1990 S.L.T. 249 Page 41989 WL 984342 (OH), 1990 S.C.L.R. 186(Cite as: 1990 S.L.T. 249)Textbooks referred toBell, Principles (10th ed.), s. 26.Craigie, Conveyancing (3rd ed.), pp. 246-248.Gloag, Contract (2nd ed.), pp. 37 and 39.McBryde, Contract, paras. 5-86 et seq.On 27 July 1989 the Lord Ordinary repelled the pursuers' pleas in law,sustained the defenders' first plea in law and dismissed the action.LORD CAPLAN.[After the narrative quoted supra his Lordship continued:]In their pleadings the pursuers plead that the said correspondence amounts to aconcluded and effective bargain. They further plead that esto the said contractis improbative it has been validated by rei interventus and homologation. Bothparties have preliminary pleas attacking the relevancy of each other's pleadings.At the procedure roll hearing it was contended on behalf of the defenders thata qualified acceptance of an offer is in effect a counter offer (Craigie,Conveyancing (3rd ed.), pp. 246-248). If an offer is met by anything less than aclear acceptance then such acceptance can be ignored -- Johnston v. Clark. Theeffect of a refusal of an offer is that the offer lapses and a counter offer isin fact a refusal. I was referred to Gloag on Contract (2nd ed.), pp. 37 and 39,Uniroyal v. Miller & Co. Ltd., and Wolf and Wolf v. Forfar Potato Co. Counselalso discussed the cases referred to by Gloag at p. 37, namely Hunter v.Huntersand Hyde v. Wrench. It was also claimed that the letter dated 11 January1989 from the pursuers' solicitors concluded nothing since by that stage therewas nothing to accept. In any event, the offer constituted by the letter of 29September would have lapsed. Mere negotiations will not be sufficient to keep anoffer open if the offer would otherwise expire. I was referred to Glasgow etc.Steam Shipping Co. v. Watson . I was further referred to the classic definitionof rei interventus in Bell's Principles, s. 26 and it was argued that it wascritical that the actings be "not unimportant" . The actings relied on by thepursuers, namely the preparation of a draft disposition and the preparation andrevisal of standard forms, were not of sufficient importance to set up a casebased on rei interventus. I was also referred to Mitchell v. The StornowayTrustees . It was argued that there was no concluded informal agreement whichcould be homologated (Law v. <strong>Thomson</strong> ). Finally, I was referred to Heiton v.Waverley Hydropathic Co. as an illustration of actings considered to be tootrivial to be the basis of rei interventus.For the pursuers it was contended that the letter from their solicitors of 11January 1989 concluded a formal contract. In so far as the defenders' qualifiedacceptance of 29 September 1988 was to be regarded as an offer, time was not ofits essence. The view that a qualified acceptance had the effect of nullifyingthe offer it related to was based on doubtful authority and in any event was toobroadly stated. Missives in commercial negotiations should be regarded as anevolutionary process where offers and counter offers are constantly *252 beingmodified and adjusted as negotiations progressed. In the present case, therelevant correspondence was part of a lengthy and complicated negotiationprocess. Even if a qualified acceptance should be regarded as a refusal of therelevant offer that rule would only apply if the qualifications related toessential conditions so that the qualified acceptance could be regarded as acompletely new offer. With regard to inessential conditions it is more correct toregard such qualifications as proposals for modification of the offer rather thanas a refusal of the offer. I was referred to McBryde, The Law of Contract, paras.5-86 et seq. The cases founded on by Professor Gloag at p. 37, namely Hunter v.Hunters and Hyde v. Wrench , are doubtful support for the views the authorCopr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
1990 S.L.T. 249 Page 51989 WL 984342 (OH), 1990 S.C.L.R. 186(Cite as: 1990 S.L.T. 249)expresses. In Wolf and Wolf v. Forfar Potato Co. Lord McDonald expresses the viewthat, if negotiations continue after an original offer is refused and theoriginal offer is thereafter unreservedly accepted, the offeror may well bebarred from maintaining that no bargain had been concluded. Moreover, in Wolf andWolf there had been an admission that the original offer was to be regarded asrefused. HUniroyal Ltd. v. Miller & Co. Ltd.and Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v.Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd. were "battle of the forms" cases. In NewZealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. SatterthwaiteLord Wilberforce commented thatin many ways a traditional analysis of offer, counter offer, rejection andacceptance is out of date.In any event, if the contract was not to be regarded as probative it wascompleted by rei interventus and homologation. In Bell's definition of the formerthe word "important" can only mean "material". To have a disposition draftedinvolves expense and is therefore material. The defenders had no relevantaverments from which it could properly be concluded that the defenders' counteroffer of 29 September had not been accepted within a reasonable time. The actingsof the parties following upon the exchange of letters on 11 January 1989, wereclearly referable to the contract established by the whole correspondence.In my view counsel for the defenders were quite correct when they contendedthat the effect of the qualified acceptance of 11 October 1988 was to set up acounter offer which supplanted and cancelled out the offer represented by thedefenders' acceptance dated 29 September. The law on the matter may not besupported by voluminous authority but the authority which exists is clear and hasremained uncontradicted over a long period of time. Professor Gloag sets out inhis textbook on Contract at p. 37 of the 2nd edition, the position as heunderstood it. Certainly the effect of Hunter v. Hunters(one of the two cases herelies on) is somewhat obscure but Hyde v. Wrenchis a clear enough case andappears to proceed upon principles which would be common to both Scots andEnglish law. That Hyde v. Wrenchis still the cornerstone of English law on therelevant topic was made clear by the judicial observations in Butler Machine ToolCo. Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd.The position in Scotland has been made no less clear in the recent case ofWolf and Wolf v. Forfar Potato Co. As Lord Robertson observes at p. 106, the rulespoken to by Gloag accords with common sense. In the case of an offer with notime limit attached, the offer by implication remains open for a reasonable timeand that would include such time as in all the particular circumstances of thecase may reasonably be required to allow the offeree to reply. However, when theofferee replies by way of a qualified acceptance he is, in effect, saying thatthis is my response to your offer. The focus then shifts to the original offerorwho has to consider whether or not he will accept the counter proposals. He doesnot require to consider whether or not specifically to withdraw his originaloffer for he already has had the offeree's response to it. If the position wereotherwise there would effectively be two offers affecting the same subjects onthe table at the same time. If the original offeror were to accept the qualifiedacceptance simultaneously with the offeree withdrawing his qualified acceptanceand accepting the original offer, then considerable practical difficulties couldemerge.The great advantage of the law as I understand it to be is that it is clear andcertain. The arguments advanced on behalf of the pursuers may be imaginative butthey find no support in the authorities. It may be that, in the course ofprotracted negotiation, an acceptor who tries to obtain improved terms does notwant to reject the original offer outright. However, he can only be judged bywhat he states formally, not by unexpressed reservations and the clear import ofa qualified acceptance is to the effect that these are the terms upon which I amnow prepared to conclude to contract. If, as the pursuers contend, negotiation isan evolutionary process, negotiations have evolved to the point where it is theacceptor's counter offer which is under active consideration, not the earlieroffer. Moreover, I do not find the attempt by pursuers' counsel to draw adistinction between essential and inessential conditions of the contract helpful.If the effect of a qualified acceptance has to be weighed by assessing the degreeby which the qualifications may be regarded as essential to the contract, thiscould only lead to confusion and uncertainty for the contracting parties. Icannot see that the law as it presently stands presents any particulardifficulty. A party who receives an offer, knows that he must accept it, refuseCopr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works