency situations.Consequently, the preconditions have been created for effective protection and rescue of people and goods in thesesituations in accordance with the Constitution and with respect to decisions, guidelines and suggestions from someimportant international instruments, such as the UN International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR),the UN Development Program (UNDP) and USAID's Press (readiness, planning and economic security). 1Law on Fire Protection 2 is one of the most important laws in the field of emergency situations and preventionthereof. The adoption of a new Republican law on fire protection the jurisdiction of the Government, police andlocal authorities in terms of fire protection and rescue activities is fully determined. It further defines the obligationsof territorial self-government bodies, legal entities, private businesses, citizens and others related to the fireprotection and rescue activities, fire and rescue organization units (professional, industrial, volunteer, etc.), thecompetence of bodies and procedures in firefighting and rescue of persons and property, the rights and obligationsof participants in firefighting and rescue of persons and property and other.The provisions of the Law of Explosive Materials, Inflammable Liquids and Gases RS 3 define the jurisdiction andthe role of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, as the bodies who take the dominant position inthis field related to the control of trade and transportation of explosive substances, weapons and ammunition. Theprovisions of this Law refer that explosives, inflammable liquids and gases are subject to a special mode in terms ofproduction, use and storage.The Law of Transport of Dangerous Goods of the Republic of Serbia 4, which is in continuity with the previous one,in particular asserts the prevention starting first from abstract and then the real dangers and consequences that occurdue to violation of its provisions. Given that a large number of accidents happen during the transport of dangerousgoods and are more frequent in road and water than in rail transport, this is a particularly important role of theMinistry of the Interior in the control of transport of dangerous goods particularly for the following:compliance with regulations referring to transport of dangerous goods,proper means of transportation,providing that the carriers and other participants in traffic follow the basic driving rules,training of persons who transport hazardous materials andpossession of proper documentation.The Law on Trade of Dangerous Goods of the Republic of Serbia 5 was adopted also in compliance and in legalcontinuity with the foregoing two. This Law governs the conditions under which the explosive materials are placedon the market. The jurisdiction for trade has been established within the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic ofSerbia.1The law on emergency situations with expert commentary, „Official Gazette of the RS“, No.111/05, Belgrade 2009. p.5.2 „Official Gazette of the RS“, No.111/09, Belgrade 2009.3 „Official Gazette of the RS“, No.44/77, 45/85, 18/89, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94.4 „Official Gazette of the FRY“, No.27/90, 45/90,24/94, 28/96, 21/99, 44/99, 68/02.5 „Official Gazette of the FRY“, No.30/85, 6/89,53/91,24/94, 28/96, 68/02.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSIONTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 160Because of their consequences, the emergency situations are long remembered and require quick response of allforces of community in their prevention, protection and rescue of people, material and cultural goods, as well as theelimination of the consequences which occurred.The analysis of the development of emergency situations and operational decision-making is made more difficultcue to rather a large uncertainty of their basic elements, different views on the choice of methods for theirelimination, the complexity of the quantitative evaluation of the efficiency of the decisions made.Management bodies, even with considerable financial resources, must act under the circumstances of obvious lackof time, accuracy and reliability of information, which may lead to reaching unreasonable and even wrongdecisions, and therefore, to large losses, and not just material ones.The effectiveness of disaster management significantly depends on the context in which it unfolds, which is mainlydefined by the state mechanisms which ensure safety. The objectives in the field of protection and rescue fromnatural disasters, fire, technical and technological disasters and other dangers are unequivocally clear and reflect inrealization of different activities.The Ministry of the Interior has special rights and obligations related to the provision of performance of managerial,operational, technical and administrative work in protection and rescue. Since the police have taken overjurisdiction in the area of protection and rescue, this resulted in positioning the field of protection and recovery asthe basis for defining services and main tasks by the implementation of which the safety of citizens and theirproperty is achieved. Accordingly, in the RS Ministry of the Interior there is a separate organizational unitestablished called the Emergency Department, as a specialized line of work with the inherent jurisdiction in thismatter.The compositions of the Department for Emergency Situations, both in terms of formation and organization,provides for a good framework in prevention and remedy of the consequences of natural and technologicaldisasters. This is particularly so because our country faces a number of a security risk in this field and therefore itwas necessary to organize a unified system of protection and rescue.The basic goal and direction in the Republic of Serbia is to incorporate the activities aimed at protection of lives,health and property of citizens, at preservation of the conditions necessary for life and preparation for coping withthe situation in terms of fires, natural disasters, the effects of hazardous substances and other conditions of danger.In addition, the goal is to create conditions for the preparation and participation of citizens, businesses, governmentagencies and other organizations and professional services, professional and other associations to protect and rescuepeople and property from fire, natural disasters and technological accidents. All the above mentioned activities aswell as their implementation are the obligation of the laws that harmonize regulations with the European standards.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 161R E F E R E N C E S1. Blagojević, M., (2009). „The role of special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia interms of peacetime emergencies“, MA thesis, Faculty of Security, Belgrade.2. Davis, H., Walters M.,(1998). Do all the crisis have to become disasters? Risk and risk mitigation - disastersprevention and management, New Jersey Academy, vol.5.3. Nikač, Ž.,(2006) „Legal protection of the safety regulations in emergency situations“, Legal Life, Journal ofLegal Theory and Practice, Belgrade, No. 9/06,4. Savić, S., Anđelković, B., Stanković, M.,(2006) „Specific features of risk management and emergency situations,Proceedings of the Symposium on Operational Research“, Symopis-06, Faculty of Organizational Sciences,Belgrade.5. Talijan, M., Keković, Z.,(1999) „Internal affairs and preventive evacuation", Proceedings, Faculty of defenceand protection, Belgrade.6. The RS Constitution, laws, etc., regulations and bylaws7. Other - Internet and others.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 162UDK:007:912]:004656.073.436:620.26THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) ASA FUNCTION OF HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT REALIZATION IN A DANGEROUS GOODSTRANSPORTATION AREADjordjević Ivica, Dzigurski OzrenUniversity of Belgrade, Faculty of security studies,50 Gospodara Vucica St. Belgrade;djivica@gmail.com; edzigurs@etf.rsAbstract: The dynamics of scientific and technological development and globalization of production activities haveled to a drastic increase of dangerous goods volume transportation in all forms of transportation. In most cases,transportation corridors go past and/or through settlements. In the given circumstances there is a risk control need incase of possible accidental situation. In addition to traffic control and potentially harmful effects measuring, the ICTpotential can be used for informing or educating and training people how to act in such circumstances.The paper proposes an ICT architecture based on the concept of distributed computing systems implemented onthe concept of Integrated command and control systems based on of C4I (Command, Control, Communication,Computers and Intelligence) principle. Information about a vehicle carrying dangerous goods location, as well as ofthe current parameters of hazardous substances, can be continuously sent to the monitoring center via wirelesscommunication and the global positioning system (GPS).The information obtained in case of an accident during hazardous matters transportation, can be used for theselection and implementation of an adequate plan for responding to and managing the emergency situation.A successful response to an accident situation requires the previous development of plans for emergency situations,and education and training of population.Besides a continuous gathering of information about the transport of dangerous goods, the use of ICT enablesproper management accidental situation, and the ability of education and training based on the simulation ofdifferent accidental situation scenarios.Key words: Transport of Dangerous Goods, ICT, C4I systems, monitoring, education and training in emergencysituations, notification and alerting, human security.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 163INTRODUCTIONThe globalization had opened national borders for transition of goods, services and people. Increase in cross-borderactivity proportionally increases the risks of transport volume growth, especially in the field of dangerous goodstransport. The international standards in this field are very strict, obligating transport companies to undertake theappropriate measures and procedures in order to minimize the risk of unwanted events. However, considering aninevitable rule of grand numbers and lacking possibility of absolute risk control, it is necessary to prepare for theoccurrence of crisis situations.Technical solutions provide a vast potential in the field of dangerous goods transport control and monitoring. Thepowerful computers and software solutions enable model establishing and simulation of various situations. It is infact possible to provide predictions according to the geographic features of terrain, type of matter andmeteorological conditions. Success in implementation of drafted plans of reaction in crisis situations also includesthe appropriate preparations of citizens situated in the zone affected by such crisis situation.The state institutions and services are legally obligated to prepare the citizens for an appropriate reaction in possiblecrisis situation. Research performed for the purpose of this paper had shown that the citizens situated in closevicinity of roads used for dangerous goods transport were not provided with the sufficient information oncircumstances they are exposed to and how should they react if any of such events should occur. Due to the lack ofinformation, citizens may be exposed to the unwarranted security risks in the case of accidents involving thevehicles transporting dangerous goods.DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT REPRESENTING THE SOURCE OF HUMAN SECURITYVIOLATIONThe Human Security concept in its very core provides an alternative approach in the fields previously monopolizedby military-police structures. The foundation of the idea promoted by the UNDP in 1994 consists of care of humanbeing as a basic value of any given society. In such context, security services have their role in human lifepreserving and providing the appropriate conditions for achieving potentials for each and every one of us. Ofcourse, the individual achievement is to be in line with the established societal principles and norms, whereadherence is provided by the appropriate control mechanisms.System institutions, together with the system itself have the purpose of facilitating implementation of theestablished civilization norms and achievements, in order to prevent conflicts with other social groups, but also tosuperimpose the interest of majority against the interest of minority in the society.The list of factors jeopardizing human security contains dangerous goods transport within its top items. If amethodological matrix used within the human security concept is to be applied, the dangerous goods transport canbe recognized within several indicators depicting the human security status.The core fields or components of human security according to the UNDP include:economic security, covering basic income earned by the “productive and lucrative work”;food security, all people, in any given moment must have access to food, both in physical and economicsense;health security, for all people, with special emphasis on underprivileged;environmental security, defined as a healthy physical environment;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 164personal security, in form of decreased threats of any form of violence against an individual;community security, i.e. security by belonging to a group (providing that the groups societal norms andbehavior do not threat individual’s physical security being a member of the group, or security of others inthe environment); and political security, life in an environment facilitating implementation of basic human rights. 1Having in mind fields quoted according to the UNDP concept, one may note that the human security, among theother issues, includes:availability of an appropriate health care and treatment in the case of illness and accidents;healthy environment andelimination of threats against citizens’ health and life from the environment.These issues are directly correlated with the presence of dangerous goods in the close vicinity of citizens, whether itwas their working or living space. The scientific-technical development had enabled an expansion of economicactivities’ field throughout the planet Earth, bringing up the necessity of raw materials transport, traveling greatdistances.Our country is, regarding the geographic position, located on the transport corridor carrying, among the others,miscellaneous aggressive substances, acids and other hazardous compounds which being released may contaminatethe area and cause numerous casualties.The international standards established in the subject field define prerequisites for minimization of the risk.However, having in mind that these activities are so dynamic that the unpredictability factor is ever present, ourcommunity must also be ready to react should the worst-case scenarios occur.As Table 1 shows, the statistic indicators on dangerous goods transport volume indicate a mild stagnation.However, the long-term trends in comparison with the previous decade, i.e. before the latest globalization phasestart, indicate that the dangerous goods transport had had multiple-factor increase.The Denmark case presented in Table 2 can be illustrative within this context.1 UNDP (1994): Human Development Report. Oxford University Press, New York – Oxford, 24-33.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 165Table 1. Transport of dangerous goods (million t/km) – Selected countriesSource: European Road Statistics 2007: European Union Road Federation, International RoadFederation, Brussels Programme Centre. Brussels, 65.Table 2: Transport of dangerous goods by Danish roadYearsDangerous goods total transport 1999 2008Weight of goods loaded, 1000 tones 295 737Source: http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/saveselections.asp (25th March 2010.)The table shows that, within the period 1999 – 2008, transport of dangerous goods via Denmark’s roads had hadmultiple-factor increase. If we cross-reference the Table 2 data with the Table 1 data, the conclusion is drawn thatthe greatest quantities of dangerous goods were transported in 2002.There is always an issue of data relevance and methodology used, but having in mind that the sources originate inEU area and are based on the data from national statistics sources we may assume that no issues of this type shouldarise in this case.Regarding the volume of dangerous goods transported, providing a full overview requires a quality analysis of dataavailable. Based on the data for the year 2006, we may note that the total structure of dangerous goods transportedon the territory of 27 EU Member States and Norway covers the following categories of dangerous goods: flammable liquids – 58 %; fuels (different forms) – 12 %;

acids – 11 %;TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 166 miscellaneous explosive substances – 6 %; oxides – 3 %; other non-classified dangerous goods – 10 %. 1Undoubtedly, it is possible to establish a correlation between increase in dangerous goods transport and relatedrisks. Verification of this thesis can be well depicted with the increase in number of emergency calls for crisissituations occurring in the situations of dangerous goods transport and storage in Canada (Table 3). During theperiod 1990 – 2008, the number of calls had increased from 173 2 to 1007 3 .Table 3: Emergency Calls for Crisis Situation on the Territoryof Canada in 2008 per Transport TypeTransport typeNumber of callsRoad 262Railway 145Air 17Maritime 16Pipeline 1Storages and other infrastructure 564Multimodal transport 2Source: http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/canutec/stats-2008stat-435.htm (20th March 2010.).Presented structure indicates potentially critical points in traffic infrastructure regarding incident occurrenceregarding dangerous goods transport and storage. The majority of calls came indeed from the storage capacities andreloading ramps. The second place belongs to the road accidents, followed by the railway, while the pipelinetransport being at the end of the list had shown to be the safest transport option in the Canadian experience.Which of the transport routes would potentially carry the highest risk depends on various factors – starting from thestate of traffic infrastructure, covering status of vehicles, down to the cultural setting and security culture levelwithin the community being analyzed.Serbia, with its preconditions, is a territory where security analyses and prognoses are not easily made. Startingfrom the fact that the decades of economic crisis had deteriorated any form of institutional accountability towardscitizens and that we are still in the initial capital accumulation phase when public officials take greater interest intheir own pocket than social accountability of their appointment. Deterioration of infrastructure is not only reflectedin physical downgrading of roads, but also in downfall of institutional prerequisites for the community to cope withany problem at hand.The previous civil protection system, covering almost the entire population and drafting numerous plans for crisissituations had remained in tatters. Searching for new solutions, some of the good aspects of all systems weredeclared ideological heritage, while the new solution exist only on paper.1 Simo Pasi (2008): Statistics in focus 66/2008. EUROSTAT, Luxembourg, 6.2 http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/canutec/stats-1990stat-453.htm (25th March 2010.).3 http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/canutec/stats-2008stat-435.htm (20th March 2010.).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 167The problem may be clearly noticed by analyzing spatial distribution of buildings in the vicinity of roads, i.e.directions of dangerous goods transport. Limitation of this paper length discourages analyses of each individualaspect of this problem, but it is our opinion that one of the societal functions of this kind of papers is to point out theexistence of a problem.IMPLEMENTATION OF ICT IN DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT CONTROLFast-paced development of the Information Communication Technologies (ICT) has a significant influence, amongthe others, on development of systems used for dangerous goods transport control. In general, these systems includethe following aspects:transfer of information to and from the vehicle (telecommunication);data processing (information technologies); andinformation use for decision making with the purpose of safe transport and efficient solutions to use theexisting technologies for transport control (command and control).The new technologies, such as navigation systems, Internet, mobile networks are but a few examples of theInformation Communication Technologies used for the dangerous goods transport control in road traffic, but also inother forms of transport. Application of these technologies can provide implementation of modern systems fordangerous goods transport control – the Integrated Transport Control Systems (ITCS) 1 .The innovative technologies may provide an active support for transport monitoring and provide value-addedservices for legally-required information provision, while also alleviating the risk in the case of accident. Openstandards and migration to the SOA (service-oriented architecture) shall dramatically increase scales on global levelregarding business models. The promising technologies, of course, include wide-spread satellite positioningsystems.In the case of dangerous goods transport, there is a need to permanently monitor both vehicle position and goodsstate, for the security purposes.Automatic vehicle identification techniques based on RFID technologies, which provide for the transportinformation electronic storage. Route planning may be time-independent or reactive, depending on the fact if thereal-time information of traffic network conditions is included in this management process. These information areacquired by sensor networks and made available to databases real time. Besides, the Geographic InformationSystems (GIS) shall provide for the spatial data management with the purpose of decision making processesstreamlining. The important technological requirements placed upon these systems are integration andinteroperability, in order to assure the maximum traffic efficiency and security 2 .The following components are used for the transport vehicles location control within the ITCS 3 :• transport monitoring equipment (sensors, detector, control and monitoring equipment, video-detectors), TVmonitoring equipment;1 Russo F., Vitetta A., Rindone C., Delfino G., Quattrone A. (2008): "ITS for monitoring and estimating road accidentprobability for dangerous goods transport"; Association for European Transport and Contributors.2 Fisichela M., Targon V., Pandolfi A. (2006): "The framework for dangerous goods tracking and management – TheIntegrated Information System"; 5 th Prague, AED Conference.3 Batarliene N. (2006): "Location and control of cargo and vehicles with new technologies"; Transport and Telecommunication,Vol 7, No 1.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 168• satellite navigation and positioning systems (GPS, GLONASS, EGNOS, Galileo);• radio-communication systems;• geographic databases and information systems (GIS);• road databases;• electronic cards with transport data;• meteorological data monitoring systems and• measuring and other systems.In the technical sense, modern systems providing dangerous goods transport can be implemented as an integratedcommand-control systems, based on C4A concept (Command, Control, Communication, Computers andIntelligence). These systems, via the satellite, GSM and other secure forms of communication, augmented with theappropriate security equipment and trained staff; cover all critical points throughout the territory where the transportoccurs. Besides stationary local security centers, C4I systems also cover mobile centers used in the crisis situationsto cover the locations of accidents and breakdowns or for mobile supervision of critical buildings and locations.The C4I concept based systems are the command-information systems, unifying all of the advantages of applicationof modern communications, computers, processing of data and information of importance for security during thecommanding process. Within the C4I system, spatial data and relations processing and visual presentation isprovided by the special software subsystem GIS (Geographic Information System). By integrating expert systems inGIS software, C4I also obtains special capabilities for a quality spatial decision support for managing of crisissituations invoked by the security accidents.Based on the analysis performed, we can conclude that due to the extreme significance of this field for the state andeconomy operation, numerous activities regarding the dangerous goods transport safety may be regulated on thestate level through the ministries of army, police, energy and economy. For that reason, having in mind the strategicsignificance and numerous endangering forms, dominant dangerous goods transport security systems implementC4I concept. Such systems are presently standard applications for defense and security in state institutions, as wellas in the organizations of strategic importance. Prominent quality of C4I concept and systems based on it is thatsuch systems facilitate an efficient real time management, which is one of the basic requirements for the securitysystem implementation.Besides the basic requirement for an efficient, real time management, complex security systems require completionof the following fundamental tasks:security supervision of all critical buildings and locations;decision support based on reliable information and expert knowledge andcommand and control in real time setting.In order to provide for the high level dangerous goods security, completion of such tasks can be assured byimplementation of Integrated C4I systems.

INTEGRATED C4I SYSTEMSTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 169The C4I concept (Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence) had been developed with theobjective to execute and support security operations planning and management. Its main systems are:integrated command and operations centers – stationary or mobile centers used for unification andprocessing of all information regarding the transport security;decision support system – decision support software providing necessary expert information andsituational notifications in logical form for command executives, regardless of their location, providing ageneral overview of the current situation or incidents. Visual presentation and complex overview of securityobjects and processes is provided by software categorized as the Geographic information system (GIS);integrated communication system – security communication system transmitting multimedia information(textual and numeric data, audio and visual information) between the command and control centers; amongthe teams and subjects responsible for the security. For instance, digital radio system, satellitecommunication system, security data transfer networks, CCTV monitoring systems.Figure 1: Integrated command-control system for security information management in dangerous goods transport,as well as for education and training of personnel and the population 1 .1 The original scheme, made by the authors.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 170vast area surveillance system – complex surveillance system covering the area and objects within,detecting incident events, activating warning alerts and provide information flow in real time setting; in thefield of the events and incidents in vast areas. This is especially significant in the field of traffic andtransport monitoring, with recognition of objects in space and detection of their unusual behavior. If thetransport should pass through critical areas (urban environment, war- and terrorism-affected arease), thesurveillance is being performed by setting up ad-hoc wireless sensor networks (BSM);system for resource monitoring and management – provides mechanisms for allocation and managementof resources used in the security activities and responses to incident events;physical-technical security system – defines and protects transport facilities, road corridors, regions, etc.The system may contain area breach protection, fire protection, video surveillance (CCTV), access control,integrated barriers, protective illumination, etc, as well as an appropriate communication infrastructureČsystem for alarming and notification – communication system for informing responsible subjects andpublic on incidents occurred, with suggestions of measures for alleviating the incident consequences;simulation and training system – provides a simulation of accident events and staff training for incidentmanagement. In addition, this system provides education and training of the population based on thesimulation of various emergency situations.EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF CITIZENSThe first issue we had noted during the preliminary research for the purpose of this paper is that the legislation andmaterials found on the Internet mostly relate to the transporters’ obligations.Available literature and legislation in subject field mostly cover standards, training for drivers and handlers ofdangerous goods. Sources on warning methods for citizens potentially exposed to breakdown effects during thedangerous goods transport are very sparse.One might say that it is justifiable, since those actions are to prevent accidents. Considering that such events cannotbe fully controlled everyone who might potentially be exposed to the effects of explosion or propagation ofdangerous fumes should be familiar with possible scenarios.For the institutions to act preventively, besides production of urban development plans which must contain riskestimation in the event of dangerous goods transport, citizens must also be familiarized with the procedures andmeasures if the crisis event should occur.In Table 4 there is identificated Hazardous Industries and Locations in Serbia.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 171Table 4: Identification of Hazardous Industries and LocationsCompany Location Goods Class Transportmethod1 Duga Viline vode organic solvents II railway2 Galenika Batajnički drum organic solvents II road3 Dalija Batajnički drum organic solvents II road4 Grmeč Autoput, Zemun organic solvents II road5 Rekord Rakovica organic solvents II road6 Rafinerija- Pančevački put oil derivates III roadBeograd7 Jugopetrol Radnička oil derivates III road, river8 Beopetrol Savska, Ostružnica oil derivates III road9 Tehnogas R.Vujovića - Čoče, technical gasses III roadRakovica10 Petrolgas Ovča butane-propane III railwayconcoction11 Grmeč-Balkan Pančevački put organic solvents II road12 Šećerana - Vrenje Radnička ammoniac I railway13 Tehnohemija Viline vode miscellaneous II railwaychemicals14 Beogradski Makiš chlorine I roadvodovod15 Beogradski Bežanija chlorine I roadvodovod16 Beogradski Banovo Brdo chlorine I roadvodovod17 BIP Autoput, Beograd ammoniac I road18 Hempro Autoput, Zemun miscellaneous II roadchemicals19 Žel.stanica Dunav Viline vode miscellaneous II railwaychemicals20 Žel.stanica, Bgd Savski most miscellaneous II railwaychemicals21 Žel. stanica, Ovča Ovča miscellaneous II railway22 Žel. stanica,ZemunZemunchemicalsmiscellaneouschemicalsIIrailwayClass of goods I – very toxic goods; Class of goods II – toxic goods; Class of goods III – flammable goodsSource: http://www.zdravlje.org.rs/ekoatlas/07at1.htm (20th March 2010.).Table 4. shows that in the mere territory of Belgrade there are 22 registered locations being a potentially significantsource of chemical fumes, i.e. the locations of explosion which may lead to heavy injuries of numerous citizens.Besides the individual risks, the effect multiplication also deserves some attention. An example of hypotheticsituation combines railway transport with overhead viaduct, nearby bridge or storage where the waterway alsocarries dangerous load, etc.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 172Potential of ICT in the field of informing and education for citizens on possible situations and preparation for thoseis certainly not directing towards panic propagation; instead, its goal is to introduce the citizens to all elements thatcould contribute to their own security. Numerous forms of communication and information transfer are currentlyavailable for everyone.Hardware prices had decreased in such an amount that even the poorest segments of society have cellular phonesand computers. A comprehensive action to introduce the citizens with significance of timely acquisition ofinformation for survival of their family and loved ones may be a good motive to engage the majority of population.Educative material may be distributed to all families in an appropriate multimedia form: CD or DVD. It is alsopossible to publish presentations on website and deliver its web address via an appropriate leaflet, thus simplifyingthe information distribution process.Use of ICT enables, in addition to continuous collection of information on the transport of dangerous goods,appropriate decision-making for disaster management, as well as the possibility of education and training based onthe simulation of various emergency situations. These activities are implemented using algorithms in the field ofartificial intelligence, using the built-in knowledge base and database, as well as information about the disaster fromthe past.The third part of this paper indicates that there is an option to almost instantly be informed on any accident, scopeand type of contamination. For the information to be useful, a system must exist to timely react on receiving theinformation from the field. The informing an alarming system may also be efficient with use of electronic media.However, we believe that the option to create the network consisting of all cellular phones in the affected territorywas not elaborated enough, which would inform everyone on necessary activities in real time setting.Of course, implementation of this type of project has a prerequisite in strong institutional foundation with clearlydefined strategy, both in national and local level. Existence of a permanent monitoring of potentially risky areas andterritories with early warning system is a prerequisite. A readiness must exist, but accompanied with the capabilityto apply knowledge and innovations in establishing a flexible system for the efficient response in accident situationon all levels. Such a response is possible in the situation of mass accidents only if all potential actors are preparedfor the conditions they might encounter.In the field of roads used for dangerous goods transport, it is necessary to establish a special education program forthe urban planners and designers, so their attention is brought towards the significance of standard application indesigning new streets and buildings under their jurisdiction. Communal inspection offices must also be informedabout their role in norms enforcing, to ensure that the field situation is in line with the office-designed one. Finally,the citizens must know which steps they should take on the first indication of danger, before obtaining detailedinstructions to be forwarded after the full scale of that event is surveyed.The most appropriate system for awareness building for citizens on significance of noted procedures is the systemof education. Later on, via the local government institutions, participation of all citizens in basic forms of educationshould be assured, in order to enable them to independently monitor all changes published by the authorizedinstitutions.It is important to nurture the trust in system and people managing it, so that citizens would act as recommended inany given crisis situation. Direct communication between the citizens, local government and authorized stateinstitution should flow via the persons professionally trained for work in the field and having certain qualitiesgaining citizens’ confidence.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 173CONCLUSIONAvailability of reaction plans for the accident situation in inhabited areas surrounding traffic routes used fordangerous goods transport is not satisfactory. General public is almost totally ignorant on procedures, what shouldbe done and in which manner if such conditions are to occur.When the accident situations plan are designed for the events of breakdowns in the area around traffic routes, allprevious experiences from situations should be taken into account. The practice had shown that dangerous goodstransport can potentially cause a great devastation and injuries of citizens nearby roads used for such purposes.Besides the waterways, road and railway traffic routes, risk estimation should also include processing of oil and gaspipelines.ICT offers a great potential in subject field. Starting from model development for the event rollout projection andproduced plans evaluation, down to the procedures for citizens in actual situations. Modern communication systemsprovide monitoring of risky transports, instant acquisition of parameters and swift reaction if the need should occur.An efficient system also covers preparation of citizens for the appropriate reaction, in line with the field situation.The modern media provide endless possibilities, starting from informing via radio and TV broadcasts, down to theeducative materials which may be distributed via Internet or DVD/CD to every address.The intention of the author of this paper is to demonstrate how ICT, in addition to continuous collection ofinformation on the transport of hazardous materials and proper management of emergency situations, can be usedfor education and training based on the simulation of various emergency situations.Failure to take measures in the field of planning and preparation of citizens for crisis situations which might be theconsequence of traffic accidents in dangerous goods transport is a direct breach of the Law on EmergencySituations. The Law on Emergency Situations prescribes obligations for state and other organs and organizationsregarding the situations that may be viewed in this field, as defined by the Law. The Article 3 Point 2 of this Law,among the other tasks, stipulates: protection, being a set of preventive measures directed towards communityresilience strengthening, remedying possible endangerment causes, decrease of natural disasters influence,prevention of other accidence and if such should occur, alleviating their consequences; The same article, Point 8stipulates: organizing and empowering citizens for personal, mutual and collective protection.Defining the prerequisite of public disclosure, the Law prescribes that the data on hazards and acting of stateinstitutions, province institutions, local government, and other protection and rescue institutions operation shall bepublic. The state administration organs, province organs, and local government organs must assure that the citizensdwelling in the area which may be affected by natural or other disaster are informed on danger. 1Presently, the only thing available to the average citizen of the Republic of Serbia is prescribed as obligatory aregeneral recommendations on acting in disaster events, published on the website of the Ministry of the InternalAffairs 2 .In comparison with other state organs, this is indeed commendable; however, the plans for acting in crisis situationsshould urgently being developed, covering all possible scenarios for hazard zones with subsequent presentation tothe citizens potentially endangered by actual crisis situations.1 Law of emergency situations of the Republic of Serbia, available at:http://www.mup.sr.gov.yu/cms/resursi.nsf/Zakon%20o%20vanrednim%20situacijama.pdf (25th March 2010.).2 Ministry of the Internal Affairs, sector for the protection and recovery:http://prezentacije.mup.gov.rs/sektorzazastituispasavanje/saveti.html (25th March 2010.).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 174BIBLIOGRAFY1. Batarliene N. (2006): "Location and control of cargo and vehicles with new technologies"; Transport andTelecommunication, Vol 7, No 12. Canada: Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Portfolio: http://www.tc.gc.ca3. Fisichela M., Targon V., Pandolfi A. (2006): The framework for dangerous goods tracking andmanagement – The Integrated Information System; 5 th Prague, AED Conference.4. Law of emergency situations of the Republic of Serbia, available at:5. Economic security, covering basic income earned by the “productive and lucrative work”;http://www.mup.sr.gov.yu/cms/resursi.nsf/Zakon%20o%20vanrednim%20situacijama.pdf6. Ministry of the Internal Affairs, sector for the protection and recovery:http://prezentacije.mup.gov.rs/sektorzazastituispasavanje/saveti.html7. Russo F., Vitetta A., Rindone C., Delfino G., Quattrone A. (2008): ITS for monitoring and estimating roadaccident probability for dangerous goods transport; Association for European Transport and Contributors.8. Simo Pasi (2008): Statistics in focus 66/2008. EUROSTAT, Luxembourg.9. UNDP (1994): Human Development Report. Oxford University Press, New York – Oxford.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 175UDK:656.073.436:620.26007.528.9].004007:912]:004THE MODERN ARCHITECTURE OF GIS AND CARTOGRAPHIC KEY AT THE ENVIRONMENT OFWEB MAP SERVER FOR DETERMINATION SAFETY ROUTS IN TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUSSUBSTANCIES1 Mirko Borisov, 1 Radoje Bankovic, 1 Sinisa Drobnjak, 2 Milos Jelic, 2 Tomislav Jovanovic, 3 Snezana Urosevic1 Ministry of defence, Military Geographical Institute, 5 Mije Kovacevica Street, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia2 ”Kirilo Savic” Institute, 51 vojvode Stepe Street, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia3 ”Serbian Railways”, 6/IV Nemanjina Street, 11000 Belgrade, SerbiaAbstract: Appliance of computer technology in area of GIS and digital cartography lead to creating and developingnew solutions in that science disciplines. Creating of the digital cartographic key and the new architecture in theGIS are very important. This paper, as part of technological development project realization (number TR 21037),describes appliance of the new architecture in GIS and digital cartographic key on the Web Map Serverenvironment for determination safety routes in transport of hazardous substances. All of that available to use newsoftware environment and solutions with more aspect, as: multi-viewing, accommodation to multi functional andmulti-user data accesses.Key words: hazardous substances, transport, safety routs, digital cartography, cartographic key, architecture of GIS,Web Map Server.INTRODUCTIONDevelopment of new, particularly Internet technology create in general conditions for a completely differentmanagement and distribution of geospatial data. In the “background” of digital maps, as well as the end product ofdigital cartography, is the whole system of procedures and equipment, which together form a whole -geoinformation system (GIS). Modern architecture is a GIS layer structure, and geospatial data (geometric andalphanumeric) are integrated and form the core of the system - the database.The advantages of this approach are multiple: all data is stored in one place (which means no redundancy data), datacan be accessed by multiple users at the same time (multi-user mode), easier to manage large amounts of data, fasterupdating of content, facilitate exchange of information between users and institutions, greater efficiency in workand so on.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 176Middle class modern architecture of GIS services make the “connection” between the database and clientapplications. Client applications access the services (in this case is the WMS Web Map Service), and sends therequest for specific content (HTTP - Hyper Text Transfer Protocol, request), and service response (HTTP response)returns a digital image or map. Server accesses the database and retrieves the necessary information, and candownload data from another server available.In this way, we can very quickly get a digital cartographic display, as a combination of strata (layers) for which dataare sorted based on common attributes and are topics that can be displayed separately or can be combine (overlap).This view of cartography is of particular importance in the field of transport and processing of hazardous wastefrom the boats (and dangerous goods in general), which may be accompanied by the occasional accidental situationswith significant consequences for the environment and human health. One of the key tasks in the project oftechnological development 1 was devoted to the construction of modern architecture in the environment of GIS WebMap Server, for the purpose of routing the optimal route for the transport of dangerous goods from exploitation ofvessels, reducing risk to the population and the environment and minimizing the possible consequencesextraordinary events.SPATIAL DATA SETSIn the first phase of this project were carried out research in field of digitalization of geodatabase with the industrialand infrastructure macromaterial (in inventory of the European Union) for purpose of building an informationsystem for monitoring activities in the process of ship hazardous waste streams in real space and time in normal andaccident conditions 2 .For this reason, the this GIS project integrated a complex set of spatial databases, which with a variety of data onwaste from the operation of ships and facilities on the river, the terminal for the reception of waste transfer stationsfor driving waste, recycling centres, composting, temporary storage and deposition in the coastal zone of rivers, isthe basis for modern and standardized way of monitoring and reaction to possible accident situation. Also, designedGIS allow forecasting and prevention of many special events with ferry and other hazardous waste materials.Realization of these GIS functions and management accident situations in real space and time required thedevelopment of appropriate digitized map of space. High quality three-dimensional analysis space is unimaginablewithout the data contained in digital terrain models. They are the basis, primarily for visualization of threedimensionalspace, animation space in monitoring the dynamics of certain phenomena (e.g., assessment of possibleareas affected by chemical accidents with hazardous waste on the river ferry, which transports the road or thelocation of industrial plants for processing this type of waste), velocity of propagation of the contaminated cloud,surface leaked out hazardous liquids, deep layers of contaminated soil and water courses, surface threatenresidential areas and so on.By using the GIS platform can be at any time to determine where there are some physical objects (ships, oil slick,ports, rail tank car and a hazardous waste, sensitive facilities (water supply, schools, hospitals, and residentialbuildings), industrial plant for the treatment of hazardous waste etc.). For the realization of the demands are madesketches, maps, plans, maps, and so on, and the three basic sets of spatial database: a set of raster, vector set and aset of digital terrain models.Application of raster spatial data setsApplication of raster spatial data sets associated with all of those areas in which the primary search of informationabout space. This data set is structured. It is their basic characteristics, but also disadvantages.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 177Many times users want to use a raster data set as traditional (analog) charts, but this time using a computer or wantto develop some of its specific GIS applications. In the course of the project of technological development 1 used asophisticated method of raster data sets for control and monitoring of dangerous goods transport ships, road and railvehicles, in conjunction with global positioning devices (GPS), which is reduced to the following specific areas ofapplication :computer supported chartometric (coordinates of the position sensing, measuring length, angles, etc...);computer-supported monitoring of transportation funding and support for their movement (as base maps fornavigation systems rolling stock of all forms of transport);development of GIS applications for environmental protection from possible accidents during transport andhandling of hazardous materials in industrial plants and others.We use technology of digital aerofoto products (DOF), which is supplied on the basis of satellite or aerial images, inorder of quality and time-optimal spatial updates on a particular vector set.Application of vector spatial data setsThe specific tools developed within the GIS software, contributing to the procedures of search and analysis as muchcloser to users. In this way the user can create queries within a single theme (which is where the industrial facilityfor the treatment of ship waste), or make inquiries by overlapping several topics (such as buildings has a largeadministrative) use network analysis capabilities (e.g. the shortest route between terminals Shipping handling ofhazardous waste and its processing plant or landfill disposal).The results of such analysis can be presented in graphical or textual form. Also, the application of network analysiscapabilities and data in vector format with databases can be obtained from the analysis of the shortest path betweentwo points, which is of great importance in the field of traffic safety in the transport of dangerous goods. On Figure1 gives an example of determining the shortest path between the terminals for the reception of ship wastes and theirprocessing facility in the coastal zone of the Danube 2 .Figure 1: Determination of the shortest path using the data in vector format 2 .

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 178The project is a vector data set used for the preparation of papers and maps:transportation infrastructure that will be transported waste to final destination;network of entrepreneurs that will take waste from ships and transported to processing facilities;variable hazard along roads in the event of accident,sensitive facilities, and especially of vulnerable groups and so on.However, from the standpoint of protecting the civilian population, sensitive buildings and protected natural andcultural heritage, it is desirable to define the optimal (not necessarily the shortest) route for the transport ofhazardous wastes and other hazardous substances. For this purpose, use and requirements of the relevant regulationsrelated to the appreciation of the prescribed protective distance of the selected route of sensitive facilities andconservation values.Application of the protective distance of the optimal route selectionCompanies that produce, process, store and transport hazardous materials, have an obligation to undertake a seriesof measures which include: adjusting the EU directives in the field of environmental protection as well as ofinternational industrial and branch associations, making risk assessments and plan care to chemical accidents;respect Regulation of protective distances; standardizing enterprise management and environmental risk (byintroducing a series of ISO standards ISO 14000 or EMAS 2) minimization and a rigorous control of transportationof hazardous materials and waste and so on. In Figure 2 are shown a way of calculation and choice of optimal routesfor the safe transport of dangerous goods, with the prescribed safety distance (according to the example of “goodpractice” from Sweden) 3 .Figure 2: Individual risk in transportation of dangerous goods and protective distance that should be taken intoaccount when transportation hazardous substances 3 .

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 179In the diagram in Figure 2 are shown in the prescribed safety distance route of facilities for the safe conduct of thetransport of dangerous goods.For the analysis of individual risk in the city Getenburgu (Sweden) were used two methods.Specified distance can be applied with some modifications to other cities:50 m: for the work zone, communication centres (railway stations, etc.);100 m: for residences, hotels, shopping malls and smaller assembly halls and200 m: for schools, sports arenas, large assembly hall and the hall.In some cases, can be applied to short distance with the required preventive measures and appropriate risk analysis,which shows that made the risk acceptable. Determination of distances based on the calculation of individual risk byusing two methods, CPR18E and CPQRA.Risk management at the city level can be achieved by developing a plan of protection against chemical accidents,resulting in the transport of dangerous goods.The problem of dealing with hazardous waste from generation vessels resolved through elaborate procedures forhandling hazardous waste as well as special programs inception, making this hazardous waste management at thestate level.DIGITAL SPATIAL MAPSMany of the benefits of information technologies of developed countries are taking advantage of the promotion andavailability of digital spatial data of the territory of their country. Therefore, there is obvious necessity for using GIStechnology to deal with the distributed spatial data.Formation of geospatial databaseThe central part of every information system is database. In Figure 3, are represented concept and purpose ofgeospatial database.Figure 3: The concept and purpose of geospatial data bases

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 180Principle of a GIS project chronological looks as follows:acquisition (gathering) of geospatial data,input data,storage,data analysis,presentation and visualization of data,distribution of data.Formation of geospatial database is a prerequisite for the successful use of spatial data in digital form, and the basisfor the development of GIS. As the problem of distribution of spatial data in digital form is a relatively new area,there is a need for new regulations (standards) for easier distribution of data through a computer network anddistribution of data in certain media.The place and role of digital cartography is largely covered through presentation and visualization of geospatialdata, while the most important functions of GIS are analysis of geospatial data and providing answers to variousqueries. The data in database are tabular structure defined by the language for definition of data that is known asData Definition Language (DDL). An example of defining a table looks like:create table object:(number number (3) not null,area number (6) not null,topology number (3) not null,geometry mdsys.sdo_geometry not null,constraint object_pk primary key (number)).In the above example is shown the table object with the following columns: number, which will be represented bythe character "number" of length 6, area, which will be represented by the character "number" of length 6, topology,which will be represented by the character "number" of length 3 and geometry, which will be described withmdsys.sdo_geometry structure that provides a description of geometry (point, line and surface). Language formanipulation of databases is SQL (Structured Query Language) which consists of four parts, namely:DDL (Data Definition Language) is used to create and update the structure of objects within a database, forexample: CREATE, ALTER, DROP construction;DML (Data Manipulation Language) which is used to store, modify, delete and update data within adatabase. For example: SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT construction;DCL (Data Control Language) is used to create rules for controlling database access with purpose ofpreserving its integrity, that is: GRANT, REVOKE construction;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 181TCL (Transactional Control Language) is used to manage various transactions that occur within a database.For example: COMMIT, SAVE POINT, ROLLBACK.The primary key is a field in a table, which controls connections with other tables and prevents the recurrence ofidentical data in the tables. Table 1 "Object" is at the base after the execution of written orders, but it has no data,but only defined columns. After we used command "insert" table will be filled by the appropriate data.Table 1:Table formnumber surface Topology geometryWhen we talk about relational databases, term relation refers to a table, a table rows represents n-tuples, andcolumns of a table represents attributes. An example of the instruction for entering data into appropriate columns is:insert into objects values(6,120,25,sdo_geometry (2003, null, null,sdo_elem_info_array (1,1003,1),sdo_ordinate_array (6600964.53,4700467.28, 6600993.96,4700467.28,6600993.96,4700451.46, 6600964.53,4700451.46, 6600964.53,4700467.28))).In the Table 2 after the execution of this instruction will be found the following information:Table 2:Data od areas surface, topology and geometrynumber surface Topology geometry6 120 25 SDO_GEOMETRYIf you want to single out from one or more tables of data a group of data, there is possibility to create, so called,views under spatial data (view). Moreover, if you want to display objects, but only those which are, for example,built-up areas, such a view would have the following structure:create or replace view NASELJENA_MESTA(number, topology, geometry)Asselect a.broj, a.topology, a.geometryfrom building awhere a.topology = 25with read only.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 182Hence, it is necessary to define or replace the definition (if view with that name already exists in the database) ofviews NASELJENA_MESTA which will have columns (number, topology, geometry) so that they will be taken asan existing table column object, provided that the code topology is equal to the number of 25.Middle layer - ServerThe primary function of the middle layer is to receive a request from the client, then the execution of certainfunctions which are generated by the request of a client, creating and sending a "response" to a client (in this case itwould be a map).Depending on whether the client sent a request for static or dynamic content, services will either access a databaseor will return already prepared (static) page as response to a client.If the required content is dynamical, on the server must be programs whose execution would be generated by thecontent of the communication service to a database. These programs that are executed on the server are calledservlets and written mainly in Java code.When you use the word Web, first of all it is reference to three major, separate standards and tools based on:language for marking hypertext (known as HyperText Markup Language, HTML), protocol for transferringhypertext (known as HyperText Transfer Protocol, HTTP) and packet of network protocol TCP/IP.For structuring and displaying data in a Web search engine, the most appropriate is HTML. Network protocolTCP/IP transfers data between applications on the Internet. Moreover, HTTP is a component that connects all layersin the GIS three-layer architecture, and works as follows: a client web browser sends a request to a Web server forspecific resource, and a Web server then sends to the browser a response.Response to HTTP resource transfers required - HTML document, image or output of a program - back to the Webbrowser as a "useful load".Web services operate on the principle of "Publish - Find - Bind," which means that there is a registry service, inwhich all publicly available service publishes its resources.The client firstly checks the existence of the required services in the directory service, and then sends the request toa provider, according to their needs. In Figure 4 is shown the scheme of the model P-F-B. In the web services are:WMS - Web Map Service,WFS - Web Feature Service,WCS - Web Coverage Service andCSW - Catalog Service for Web.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 183Figure 4. Model P-F-BWeb Map Service is the OGC web service that provides data in a format of geographic maps. Instance of thisservice is called MapServer. This service is available through HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) clients on theInternet. HTTP generally supports two types of requests: GET and POST. One or both of the requests can beforwarded to the WMS, where the support is required for the GET method, while the support for the POST methodis optional. When specifications URL (Uniform Resource Locator) address to access the WMS, it is reservedseveral characters defined by international standard, whose meaning is shown in Table 3.Tabela 3. The meaning of certain charactersCharactersThe Meaning? Marks the beginning of questionable string&Separator between parameters in questionable string= Separator between name and value parametersSeparator between individual values in list-oriented parameters (such as the BBOX, LAYERS and’STYLES in the Get Map request)+ Character for the "space" characterThe request which is to be sent to a server defines the parameters. Each parameter must be defined by the titlesetting, and each parameter can have one or more allowed values. If you use the POST method, then the serverreturns an XML (Extensible Markup Language) document. The content and structure of the required syntax isshown in Table 4:Table 4. The content and structure of the syntax requiredURL Componentshttp://host[:port]/path[?{name[=value]&}]name=value&DescriptionURL prefix. [] Means 0 or 1 case of optional part;{} Means 0 or more casesThe request parameter names and values

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 184WMS service allows dynamic construction of digital maps as images or as a series of graphic elements or as a set ofgeographic objects, and rendering of geospatial data. It also provides answers to basic queries about the contents ofdigital maps. In addition, WMS service provides information about maps that can be generated at the same timewhich of the cards can be made further inquiries.In the WMS are defined three basic operations: GetCapabilities, GetMap, and GetFeatureInfo, with the last optionalcharacter. These operations are: - supplied metadata of services, available layers, supported output formats, availabilityof the styles, and so on; - allows the user to retrieve a map with certain definition of:o Areas of interest,o Spatial reference system (SRS),o The size of maps,o Layers to show,o Style to display layers,o Color display,o A way of informing the user about the error,o - an optional procedure that allows obtaining additional information about the geoobjects.In addition to basic operations, there are several optional operations DescribeLayer, GetLegenGraphic,GetLegedURL. GetCapabilities request parameters. They are shown in Table 5:Table 5. Optional operations and the required parametersThe required parameter Required/Optional DescriptionVERSION=version Optional Request versionSERVICE=WMS Required Type of serviceREQUEST=GetCapabilities Obavezan Name of applicantFORMAT=MIME_Type Opcionalan Output format metadataUPDATESEQUENCE=String Opcionalan A series of numbers or strings to "cache controThe client can send requests to multiple map servers, and obtained maps can be combined according to their needs.An example of a combination of several maps is shown in Figure 5.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 185Figure 5. Using maps from multiple serversResponse to the request is an XML document containing service metadata specified in XMLschema. Schema defines mandatory and optional metadata content and format of the content. When required, URL indicates which information will be displayed on the map, which part of the Earth will be shownin any coordinate system and the output format. The process of creating maps is shown in Figure 6.DisplayFormat of picturePicture : GIF, PNGDispleycharacteristicConvertingpicturePictureconstraintRenderingWMSelements for displayRaster/ VektordescriptionRules andstylesQueries andconstraintsGeneratorfordisplayingelementsWFS /FilteriWMSFigurgeo-objectsWFSData sourceOpenGisspecificationsfor geo-objektsFigure 6. The process of creating digital maps

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 186Creation of digital maps requires two basic components: geospatial data and specifications for portraiture -portrayal. "Portrayal" is the process of transforming geographic data into a form that is understandable to people. Itsupports different rules for rendering. Specifications for portraying define how data will be displayed on the digitaldisplay.Geo-objects (features) are selected from a set of data (data source) by using queries and constraints (queryconstraints). The elements for displaying geo-objects are generated using styles (styles) and rules for displaying(rules). Followed by a graphic representation of the content and rendering, met with limitations related to modus fordisplaying a map.There is possibility to use existing styles which are in the WMS for displaying the geo-objects, but it is possible tocreate your own style by the client using the SLD (Styled Layer Descriptor) XML-based language for definingstyles. Output image formats are mostly: PNG, GIF or JPEG. An example of URL with the request :http://a-map-co.com/mapserver.cgi?VERSION=1.3.0&REQUEST=GetMap &CRS = CRS: 84 & BBOX =- 97.105,24.913, -78.794,36.358 &WIDTH = 560 & HEIGHT = 350 & LAYERS = AVHRR-09-27 & styles = &FORMAT = image / jpeg & Exceptions = INIMAGEWeb Feature Service is a web service that enables the delivery of geo-spatial objects from the Internet, includingthe definition of their structure, the creation of thematic content for a particular geometry and management of thecontent of the layers.Feature (geo-object) can be defined as real-world entity or event. Feature Type defines the structure of the geoobject.It is defined by a set of attributes that have the name and type. Attributes can be numbers, strings, dates,geometries of the geo-locate objects on Earth and other geo-objects. WFS are a service interface that describes themanipulation of data on geo-objects. Operations data include the following features: adding, deleting, updating,procurement and query performance.They are performed to geo-objects by using HTTP and platforms of distributed information system. Therefore,WFS supports the direct exploitation and access to the Web, unlike that of WMS data submitted in the form ofimages. The request that client sends WFS, follows the following phases:the client application requires the WFS "capabilities" document. That document contains a description of allthe resources that are supported in the WFS as a list of all types of geo-objects that can perform theoperation;client may (optionally) to send a request to WFS for a detailed description of one or more geo-objects ortypes of elements that are within the resource provider;based on the definition of geo-object type, received in response to the previous two demands and availableresources of the service, the client application sends a specific request WFS;the request was forwarded to the web server;WFS receives and processes the request;

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 187after processing, generates and sends a response to a client.WFS service supports the following operations:ooooo provides metadata about services, available types of geo-objects and operationsthat may be made of them; describes the structure of the types of geo-objects: APPLICATION GMLschema type of geo-objects; allows users to retrieve geo-object through the specification of attributes andconstraints defined through spatial or alphanumeric query using the OGC Filter Language; allows locking of one or more types of geo-objects in order to carry outtransactions; allows creating, updating and deletion of geo-objects. It service transaction requests.Transaction requests are composed of operations that modify the geo-objects in the database: insert, update, delete.Example URL for the request http://www.someserver.com/wfs.cgi?SERVICE = WFS &VERSION = 1.1.0 &REQUEST = DescribeFeatureType &TYPENAME = TreesA_1MOGC Filters allows you to define spatial and alphanumeric queries. Composed of terms thatsupport the following operations:arithmetic (+, -, *, /),comparison operations (, = ...),logical (AND, OR ...),Space (BBOX; within; INTERSECT ...),feature ID.When is required by the WMS users, it takes the appropriate layers in the WFS and thus is obtained as aset of map layers. The client application can directly access the WFS with the request for specific content. WFSworks mainly with vector data types (point, line, polygon). In Figure 7. is shown overview of the schematicapproach of the WFS or WMS application:APPLICATIONWFSLAYERSWMSMap as group oflayersGMLGEOSPATIALDATABASEFigure 7. Access to WFS

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 188Web Coverage Service supports the electronic exchange of geospatial data in the form of "coverage", which isdefined as a digital geospatial information, which is a phenomenon that varies in space and refers to the surfaceappearance of raster type.WCS service provides access to alternate (without rendering) geospatial information, such as (temperature, cloudcoverage, ...) necessary for rendering on a client side, and as input for various scientific models. As well as WMSand WFS, WCS allows the user to choose the piece of information using queries."Coverage" is a layer of data that is not in the maps obtained in response to a request . These are objectsthat point to one or more attribute values related to a location within the space-time domain and that the request canobtain and overlap with the basic content of the map.Coverage Portrayal Service (CPS) is a link between WMS client and WCS services, using SLD. Link CPS isintegrated within the architecture of OGC implementation of two standard interfaces: Interface WMS and WCSinterface. In Figure 2.9 is shown the connection between CPS-WMS-WCS:.Service WCS publishes layer that contains information about a specific location,The client finds the published layers and wants to see them in graphical form in order to perform furtheranalysis,Client Access to CPS in order to find out whether it is possible to visualize objects of layers which arefolded with maps with familiar conten,Client forms SLD raster descriptor to perform channel selection and marking colors RGB,The client formulates a request which includes WMS and specifications related to the (raster descriptor,HEIGHT, WIDTH, BBOX, SRS);WMS client issues a request to the CPS,Link CPS accepts WMS the request from the client, provides the SLD if necessary and formulate a WCSrequest for data based on specifications given within SLD,Service WCS returns required "coverage" to CPS that searches data in the requested BBOX and SRS, usingother SLD specifications and returns the image to the client,Services have default styles for displaying geospatial object. To define more specific ways for viewingcontent and definition of new styles of display is used the SLD.A typical service chain, where CPS supplies a "coverage" from a variety of WCS as a result of the operation"portray" gets rendered image (Figure 8.):

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 189WCSReprojection fromone coordinatesystem to anotherto clientWCSPortrayalServiceReprojectionServiceOverlayWFSWCSReturns layer with vectordata in the required spatialframeworkFigure 8. A typical service chain, where CPS supplies a "coverage" from a variety of WCSThe Web Coverage (WCS) Service provides these three operations:• operation returns an XML document describing the service and brief descriptions of thedata collections from which clients may request coverage;• operation lets clients request a full description of one or more coverage served by aparticular WCS server. The server responds with an XML document that fully describes the identifiedcoverage;• operation is normally run after GetCapabilities and DescribeCoverage operation responseshave shown what requests are allowed and what data are available. The GetCoverage operation returns acoverage (that is, values or properties of a set of geographic locations), encoded in a well-known coverageformat.GeoServer is an “Open Source“ software engine written in java which supports OGC (Open GIS Consortium)standards and specification. (Figure 9).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 190Figure 9. GeoServer functionGeoServer has possibility publishing data from different sources. His interface offers possibility of creating newfeature types in geodatabase based on existing data. Feature types are created on way that they present differentthematic layers.Feature types contain data from table or view which is made inside geodatabase. GeoServer also supportpresentation of geometrical content of feature types and inside them there are possibility of rendering (visualizationgeometrical content) and data can be exported in few different formats (Figure 10.):Figure 10. GeoServer Export formatsSoftware solution ESRI Company also represents completely new approach in process of creating geospatial dataand it has compatibility with other solutions. Completely ArcGIS architecture (network organization, client/servertype) consists of:ArcMap, application for data visualization,ArcCatalog, application for data organization andArcToolbox, application for data processing.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 191Completely architecture of ArcGIS products is shown on Figure 11.Client layerFigure 11. ArcGIS architectureClient layer represent collection of independent applications which communicate with server requesting somespatially or no spatially content, which are generated on server layer based on communication with databases,subsequently manipulate with that data agreeable with itself needs and objectives.When a client application requests the use of a particular service, the server generates a response and returns it tothe client application. The server can be configured to handle a number of simultaneous requests and can orchestratehow it responds efficiently to respond to those requests.Client applications are Web, mobile, and desktop applications that connect over HyperText Transfer Protocol(HTTP) to Internet services or to local services over a LAN or WAN.Client application in tree-layered architecture model is not only application, often it is Web explorer. Web explorerarranges and presents HTML resources, sending HTTP requests for resources and processing HTTP response.Tree-layered architecture model means that we needn’t make, install or adjust client application.Every visitor with Web explorer can use Web application which read data from database without installationauxiliary software, without using specific operating system or determined hardware platform. It means thatapplication can service planery, geography different positioned users. Examples of these applications are: GoogleEarth, MGI etc (Figure 12).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 192Figure 12. Google Earth applicationCONCLUSIONDescribed architecture of GIS system based on Web service using, enables users to access spatial data in any timeand from different locations. Access recommendations by OpenGIS consortium have many advantages anddisadvantages. There are some advantages:because of exceptional flexibility these access has unlimited appliance area,Internet technology make these systems accessibly for all locations on World,using of MapServer which return raster maps in some of standard formats and slim HTML client whichillustrate them, make these approach platform independent.Some disadvantages are:generation, rendering and presentation raster maps demanding fast internet connections and flow rateandrecommended and presented systems are open system with internet access and for that reason we takeinto account safety and security.To establish a unified GIS, we must apply the principle by which the data once collected can be used many times inmany other areas (administrative, economic, scientific, military, cultural, etc.). This principle does not apply only tothe rationalization, but also the uniqueness and quality of study common geospace.On example project TR 21.037 has been demonstrate that this technology may well be applied to create digital mapswith optimal routes for the transportation of hazardous waste from the operation of vessels (and all other dangeroussubstances) road and rail infrastructure, with a reduced risk the population and the environment.Remark: Paper is realized within the scope of project TR–21037: “Development of integrated ship wastemanagement model on waterway corridors of Republic Serbia”, sponsored by Ministry of science and technologicaldevelopment of Republic Serbia, 2008-2010.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 193BIBLIOGRAFY1. Vukić, M. and alt.: Project of technological development TR – 21037 «Development of integrated ship wastemanagement model on waterway corridors of Republic Serbia», «Kirilo Savić» Institute a.d., Belgrade, 2008-20102. Radoje Banković, Mirko Borisov, Zora Đorđević, Jelena Popić, Saša Kostić, Miodrag Mandušić: Digitalizovanemape prostora u sistemu upravljanja hemijskim udesima (Digitalized Map Sheets in Chemical Accident EmergencyManagement System), The second International Symposium „Environment Protection in Industrial Areas“,Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia, 28-29 April 2009, 489 – 4953. Jönsson Daniel: Proposal of a new route for dangerous goods in the city of Helsingborg – A comparison betweenthree methods for risk analysis, «Master of Science in Risk Management and Safety Engineering at LundUniversity, Sweden, Executive Summaries of the Master's thesis», October 2004, Department of Fire SafetyEngineering Lund University, Report 7022, Lund 2004; Copyright- Brandteknik, Lunds Universitet, Box 118,22100 Lund, pages 81-844. ESRI: Using Arc Map, User Guide, Redlands, USA, 2002.5. Banković, R.: Radni materijali-disertacija, Vojna akademija, Beograd, 2010.6. Borisov, M.: Razvoj GIS, Monografija, Zadužbina Andrejević, Beograd, 20067. Drobnjak, S.: Radni materijali-disertacija, Gradjevinski fakultet, Beograd, 20108. Hiroshi Murakami: New Legislation on NSDI in Japan-Basic Act on the Advancement of Utilizing GeospatialInformation, Bulletin of the Geographical Survey Institute, Vol. 55, Japan, 2008, pp. 1-10.9. http://www.cartographic.com/topographic_maps.asp10. http://www.esri.com/news/arcnews/summer07articles/siemens-esri-team.html11. Open GIS Consortium, Inc., http://www.opengis.org12. Tošić, D.: Jezici za obeležavanje XML, Matematički fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 200613. Ulrich, V.: GIS-smernice, Beograd, 200714. Nedić, J.: Prezentacija lokalnih geopodataka u okruženju virtuelnih atlasa bazirana na upotrebi namenskih XMLdokumenata, 200815. Marija Vukić, Vladanka Presburger - Ulniković, Snežana Urošević, Uroš Spruk: Integrisani model i Sledatinformacioni sistem za upravljanje multimodalnim transportom opasnih materija i međuresornu koordinaciju uvanrednim situacijama (Integrated model and information system for management of hazardous substancesmultimodal transport and interdepartmental coordination in emergency situations), A plenary lecture on invitation,Second International Scientific Conference „Transport of Dangerous Goods and Risk Management – TOMUR 10“,Proceedings, Belgrade, Serbia, 30-31 March 2010, pages 1-4

UDK:614.878.084TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 194THE USE OF GIS TECHNOLOGY IN MONITORING OF TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUSSUBSTANCESDragoljub Sekulovic, Nenad Dimitrijevic, Ljubomir GigovicMilitary Academy, 33 Pavle Jurisic Šturm Street, 11000 Belgrade, SerbiaAbstract: Support to civil authorities and the population in case of natural disasters and catastrophes is the third taskwhich is defined within the basic missions and objectives of the Army of Serbia (AS). For that purpose, theinvolvement of AS is also connected with possible chemical accidents and failures in transport of dangerous goodsand correcting their effects on the population. In this complex area which as an ultimate goal has swift, completeand effective action in preventing and neutralization consequences of contamination of dangerous goods duringtransport, implementation of modern GIS systems and technologies represent an indispensable part. The advantagesof using GIS technology can be identified through: fast and reliable delivery of data on a potential accident siteusing a global positioning system (GPS), rapid assessment of the effects of actions of contaminants, combinatingmathematical models within GIS environments and software packages "HeSPRO” and by informing the subjectsabout the data that are necessary for timely response on all levels and coordination of their actions using the GPRScommunicating system.Key words: GIS, technologies, monitoring, transport, dangerous goodsINTRODUCTIONThe twentieth century was the century of development of chemical industry and energy. The existence of a largenumber of plants for the production of different raw materials and products whose operation is based on the use ofhazardous (highly toxic) chemical substances poses a serious threat to life on a broader geographic space, withunforeseeable consequences. As chemical substances are by their own nature more aggressive compared to a humanand the environment, each of their uncontrolled release can lead to unforeseeable consequences and disasters. Bychemical contamination of air, water and soil the basic resources are threatened and the ecological balance isdisturbed on earth as a whole or any of her parts. The risk of such accidents can be present while working and usingchemical industry facilities, buildings, facilities, equipment, installations and equipment and others. Apart fromthese, a large segment of the risk lies in the possibility that when moving a substance or a group of substances fromone location to another during transport a chemical accident occurs, and therefore lead to uncontrolled emissions oftoxic, flammable or explosive chemical substances. The probability of chemical accidents happening duringtransport of dangerous goods is not small, especially if the obsolescence of technological process in chemicalindustry plants and used up resources for preservation and protection of dangerous goods are taken into account.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 195On the other hand, our country is one of the transit countries, and therefore the traffic of dangerous goods isincreased in international road corridors.Chemical accidents occur suddenly and often in unpredictable places, and therefore the speed of action and the wayof engaging work teams is the most important fact in dealing with consequences of the accident. For a quick andeffective repair of consequences, timely and reliable data about the origin of a chemical accident and the assessmentof dynamics and the structure of development of the chemical situation within the region of events are required. Theresults of the assessment of the chemical situation are based on complex models which are implemented within theGIS technologies include many realistic phenomenon which follow the complex process of the creation and thedynamics of the accident. Those models must be supported by specially trained users and high resources ofcomputer technology and information technology. Therefore, relatively simple mathematical models are particularlysuitable, because in the short term they provide an approximate assessment of the chemical situation, on whichcertain measures of protection of the population, material resources and environment and be taken. From the aspectof monitoring transport of dangerous goods, examining the current state (coordination bodies at all levels), theengagement of various fixed and temporary structures, this represents a significant contribution to their moresuccessful engagement and more efficient implementation of set tasks.ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF GIS TECHNOLOGIESThere are three main ways in which it is possible to practically use the benefits offered by GIS technology inmonitoring the transport of dangerous goods:1. Monitoring of transport, this is achieved through regular monitoring of movement of vehicles that transporthazardous materials, continuous maintenance of connections, as well as the ability of determinating thecurrent location within a short time interval and a secure delivery of data on a potential accident site.2. Fast and reliable assessments of the effects of effects of contaminants combinating mathematical modelswithin GIS environment, simulating the movement of risk and forming conclusions on how to respondbased on made assessments.3. Increasing the operational and speed of response to the event right through the timely response of subjectsto accidents and the coordination of their actions.For these tasks to be really attainable, it is necessary to take a series of general steps through the formation ofcertain organs and define their tasks and activities:1. Establishment of a control center for monitoring the transport of dangerous goods. This is the basic andnecessary step given the fact that still there is no precisely defined responsibility of state bodies andagencies in responding to the accident, nor the existence of a central body which will be the holder of allactivities. The Center must be adequately equipped with IT and technically-qualified professional body forthe following activities:supervision and monitoring,assessment and analysis of accident,quick response to assess of the effects, andInforming all relevant departments and agencies, then coordination and harmonization of theiractions.2. Defining an adequate network of roads – routes for movement of vehicles that transport hazardous materialsby using the possibilities of GIS in GPRS technology with the support of adequate mathematical modelsand information.3. Developing and implementation of GIS system software package which function is the assessment andforecast of the chemical situation after a chemical accident.4. Production of complex multimedia database on the territory using the possibilities of GIS in itsimplementation in the appropriate GIS software. The database which is at center’s disposal should include:

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 196 review of all subjects response to the accident: the relevant institutions, bodies and agencies, theiractivities and possibilities of engagement; overview of Network-road routes for transport, their detailed analysis of the geomorphologiccharacteristics of soil and terrain along the routes which hazardous materials are being transported(configuration of relief, character of soil, covers with trees, proximity to populated places,population, sources of drinking water, etc.) and Register review of all hazardous substances that are transported, with the physical-chemicalcharacteristics.5. Equipping vehicles that transport hazardous materials with adequate digital devices for global positioningwith auxiliary equipment.6. Connecting all subjects of response to the accident mutual with the Control center, provision of adequatecommunicational GPRS network, as well as in informatical connections with a unique database from thecenter.SYSTEM FOR AUTOMATIC VEHICLE TRACKING (AVT)System for automatic vehicle tracking allows remote control over cars and a centralized management of rollingstock using GIS, mobile network (GPRS service) and the Internet. It represents a sophisticated modular system thatuses GPS and various radio communication systems for data transmission.Primary components of the GPS tracking system are (Figure 1):GPS receiver (the receiver), with a unit for power and data transfer;Communication device (modem), GSM modem, radio or satellite transmitter;Communication service for the subject system for transferring data GSM/GPRS, andControl Center with installed user software application, server and modem.The system provides detection, monitoring and communication from the base – the center with unlimited number ofvehicles which are used to transport hazardous materials. Location of the vehicle is determined using a GPSreceiver installed in the vehicle that provides data on height, speed and the direction of movement which allowsmonitoring and reporting on each unpredicted situation, in real time. The GPS unit, which is built in every vehicle,receives signals from satellites, precisely determines the location of the vehicle via mobile network operators (GSM– Global System for Mobile Communication), and submits data to the center for automatic vehicle tracking. Theequipment installed in the vehicle carries “alarm” signals and the precise position of the vehicle to the Controlcenter through communication network. The transfer of data between the Control center and the vehicle is manlycarried out through GSM mobile telephone network using a data channel and SMS/GPRS service. Also the driverwhile driving can identify the current position of his vehicle on the display of a laptop or a PDA device.The system for automatic vehicle tracking works in this way, the GPS receiver calculates (using triangulation) itslocation based on the data which in the given (programmed) time intervals, obtained from GPS satellite (for 2Dposition a “contact” with 3, and for 3D with 4 satellites is sufficient). Besides the correct position, the GPS receivercalculates a number of other parameters: speed, direction of movement, path, given length of the route distance to agiven destination, etc. When you want to transfer data about the position of the object, the control center, throughcommunication service, takes data from the communication device (modem) connected to a GPS receiver in amobile object. If the GPS is under power and if it “sees” satellites, the exact position and other information aredownloaded in real time.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 197Figure 1: Components of a system for automatic vehicle trackingIf that is not the case, and a connection is established through a communication service, the data can be downloadedfrom the “logo” (internal memory of a GPS device which, depending on the type of the device can memorize thelast 12.000 km of the object’s movement).Based on the developed system for automatic vehicle tracking the current location of the chemical accident isenabled, informing the center by which objective conditions of forecast evaluation of the danger of the chemicalaccident are created.MATHEMATICALLY MODELED ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WITH CHEMICALACCIDENTSIn accordance with the Regulation on the methodology for assessing risk of chemical accidents and environmentalpollution, with measures of preparation and measures for removing consequences, the Army of Serbia in 2004 hasdeveloped a mathematical model on assessing the situation of chemical accidents with the appropriate softwarepackage “HeSPRO” (Figure 2). The programme package “HeSPRO” originated with the efforts made to integratethe functions of evaluation and prediction of effects of hazardous substances, as during chemical accidents, as wellas the use of highly toxic substances. Its implementation into a unique GIS system of the Army is in progress.Using HeSPRO software for evaluation and prognosis of the chemical situation during a chemical accident, with theoccurrence of the primary or the secondary cloud, it is possible to determine:1. The depth of propagation of the primary and the secondary cloud,2. The surface area of propagation,3. Overview of the data on the map,4. The arrival time of the cloud on the given border,5. The duration of the chemical contamination,6. Estimate number of personnel in the focus of the accident,7. Estimate number of personnel in the zone of propagation of the cloud and8. Assessment of contamination of open water sources.The main document of the programme is the “situation”, and that term implies a set of input and output data thatdescribe the accident caused by dangerous substances. Creating a new situation, all values are erased r set to certaindefault values. When starting a new situation initially it opens a tool for determinating the parameters of theaccident (Figure 3).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 198Figure 2: The basic layout programme “HeSPRO”(1) Desktop, (2) determination of parameters of the accident, (3) place of the accident – the focus, (4)observed point, (5) zone and range of primary cloud, (6) zone and range of the secondary cloud, (7)summary report, (8) data about the observed point and the effects of the cloud on it, (9) data on themeteorological situation in the observed area, (10) meThe main document of the programme is the “situation”, and that term implies a set of input and output data thatdescribe the accident caused by dangerous substances. Creating a new situation, all values are erased r set to certaindefault values. When starting a new situation initially it opens a tool for determinating the parameters of theaccident (Figure 3).Figure 3: Determination of parameters of the accident

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 199Minimum data to create a situation is given by using this tool, and that are the data on the type and weight(quantity) of the dangerous substance. Other data that are given to the programme by using this tool get predefinedvalues and are changed when needed. Those are: the average thickness of the puddle, time of decontamination(remediation) and time and date of the accident. All parameters which are given to the programme during themonitoring of the situation can be saved in the form of files.Setting the meteorological situation is shown in Figure 4.Figure 4: The tool for setting the meteosituationTemperature is defined at the height of 2 m and at the height of 0.5 m. These values are entered using the slider (1)or directly by typing in numerical values in provided fields (2). For calculations in the programme wheretemperature of the air is used, we take the value of the temperature at 2 m and that value would have to be defined.Temperature at 0.5 m in this version of the programme is used exclusively for automatic determination of thevertical stability of air (4). If that value is unknown, it is necessary to cancel the marking (3) and then we get theability to determine the vertical stability of air “by hand”. The wind’s speed (5) and the wind’s direction (6) isdetermined by placing the slider (5) to a specific value, while the direction of the wind can be defined graphicallythrough an appropriate interface (6) dragging the cursor on the blue area or entering numeric values into anappropriate field. Time and date of measuring have an informative character, but it is important to enter thisinformation so that when opening a new situation we can know how many valid meteodata is available.The complete desktop of the programme includes space for graphical monitoring of the situation. The programmeallows you to determine how many kilometers in the field are shown by the width of the desktop. The data on thewidth of the situation can be seen in the status bar in the form of .Based on given parameters, the programme provides a graphical representation of the focus and the range of theprimary and the secondary cloud. Ranges and areas of the primary and the secondary cloud mean the border towhich the unprotected personnel, during the effects of the cloud, will get the dose which is on the border of thethreshold – the dose. It should be noticed that the effect time of the secondary cloud is far longer than the effecttime of the primary cloud. The position of the focus on the situation can be changed. Graphical view of the situationis possible to adapt to the needs of the user in whole. It is refreshed automatically or “manually” with the change ofparameters which influence the output sizes, which are defined by the user himself. Automatic refreshing of thesituation does not require to be turned off, except in the cases when there are problems with the hardware itself, orwhen the computer fails to follow the work of the programme.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 200The observed point has an important role in the programme and refers to the object for which we want to assess thevulnerability after the accident. The basic layout of the tool (with part of the situation) is shown on Figure 5. If wewant to assess the vulnerability of the no dotty space (the population), as an observing point the approximate middleof the space should be taken.Figure 5: Setting up and monitoring the observed pointPositioning in relation to the focus can be done: by manual moving and by choosing the observed point and setting avalue for the distance and angle relative to the focus (3). Information about the time of the arrival of the cloud to theobserved point (4) is given in the form of date and time and in the form of the time elapsed since the accident.General information about the vulnerability of the observed point by primary and secondary cloud, or summary, canbe seen on the tool as information of the concentration of money, time of the effect and inhalational dose (5).Because of the fast and picturesque insight into the vulnerability of the observed point, on the tool there is a setspace in which the colour overruns from green (low vulnerability) to red (severe vulnerability). Positioning of theline in this region reflects the vulnerability of the observed point on a specific position.The time scale is used for observing the development of the primary cloud during the time after the accident. Theappearance of the tool of the time scale is shown in Figure 6.Figure 6: The time scale

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 201Setting the time for which we want to do the assessment is done by using the slider (1). When needed the option“Auto refreshing” can be turned on (2). By turning on this option the programme will follow the progress of thesituation in real time. Calculations and refreshing the situation will be carried out every minute. Depending on theposition of the slider, time that fits situation will be written (3). The main objective of the time scale is assessmentof the vulnerability from the primary cloud on the range that is reached within the observed time (4). Those data arechanging with the changes of time. At the bottom of the tool a similar picturesque view is given as it was alreadydescribed by the vulnerability of the observed point.By integrating the HeSPRO software package into a single GIS system will be enabled update climate –meteorological conditions at the moment, as well as a complete adjustment of graphic display on the vector map. Inthis way the affected areas of the primary and the secondary cloud in the area and the position of the critical pointtowards which we want to assess the vulnerability after the accident will become clearly seen. Also, the GISenvironment will provide and additional geostatistic analysis through: determinating the number of residents in thevulnerable zone, additional buffering of the space, multimedia simulation of cloud movement, calculating surfaces,3D overview of the space and other. All of these applications require a production of a unique geostatistic database.CONCLUSIONApplication of modern mathematic – geographic – information technologies in the mentioned forms and throughlisted steps it is useful for several basic reasons: Quick and reliable delivery of data on the accident site directly by a GPRS system or a digital trackingsystem using a GPS device; Entering data into a central computer; Rapid assessment of effects of the effects of contaminants by combinating mathematical models; Getting a simulation of the movement of danger and the output data of the possibilities provided by the GISdatabase; Forming conclusions on how to react based on the assessment; Informing the subjects on all data that is needed for a timely response on all levels and coordination of theiractions using digital systems of connection and A quick response of the subjects on repairing the consequences.A special contribution in the development of GIS technologies represents the establishment of a unique database onhazardous chemical substances and critic points on the roads, creating favorable conditions for an adequate planningof their rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the contribution is visible in the field of promotion and integration of acommon action of institutions in charge. Because of the mentioned reasons, possibilities that are given by GIStechnologies must become a significant factor in the decision-making process regarding transportation of hazardousmaterials within all state and social organizations and institutions whose powers are monitoring and management iftransport. Because of these listed characteristics, the system can find an appropriate use in other areas and logisticsystems when we want to achieve a more rational and efficient management of transport, while simultaneouslyincreasing the level of security.REFRENCES1. Lukovic, Z., Milenkovic. Z, Marinkovic G.: Interim guideline for evaluation and prognosis of the situation withchemical accidents with hazardous materials, GS Army, Belgrade, 20042. Miljuš M., Vidovic M.: Risk in the transport of dangerous goods, Belgrade, 2003

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2023. Stojanovic D., Djordjevic-Kajan S., Stojanović Z.: Spatiu - Temporal Object Modeling and Management Systemas a Framework for Temporal GIS Applications Design and Development, Technical Report No. 7 / 2000,Computer Graphics & GIS Lab, Faculty of Electronic Engineering, UNIVERSITY of Nis, 20004. Open GIS Simple Features Specification, Open GIS Consortium, Inc., Open GIS Project Document 99-049,1999. (Http://www.opengis.org)5. Modern technologies of transportation - an integrated system of transport, Belgrade, 19856. Z. Čvorović V.: Managing risks in the environment, Andrejevic Foundation, Belgrade, 20057. Šimurina M., Krstić, B.: Overview of core activities in the event of an accident during transportation ofhazardous materials, Belgrade, 20038. D. Stojanovic: Hazardous materials, production, storage, transport and use, Belgrade, 2003

UDK:355.69614.878.084TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 203TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE REGARDING CORRECT DETERMINING OFHAZARD DIVISION AND STORAGE COMPATIBILITY GROUPSZoran Bajić, Radun Jeremić, Radenko DimitrijevićMilitary Academy, 33 Pavle Jurisic Sturm Street, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, zoran.bajic@va.mod.gov.rsAbstract: Methods for determining of hazard division and storage compatibility groups are given in this paper andthe influence of mixed explosive ordnance storage during transportation on explosive safety issues.Keywords: Transport of explosive ordnance, hazard division groups, storage compatibility groups, explosive safetyINTRODUCTIONExplosive ordnance (XO) is the dominant factor in determining the outcome of combat or stability and supportoperations. It is a critical component of fire and maneuver operations performed by the force projection Army. XOprovide the means to defeat, as well as destroy, the enemy, and provide the force with the ability to block, screen, orprotect itself. Military operations can based on unexpected contingencies and so they will require the XO logisticssystem to be modular, tailored, easily deployed, flexible and safe.Transportation of XO conducts due to different reasons and presents one of the most critical operations involvingXO in the Army regarding logistics operations. These operations include receipt, turn-in, issue, shipment, andretrograde. Receipt refers to a shipment of XO received from an XO supply point, storage areas, or directly from aport, depot, or manufacturing plant. Turn-in refers to the return of unexpended XO and salvage items to a storagefacility by the using unit. Issue refers to the transfer of XO stocks from a munitions storage facility to an authorizeduser, but not to another storage facility. Shipment indicates the movement and transfer of XO stocks from onestorage facility to another–either into, within, or out of the theater. Retrograde of XO generally includes the returnof unserviceable XO, captured enemy XO and serviceable XO to rear supply or depot facilities.The role of the XO logistics system is to provide the right type and quantity of XO to the force in any contingency,from full scale contingencies to military operations other than war/stability and support operations. The challenge isto move required amounts of ammunition into a theater from the prepositioned sources in a timely manner tosupport force. The system must also be flexible enough to meet changing XO requirements in simultaneousoperations. The objective of the system is to provide mission-configured load support forward to the force aseconomically and responsively as possible to minimize handling and reconfiguration. The unique characteristics ofXO complicate the system of XO distribution. These factors include its size, weight, and hazardous nature.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 204It requires special handling, storage, accountability, quality assurance, and security [1, 2]. Accident prevention canbe mainly accomplished with proper mixed packaging of XO during the transport and that is why it is essential toclassify correctly XO according to adequate hazard division (HD) and storage compatibility (SC) groups.CLASSIFICATION OF XO IN HD AND SC GROUPSConventional XO is a hazardous good. The main danger for human beings and animals in the vicinity of detonatingXO is generally a combination of blast, fragmentation and incendiary effects. Moreover, some types of XO alsocontain toxic and/or corrosive material. According to ADR (European Agreement concerning the InternationalCarriage of Dangerous Goods by Road) dangerous goods are divided into 9 different classes.Conventional XO and explosive is grouped in class 1 as hazard divisions 1.1 to 1.6. Due to the considerabledifferences between the types of XO goods of hazard divisions 1.1 to 1.6 are again subdivided into compatibilitygroups.Hazard Division 1.1 substances and items have a mass explosion hazard. A mass explosion is an explosion thataffects almost the entire load instantaneously and results in severe devastation or destruction close to the detonationsite. Within a wide radius, blasts, projected fragments and debris as well as ground waves pose a danger to thevicinity.Hazard Division 1.2 substances and items do not have a mass explosion hazard. Subsequent single explosions(detonation, deflagration) occur in ever-shorter intervals. Depending on the size of the items and the explosivemass, the hazard through projected fragments and debris covers a wide radius. The blast pressure affects only theimmediate vicinity.Hazard Division 1.3 substances and items do not have a mass explosion hazard. They have a fire hazard and a minorhazard either because of the blast pressure or projected fragments and debris or both. Te burning process resultseither in a significant radiant heat (for instance in the case of propelling charges) or the agents and itemssubsequently burn or explode in such a way as to cause a minor blast pressure or projection of fragments and debrisor both. In case of fire, the vicinity is exposed to the danger of radiant heat and projected burning parts and items(for instance pyrotechnic flares) or packaging, while the hazards of blast pressure and projected fragments anddebris are relatively low. Apart from that, there will be heavy smoke when pyrotechnic agents and particularlysmoke generating agents are burned. Smoke may have a caustic and/or toxic effect.Hazard Division 1.4 substances and items only have a minor explosion hazard when the propelling charge or theexplosive agent ignites during transport. Te effects are basically confined to the package itself, and it is unlikely thatlarger fragments will be projected over longer distances. An external fire must not cause virtually instantaneousexplosion of almost the whole content of the package. Te closer vicinity is subject to the danger of radiant heat andfire (normal fire). Igniter caps, high explosive mixtures or components such as cartridge shells that are propelledfrom the origin of the fire may lead to eye injuries and minor burns.Hazard Division 1.5 substances are very insensitive and have a mass explosion hazard. They are so insensitive thatthere is very little probability of initiation or of transition from burning to detonation under normal transportationconditions. Te minimum requirement for these substances is that they must not explode in an external fire test.Hazard Division 1.6 items are extremely insensitive and do not have a mass explosion hazard. These items containonly extremely insensitive detonating substances and demonstrate a negligible probability of accidental initiation orexplosion propagation. Te danger posed by subdivision 1.6 items is limited to the explosion of a single item [3, 4].

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 205Since different explosives and XO can react very differently owing to their chemical characteristics, sensitivity,structure and composition, the ADR divides XO into altogether thirteen so-called compatibility groups. Thisclassification is very significant when one has to determine the permissibility which of the different XO types maybe combined in one transportation unit.According to the United Nations (UN) Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, documented inthe Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Tests and Criteria for disseminating of the HD and SCgroups are divided into seven series which are described below [4]:(1) UN Series 1 - Detonability tests for new substances,(2) UN Series 2 - Insensitivity tests for new substances,(3) UN Series 3 - Hazard tests for handling and transporting new substances,(4) UN Series 4 - Hazard tests for handling and transporting new articles, packaged articles and packagedsubstances(5) UN Series 5 - Hazard Division 1.5 tests (very insensitive explosive substance (with a mass explosion hazard)).(6) UN Series 6 - Hazard Classification tests (Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4).(7) UN Series 7 - Hazard Division 1.6 tests (extremely insensitive explosive articles which contain extremelyinsensitive detonating substances (EIDS)).As a result of an extensive experimental work, conducted during the realization of the science and research project[5] in the Military academy by the members of the Department of Military technology and Technical OverhaulWorks (TRZ – Tehnički Remontni Zavod) in Kragujevac, HD and SC groups for XO in use in Serbian army andMoD were proposed. Also, modified series of tests were proposed in order to minimize test costs, amount of usedXO for tests and amount of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) produced, but preserving reliability of resultsobtained using these methods. Only UN test series 6 were modified. Other series of tests weren’t modified due tothe lack of required XO and needlessness of conducting specific tests (test series 5 are conducted for the XO whichshow the behavior corresponding closely to the criteria for Hazard Division 1.5, like ammonium-nitrate explosivesand test series 7 are conducted for HD 1.6, both of this HD groups have minor presence or they are not present at allin Serbian armed forces.Tests series 6 are conducted to answer the question “Which Hazard Division (1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4) correspondsmost closely to the behavior of the XO?” The test series includes internal ignition or initiation, propagation ofburning or explosion, and fire tests of products. The geometrical arrangement of the products should be realistic inregard to the packing method and the conditions of transport and storage should be such as to produce the mostdisadvantageous test results.Tests series 6 which were modified are test 6(a) - Single Package Test and test 6(b) - Stack Test. The modificationof 6(a) and 6(b) test is achieved through layered testing. The first testing is conducted with “bare” (non-packaged)XO items. If the sympathetic detonation occurs with two single items the test proceeds with XO items in singlepackages. Test proceeds further on with activating one item in the crate package and later on, if necessary, withtesting of sympathetic detonation occurrence between crate packages. Stack test is not performed.It was determined that this method of testing is far simpler for implementation and brings significant savings in timeand resources. Recommendations made in the research can be temporarily used in the system until the finalestablishment of the UN testing methods.Rocket 128 mm with HE warhead M63 “Plamen” for multiple-rocket launchers is used for an example of themodified test series 6 [5].Partial sympathetic detonation occurs when the bare rockets are set up on each other (Figures 1 and 2), which isdetermined by close inspection of the test site.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 206Figure 1. Sympathetic detonation test set up with non-packaged rockets 128 mm HE WHD M63Figure 2. Sympathetic detonation test result with non-packaged rockets 128 mm HE WHD M63The next experimental set up uses single packaged rockets (Figures 3 and 4).Figure 3. Sympathetic detonation test set up with single packaged rockets 128 mm HE WHD M63

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 207Figure 4. Sympathetic detonation test result with single packaged rockets 128 mm HE WHD M63The final test uses crate packaged rockets but only if detonation, partial detonation or explosion occurred inprevious tests. Test set up and result is shown in Figures 5 and 6.Figure 5. Sympathetic detonation test set up with crate packaged rockets 128 mm HE WHD M63Figure 6. Sympathetic detonation test result with crate packaged rockets 128 mm HE WHD M63According to conducted modified test series 6 results, rocket 128 mm HE WHD M63 is classified as 1.2 E.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 208TRANSPORTATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCETransportation of XO means any movement or carriage of conventional XO. Transport can be conducted by land,air and sea and can be internal and external. Besides the production of XO, its transportation poses the greatest riskin the handling of XO. For this reason, XO transportation should be limited to a minimum. It should be carefullyplanned, prepared and conducted so as to ensure that the XO arrives accident-free and safely at its destination. Inthis context, the aspects of safety, security and stockpile management must always be taken into account. The type,route and time of XO transportation must be selected so as to keep the risk for all personnel involved in thetransportation at a justifiable low level.Class 1 substances or items – i.e. conventional XO – should not be transported together on one vehicle, with itemsor substances belonging to classes other than class 1.Class 1 substances or items belonging to different compatibility groups should not be transported together onto onevehicle unless the following table 1 permits this “mixed loading”. Restraints indicated in the table should beobserved.Table 1. Mixed loading according to the SC groupsSCGAA B C D E F G H J K L N SХ OB O Х O O O O O Х ХC O Х Х Х O O Х ХD O Х Х Х O O Х ХE O Х Х Х O O Х ХF O O O O Х O O ХG O O O O O Х O ХH Х ХJ Х ХK OLN Х Х Х Х O O Х ХS Х Х Х Х Х Х Х Х Х Х

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 209Mixed loading is permitted when in the cross section between SC groups stands “X”, conditionally permitted for“O” and restricted for blanks.Packages of substances and articles in compatibility group B and D may be loaded in the same vehicle, providingthat they should be transported in container or in a separate compartment approved by competent authority, toprevent any transmission of detonation from articles in compatibility group B to substances or articles incompatibility group D.Packages containing substances and articles in compatibility group L should only be stowed with packagescontaining the same substances and articles type within compatibility group L.Admissibility to the road transport of goods in compatibility group K should be authorized by an appointed andcompetent authority.Training and dummy XO must not be mixed with live XO to avoid accidents from their improper use.CONCLUSIONA competent and specially qualified agency should be appointed to decide whether a substance or item belongs to aspecific hazard division and a compatibility group, thus providing a reliable basis for the planning of appropriatesafety measures for the storage and transportation. UN tests series 1-7 require considerable financial means, expertresearchers, extensive investigations and testing, valid regulations, facilities, equipment, XO for testing andmethods for UXO detection and disposal. Modified test series 6 are temporary and they are to be conducted until allXO in the forces are classified into according HD groups. Depending on XO characteristics, i.e. type of theexplosive/chemical charge, type of the fuze, presence of the propellant charge, presence of the mounted fuze etc. SCgroups can be determined. It is highly recommended to use already determined HD and SC groups for XO used inforeign armies at least for comparison (i.e. Joint Hazard Classification System in the US DoD [6]).LITERATURE1. FM 4-30.1, Munitions Support in the Theater of Operations, HQS Dept. of the Army, Washington, DC, USA,20032. FM 4-30.13, Ammunition Handbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Munitions Handlers, HQS Dept. ofthe Army, Washington, DC, USA, 20013. FSC.DEL/554/05/Rev.2, Best Practice Guide on Ammunition Transportation, OSCE, 20034. TB 700-2, NAVSEAINST 8020.8 B, DoD Ammunition And Explosives Hazards Classification Procedures, 19985. R. JEREMIĆ, R. DIMITRIJEVIĆ, D. MILOSAVLJEVIĆ, Z. BAJIĆ: Solving the Problem of Explosive Safety inAmmunition Depots (in Serbian), Science and Research Project, MoD, Military academy, Belgrade, Serbia, 20086. Hazard Classification of United States Military Explosives and Munitions, U.S. Army Defense AmmunitionCenter, McAlester, OK, USA, 2007

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 210UDK:656.073.436:623.4(497.11)A MODEL OF A TRANSPORT COMPANY CHOICE FOR TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS INTHE SERBIAN ARMYBoban Djorovic, Nenad Dimitrijevic, Srdjan DimicMilitary Academy, 33 Pavle Jurisic Sturm Street, 11000 Belgrade, SerbiaAbstract: Significant part of cargo transport in the Serbian Army take ammunition and explosive facilities transportas transport of dangerous goods. Because of specific cargo and impossibility to satisfy transport demands with hisown vehicles, the Serbian Army has need to buy transport services. In this paper, a model of a transport companychoice for transport of dangerous goods in the Serbian Army is presented.Key words: transport, dangerous goods, transport service, modelINTRODUCTIONTo ensure normal functioning of the Serbian Army (SA) and carrying out regular and emergency duties, it isnecessary to provide the opportunity to meet a wide range of transport requirements, including a significant part ofthe transport of dangerous goods. Since the SA don`t have adequate number of motor vehicles for the transport ofdangerous goods, the need to purchase transportation services on the market imposes. Rapid technologicaldevelopment in the last century has significantly influenced the lives of people. Such progress has led to theemergence of many goods, raw materials and products which are used in everyday life, and by their nature aredangerous to humans and the environment. Hazardous substances themselves are determined as the risk to humansand the environment, that increases during their transport, respectively during the performance of the transportprocess due to manipulation that must be done in the process.Transport of dangerous goods is the most complex form of transport primarily due to unforeseeable consequencesthat result from negligence and unprofessional conduct in the handling (manipulation), and transport in the form ofpeople, property suffering, and endangering of the environment. On that occasion there may be a risk for personswho handle hazardous materials in packaging, unpacking, loading and unloading, as well as for drivers and otherpersons who are found in the vicinity.This paper presents a model of the transport company choice for the transport of dangerous goods in order toimprove the organization and functioning of transport, improve the quality of transport services and reduce costsand duration of transport.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 211NOTION AND DANGEROUS GOODS DIVISIONNotion Dangerous Goods means products in which because of the nature of their composition or because of theirproperties, during their storage, transport, loading, unloading and similar manipulation may happen to get to eventsthat are dangerous and harmful for the environment. To ensure the safe transportation and manipulation of theseloads, they must be packaged, stored and transported under special conditions. Some of the hazardous substancesare so uncertain for the safe transport, that the carriers do not receive them for transport, but the producers or userstransport them themselves.The division of dangerous goods is carried out in accordance with international regulations governing their use,transportation and storage. Depending on the properties and characteristics, all hazardous materials, according to theEuropean agreement on international road transport of dangerous goods (ADR) are classified into nine classes [1].Otherwise, hazardous materials include materials and objects that can be finished products, semi-finished,intermediate, product, raw materials or waste, and have characteristics of hazardous substances, so that duringtransportation they can lead to the endangerment of human life and health and environmental pollution.DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE IN MILITARY TRANSPORTBy the Military vehicles, for the needs of SA, among dangerous substances the most often are transportedammunition and mines and explosive devices Class 1 and flammable liquids 3rd Class. In addition to these loadsweapons are often transported and, which also requires special conditions during transport.Ammunition: For the transportation of ammunition and other dangerous cargo, it is necessary to take appropriateprecautions in order not to endanger the safety of those who come into contact with them and to preserve the cargofrom damage. In order to preserve the quality of the ammunition and secure its use, it is packed in suitable and therequired packaging, which should ensure its safe transport, storage and easy handling.Explosives: Explosives are materials, individual compounds or mixtures of several compounds, which, driven by animpulse (stroke, dry heating), immediately chemically decay thereby creating a large amount of gas with the releaseof large amounts of heat. That immediate decomposition of explosives, which results in a sudden increase inpressure, with the occurrence of detonation is called the explosion [2]. According to the chemical composition andproperties the explosives are divided into: Deflagrantne gunshot or explosives (gunpowder) Brizantne explosives Security and explosives Initial explosives or detonators.Explosives are packed in containers of different shapes. Material for production of packaging must be completelyinactive in relation to explosives, not to have a reaction that would have evolved gases and the increase of pressureled to the explosion [2].Weapons: The Directive on the transport personnel weapons and military equipment defines the provisionsgoverning the transport of weapons in a military transport. Transportation can be realized with special or standardcargo vehicles, depending on the type of weapons [2].All types of missiles and their launching devices, and guidance, bombs, mines, ammunition and all kinds ofexplosives, gunpowder and the means of ignition, travel with armed escorts. Sender load is required to ensure theirfollowers and to bring an act which prescribes procedures and specific measures for the followers during theweapons transport [2].

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 212Flammable liquids: Many fluids have a characteristic to burn on a certain temperature in contact with flames,sparks or other fire cause. Flammable liquids are divided into three groups [2]:Group 1 - point flammable liquid below 21 ° C,Group 2 - Flammable liquids point of 21 ° to 55 ° C,Group 3 - point of flammable liquids from 55 ° to 100 ° C.Transport flammable liquids shall be done in containers, which are made of material that is completely inactivecompared to the packed liquid, or Kontener, while transporting of very large quantitis is done in various types oftankers. Liquid fuels are, in addition to ignition, dangerous because of its toxicity [2] during the manipulations.DEFINING OF CHOICE OF TRANSPORT COMPANY MODELIn accordance with the Rule on the use of motor vehicles in the SA and the fact that SA is unable to carry out thetransport of dangerous goods independently, and having in mind that it is not economically justified to implementall the tasks independently, the model of choice of transport company for the needs of transport of dangerousmaterials in SA has been defined.Since the Sai s specific system, for its purpose and basic tasks, a model is proposed that represents a modification ofthe offered public procurement procedures, with respect to the defined principles of public procurement, all with theaim to accelerate and simplify the process of selecting a trucking company for the transport of dangerous goods inSA. The proposed procedure for selecting transport companies is presented in the form of the algorithm in Figure 1.The procedure of public procurement of transport services for the SA is run by the purchaser, that is the Departmentof Traffic and Transportation, provided that the public procurement is stipulated in the annual procurement plan andthat the funds are provided for the purchase of assets in the financial plan. Based on analysis of the availability of itsresources and observed needs of subordinate units, the relevant report is submitted to the elders, with a proposal tomake contracting transportation services for the SA.On the basis of submitted papers, provided that there are all necessary conditions for public procurement, competentcommander, decides to start the procedure of public procurement of transport services for the SA. Simultaneouslywith the adoption of decisions to the public procurement procedure, competent commander brings an act on theformation of a committee for the public procurement of transport services.The next step in the defined model is the preparation of tender documents. Department of Traffic and Transport, hasa duty to prepare the tender documents so that bidders can use the card to prepare a valid bid.When it was decided to launch a public procurement procedure and when tender documents are prepared, the nextstep in the defined model is publishing a public invitation. Public invitation is published in the Official Gazette ofthe Republic of Serbia and the portal of the Public Procurement Office.After the publishing of a public invitation, the following step is the submittion of tender documents.Department of Traffic and the transportation has the duty from the day of publishing of a public invitation to permitdirect access to the tender documents and downloading them to all interested persons.In the event that there is a need to make changes or amendments of tender documents the Department of Transportand traffic is obligated to immediately and without compensation of the amendments to provide interested partieswho have received tender documents. If the interested parties need additional information or clarification regardingthe preparation of the bid, they may ask for them in writing no later than five days before the deadline forsubmission of bids by the Department of Traffic and Transportation, which shall within two days send a response inwriting and simultaneously provide that information to all other persons who have received tender documents.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 213PURCHASERBIDDERConditions for thestart of proceedingThe decision toinitiate proceedingFormationCommissionPreparation of tenderdocumentsPublic invitationSubmission of tenderdocumentsThe public opening ofreceived applicationsAmendments to the tenderdocuments *Taking the tenderdocumentsFiling an application withan offerAttendance at the publicopeningTour of the bidders whoqualifyThe public opening of bidsand report ofevaluation CommissionSelection of thesuccessful bidder bymulticriteria evaluationCompiling a list ofranked biddersCommission ReceptionAttendance at the publicopeningReport on contractassigningNotice to BiddersThe request forprotection of rights *The decision of theCommission for theProtection of Rights ** as neededCONTRACTASSIGNINGCONTRACTCONCLUSIONFigure 1. Algorithm of choice of a transport companyAll interested persons who meet the requirements prescribed by the Department of Traffic and Transportation, aspurchaser, in the bid and tender documentation have the right to participate in public procurement procedure.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 214The tender documents for the Department of Traffic and Transportation defines what is considered necessaryfinancially and economically, as well sufficient technical and human capacity. When defining the conditions forparticipation in the Department of Traffic and transport must see to it that they do not discriminate against bidders,and that the logical connection with the subject of public procurement exists.After a period of 30 days, is the public opening of received applications. The Commission, appointed by decision ofthe competent officers, is checking the correctness of submitted documents and creates a list of bidders who havesubmitted complete and correct document. In the period of 15 days, the Commission makes a tour of the Bidder andcontrols the data submitted with the tender documents. After a period of 15 days is the public opening of bidsreceived, which relate to the price. The Commission brings their observations and assessments from the control ofthe bidder who submitted the correct application. After that, commissions in accordance with defined criteria: cost,quality of service, payment terms, technical and technological characteristics of the transport vehicles, using themethods of multicriteria evaluation selects the best bid. Based on the results of application of multicriteriaevaluation metod, a list of rankied bidders according to the above-defined criteria is got. Contracting is doneaccording to this ranking.DETERMINATION OF RELATIVE WEIGHT CRITERIAIn order to make good decision, it is needed to specify the alternatives by defining appropriate criteria, with thedetermination of weight coefficients for each criterion. Given that all the criteria for the variants ranking don’t haveidentical impact on observed problem, the question of determining their relative weight appears. In the process ofevaluation on the multicriteria basis, determination of the relative weight of individual criteria is the biggestproblem and the most sensitive place that can decisively influence the final results of the evaluation.In order to determine the relative weight of criteria, interviewing of experts was conducted, and then rankingmethod was applied to the resulted data, for which [4] an application for the calculation of the relative weight ofcriteria was made. By using the application in just a few steps we come to the relative weight of criteria that areshown in Figure 2.Figure 2. The relative weight of criteriaTo verify the proper selection of experts, and thus in a certain way to ensure the validity of the results, it wasnecessary to do the assessment of competence of experts investigated. This procedure was carried out according tothe approach developed in [5]. Since this procedure is a modification of the known methods for the assessment ofcompetence of experts, and that is adapted to the needs of research in the field of transport support of the defensesystem, it was necessary to perform only minor adjustment of procedure in specific problem and situation.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 215According to [5], acceptable coefficient of competence of group of experts would be considered the coefficient witha value greather than 0,5. As the average coefficient of competence of experts surveyed is K = 0733, we can say thatexperts are competent.DESCRIPTION OF DEFINED CRITERION EOR SELECTION OF TRANSPORT COMPANIESHaving considered the market conditions for doing business, as well as specific military organization, inaccordance with [3] and by interviewing experts in the field of traffic and transportation in the defensesystem, to solve the above problems we propose the use of the following criteria:1. cost services,2. quality of transport services,3. terms of payment,4. technical and technological characteristics.CRITERIA 1 - SERVICES COSTCost of services as criterion is described via offered price. Each bidder for submitted offer gets certain scorescalculates by pattern (1):R C (1)tez minBBCiCii = 1,… nn = number of offers,Rtez = 33 - relative veight of criteria,Cmin - minimum offered price,Ci – price ofi th-bidder.CRITERIA 2 - QUALITY OF TRANSPORT SERVICESThe quality of transport services is a term that is described by a lot of parameters. For the purposes of defined modelit is proposed to assess the quality of transport services through the following parameters:reliability - this parameter shows the number of missing (canceled) request by the bidder,security - a parameter that should be considered through the relative safety indicator, using the number oftraffic accidents (SbN) on 100,000 km,Environmental Protection – should be considered through the characteristics of engines that are beingused by the transportation vehicles, in terms of use of engines with the Euro standards,ITS applications - this parameter should give information if intelligent transportation systems to trackcargo and vehicles have been applied.The number of points that each bidder gets is calculated according to the forms from 2 to 4:

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 216• the number of points for the reliability of services:BPUiRtez BOmin (2)BOiRtez = 34 - relative weight of criteria,Bomin - the smallest number of canceled requests,Boi – the number of cancelations of nth – bidder.The number of cancelations is increased by one, as there would not be the possibility that in the event that thenumber of cancelations is zero, would appear division by zero.• the number of points for safety:Rtez SnminBB (3)iSRtez = 34 - relative weight of criteria,Sn min - the minimum number of SbN,Sn i- no-SbN of the nth-bidder.niAs with the number of canceled requests, here is also the number of SbN increased for the value of 1, in order not tohave the possibility that in case that SbN number is zero, appears the division with zero.• the number of points for environmental protection:BZS iRE (4)tez iE maxRtez = 34 - relative weight of criteria,Ei – standard of nth-bidder,Emax - the best offered standard.For the standards newer than Euro 4, the value 4 is assigned, for the standard Euro 3 value3, for the Euro 2 standardvalue of 2, and if the standards are older, the value of 1.• application of ITS technologies:Bidders who apply ITS technology for tracking cargo and vehicles gain the maximum number of points, which is34, while the suppliers who do not use these technologies receive zero points.When calculated, the number of points for each parameter of each bid, the calculation of the arithmetic mean of theobtained data points is conducted and that comes in multi- criteria evaluation, as information about the quality of abidder.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 217CRITERIA 3 - TERMS OF PAYMENTPayment terms as criteria are described by the deadline of payment offered. The number of points for each bid iscalculated by the form (5):RtezUiB (5)UP iU maxRtez = 14 - relative weight of criteria,Ui – deadline of nth bidder,Umax - the longest maturity of deadline offered.CRITERIA 4 – TECHNICALY- TECHNOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICSIn order to reach measurable data on technical and technological features that represent a particular bidder it isproposed that the quantification is performed for thefollowing parameters:• The average age of vehicles available –this parameter gives information about the age structure of vehicles thatthe bidder registers for hiring,• the number of vehicles available - the number of vehicles that Bidder may engage at any time, for theimplementation of traffic demands,• possession of appropriate certificates - this data shows the number of drivers who have the appropriatecertificates for the transport of hazardous cargo.The number of points that each bidder gets is calculated by patterns from 6 to 8:• the number of points for the average age of vehicles:BSViRtez = 19 - relative weight of criteria,SV min - the minimum average age,Svi – the average age of nth bidder.Rtez SVmin (6)SVi• the number of points for the number of available vehicles:Rtez* BViBV (7)iBVmaxRtez = 19 - relative weight of criteria,BVi and - no vehicles, and the nth bidder no,BV max –the maximum number of vehicles offered.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 218• the number of points for possession of appropriate certificates:BSiRtez Si (8)B BS maxRtez = 19 - relative weight of criteria,BS and - the number of drivers and the bidders-certified,BS max – the maximum number of drivers with certificates offered.When calculated for each bid the number of points for each parameter, the calculation of the arithmetic mean of theobtained points is performed, and that data comes in multi-criteria evaluation, as an information on technical andtechnological characteristics of a particular bidder.In the described model, the importance of applying methods of multi-criteria evaluation in choosing the winning bidis. Analyzing the nature of the problem of choice of a transport company, the method of analytical hierarchy processstands out as the most suitable, as it provides a complete ranking of alternatives based on multiple criteria with thepossibility of decomposing the problem on several levels.In Figure 3 was performed the decomposition into a hierarchical structure of the problem of the transport companychoice for the needs of transport of dangerous goods.Level 1GoalThe choice of carriersLevel 2CriteriaC-1PriceC-2quality of transportservicesC-3Terms ofpaymentC-4Technical andtechnologicalcharacteristicsLevel 3Sub-criteriaSc 1Sc 2Sc 3Sc s Sc s+1Level 4AlternativeOffer No. 1Offer No. 2Offer No. 3Offer No. nFigure 3. The hierarchy model of choice of transport enterprisesThus defined hierarchical structure is transferred to the software package Expert Choice [6], that leads in a coupleof steps to the final ranking of alternatives, Figure 4. In order to view the possibility of using this method, values offour bidders are included into the software.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 219Figure 4. The final version of application of Expert softwareAs a way out from the software we get rank of alternatives on which basis in the next phase we do the contractingwith the most successfull bidder.CONCLUSIONThe time in which we live is characterized by a number of reorganization in order to "convergence" of our countryto developed European and world countries. Changes are present in almost all spheres of economic and social lifeand in the SA as one of the most important state institutions. What is it to emphasize the technical - technologicalmodernization in which the material and human resources will be used much more productively and efficiently.Serbian Army is unable to meet by its own means all transportation requirements that its units have the need of asusers, especially when it comes to transport of hazardous materials. With this raises the question of economy andself-satisfaction of all claims. According to the existing way, selection is made only by the criterion of the lowestoffered price, which results in that the transport requirements implemented with low-quality services, unsafe andwith frequent denunciations.Quantity of transported goods in the last few years has the trend of continuous growth. Every year on the roadsacross Europe transporting of hazardous materials is increasing. In this way, the emerging risks of traffic accidentswith hazardous materials increases. The problem of efficient and safe transport of dangerous goods is amultidimensional problem that needs to be viewed from several angles and from several aspects.The paper has taken into consideration the possibility of realization of the transport of dangerous goods for theneeds of SA using the service transport companies, in order to reduce transport costs and improve the quality ofimplementation thereof. The focus of the work was aimed at defining the model of choice of the transport company.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 220REFERENCES1. LJ. Petrovic: Transport of dangerous goods road transport-introduction restructured ADR, Trigon Engineering,Belgrade, 2004.2. Insructions for transportation of Armament and Military Equipment (Official Gazette of the military br.5/83),19833. Law on Public Procurement, Official Gazette RS, No. 39/09, 20094. S. Dimic: The model of choice of transport enterprises for road transport in the Srerbian Army, Master`s thesis,Military Academy, Belgrade, 20105. B. Djorovic: The research of design of the organizational structure of the governing bodies of transport services,doctoral work, Military Academy, Belgrade, 20036. www.expertchoice.com

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 221UDK:656.2.073.436:620.26SAFE RAILWAY TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES -APPLICATION OF OLD AND NEW REGULATIONSGordana AndjelicPE ”Serbian Railways“, 6 Nemanjina Street, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia, goca.andjelic@srbrail.rsAbstract: Awareness about safety and increased risks in the times of technological development is bigger andbigger and it carries with itself a danger of progress misuse. In order to achieve results on prevention improvement,risks management in the transport of the dangerous substances must be treated dividedly and procedurally.Professional approach to these activities conditions knowledge and respecting of the large spectrum of regulations.Lawyers would say that there are valid and invalid regulations. Performing of the dangerous goods transportaccording to the old regulations is, actually, with the appliance of the valid, obsolete, regulations. So-called newregulations are certain, which are already applied in the practice in advance, owing to application of the high safetycriteria (of traffic and general safety). Safe railway transport of dangerous substances is currently balance of the,conditionally speaking, old and new regulations and with great guiding of the Rulebook for the international railwaytransport of dangerous substances („RID“). By speeding up of the harmonization process and by reaching of theharmonized regulation (national and international), a small step with big flywheel is made (“Perpetuum mobile”) inthe transport of dangerous substances.Key words: dangerous substances, transport safety, harmonization of regulation, Rulebook „RID“, advisor for safetyINTRODUCTIONIf we treat the dangerous goods transport as special and specific transport assignment, in that case preparation phaseof realization of this work must have more studious preparation in the comprehensive regulation, both for domesticand for international traffic. Professional access to those activities conditions knowing and abiding by of wide rangeof the rules. Can proportion between the project assignment, which runs as follows „safe transport“, and the strongapplying of the valid rules be set up? Logical question from the mentioned dilemma concerning the proportioncharacter follows, i.e., will the mentioned proportion be opposite or equal?DISCREPANCY, DIVERSITY, OBSOLESCENCE OF RULESAfter the analyses of the basic and most important rules which regulate the mentioned rail transport, we will notice:discrepancy, diversity, obsolescence or outdatedness. At the start, we will see the rules of the internal regulation:

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 222Dangerous Goods Transport Law (hereinafter abbreviated „ZOPOM“) – («Official Journal of SFRJ», N o27/90, 45/90, «Official Journal of SRJ», N o 24/94, 28/96, 21/99, 44/99, 68/2002, «Official Gazette of theRepublic of Serbia», N o 36/2009);Dangerous Goods Transport Regulation in the road and rail transport (Hereinafter as „the Regulation of theGovernment“) – («Official gazette of the Republic of Serbia», N o 53/2002);The Rulebook concerning the way of the dangerous goods transport in the railway transport (Hereinafter as„Rulebook 120“) SRJ – II/7-2.1. „Official Journal of SFRJ”, N o 25 of 24. IV 1992. and Dangerous Goods Transport Guideline on Serbian Railways (hereinafter «Guideline 171», ZJZ N o 193/10-03 valid until January 1, 2003).Good example of the rules discrepancy is certainly the example of the approval issuing of Authoritative CompetentBody for the transport of the specific class of the dangerous goods (dangerous substances). The term ofAuthoritative Competent Body is, conditionally speaking, the variable category which achieved its variabilitytogether with the transformations in society. It is about Ministries which changed its names and sectors in time. Ourobserved rules did not manage to follow up with these modifications and disagreements occurred. Synoptic reviewof this conclusion can be given through the Таble 1.Class ofdangerousgoods–Kind of dangerТаble 1: Rule and Authoritative Competent BodyRule and Authoritative Competent Body„ZOPOM“«GovernmentRegulation»import, export, transit Internal transport Internal transportЕxplosivesubstancesDangeroussubstancesClass 6(poisons)RadioactivesubstancesDangerouswasteArt. 41. para. 1. and 2.«Federal Organ of administrationwhich isauthoritative for InteriorAffairs»*)Art. 59. para 1. and 2.«Federal Organ ofadministration which isauthoritative for healthaffairs, in accordancewith federal organwhich is authoritativefor Interior Affairs»Art. 41. para.1. and 2.«Authoritative Organ in the Republic(Authonom Province) from whichconsignment is forwarded»Article 52. para. 1. and 2. (poisons)«Authoritative Organ in the Republic(Authonom Province) from whichconsignment is forwarded »Art.59. para.1. and 2.«Authoritative Organ in the Republic(Authonom Province) from whichconsignment is forwarded »Art. 7. para. 2.Ministry of the InteriorAffairsArt. 7. para 3. (class 6)«Ministry of Transport andTelecommunication**)»Art. 7. para 4.«Ministry of NaturalResources and EnvironmentalProtection»Art. 7. para 4.«Ministry of NaturalResources and EnvironmentalProtection»

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 223Table Legende:*) Regulations of Article 51 of «ZOPOM» expire on May 23, 2009, concerning the transport approval of poisonsover state border (import, export, transit). See Article 106, Chemical Law (Official Gazette of RS, No36/2009) which is published on May 15, 2009 and comes to effects on May 23, 2009.**)Confirmed interpretation from the Ministry of Infrastructure is that the mentioned is valid just for thetransport of poisons in the internal transport.We can see from the Table 1. if for the transport of specific class of dangerous goods (kind of dangerous), it isnecessary to have the «APPROVAL» from specific competent ministry, and on the basis of which regulation(«ZOPOM» or «Government Regulation»). In practice «APPROVALS» for the transport are called «DECISIONS»on transport or «LYCENCES» for transport.APPLYING OF „SAFETY“ PRINCIPLETraffic developing under these conditions is moving slowly, and according to words of the experts from the EUAdministration - unacceptably. By main applying of one of main transport principles – “SAFETY” principle, asolution, which reduces potential risks during realization of dangerous goods transport, occurs. Where dilemmasoccur, after defining all possible options, variant with the smallest risk, namely, the safest variant is always beingchosen. Possible assistance for finding solutions of bigger dilemmas is certainly in the Competent Ministries.Interactive relation between economy and legislation is pulsing result of economic needs and answers on thementioned.This way of functioning is definitely under compulsion and it must be regarded as transitional category. Finalsolution should very soon become active, by coming into force new «Dangerous Goods Transport Law», by whichall the four above mentioned regulation will not be valid („ZOPOM“, „Government Regulation“, „Rulebook 120“and «Guideline171»). This act creates a lot of space for making rules and guidelines, which will prescribe and ordermore precise and more real, in accordance with EU regulation and National regulation the Republic of Serbia, theprocedures and obligations of participants (players) in the dangerous goods transport.RULEBOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT – „RULEBOOK (RID)“Guiding principle and reference for harmonization of rules is Annex „С“ of International Rail Transport Convention„(COTIF)“– Rulebook for International rail transport of dangerous goods (with annex as its constituent part), knownunder the abbreviation „(RID)“(valid of 01/ 01/ 2009), (Hereinafter „Rulebook (RID) “).«Rulebook (RID)» is valid, basically, for International Dangerous Goods Rail Transport on the territories ofMember States «(COTIF)» and for the transport which is supplement for rail transport, where „Uniform Rules(CIM)“ are applied, which are subject to valid International rules for the transport in other modes of transport. Thetransport to which this «Rulebook (RID)» applies, is subject to, among other things, General National regulation orInternational regulation on dangerous goods rail transport.Member States «(COTIF)» are (status as of June 30, 2008.): Albania, Algeria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Croatia, Letonia,Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Morocco, Hungary, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Poland, Portugalia, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Serbia, Slovakia,Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Czech Republic, Tunis, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. Each Member State reserves theright to regulate or prohibit the International dangerous goods transport on its territory from the safety reasons on itsterritory.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 224Aggravating moment is the fact that text of the «Rulebook (RID)» (the valid one came into effect since January 1,2009) was not translated on Serbian language. In practise it means that it is applied in the limits of the term «must».GOOD PRACTISE would be existence of printed (or electronic) translated publication, available for all participantsof the transport chain during dangerous goods transport, and they are: forwarders, transporters, receivers, loaders,packers, users of container tanks or portable tanks, users of tank wagons, railway infrastructure managers, etc.A similar situation occurs in road transport of dangerous substances, where printed (or electronic) publication of thetranslated European Agreement about international road transport of dangerous substances does not exist – AnnexА and Annex B. Committee of experts “(OTIF)” for dangerous goods transport constantly works on amendments ofthe “Rulebook (RID)”, and these amendments are published every two years (the following ones will come intoeffect from January 1, 2011).SAFETY REGULATIONS OF “RULEBOOK (RID)”Awareness about general safety and increased risks in the times of technological development is bigger and bigger;with itself it carries a danger of misuse of progress attributes of mankind. In order to achieve results in preventionimprovement, risks management in the dangerous substances transport must be treated dividedly and procedurally.Let’s take a look at Chapter 1.10 of “Safety regulations“ of “Rulebook (RID) ”, which is relatively new, but it isbeing added and enlarged more and more. Chapter 1.10 is response to requests which are reflection of the misuse ofa technical - technological development of Earth and it is a base for implementation of risk managementmethodology in this field. With a view to this Chapter 1.10, under the term “safety” measures of cautiousness(precaution) are implied; these measures have to be taken in order to decrease theft or misuse of the dangerousgoods that could endanger persons, assets or environment. Beside general regulations, safety training, regulationsfor goods with high potential danger and safety plans, the Table 1.10.5: List of goods with high potential danger, is,also, given.GOODS WITH HIGH POTENTIAL DANGER AND TREATMENT IN PRACTISEGoods with high potential danger are the goods where there is a possibility of misuse in the terrorist purposes andwith it connected danger with the greatest consequences, such as mass loss of human lives and mass destructions.The terrorism is current issue in the world and it is globally connected with the large systems in the world, such asrailway.With these tendencies a new field in the dangerous substances transport is opened, and especially of class 1 –explosive materials and objects with explosive materials. By means of analysis of PE „Serbian Railways”operational data about monitoring of the dangerous substances transport, for years 2005, 2006 and 2007, it can beclearly concluded that about 80% - 90% transported dangerous substances of class 1 belongs to “List of goods withhigh potential danger”.In order to decrease all predictable risks for any undesired events, a need for application of additional preventiveactivity obtrudes itself. A procedure, in the form of internal order for the targeted railway staff that participates inthe transport realization, has been established. The order defines the targeted transports methods of announcementof the authorized forwarding company for the operational service for monitoring of the dangerous substancestransport of PE “Serbian Railways”, as well as details of parts of technological process reception in the entranceborder stations, as well as further on entire transportation route.The goal of application of a special procedure was to achieve minimal consignment delay in the entrance and exitborder station. The practise showed that this goal was achieved, as well.Dangerous substances transport of class 1 by railway primarily has to be organized system with in advance definedprocedure, which will be:

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 225followed until the end,checked during realization,operationally followed by railway andin coordination with other subjects that take care of this transport (from the hired forwarding company to thespecial state safety subjects).The presented version is an EXAMPLE OF GOOD PRACTISE of preferential implementation of one of the basictraffic principles, the principle of «SAFETY». PE “Serbian Railways” is as a transporter huge system with largescope of work. Large amount and transport quantity can not be reasons for superficial performing of the singletransport, and especially not for the dangerous substances transport of the class 1. Let’s establish a rule:TRANSPORT QUANTITY HAS TO RESPECT THE TRANSPORT QUALITY.ADVISOR FOR SAFETYIn order to readily accept the formalization of the new regulations and apply them completely, let’s take a look atthe futuristic review of the desired and expected. By speeding up of the harmonization process and by reaching ofthe harmonized regulation (national and international), a small step with big flywheel is made (“Perpetuummobile”) in the dangerous goods transport. Which part of the assembly will be cell – unit of the moving power inthe economy, which will carry the pioneering attempt on the field? We can find the answer in the Chapter 1.8 of the“Rulebook (RID)” – Control measures and other incentive measures for application of the safety regulations, moreprecisely 1.8.3 – Advisor for safety.Every enterprise, which activity involves dangerous goods transport by railway traffic, or with this transportconnected packing, loading, or unloading, has to name one or more Advisors for safety for dangerous goodstransport; the task of this advisor (s) would be help in risk prevention for people, objects and environment, thatcome out of such activities. The exceptions will be according to exactly determined items by the competentauthority of the Member State. The exceptions are possible for the enterprises:which activity refers to the transport for the military needs,which activities refer to limited quantities per wagons,which main or secondary activity is not transport (loading, unloading) of dangerous goods, but onlyperiodical performance of the internal transport (loading, unloading) of dangerous goods and if there is nogreater danger for environmental pollution.Only the enterprise activity is competent to direct the Advisor for safety to find means and methods and to takemeasures for application of the valid regulations within the optimal safety conditions. Advisor’s obligations arenumerous; they imply teaching, counseling, controls, report preparation, re-examination of some activities,establishing of new procedures, methods, participation in various commissions, and other which directly orindirectly influence safe duration of dangerous goods procedure (transport, loading, unloading, packing, transshipment,....).Due to all these obligations the Advisor for safety is local system cell – its enterprise, which willestimate and give instructions for increase or decrease safety measures.On the other hand, in the global system, Advisor for safety is again cell, that will, after the accident, which hashappened during the observed process (transport, loading or unloading), prepare a report about the accident for themanagement of the enterprise, and, if necessary, for local authorities. Therefore, the role is mutual, and its functionis very influential for entire safety system in the State, during all these processes with dangerous substances.Suggestion of draft of new «LAW ON DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT » made great innovation comparedto “ZOPOM”, predicting the chapter IV ADVISOR FOR SAFETY FOR THE DANGEROUS GOODSTRANSPORT IN ROAD, RAILWAY AND WATER TRAFFIC.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 226CONCLUSIONBy means of analysis of PE „Serbian Railways” operational data about monitoring of the dangerous substancestransport, for years 2005, 2006 and 2007, it can be clearly concluded that about 80% - 90% transported dangeroussubstances of class1 belongs to “List of goods with high potential danger”.Traffic developing under existing conditions is moving slowly, and according to words of the experts from the EUAdministration - unacceptably. By main applying of one of main transport principles – “SAFETY” principle, asolution, which reduces potential risks during realization of dangerous goods transport, occurs.In order to decrease all predictable risks for any undesired events, a need for application of additional preventiveactivity obtrudes itself. A procedure, in the form of internal order for the targeted railway staff that participates inthe transport realization, has been established. The order defines the targeted transports methods of announcementof the authorized forwarding company for the operational service for monitoring of the dangerous substancestransport of PE “Serbian Railways”, as well as details of parts of technological process reception in the entranceborder stations, as well as further on entire transportation route.Suggestion of draft of new «LAW ON DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORT » made great innovation comparedto “ZOPOM”, predicting the chapter IV ADVISOR FOR SAFETY FOR THE DANGEROUS GOODSTRANSPORT IN ROAD, RAILWAY AND WATER TRAFFIC.Function of Advisor for safety is very influential for entire safety system in the State, during all these processes withdangerous substances.Until the date of entering into force of the adjusted and harmonized regulations, and after that date, let’s respect therule: TRANSPORT QUANTITY HAS TO RESPECT TRANSPORT QUALITY.By speeding up of the harmonization process and by reaching of the harmonized regulation (national andinternational), a small step with big flywheel is made (“Perpetuum mobile”) in the transport of dangeroussubstances.Remark: This paper has been written on the basis of operational experiences of the Department for commercialoperation and dangerous substances transport of the Freight Service Department – Operations Directorate; PE»Serbian Railways».REFERENCES1. Annex “С” of Convention about international railway transport “(COTIF)”– Rulebook for international railwaydangerous goods transport (with appendix as its constituent part), known under the abbreviation “(RID)” (validfrom January 1, 2009)2. Law on dangerous substances transport («Official Gazette of СФРЈ, no.27/90, 45/90, «Official Gazette of СРЈ»,no. 24/94, 28/96, 21/99, 44/99, 68/2002, "Official Gazette of RS", N o 36/2009)3. Regulation about dangerous substances transport in road and railway traffic ("Official Gazette of RS", no.53/2002)4. Rulebook about method of dangerous substances transport in railway traffic СРЈ – II/7-2.1. “Official Gazette ofСФРЈ”, no 25 from 24 IV 19925. Instruction for dangerous goods transport on JŽ, ZJŽ no. 193/10-03, valid from January 1, 2003

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 227UDK:656.614.3.073.436MANAGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM OF TRAINING FOR WORK ON THE SHIPS CARRYINGDANGEROUS SUBSTANCESDragan Trifkovic, Radosav Nikolic, Svetislav Soskic, Ivana Atanasovska 1Military Academy, 11000 Belgrade, Pavla Jurisica Sturma 331 Institute “Kirilo Savic” a.d., 11000 Belgrade, Vojvode Stepe 51Abstract: The international and domestic regulations of waterway transport of dangerous substances and dangerouswaste handling, regarding needed knowledge and skills of crew members of ships carrying such goods are analysedin this work, that has been issued during the realization of the project of technological development TR 21037 [1].Management of the system of training for seafarers, working on the ships carrying dangerous substances, and safetyhandling of dangerous substances and waste is one of the most effective proactive answers to the risks of possibleaccidents. In accordance with the experience in realization of variety of training programmes for seafarers andduties on ships, as well as requirements for highly qualified cadre in maritime market of dangerous substancestraffic and performed analyses, the model for training management based on certificated quality systemmanagement is proposed.Key words: ship, transport, dangerous substances, crew, training system, law regulation, safety workINTRODUCTIONAccidents on sailing routes (collisions, sinks, strands, fires, explosions, water breaches, chemical fallouts, etc)between ships that carry hazardous substances can cause the loss of people’s lives, endanger health and safety,inflict unfathomable material disasters, endanger the environment and make water traffic difficult and block it. Allsubjects (legislation, authorized ministries, naval companies, water-management organizations, etc) must beincluded in order to prevent consequences. The main causes identified from the analysis of accidents in water trafficare human factors (carelessness, inattentiveness, and low personnel skills) and technical inadequacy of ships andship equipment. The aim of human resources domain should be the better training of personnel and highlydeveloped consciousness of responsibility and dangers.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 228The following regulations apply in transport of dangerous materials via maritime routes: International conventionon Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1 , International Maritime Code for Dangerous (IMDG Code) 2 , International Codefor the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquid Gasses in Bulk (IGC Code) 3 , Maritime Pollution(MARPOL) 4 , The Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Carriers (BC Code) 5 , The Code of Safe Practice for SafeLoading and Unloading of Bulk Carriers (BLU Code) 6 .Based on the European Agreement Concerning the International Transport of Dangerous Goods via waterways 7 , aship that carries dangerous goods must have a certified person on board.Certificate is valid for five years, then the same course must be passed again. Training courses are completelyregulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 8 and the authorized ministries of member states. On theother hand, educational facilities that train candidates have the possibility to define content. The analysis ofmaritime and inland waterway transport show that European Union has lost approximately 40% of its seamen sincethe beginning of 1980’s, and that it lacks over 30.000 trained sailors 9 .The need for this type of personnel would be even bigger if their potential is better used, especially for thedevelopment of intermodal transport. There is no official information about sailor and navigator numbers fromSerbia that currently sail domestic and foreign waters, but the estimate is over 10,000.This type of training must contain the following subjects and practical exercises:1. General provisions considering transfer of dangerous materials (relevant regulations, classification andproperties of dangerous materials);2. Risk types (fire, explosions, radioactivity, loss of stability, environmental pollution, toxicity, corrosion,etc);3. Preventive measures for accidents;4. Measures in case of accidents or incidents (first aid, rescue operations, etc);5. Personnel tasks according to muster list;6. Equipment for the transport of dangerous materials (gas detectors, oxygen concentration detectors, etc);7. Practical exercises:- Procedures for entering closed ship’s spaces,- Handling dangerous cargo,- Handling equipment for personal and collective protection, fire extinguishers, first aid kits, etc.‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐1 SOLAS - International convention on Safety of Live at Sea2 IMDG Code - International Maritime Dangerous Goods – Code. The official abbreviation: IMDG3 IGC Code - The International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gasses inBulk4 MARPOL 73/78, International Convention of Sea (Waters) Protection from Ship Contamination, 1973, amendedand complemented by the 1978 Protocol, with all the later amendments and complements5 BC Code - The Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Carriers6 BLU Code - The code of safe practice for the safe Loading and Unloading of Bulk carriers7 ADN - European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterway. Theoriginal name of the document (in French): Accord europeen relatif au transport international des marchandisesDangereuses par voie de Navigation interieure. The official abbreviation: ADN8 IMO - International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org9 Smernice za poslovanje sa EU - Saobraćaj, Privredna komora Beograda

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 229Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) prescribes training programs relatedto work certifications [2]:- Dangerous cargo,- Oil tanks,- Chemical tanks, and- Liquid gas ships.Instructors must also have authorizations, experience, didactic-methodical capabilities and they also must be proneto pedagogic work.Considering a quick technological development of shipbuilding, installations, devices and equipment, there is aneed for advancement, new professions, new personnel. That’s why education centers have a critical role in a timelyadapting to new demands and market needs. This centers receive accreditation if they meet certain conditions. Thebasic condition for survival and development in the service market is product/service quality. This can be done via adeveloped, well established, maintained and certified quality system.Key advantage of certified quality systems is not a marketing benefit but the proof that stated standards are met, thatbusiness is performed according to defined principles. Besides that, International Maritime Organization, duringclassification of its members into white and black list, seeks valid proofs that these conditions are met. First, thisimplies a valid working license for educational center, and proof that STCW Convention standards are met.The assessment of fulfillment of these standards is checked by the authorized certification body which also issue acertificate (Lloyd, Bureau Veritas, and others). Five years after certification, centers are subject to independentexternal checkup done by authorized checkers that also must meet the demands of STCW Convention.The Model of Managing Training SystemAssuming that training center has three active employees, and that it contracts third-party collaborators for training(instructors with specified qualifications), organization and level of communication can look like those shown inFigure 1. Quality assurance representative is authorized and responsible to handle documented and certified qualitysystem aligned with ISO 9001:2008, IWA 2 and STCW conventions [3], [4].DIRECTORSECRETARYQUALITY ASSURANCEREPRESENTATIVEINSTRUCTORSFigure 1. Organizational schematic of seamen training center

SERVICECUSTOMERSSERVICECUSTOMERSTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 230For such a small service organization, as is almost every training centre for seamen, quality control can be realizedby applying processing approach shown in Figure 2.CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT OF QUALITYMANAGEMENT SYSTEMQuality policy, plans and objectivesIM OMINISTRIESECONOMYMANAGEMENTRESPONSIBILITYREQUIRE-MENTSINPUTRESOURCEMANAGEMENTSEAMENTRAININGCENTERSERVICEREALIZATIONMEASUREMENTANALYSIS ANDIMPROVEMENTTRAININGSERVICEOUTPUTSATISFA-CTIONWELL-TRAINEDCUSTOMERS(EXAM PASSED)AGREEMENTSFigure 2. Process approach to quality control systemThis type of organization offers the possibility for easy management (processes, not people, by the principle “plan,manage, improve”) and directing the process towards the user.Service realization, measuring and tracking user satisfaction, and managing resources are three key process groupsby which management governs the Centre.However, for these groups of processes, it is necessary to identify individual processes, inputs and outputs, ways oftransforming inputs and outputs, and methods of governing activities [5].

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 231Center’s model of training seamen acknowledges the following processes:1. Identifying the demands of users;2. Reassessing the demands of users;3. Preparations for the realization of training services;4. Establishing the need to develop new training services;5. Developing training services;6. Subcontracting instructors and equipment;7. Training services realization;8. Measuring service performances;9. Getting the results from provided service;10. Reassessment of management;11. Improvements.Connection between identification processes shown in Figure 3.13 45 6 7 92 11 2 10 8Figure 3. Connection between identification processesTraining Centre’s complete business system, including quality control and previously stated processes are definedby procedures:- Managing quality system documents;- Business communication;- Reassessment of leadership;- Governing human resources, infrastructure and work space;- Enrollment in courses;- Contracting;- Managing design and development of courses;- Supply;- Execution of courses;- Measuring and tracking user satisfaction;- Internal checks of quality control;- Managing irregularities;- Analysis and improvements of quality system.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 232Quality representative controls system documents and external documents considering: type, appearance, content,status, naming, writing, adopting, practicality checking, and changes. Quality system documents include qualityrulebook (with policy, goals and plans), procedures, logs and instructions. Quality policy, prescribed by director,contains determination to meet demands and active efficiency improvement of quality system, and also givesframework for establishing and reassessment of quality goals.Defining quality goals begins from the defined quality policy, and training centre’s need to govern the changes bywhich user demands and expectations are always respected, as well as normative-legal regulations. Quality goalsare defined globally for the entire organization and operatively for certain courses and processes.In reassessing leadership, we answered the following questions:- Is quality system aligned with ISO 9001/2008 standards and STCW Convention by stated policy andquality goals;- Is the quality level achieved in leadership: adequate to candidates’ demands and expectations,competitive, and does it have the best practices of sailors and seamen, as well as adequate answer totrends and demands in this field;- What are the causes of inconsistencies and complaints relating to courses;- Are corrective and preventive measures that are appointed according to previous reassessmentsappropriate;- Which factor influences the motives of employees and engaged persons to secure the quality of courses.Procedure that refers to business communication defines the basis for communication and archive protocol with theaim to keep business communication, registration and archive adequate and reliable for performing businessactivities related to training of seamen, and to enable the required level of business information.External communication is directed to candidates for courses, agents, shipping companies, authorized ministries,and strong marketing approach on the market. Authorizations and domains of external communication are definedby hierarchy, where director and secretary can transfer their authorizations to the representative of quality.Managing human resources and infrastructure requests from Centre’s leadership:- Good selection of personnel and engaging competent and trained instructors;- Personnel improvement;- Defining principles of good work and rewarding success;- Providing adequate working conditions (office space, training equipment, trainers, simulators, computerprograms, a ship for practical purposes, protective gear, literature).Entry for the courses must be a predictable activity to plan and carry out on the basis of:- Planning the courses (see Appendix 1);- Established entry procedure (ways of communication, inspecting requests, etc);- Timely reporting of authorized ministry;- Secured resources (office space, personnel, literature, etc), and- Executive preparations for performing courses.Contracting is part of business activity from the stage of preliminary contacts to contract signing, in order to defineprocess and to make it clear for both users and suppliers. Center should define: types, content, reassessment andkeeping of contract, contracting authorizations, ways of protecting users’ interest and Center.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 233Supply includes equipment, material and services used by the Training Centre and users. In a certain way, userentries can be considered as part of the supply, and a very important working process from the aspect of qualitysystem. Instructors and collaborators are also considered as part of the supply. Center should secure that thesupplied product/service is in accordance with specific supply demands.Supplier is chosen based on the capability to deliver the product according to specified requests. Documentprocedure defines supply types, supply authorizations, supply procedures (requests, offers, invoices, contracting,realization), and assessment of supplier or provider.Procedure conducting courses includes training program realization according to subject plans, issuing certificationsupon the successfully completed training and the way of reporting performed courses, with a goal of meetingregulations and international conventions for training sailors.The application of adequate measuring methods and tracking user satisfaction and methods for processing data ismandatory so that management could gather relevant entry elements for improving quality of courses (applicationof corrective measures). User satisfaction in courses can be measured most adequately by polls and via directconversations/interviews.Internal checks are being performed in order to verify accordance of quality systems with ISO 9001/2008 andSTCW conventions, its effective application, maintenance and continued improvements by applying corrective andpreventive measures. Tracking and measuring quality of courses must be performed by all personnel in the Centre,including instructors.Centre should consider: non-attendance, objections, complaints, and omissions in courses. Centre’s managementmust be permanently committed to analyzing quality, bringing and executing preventive and corrective measuresfor the ongoing improvement and in accordance with policy and quality goals.Managing design and development of the course that teaches handling dangerous cargosAs the Training Center has the improved managing system, and there is a real need to begin developing the newcourse that deals with handling dangerous materials, Center must manage its own development.All employed and involved persons, as well as interested parties from wider community, can give the initiative tothis course. Initiative should contain precise features. Design implies a process by which course entries transforminto results, apropos course specification and program. Course is being designed for commercial execution on themarket where the Center has assessed the possibility of profit, or it is being designed based on contracts with clients(candidates, companies, agencies, ministries, etc).Course development implies a process where the results transform into specifications for its execution, which definemethods and criteria for its success. When the arrangements are being made according to defined content (STCWconvention, theme plan, addendum 1), Center’s management develops the course without design, because design isdone somewhere else (i.e., in IMO).Course design and development (CDAD) must be described in detail using adequate procedure for which theresponsible person is quality representative. This procedure defines:- CDAD initiative;- CCAD planning;- Organizational and technical issues;- Entry requests for CDAD;- Results from CDAD (course look and content, instructions, preparations, approval and usage);

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 234- CDAD reassessment;- CDAD verification;- CDAD validation;- CDAD changes.Quality representative considers every initiative for the new CDAD, and brings written opinion which consists, asneeded, some of the following elements:- Course description and properties;- Criteria for the assessment and success of CDAD;- Forecast based on competition achievements and trends in the field;- Necessary resources for successful CDAD;- Resources necessary for commercial execution of successfully designed and developed course;- Minimum and maximum number of participants in successfully designed and developed course;- Forecast on the return of invested resources in CDAD, and- Time table for economically viable and successfully designed and developed course.Based on this opinion, director reaches a decision in writing, considering the approval of initiative. As this initiativeis related to the course defined in STCW convention, entry demands are accepted without changes, they are statedas verified and without comments.After the decision, if the initiative is accepted, director affirms-defines:- Entry requests for CDAD of new course;- Project leader and persons responsible for CDAD;- Plan details for CDAD, its reassessment, adoption and update;- Obligations of other employees in the Training Center;- Communication (reporting) between named responsible persons for CDAD of new course and director;- Communication with state’s institutions, authorized ministry, apropos his Secretary for waterway trafficand certifying bodies, when needed, especially considering legalization, approval, authorization andverification upon successfully designed and developed course.Center prepares a CDAD plan that must reflect and show:- Principles of development activities;- CDAD stages;- Development of services for CDAD in and out of Training Center;- All resources for CDAD, as well as its later execution;- Center’s responsibility;- Time table and persons that will perform reassessments, verification and validation of CDAD stages;- Methods for verification and validation;- The need to calibrate measuring and controlling equipment used for the evaluation of some propertiesfor which course starters train, and- The need to prepare verification and validation program.Assessment applied in developed course should be planned as entry for CDAD reassessment.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 235Entry demands for CDAD:- Are defined and documented;- Include appropriate law and regulations, as well as demands from international conventions related tosailor training;- Include all results of contract assessment when CDAD is performed, and- Reassessed from the point of adequacy and choice.Entry levels for CDAD are the basis for the creation of course specifications, course program, execution methods,control, reassessment, verification and validation. In this case, reassessment, verification and validation are relatedonly to development of processes necessary to perform course, not for the design.Outputs from CDAD are manuals and appropriate literature (written as support for developed course or acquiredthrough IMO), which communicate the way to execute and control it. Outputs from CDAD do not contain coursespecification and theme plan (given in STCW convention).Course execution manual contains:- Course number (code) or description;- Description of every single activity;- The role of appropriate persons in executing every single activity;- Description of roles per level of engagement, and- Legend of persons and functions.All participant of the course are expected to adhere:- course properties;- course instructions;- literature;- criteria for control;- documentation stated in specifications and instructions, and- to forming logs in a defined way.Every CDAD stage of reassesses its results. This process is based on experience acquired in previous courses.After the preparations of new course, verification is applied through:- course execution according to defined specifications and instructions;- taking into consideration the reassessment results;- controlling the execution with defined procedure;- observing course execution and results from independent person;- course execution in the presence of authorized institutions or verification bodies, domestic or foreign(when needed, or adequate);- anonymous polling about course;Based on verification report, director reaches a decision considering:- is the course won;- changes in manuals that will be used after the successful CDAD;- course validation.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 236If the course doesn’t have satisfactory quality, director announces termination or repetition of CDAD. As the courseis prescribed by STCW convention, it’s verified by authorized ministry, when needed.Validation is performed in order to verify is demands, requests and expectations of participants are met. If thecourse didn’t satisfy validation process, certain changes are done after which the validation is repeated.Special importance for validation would be information from participants after some time they spend on the ship.According to author’s research and according to persons who work on ships that carry dangerous materials, existingtheme plan should be critically reassessed. Primarily, this implies the connection between theory and practice, aswell as contents.Practical training in total of 5 classes covers only first aid, while there is no practical training for handlingdangerous materials. As far as content is concerned, theme plan does not include themes related to handling wastefrom dangerous materials and other ship waste, so crew procedures do not deal with hazardous consequences. Forthat, we need the initiative to change training program.CONCLUSIONReal needs for well trained personnel on ship that carry dangerous materials can be solved by creating TrainingCenter for sailors and seamen. High quality of education and successful operations on the market are possible byefficient management of training system. For current business system, this implies implementation, maintenance,certification and independent verification of systems aligned with demands of ISO 9001, IWA2 and STCWconvention.Defined procedure of design and development of course for handling dangerous materials secures all necessaryconditions (human and material resources) for the fulfillment of user demands. The existing training program,apropos theme plan, has to be reassessed and the initiative for its improvement needs to be set in motion.Benefits of forming specialized center, similar to the mentioned one, or designing and developing courses forhandling dangerous materials in the scope of existing centers should be analyzed with appropriate studies andbusiness plans.Remark: This paper was written as a result of the research done within the technological development project TR –21037: «Development of an integrated system of managing ship-generated waste onwaterway corridors in theRepublic of Serbia», financed by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic ofSerbia, 2008-2010REFERENCES1. Marija Vukić et al: The Development of An Integrated Model for Management of Waste Materials from Shipsin the Navigable Corridors of the Republic of Serbia [Razvoj integrisanog modela za upravljanje brodskimotpadnim materijama na plovnim koridorima Republike Srbije], The Project of Technological Development (ID.no: 21037), Kirilo Savić Institute, Belgrade, Serbia 2008 – 20102. Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Code), IMO3. JUS ISO 9001 - Sistemi menadžmenta kvalitetom, Savezni zavod za standardizaciju, Beograd, 20014. IWA 2 - Sistemi menadžmenta kvalitetom – Uputstvo za primenu ISO 9001:2000 u obrazovanju, Prevod20015. Orlić, S.: Tumačenje i primena standarda ISO 9001, Inquality, Beograd, 2008

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 237Appendix 1O.N.PROFICIENCY IN HANDLING OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESAND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES(Subject area)1. INTRODUCTION1.1 Importance of knowledge of dangerous substances2. CLASSIFICATION OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES2.1 IMO class definitions of dangerous goods in class 1‐92.2Physical and chemical properties of dangerous and harmfulsubstancies3. CONVENTIONS, REGULATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS3.1 SOLAS 19743.2 MARPOL 1973/19783.3 IMGD CODE3.4 Code on handling of solid form substances in bulk ‐ BC Code3.5 Declarations, documents and packaging3.6 Portable tanks, tank containers and vehicle4. MARKING AND LABELLING4.1 Identification and marking4.2 Stowage and segregation5. SAFETY OF PERSONNEL5.1 Safety equipment and gauging instruments5.2 Cargoes having tendency to move5.3 Substances possessing chemical hazards6. CLASS I – EXPLOSIVE6.1 Hazard divisions and compatibility groups6.2 Packing6.3 Structural serviceability of freight containers and vehicles6.4 Stowage provisions6.5 Segregation from dangerous goods of other classes6.6 Transport and stowage of goods on passenger vessels6.7 Precautions during loading and unloading of goods7. CLASS II – GASES7.1 Identification of gases7.2 Types of containment vessels and portable tanks7.3 Use of relief and closing devices7.4 Stowage categories7.5 General stowage precautionsCLASSESLectures Demonstration1 ‐4 ‐4 12 ‐2 ‐3 ‐3

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 238O.N.PROFICIENCY IN HANDLING OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESAND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES(Subject area)LecturesCLASSESDemonstration8. CLASS III – FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS8.1Packing, tanks, freight containers, portable tanks andvehicles8.2 Stowage categories8.3 General stowage precautions8.4 Conditions of segregation8.5 Transport of flammable liquids at elevated temperatures9. CLASS IV – FLAMMABLE SOLIDS9.1 Classification of flammable solids9.2 Transport and stowage, control of temperature9.3 Stowage categories9.4 General stowage precautions9.5 Conditions of segregation9.6 Emission of poisonous and flammable gases10.CLASS V – OXIDIZING SUBSTANCES AND ORGANICPEROXIDES10.1 Packing10.2 Transport and stowage with temperature control10.3 Stowage categories10.4 General precautions10.5 Conditions of segregation11.CLASS VI – POISONOUS/TOXIC AND INFECTIOUSSUBSTANCES11.1Hazards from foodstuff, working areas and crew livingquarters contamination11.2 Types of packing, packing classification and grouping criteria11.3 Stowage categories11.4 General stowage precautions11.5 Conditions of segregation11.6 Decontamination measures12. CLASS VII – RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS12.1 Types of ores and concentrates12.2 Type of packaging groups12.3 Stowage and segregation transport index12.4 Stowage categories12.5 Conditions of stowage and segregation/distances3 ‐3 ‐3 ‐3 ‐

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 239O.N.PROFICIENCY IN HANDLING OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCESAND HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES(Subject area)LecturesCLASSESDemonstration13. CLASS VIII – COROSIVES13.1 Packaging groups/classification13.2 Stowage categories13.3 General stowage precautions13.4 Conditions of segregation13.5 Hazards from wetted materials/substances3 ‐14.CLASS IX – MISCELLANEOUS DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ANDARTICLES14.1 Types of dangerous substances and articles14.2 Examples and conditional hazards14.3 Substances/materials dangerous only in bulk14.4 General and special precautions14.5 Conditions of segregation15. EMERGENCY PRECAUTIONS AND PROCEDURES15.1 Safety of electrical appliances15.2 Entry into enclosed spaces15.3 Spillages and fires15.4 Considerations of incidents on deck and under deck15.5 Emergency plans and procedures3 ‐16. FIRST‐AID TREATMENT16.1Hazards from inhalation, ingestion‐swallowed chemicals, skincontact and radiation16.2 IMO medical first‐aid guides16.3 Radio for medical advices3 4Σ 46 5

UDK:343.3/.7:504TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 240ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM AS A GROWING THREAT TO THE WORLD?Dejana DimitrijevicUniversity of Belgrade, Faculty of security studies, Department of Environmental Protection,50 Gospodara Vucica Street, 11000 BelgradeAbstract: This paper focus on defining environmental terrorism as distinct from eco-terrorism or environmentalextremism. Water supply facilities, dams, transmission lines for oil and gas, agricultural sites, transportinfrastructure are all potential targets for terrorists. Attacks on resources for which there is no substitute can causegreat economic damage and inflict hardship especially terrorism attacks on sites involving water and agriculturalresources. Regardless of the agencies or laws that are involved, successful counter-terrorism preparation can only beenhances by more communication between terrorism experts and more specific recommendations to state and localpolicymakers.Keywords: environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, critical infrastructure, vulnerable resources, water, energyINTRODUCTIONThe term 'environmental terrorism' (or 'ecological terrorism') has found its way into the public arena, NorthAmerican politics, media, and academia following the launch of the Gulf War Coalition air campaign in January1991 when Iraqi forces intentionally caused two enourmous oil spills in the Gulf waters (Schwartz, 1998). Theseevents initiated international outrage especially by Western media and promted the Administration of US PresidentGeorge Bush to accuse Iraq of 'environmental terrorism' (Newsweek, 4 February 1991: 36; New York Times, 26January 1991a: 1-4).Alternative sources, such as EPA Journal and the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, also endorsed the termin similar fashion. In academia, for example, the concept has garnered a good deal of attention: Lanier-Graham(1993) and Winnefeld & Morris (1994) have both argued that Hussein's actions amounted to 'environmentalterrorism'.An international conference on "Criminal Sanctions in the Protection of the Environment", held in 1994 inPortland, Oregon, noted that "environmental terrorism is a legitimate threat to the security".Daniel Schwartz in his article 'Environmental Terrorism: Analyzing the Concept' have examined when isappropriate to call environmental destruction 'environmental terrorism', as well as that to date, the termenvironmental terrorism' has been misused by North American politicians and media (Schwartz, 1998).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 241Most recent discussions of terrorism have focused on the identity of the terrorists, their motivations, and theincreasingly destructive potential of the “weapons” at their disposal. However, there has been relatively littlediscussion about their choice of targets. Environmental security scholars know that a strong argument can be madefor linking certain resource and environmental problems with the prospects for political tension, or even war andpeace (Chaletcki, 2002). History shows that access to resources has been a proximate cause of war, resources havebeen both tools and targets of war, and environmental degradation and disparity in the distribution of resources cancause major political controversy, tension, and violence. Terrorism experts have opined that in the last decade, thenature of terrorism has changed from professional, politically-motivated acts to amateur acts motivated by personal,religious or social differences (Hoffman, 1998; Chalk, 2000).An examination of environmental terrorism as a new category of terrorism adds new dimension to all previous, verywell-known definitions of terrorism in identifying the target as a natural resource or environmental feature. At atime when populations all over the world are increasing, the existing resource base is being stretched to provide formore people, and is being consumed at a faster rate. As the value and vulnerability of these resources increases, sodoes their attractiveness as terrorist targets. The destruction of a natural resource can now cause more deaths,property damage, political chaos, and other adverse effects than it would have in any previous decade.This paper will focus on defining environmental terrorism as distinct from eco-terrorism or environmentalextremism. Even in the Western world these two terms are used interchangeably and especially in our countrypresent completely new term and phenomenon. We will examine the risk of environmental terrorism as function ofprobability and consequence and study various vulnerable environmental resources as well as transportinfrastructure susceptible to the potential attacks. Finally, several ideas for reducing the risk of environmentalterrorism will be discussed.DEFINING ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISMThere are as many definitions of terrorism as there are acts of terrorism. Terrorism as a concept first appeared in theOxford English Dictionary in 1795 as, "a government policy intended to strike". The FBI definition of terrorismpoints out, Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce agovernment, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (USCode of Federal Regulations (28 CFR Section 0.85).While there is no consensus on exact definition of "terrorism", the word is typically used to describe politicallymotivated acts of violence with the intention to intimidate governments or civilians.Terrorists, whether groups or individuals, have various motivations: religious, cultural, political, economic,psychological, or some combination of these. The means at their disposal are often explosives, guns, poisons, orother destructive agents, though as the recent attacks showed, they can be more creative and dangerous than weexpect. Their enemies are usually governments or political figures, though with the advent of eco-terrorism, weencounter enemies such as biotech firms, pharmaceutical companies, universities or their invenstitors. Their targetsare often federal buildings skyscrapers, and rivaling both of those for the amount of long-term damage that can beinflicted upon a country: environmental resources.Environmental destruction or the threat therof can be labeled 'terrorism' when:1. the act of threat breaches national and/or international laws governing the disruption of the environmentduring peacetime or wartime;2. the act or threat exhibits the fundamental characteristics of terrorism (i.e. the act or threat of violence hasspecific objectives, and the violence is aimed at the symbolic target). An act of environmental destructioncan be termed 'environmental terrorism' only when the two latter criteria are met, and when the environmentis used by the perpetrator as an authentic symbol that instills fear in the larger population over theecological consenquences of the act (Schwartz, 1998:484).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 242According to Elizabeth Chaletski from the Californian Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment,and Security, environmental terrorism can be defined as the unlawful use of force against in situ environmentalresources so as to deprive populations of their benefit(s) and/or destroy other property (Chaletski, 2002:47).Therefore, environmental terrorism is use of force against natural resources in order to achieve political, social oreconomical goals.ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM IN OPPOSITION TO ECO-TERRORISMEnvironmental terrorism is distinct from eco-terrorism/environmental extremism. Vast majority of public, whenthey hear the term 'environmental terrorism' are actually thinking of 'eco-terrorism'. 'Eco-terrorism' is a neologismwhich has been used to describe threats and acts of violence (both against people and against property), sabotage,vandalism, and intimidation committed in the name of environmentalism. Eco-terrorism/environmental extremismis deeply based in ecology theory, the professed aim of eco-terrorists is to slow or halt exploitation of naturalresources and to bring public attention to environmental issues such as wildlife habitat loss through development orunsustainable logging, genetically engineered organisms or usage of animals for laboratory experiments. Theprofessed aim of eco-terrorists is to slow or halt exploitation of natural resources and to bring public attention toenvironmental issues such as unsustainable logging or wildlife habitat loss through development (Chaletski,2001:48). Therefore, ecoterrorism is the use of force against political, social or economical resources in the name ofprotecting the environment involving the violent destruction of property perpetrated by the radical fringes ofenvironmental groups in the name of saving the environment from further human encroachment and destruction.Earth First! is the organization that first brought eco-terrorism to the public debate. Founded in 1980, Earth First! isknown road building in wilderness areas, and dam construction, and many other actions. 1 The Earth LiberationFront (ELF) is an international underground organization consisting of autonomous groups of people who carry outdirect action according to the ELF guidelines. It was founded in 1992, in Brighton, England and it is based in theUSA, Canada and UK.Current goals are:1. To inflict economic damage on those profiting from the destruction and exploitation of the naturalenvironment;2. To reveal and educate the public on the atrocities committed against the earth and all species that populateit; and3. To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human. 2In action aimed at saving lynx habitat in 1998, the American branch of ELF arson fires at the Vail Ski Resort inVail, Colorado, in which four ski lifts, a restaurant and many buildings were destroyed. Total structural loss wasestimated at approximately $12 million. In 2001, FBI listed and named ELF as the most dangerous domesticterroristic threat.ALF (Animal Liberation Front) is also named as ecoterroristic organization in the USA. ALF is established in themid-1970s in England and expanded its activity to the USA in 1977. A review of ALF’s activities include largescalemink releases, attacks on various research facilities at universities around the USA, fur farms, destruction ofresearch documentation which resulted in a multimillion dollar damage.ALF’s Mission Statement is the core of its doctrine:1. To liberate animals from places of abuse and place them in good homes where they can live out theirnatural lives free from suffering;1 Animal & Ecological Terrorism in America, American Legislative Exchange Council, 20032 Earth Liberation Front Guidelines, available at: www.earthliberationfront.com

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2432. To inflict economic damage upon those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals; and 3. Toreveal the horrors and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors. 1In May 2006 the Guardian give details of the campaign by ALF against firms working for Oxford University, whichALF claims have caused more than 6 million pounds of damage. A major contractor of a new research laboratoryhas withdrawn from working for Oxford University because of fears of harassment and intimidation by animal rightextremists. In 1991, FBI named ALF as domestic terroristic threat.In the last few years, FBI have arrested a couple of members of ecoterroristc groups. Current FBI director, RobertMueller said one of the Bureau’s “highest domestic terrorism priorities” is prosecuting people who commit crimes“in the name of animal rights or the environment” (Janofsky, 2006).VULNERABLE RESOURCESCritical infrastructure is a term that is receiving increasing attention. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and theUSA Patriot Act define critical infrastructure as “systems and assets ... so vital to the United States that theincapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, nationaleconomic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” (Public Law 107-56(e)).Some of these systems include food, water, agriculture, health and emergency services, energy (electrical, gas andoil, dams), transportation (air, road, rail, ports, waterways), information and telecommunications, banking andfinance, postal and shipping, and national monuments and icons. This paper focuses on the water and energysector’s critical infrastructure.Scarcity and prestige of the targeted resource, its physical location, its vulnerability to attack and capacity forregeneration are the key determinants to assess the possibility of an environmental assault. Resources that arerelatively inaccessible without special equipment or are heavily guarded are less attractive to terrorists. Waterresources, as renewable resources, are also attractive to terrorists, because there is no substitute for water - it is anirreplaceable resource. Greater economic value, often linked to environmental scarcity makes a resource veryattractive.This paper focuses on the water and energy sector’s critical infrastructure.Water resourcesThe importance of freshwater and water infrastructure to human and ecosystem health and to the smoothfunctioning of a commercial and industrial economy makes water and water systems targets for terrorism. Water isa fundamental resource for human and economic welfare and modern society depends on complex, interconnectedwater infrastructure to provide reliable safe water supplies and to remove and treat wastewater. The chance thatterrorists will strike at water systems is real; indeed, there is a long history of such attacks.Water resource sites are also attractive to environmental terrorists because there is no substitute for water - it is avitally necessary resource. Whether its lack is due to a physical supply interruption or, a community of any size thatlacks fresh water will suffer greatly. Furthermore, a community does not have to lack water to suffer. Too muchwater at the wrong time in the form of a flood can cause greater damage, and flooding towns and settlements is atime-tested tactic in warfare.As an example of the economic and human chaos even moderate disruption or contamination might cause, anoutbreak of Cryptosporidium in Milwaukee in 1993 killed over a hundred people, affected the health of over400,000 more (MacKenzie et al., 1994; Smith, 1994) and cost millions in lost wages and productivity.1 Animal Liberation Front. Available at: animalliberationfront.com

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 244That outbreak, completely unrelated to terrorism, gives some sense of the vulnerability of modern water systems tosimilar undetected, intentionally caused, contamination events.Sites involving water resources are vulnerable to environmental terrorist attacks in the form of explosives or theintroduction of poison or disease-causing agents. The damage is done by rendering the water unusable and/ordestroying the purification and supply infrastructure. The physical attributes of water resource sites that make themattractive to terrorists, or site weaknesses, are many. Most water infrastructure, such as dams, reservoirs, andpipelines are easily accessible to the public at various points. Many dams are tourist attractions. Pipelines are oftenexposed for long distances. Water and wastewater treatment plants dot our urban and rural landscape.The most traditional form of water-related terrorism involves physical attacks on water infrastructure – specificallywater-supply dams and pipelines. One such attack might target a large hydroelectric dam on a major river or a majorwater supply system for a city. Terrorists equipped with a relatively small conventional explosive might not be ableto cause serious structural damage to a massive dam. A major dam failure can kill thousands of people and evenmore modest damage might interrupt power generation or affect some other important watersystem operation(Gleick, 2006:491). Many municipal water systems have particularly vulnerable points, such as single largepipelines, pumping plants or treatment systems. The bombing of the major water pipeline entering Baghdad in 2003highlights such vulnerabilities (Tierney & Worth, 2003).Most biological pathogens cannot survive in water and most chemicals require very large volumes to contaminate awater system to any significant degree. Many pathogens and chemicals are vulnerable to the kinds of watertreatment used to make it potable for human use. Indeed, the whole purpose of municipal water systems is todestroy biological pathogens and reduce the concentration of harmful chemicals through chlorination, filtration,ultraviolet radiation, ozonation and many other common treatment approaches. Many contaminants are also brokendown over time by sunlight and other natural processes. Because of these safeguards, one early commentator noted:"it is a myth that one can accomplish [mass destruction] by tossing a small quantity of a ‘super-toxin’ into the watersupply. . .it would be virtually impossible to poison a large water supply: hydrolysis, chlorination and the requiredquantity of the toxin are the inhibiting factors" (Kupperman & Trent, 1979).A more modern infrastructure concern is the use of remote computers to attack valves, pumps and chemicalprocessing equipment though computer-based controls. If a group or individual could gain control over theautomated operations of water facilities, water supplies or quality could be seriously compromised. These controlsystems were typically developed with no attention to security. As a result, many of the supervisory control and dataacquisition (SCADA) networks used by water agencies to collect data from sensors and control equipment “may besusceptible to attacks and misuse” (Heilprin, 2005). There is growing recognition of this risk (Littleton, 1995). In1990, the United States issued National Security Decision Directive 42, which states in part:"Telecommunications and information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception, unauthorizedaccess and related forms of technical exploitation as well as other dimensions of the foreign intelligence threat. Thetechnology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is used extensively by foreign nations and can beemployed, as well, by terrorist groups and criminal elements" (National Security Directive, 1990).These risks are more than academic and theoretical. In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April 2000, police arrested aman for using a computer and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire wastewater system andrelease sewage into parks, rivers and property. This is one of the first documented cases of cyber-terrorism in thewater industry (Gellman, 2002). Fears that Al-Quaida were seeking information on SCADA systems materialized in2002: “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that Al-Qaida members have soughtinformation on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems” (McDonnell & Meyer, 2002; MSNBC,2002).

Oil, gas and mineralsTRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 245After September 11, 2001, many policymakers and industry experts focused increased attention on the system’svulnerability to intentional attack, accident or natural disaster. The nation’s energy system is a complex,interconnected web in which a disruption in one part of the infrastructure can easily cause disruptions elsewhere inthe system. Traditionally the focus of energy security has been on accidents and natural disasters. After September11, 2001, policymakers and industry have had to consider the threat of intentional damage to a much greater degreethan before.Now, energy security has become an important consideration for state legislatures. According to the NationalConference of State Legislatures the following are some particular aspects of the system infrastructure that remainvulnerable:1. the electricity system (nuclear facilities, non-nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel storage and transportation,electric transmission lines, electrical substations);2. petroleum (crude oil storage and transport, fuel oil, refineries, petroleum product pipelines and terminals,cyber security, telecommunications systems); and3. the natural gas system (natural gas storage facilities, natural gas pipelines) (Brown, Rewey & Gagliano,2003).Refineries, oil derricks, wellheads, pipelines, loading terminals, and tankers are all vulnerable to fire orconventional terrorist explosives. Attacks on this infrastructure can create extensive environmental damage beforebeing contained. In addition, oil spills can interfere with the normal workings of power stations and desalinationplants. A large, full oil tanker carries upwards of 38 million gallons of crude. If such a vessel suffered a terroristattack large enough to cause the loss of the bulk of its cargo, the environmental effects would be devastating. Byway of comparison, the Exxon-Valdez spill is estimated at 11 million gallons.Oil refineries are another critical part of the nation’s energy infrastructure. From a security perspective, the larger,more concentrated refineries may pose increased risks since an outage at one large refinery will have a moresignificant effect on the oil market than would an outage at a smaller refinery. The publicly available worst-casescenarios for a variety of refineries discuss serious health effects from huge releases of anhydrous ammonia.Anhydrous ammonia is explosive when mixed with air and can severely burn the skin, eyes and respiratory tract.Releases of anhydrous ammonia would threaten surrounding areas, including civilian populations, schools,shopping centers, hospitals and wildlife areas.Petroleum products are stored in large tank farms normally located near the population centers that serve as themarket for those products. Disruptions to these tank farms pose not only an economic threat to the markets theyserve but they are also a potential public safety and environmental hazard.Weaknesses of petroleum and mineral sites include the extensive and necessary infrastructure for processing andtransportation of the resource. An attack on a site where a strategic metal is mined (e.g., vanadium or tungsten) canalso cause economic damage.The natural gas system is subject to numerous vulnerabilities from production to distribution, but the natural gassystem is most vulnerable after the gas is compressed into high pressure form for transportation and storage. Gasstored or transported in this form is known as liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG terminals and storage facilities areusually above ground and visible, which may make them more vulnerable. LNG terminals store large amounts offuel, representing another vulnerability within the energy system.Oil pipelines in Colombia have regularly been the target of attack. In 1997, over 45 separate attacks on the CanoLimon-Covenas pipeline, reputedly by leftist guerrillas from the National Liberation Army (ELN), causedColombia’s national oil company Ecopetrol to declare force majeur on all exports from the Cano Limon field

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 246(Energy Information Administration, 2001). In 1998, the ELN bombed the OCENSA pipeline, spilling over 30,000barrels of oil and triggering a blaze which killed more than 70 people and injured at least 100 others when the firespread through nearby villages (World Press, 2004).Following the launch of the Gulf War Coalition air campaign in January 1991, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein orderedthe detonation of an estimated 1250 oil wells. Nearly 600 oil wells were engulfed in flames, spewing out thickbillows of smoke that "turned midday into midnight in Kuwait" (Popkin, 1991:23). Famous attack on the petroleumsupply chain was the bombing of the French tanker Limburg in October 2002 off the coast of Yemen (BBC News,2002).POSSIBLE MITIGATION AND PREVENTION STRATEGIESThe most reliable way for a nation to protect itself against the disruption caused by environmental terrorism is todiversify resource use wherever possible. Multiple sources of food, water, and energy mean each individual sourceis less attractive as a target. In addition, federal, state, and local governments can protect environmental resources insitu through more intensive and focused monitoring efforts, in conjunction with increased environmental datagathering, a sort of “early-warning” system to identify future environmental risks. Among the best defenses againstterrorist threats are public confidence in management systems and security experts.Perhaps the most fundamental action that can be taken to protect water systems is to limit or deny physical access tovulnerable points. One of activities is to increased number of coast guard patrols in the area of water intakes alongwith increased the number of daily water samples.According to the Center for Defense Information, the recommendations for reducing the physical risk toinfrastructure are:1. facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, storage facilities, pumping plants, intake facilities and controlsystems) should be identified and inventoried;2. physical access to those most critical to operations, or most vulnerable to attack, should be controlled;3. access to water distribution maps and facility plans should be controlled when there is a clear security risk;4. surveillance cameras, motion detectors, and lighting should be installed in appropriate places;5. to prevent hacking, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) for monitoring andcontrolling water should not be connected to the Internet; and6. on-site water treatment chemicals should be kept in secure facilities and they should be inventoried on aregular basis (Center for Defense Information, 2002)."Early warning" monitoring systems can help to identify contamination events early enough to permit an effectiveresponse. An EWS must be reliable: it should minimize the potential for significant numbers of both false negatives(missing a true event) and false positives (reporting a false event). It must be easy to install and operate, providecontinuous monitoring and result in rapid notification of an event. Continuous monitoring reduces the likelihoodthat contamination events will be missed. The development of standard monitoring systems would reduce cost,permit sharing among users and facilitate repair and replacement (Foran & Brosnan, 2000). New and developingtechnologies are being developed and among these technologies are DNA microchip arrays (Betts, 1999a),immunologic techniques (Betts, 1999b), microrobots (Hewish, 1998). Most of these technologies are not yetcommercially available, nor have they been tested in large drinking water systems.A key component to the success of any response will be the advance preparation of a process or plan that providesguidelines for all appropriate stakeholders, including users, emergency responders and law enforcement agencies,local media and community leaders. The prevention of environmental terrorism will require a new vigilance: a newunderstanding of both the nature of the threat, and formulation of appropriate and effective responses (Chaletcki,2001:16).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 247REFERENCES1. BBC (2006) Introduction to animal rights. An overview of animal rights and how 'rights' differ from 'welfare'.Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/rights/introduction.shtml2. Betts, K. S. (1999a) DNA chip technology could revolutionize water testing. Environmental Science andTechnology, 33(15), 300A–301A.3. Betts, K. S. (1999b) Testing the waters for new beach technology. Environmental Science and Technology,33(16), 353A–354A.4. Brown, M. H., Rewey, C. & Gagliano, T. (2003) Energy Security. The National Conference of State Legislatures5. Chalk, P. (2000) Grave new world. Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 15. Available at:www.forum.ra.utk.edu/spring2000/grave.html.6. Chalecki L. E. (2002) A New Vigilance: Identifying and Reducing the Risks of Environmental Terrorism. GlobalEnvironmental Politics, vol.2, No. 1, pp.46-64.7. Energy Information Administration. 2001 U.S. Department of Commerce. World oil market and oil pricechronologies: 1970-2000. Available at www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/chron.html.8. Foran, J. A. & Brosnan, T. M. (2000) Early warning systems for hazardous biological agents in potable water.Environmental Health Perspectives, 108(10) (October) Availableat:http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/realfiles/docs/2000/108p993-995foran/foran-full.html.9. Gleick, P. H. (2006) Water and terrorism. Water Policy, 8 pp.481–50310. Heilprin, J. (2005) EPA watchdog finds security lapses in remote controls for water systems. Associated Press,10.January. Available at: "www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2005/01/10/national1827EST0682.DTL".11. Hewish, M. (1998) Mini-robots sniff out chemical agents. Jane’s International Defense Review, June, 31(6), 87.12. Hoffman, B. (1999) Terrorism Trends and Prospects. Lesser, Ian O., Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F.Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins. Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND,p.15313. Janofsky, M. (2006) Feds accuse 11 of ecoterrorism: Targeted meatpacker, ski resort, timber firm. New YorkTimes News Service, 21 January 2006. Available at: http://homelandsecurity.osu.edu/focusareas/domestic.html.14. Kupperman, R. H. & Trent, D. M. (1979) Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response. Hoover Institution Press,Stanford, CA.15. Lanier-Graham, S. D. (1993) The Ecology of War: Environmental Impacts of Weapon and Modern Warfare.New York: Walker.16. MacKenzie, W. R., Hoxie, N. J., Proctor, M. E., Gradus, M. S., Blair, K. A., Peterson, D. E., Kazmierczak, J. J.,Addiss, D. G., Fox, K. R., Rose, J. B. & Davis, J. P. (1994) A massive outbreak in Milwaukee of Cryptosporidiuminfection transmitted through the public water supply. New England Journal of Medicine, 331(3), 161–167.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 24817. McDonnell, P. J. & Meyer, J. (2002) Links to terrorism probed in northwest. Los Angeles Times, 13, 2002.18. MSNBC (2002) FBI says Al-Qaida after water supply. Numerous wire reports. Available at:http://www.ionizers.org/water-terrorism.html.19. Newsweek (1991) 'Saddam's Ecoterror', 4 February 1991: 36-39.20. New York Time (1991a) 'Oil Threatens Fishing and Water Supply', 26 January 1991: 1-4.21. Popkin, R. (1991) Responding to Eco-Terrorism. EPA Journal 17(3): 23-26.22. Schartz, D. M. (1998) Environmental Terrorism: Analyzing the Concept. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35,No. 4, pp.483-49623. Tierney, J. & Worth, R. F. (2003) Attacks in Iraq may be signals of new tactics. The New York Times, p. 1,August 18, 2003.24. Winnefeld, J. A. & Morris, M. E. (1994) Where Environmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet: GreenConflict in Asia and theMiddle East. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.25. World Press (2004) Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Chronology. Available at:www.worldpress.org/2282.cfm

UDK:811.111'25TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 249INTERPRETING/TRANSLATING – THE CASE OF ENGLISH V. SERBIANZoran PavlovicUniversity of Belgrade, Faculty of security studies, 50 Gospodara Vucica Street, 11000 BelgradeAbstract: Whenever verbal communication, construed as a process of sending and receiving verbally expressedmessages/information, is not possible to make in one language, interpreting appears to be the only solution of theproblem. A person who practices this intellectual activity is called interpreter. Regarding the fact that both senderand receiver know their mother tongue best, most often it is the case of interpreting from and /or to mother tongue.Further, it is assumed in this work that mother tongue is the Serbian Language. In the contemporary world, thelanguage interpreted to – target language (TL), and the one interpreted from – source language (SL) to othermother tongues in most cases is the English Language. The interpreter’s responsibility for the validity of thusestablished communication is essential, and it gains additional weight when the subject of interpreting is an area ofhuman activity and/or natural phenomenon paramount to the survival of man and his habitat. Security is one ofsuch areas. The author’s intent is to point out to only some of numerous and diverse impediments Serbianinterpreters come across in doing their work, but also to some serious and sometimes dangerous mistakes that arebeing made in interpreting by inapt or ill trained interpreters. The same difficulties await the Serbian scientists andacademics when they are writing their papers in English.Keywords: Verbal communication, interpreting, translating, security, problems, errorsINTRODUCTIONIn the conditions in which communication, construed as a verbal activity of exchanging messages and/orinformation, is not possible to establish in one language (spoken, or written, notwithstanding) because any of theparticipants in the process of communication does not have the necessary knowledge of the same language,interpreting/translating i.e. the activity of converting a message/information from the language (sourcelanguage SL) the sender (speaker/writer) sends it to the language (target language TL) the receiver(listener/reader) receives it appears to be the only solution for establishing this kind of communication. In view ofthe fact that both sender and receiver know their mother tongue best, it is interpreting or translating from and totheir mother tongue that is in question in most cases.Interpreting/translating from a foreign language to a mother tongue and vice versa is an exceptionally demandingintellectual activity. Generally speaking, the purpose of it is to convey a verbally generated message/informationexpressed by the sender in a language that the receiver does not understand to the latter in a language that they areable to understand. In this case, “language” infers a word or phrase that is a meaningful unit per se, at the sametime it may be, and most often is, a part of a wider meaningful unit – a clause or a sentence and this one, being acomplete conjured up and expressed thought, in most cases is a part of a text or conversation

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 250The special role of the translator in society is aptly described in an essay that was published posthumously in 1803and that had been written by Ignacy Krasicki:“Translation... is in fact an art both estimable and very difficult, and therefore is not the labor and portion ofcommon minds; [it] should be [practiced] by those who are themselves capable of being actors, when they seegreater use in translating the works of others than in their own works, and hold higher than their own glory theservice that they render to their country”. 1The meaning of the concept of interpreting/translating, and the purpose and relevance of this intellectual activity ofthe people we call interpreters/translators (although the human mind has already invented translating machines)stem from this. Concurrently, this makes clear the fact that the relevance of interpreting/translating andinterpreter/translator as the agent is critical, often decisive, for verbal communication, and the accountability ofinterpreting/translating and interpreter/translator for this kind of communication validity and reliability is essential.This accountability gains additional weight when the exchange of messages/information by way ofinterpreting/translating involves the areas of human activity, and natural and social phenomena paramount for thevery survival of individual, species, community, or civilization on the one hand, and the environment on the other.Needless to argue, one of such areas is security.How does it look like then when the interpreting/translating of spoken or written English is in question and theconveyed message/information falls within the area of human security environmental security, and/or the securityof cultural properties?Academics and other specialists on this matter know that science and profession admit the content of very conceptof security is not yet quite precisely defined. The reasons for such state of affairs go far beyond the boundaries ofthis work and they should not be discussed hereafter. Also, it would be enough to present, without furtherdeliberation, that neither human, nor environmental, or security of cultural goods as parts of an overall security, oras separate “kinds” of security are satisfactorily defined, outside the influence of personal view. Namely, there areauthors who argue that environmental security is a part of human security, and those who are of the opinion thatthese two securities are complementary, but still separate. When it comes to defining the security of cultural goods,its validity directly depends on the validity of the definition of “cultural goods” concept.Consequently, an interpreter/translator is on a slippery slope here, and the danger of slipping and falling down, interms of the translation validity and reliability occurs even when interpreting/translating the basic concepts ofhuman security, environmental/ecological security and the security of cultural goods/objects/artifacts. Regardingthe commonly accepted fact that there are no absolute synonyms in a language, and that there are always nuances,accountable for slight difference in meaning, an interpreter/translator is on thin ice doing their job, because thereare synonyms to be interpreted/translated in both English and Serbian Language.ENGLISH V. SERBIANIn this part of the work the author presents a smaller number of very explicit examples to illustrate lexical andgrammatical problems of interpreting/translating from BrE/AmE to Serbian and vice versa. Contrastive analysisproves to be the appropriate method of presenting, but also attempting to solve problems of this kind. Although acomplete way of presenting a word in the English language presumes both its spelling and pronunciation, theauthor will abstain from presenting pronunciation.1 Krasicki, Ignacy "O tłumaczeniu ksiąg" ("On Translating Books"), in Dzieła wierszem i prozą (Works in Verse and Prose),1803, reprinted in Edward Balcerzan, ed., Pisarze polscy o sztuce przekładu, 1440–1974: Antologia (Polish Writers on the Artof Translation, 1440–1974: an Anthology), p. 79.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2511. Division is not (always) a military unit, some English words that look like and/or sound like Serbian words buttheir meaning is different e.g.:actual stvaran, not - aktuelanaffirm potvrditi (se), not - afirmisati (se)concern briga, not - koncerndevice uređaj, not - devizadirection smer, not - direkcijadivision (o)deljenje, not - divizijaelaborate razrađen / razraditi u detalje, not - elaborateventually konačno, na kraju, not - eventualnoevidence dokaz, not - evidencijaformerly pre/ranije, not - formalnihonorary počasni, not - honorarnimanufacturing proizvodni, not - manufakturniprovision snabdevanje, not - provizijareal stvaran, not - realan -solid čvrst, not - solidan…2. Noun as Adjective, what is the basic noun and waht is the adjective, and additional problems regarding the wordorder and determining the case, e.g.capital flow protok kapitala, not - kapitalan tokpower structure struktura moći/vlasti, not - snaga strukturehate crime zločin iz mržnje, not - mržnja zločinamoral panic moralna panika, not - moral panikeSecretary General Generalni sekretar, not - sekretar generalafood chain lanac ishrane, not - hrana lancamember state država članica, not - državljaninteam member član tima, not - tim član3. Phrasal Verbs are verbs that have their meaning, but followed by a preposition, an adverb of place or time, anoun or another verb they get a different meaning. Although they are an important and well known distinction ofthe English language, they are often the source of problems in interpreting/translating. The author presents to take –uzeti, povesti... as the example, and reminds to a number of others, e.g.:take place dogoditi se, not - uzeti mestotake part učestvovati, not - uzeti deotake toprikloniti se, opredeliti setake afteruvrgnuti setake overpreuzetitake forsmatratitake onobućitake offsvućito look after, for, up, down, around, up to; to make out, up, way, money, do; to put up with, forward, up, down; toget up, down, on, off, over, over with...

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2524. Verb or Noun, words that can be used as either. A small number of them, used as a noun, are accenteddifferently than when used as a verb, e.g.:What make (napraviti, načiniti...) is this car?Koje je marke ovaj automobil?The release (osloboditi, pustiti...) of CO 2 in the atmosphere increased by 17 per cent in 2004.Ispuštanje CO 2 u atmosferu povećano je...The suspect (sumnjičiti, slutiti) admitted to being implicated in the fraud.Osumnjičeni je priznao umešanost u prevaru.As a rule, girls test (proba, ispit) better than boys.Po pravilu, devojke postižu bolji rezultat na ispitu od dečaka.5. Pleonasms, not knowing the meaning of abbreviations is the source of this kind of problems ininterpreting/translating, e.g.:(hard disc drive) HDD drajv;(random- access memory) RAM memorija;(digital versatile/ video disc) DVD disk;(liquid crystal display) LCD displej...In the following part of the work, the author presents some lexical and gramatical ideosyncracys of the Englishlanguage relative the Serbian, but also other languages. These ideosyncracys, along with many others, are always apotential source of problems in the process of interpreting/translating of any kind. Again, constrastive analysis isthe most rewarding method of presenting both language ideosyncracys and problems arising because of them.Consecutio TemporumConsecutio Temporum is the part of English grammar that regulates the relation between the tense the main verbin the main clause is in, and the main verb in the subordinate clause is in. Very simplified: if and when the mainverb in the main clause is in any of the past tenses, the main verb in the subordinate clause can be in none of eitherfuture or present tenses. There are no such regulations in the grammars of the Serbian, and other Slav languages,e.g.:He did what he thought was right.Uradio je ono što misli da je ispravno; and not – Uradio je ono što je mislio da je bilo ispravno.They all thought that she couldn’t do it.Svi su mislili da ona to ne može da uradi; and not - Svi su mislili da ona to nije mogla da uradi.The envoy said that he was leaving the country very soon.Izaslanik je rekao da će vrlo brzo napustiti zemlju; and not – Izaslanik je rekao da je vrlo brzo napuštaozemlju. 11 N.B. Although the author of this work expresses his disagreement with the authors who argue for the interpreter’s/translator’sfreedom to “move away” from SL provided that the meaning of the communicated is validly interpreted/translated to TL, it ismore than obvious from the examples presented in this part of the work that any interpreting/translating “word for word”makes an irreparable damage because it directly changes this meaning.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 253Double NegationDouble Negation, i.e. the inadmissiveness of double negation is another ideosyncracy of the English language.Again, very simplified, it presumes that two negations (or more than two) cannot stand one beside the other in thesame sentence. There is no such rule in the Serbian language grammar, e.g.:The Police don’t know anything about that criminal offence. OrThe Police know nothing about that criminal offence (one negation in both cases)Policija ne zna ništa o tom kriminalnom delu (two negations, one beside the other)Serbian government will not allow for any violation of the Resolution 1244.Vlada Srbije neće dozvoliti nikakvo kršenje odredaba Rezolucije 1244.She never knows anything about anything.Ona nikada ništa ne zna ni o čemu. (four negations) 1Singular in PluralSingular in Plural e.g.:A person is required to produce their ID at the request of a police officer.Osoba je dužna da pokaže svoju ličnu kartu na zahtev službenog lica.A pedestrian will be fined if they don’t cross the street at a zebra crossing.Pešak će biti novčano kažnjen ako predje ulicu van pešačkog prelaza.The survivor soon realized that they were taken good care of.Preživeli je ubrzo shvatio da dobro brinu o njemu.Different and Still the SameDifferent and Still the Same, e.g.:The accused then burnt up the gloves so that they cannot be used as evidence 2 . (up – gore /Adv /)Optuženi je zatim spalio rukavice da ne mogu da budu korišćene kao dokaz.A Burnt- Out Case 3 (out – napolje, izvan /Adv /)Spaljeni slučajThe building burnt down completely. (down – dole /Adv /)Zgrada je potpuno spaljenaFat/slim chanceMala šansa, although fat and slim are Adjectives of opposite meaning – fat: debeo; slim: tanak, vitak, mršav1 Idem2 NYPD records, march 2010. Source: NBC News online, march 20103 Greene, Graham: A Burnt-Out Case, Penguin Books, London, 1963.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 254ENGLISH v. ENGLISH (BrE v. AmE)George Bernard Shaw: England and America are two countries separated by a common language. 1Whenever English is either SL or TL, the method of contrastive analysis is especially applicable because of thefactor, somewhat specific for this language, and that is the existence of two English languages: British English(BrE) and American English (AmE). This is the case of standard languages at that. They do bear the same nameand their morphological and syntaxical structure, vocabulary and even phraseology is almost the same. But thedifference beetween all mentioned parts of their linguistics is apparent as George Bernard Shaw concludes in theabove quoted words.When grammar is in question, there are not many differences in applying the rules, but those that exist may be thesource of big misunderstandings with, potentially, very negative consequences. The author will explicate this bypresenting the difference relating to the usage of the Present Simple Tense and the Present Perfect Tense whenrefering to an action that takes place up to now (the moment of speaking). To denote such an action, BrE uses thePresent Perfect Tense, because the Past Simple Tense has no bearing on the present and is used exclusively todenote a past action or a fact in the past. But AmE uses the Past Simple Tense to denote the action ending at themoment of speaking, therefore relating to the present (or a moment before now) as well as an action that happenedany time in the past, e.g:BrE:Have you seen it?This question refers to the time up to the very moment of speaking. Therefore the Present Perfect Tense.Did you see it?Any time in the past, but not the moment before speaking (no linkage with the present). Therefore the Past SimpleTanse.AmE:Did you see it?Any time in the past and up to the very moment of speaking. AmE seems to have excluded the usage of the PresentPerfect Tense, at least to denote this particular kind of action.When vocabulary is in question, every word of the English language is defined by the following features: spelling,pronounciation, and meaning. Although the difference between BrE and AmE regarding spelling andpronounciation is evident, it is not the source of any significant problems in the process of interpreting/translating,e.g.:BrEcolourcentreanalyseAmEcolorcenteranalyzeWhen meaning is in question, there are four distinctive types of differences between BrE and AmE:1 Shaw, George Bernard (1856-1950). Irish playwrite and political thinker. Source: www.wikiedia.com , March, 2010.

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 255a) Words and phrases existing in BrE, and nonexisting, or mainly unfamiliar in AmE;b) Words and phrases existing in AmE, and nonexisting, or mainly unfamiliar in BrE;c) Different words and phrases used with the same meaning, each in their own language;d) Words and phrases existing in both BrE and AmE but with different meaning in ach respective languageSome of the numerous examples of lexical differences between BrE and AmE are presented in thefollowing table:BrEAmEa)Barrister / - a lawyer licenced to appear before a higher courtBoffin / - a scientist or engineerCrisps / - French friesNaff / - not that goodMains / - AC current from the grid (240V)b)/ copacetic - satisfactorily/ caboose - the car for railroad workers/ dumpster - a garbage container/ popsicle - frosen froot flavored ice cream on a stick/ spyglass - telescopec)Aerial antenna - electro magnetic wave transmitter/receiverBonnet hood - hinged engine cover in a carBoot trunk - part of the car to put baggage inCar park parking lot - parking spaceChemistry drug store - pharmacyDialing code area code - number dialed before the phone numberMotorway turnpike - road reserved for motor vehicle trafficGearbox transmission - gear shifting deviceLift elevator - up and down carrying device in buildingsLoo toilet - water closetPavement sidewalk - part of street reserved for pedestriansRoundabout traffic circle - O shaped part of streetSpanner wrench - fork shaped toolTram street car - city transportation vehicle on railsWireless radio - radio setd)BrEAmELawyer not licenced solicitor promoterto appear before a higher courtFlame to light a room torch flashlightRoom to have rest in restroom toiletUnderpass for pedestrians subway undergroundWash the dishes wash up wash hands/face

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 256Any of the presented differences of lexical nature may be a source of ambiguity and, consequently, of trouble theinterpreter/translator finds themselves in. Any author who writes in English as a foreign language will findthemselves in the same sort of trouble.The same goes for the differences of sociological and cultural nature that exist between the USA and UK, as wellas between these two countries and other countries, and express in the language. The number of such differences isalso large and some of them may be the source of serious problems affecting the process of interpreting/translating,e.g.:Contrary to the Serbian and some other languages, when decimals are in question, in English (both BrE andAmE) there exists the decimal point instead of the decimal coma. Coma is used just for separating groupsof digits in big numbers consisting of a large number of digits, the same way the point is used in Serbian,e.g.:1.500 in BrE and AmE is not one thousand and five hundred, as it is in Serbian, but one and five hundredth– 1,500 in Serbian; in the same way, in BrE and AmE 7,428 is seven thousand four hundred and twentyeight, and not seven and four hundred and twenty eight thousandth, as it is in Serbian.However, the number billion in BrE has the value of 10 12 as it has in the Serbian language, but in AmE,billion is 10 9 which corresponds to the number milijarda (10 9 ) in the Serbian language.British unit for measuring liquid - quart equals ¼ of the unit gallon or double unit pint which isapproximately 1.136 liter. This is 6/5 of American unit quart which equals double American unit pintwhich equals 0.946 liter, or 5/6 of British unit quart.The British begin their week on Sunday, so that the last day of their week is Saturday. The Americans, aswell as the Serbs, begin their week on Monday, and end it on Saturday. The British, as well as the Serbs, express a date in numbers following the pattern (DD/MM/YY) -day/month/year. The Americans do that according to the pattern (MM/DD/YY) – month/day/year, e.g.:9/11/2003 in BrE is; 9 th . November, 2003, but in AmE, it is 11th. September, 2003.The British drive on the left hand side of the road. The Americans, as well as the Serbs, use the right handside. As a consequence, the meaning of the expression: outside lane - in BrE is - the lane closest to thevehicles moving in the opposite direction, i.e. the one reserved for overtaking. In AmE, the sameexpression has the meaning – the lane closest to the side of the road.The British, as well as the Serbs, call the floor of a building that is on the same level with the street theground floor; zero level), 1 st floor is above it, 2 nd floor is above the first one, etc. The Americans do nothave the ground floor, at least in their language. Instead, they call it 1 st floor. The floor that is the first tothe British and Serbs is the second to the Americans, and so on.PRIOR TO CONCLUSIONIt should not be too difficult to picture a situation in which a mains is needed to plug in a device or an instrument ortool critical for performing an operation in a series of operations that are necessary to perform in order todeactivate, dismantle and repair a defective device that causes air, water or soil pollution. Unless the interpreter isfamiliar with both AmE and BrE, precious time may be lost in trying to clarify the meaning of the word which, inturn, may result in an ecological catastrophe (e.g.: crude oil spillage due to a defective valve…).

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 257Or, imagine, if you will, a task force comprised of trained professionals from many different countries,communicating in English with the help of an interpreter. Where would they look for an explosive device set byterrorists if they have intelligence that the device is somewhere on the second floor of a building (two or threefloors above the street level?). Again, the element of time that is always critical in responding to any kind of threatto security may be compromised here, resulting in sustaining material damage and casualties.And, what will be given to a railroad technician, trying desperately to unleash the last car of a runaway train whenhe asks for a spanner (or wrench for that matter)? There are an infinite number of situations in whichcommunication established through an interpreter/translator may affect human and environmental security and/orthe security of cultural goods, the way and type of interpreting/translating notwithstanding.CONCLUSIONIn view of the fact that the author addresses interpreting/translating in general, and particularly the problems ofinterpreting/translating a message/information from the domain of security, it is not too difficult to infer how gravea consequence an interpretation/translation that disregards the mentioned and other specifics of the Englishlanguage may produce. The same goes for the differences between the English and the Serbian language, and theones between BrE and AmE. Both sets of differences (BrE and AmE v. Serbian, and BrE v. AmE) really make lifedifficult to any interpreter/translator, but also to any Serbian author who wants to make any kind of scientific orprofessional contribution in English..In the circumstances of a security threat of any kind (terrorist or criminal act, accident or catastrophe…) in which aproper and timely response saves human lives, environment, and/or cultural goods, the validity and reliability ofinterpretation/translation as a factor of verbal communication between, let’s say, a potential terrorist act perpetratorand the ones whose duty is to prevent such an act is absolutely critical. It is the same again when verbalcommunication of joint task force members and people in charge of risk management and threat response is inquestion. In a case of emergency, an inadequately interpreted/translated word, or a number, may produce amisunderstanding the effect of which may be catastrophic. For this very reason, the responsibility of aninterpreter/translator envisaged in their high professionalism with all elements that this professionalism presumes isnecessary.For the better part of it, this work is the product of a research conducted by the author assisted by 95 students ofFaculty of Security Studies within the English Language 1 course of studies. The research examined the validity oftranslations of texts the topic of which falls within the framework of human, environmental, and security of culturalgoods in which English and Serbian language are either SL or TL. By reviewing and analyzing the translations in aseries of panels the participants of which were the students who did the translations, a number of problems wereidentified pertaining to translating language material of this kind. In this work, the author attempts to make aclassification of the sources of interpretation/translation problems that, in turn, may point to the solutions to someof the problems. Inasmuch, the work pretends to serve as a kind of handbook to those who indulge in the businessof interpreting/translating out of need or necessity. At the same time, the work does not have any large ambitiontowards professional interpreters/translators. To them, it can only be of use as a reminder of the things theyabsolutely must be aware of.REFERENCES1. Algeo, John: British or American English? Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 20062. Benson, Morton: Srpskohrvatsko-engleski rečnik, Beograd; Prosveta, 19813. Bickerton, Anthea: American-English, English-American : a two-way glossary of words in daily use on bothsides of the Atlantic, 1985

TRANSPORT OF DANGEROUS GOODS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 2584. Davies, Christopher: Divided by a Common Language: A Guide to British and American English; HoughtonMifflin, 20055. Djordjević, Radmila: Gramatika engleskog jezika, Beograd; Čigoja štampa, 19966. Hargraves, Orin: Mighty Fine Words and Smashing Expressions: Making Sense of Transatlantic English;Oxford, Oxford University Press, 20037. Klajn, I., Šipka, M.: Veliki rečnik stranih reči i izraza, Novi Sad, Prometej, 20068. McArthur, Tom: The Oxford Guide to World English. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20029. Peters, Pam: The Cambridge Guide to English Usage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200410. Ristić, S., Simić, Ž., Popović, V.: Enciklopedijski englesko-srpski rečnik, Beograd; Prosveta, 2005

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацијиНародна библиотека Србије, Београд656.073.436:620.26(082)INTERNATIONAL Scientific ConferenceTransport of Dangerous Goods and RiskManagement (2nd ; 2010 ; Beograd)Transport of Dangerous Goods and RiskManagement [TOMUR 2010] : [dedicated tosecond international scientific conference] /[editor-in-chief Marija Vukić]. - Belgrade :"Kirilo Savić" Institute, 2010 (Belgrade :"Kirilo Savić" Institute, 2011). - [7], 258str. : ilustr. ; 24 cm. - (InternationalThematic Issue ; #no. #1)Tiraž 200. - Str. [3-4]: Editorial / MarijaVukić. - Bibliografija uz svaki rad.ISBN 978-86-83059-06-51. Vukić, Marija, 1951- [уредник] [аутордодатног текста]a) Опасне материје - Превоз - ЗборнициCOBISS.SR-ID 176107276