[1961] 1 Q.B. 31 Page 111960 WL 18924 (CA), [1960] 3 All E.R. 332, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 504, (1960) 104 S.J. 704(Cite as: [1961] 1 Q.B. 31)conclusion that the defendant, through his servants who carried out the sale onhis behalf, deliberately shut his eyes to the true situation. Hardy sold the carin Blackpool, having a log book which showed that the first plaintiff was theowner of the car and that she lived on the south coast. The defendant bought itfor 605, over 100 less than the rogueHutchinson had purported to pay for it, and sold it for >760 afew months later - a large profit for a deal which was completed in about 40minutes with a stranger, who said that he was on holiday in Blackpool and gavehis permanent address as being in Hull. The defendant's servants did not evenlook at the log book or ask for any receipt to show that Hardy had bought thecar. Had they looked at the log book, they would have seen the first plaintiffwas the owner of the car. Failure to make inquiries regarding a log book if itcontains the name of a third person as owner of the car is evidence of lack ofgood faith: see per Lush J. in Heap v. Motorists Advisory Agency Ltd., [FN49]per Denning L.J. in HBishopsgate Motor Finance Corporation Ltd. v. TransportBrakes Ltd. [FN50] and per Morris L.J. in HCentral Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v.Unity Finance Ltd. [FN51] The circumstances of the sale must have createdabundant suspicion in the minds of any honest dealer.FN45 H[1911] 1 K.B. 463, C.A.FN46 Ibid. 476, 478.FN47 (1877) 2 App.Cas. 616 , 625, H.L.FN48 Ibid. 628, 629.FN49 H[1923] 1 K.B. 577, 591; 39 T.L.R. 150.FN50 H[1949] 1 K.B. 322, 337, 338; 65 T.L.R. 66; [1949] 1 All E.R. 37, C.A.FN51 H[1957] 1 Q.B. 371, 397; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 1068; [1956] 3 All E.R. 905, C.A.Stephen Chapman Q.C. in reply.[SELLERS L.J. You need not trouble about the plaintiffs' cross-appeal againstthe judge's findings.]*46 The judge's finding of fact that the plaintiffs did not intend to contractwith the rogue Hutchinson was vitiated by the approach which he made as a matterof law. He founded himself on the false premises in Professor Goodhart's article,and applied the false test there propounded. The essence of the bargain was thatthe plaintiffs wanted cash, not that they were going to contract only with aparticular individual. When cash was not forthcoming, all that they wereconcerned with was the financial stability of the man facing them in the room.The question is whether the essential intention of the plaintiffs was to bargainwith the man in the room, or whether that prima facie presumption was overridenby something more fundamental, that is, that the man in the room should have aspecific identity. Where there are prima facie two persons bargaining about thetransfer of property, there must be a heavy onus on either of them to establishthat what has objectively emerged has been vitiated by something which is notapparent to third parties, and which is based on evidence that cannot beobjectively tested. In the present case, it was not vital to the creation of thecontract that the other party should be a particular person; the plaintiffs wereonly concerned that he should have credit.Cur. adv. vult.Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
[1961] 1 Q.B. 31 Page 121960 WL 18924 (CA), [1960] 3 All E.R. 332, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 504, (1960) 104 S.J. 704(Cite as: [1961] 1 Q.B. 31)July 28. The following judgments were read. SELLERS L.J.In August, 1957, the plaintiffs were the joint owners of a Renault Dauphinemotor-car, ULJ 101.On August 3, 1957, the Saturday before the August Bank Holiday of that year, ina transaction with a man not inappropriately called "the rogue Hutchinson " bythe judge, the plaintiffs parted with the car to him. By August 6 the car was inBlackpool and there was a purported sale of it to the defendant by the rogue, asthe judge found, then using the name Hardy.If the property in the car had passed on August 3 to "the rogue Hutchinson, "whatever his true name and identity was, then the defendant would have obtained agood title on the judge's findings that Hutchinson and Hardy were but one person,"the rogue Hutchinson," and that the defendant through his servants bought thecar in good faith and without notice of the seller's defect in title.Slade J. held that no contract had in fact been entered into between theplaintiffs and "Hutchinson" and that no title had *47 passed to him, and,therefore, none was transferred to the defendant, and he gave judgment for theplaintiffs for 720, the agreed value of the car, as damagesfor conversion.The defendant has appealed against this decision, alleging that the judge waswrong both in law and in fact in so holding and it will be necessary to examinethe facts found as well as the law applied.By a cross-notice of appeal, the plaintiffs have challenged the findings of thejudge that the man, who sold the car to the defendant, was the same man as theman who had obtained it from them and that the defendant bought the car in goodfaith. It was submitted to us that the judge's findings were unjustified, but Iagree so fully with what the judge has said and held on both these matters [FN52]that I do not review the evidence or the argument afresh on the plaintiffs'contentions. The defendant and his servants, like so many who buy and sellsecondhand motor-cars, might have been more astute and more careful, but itrequires more than that to justify a finding of bad faith. The inference thatthere had been no transaction with the car intervening *48 between that with theplaintiffs and that with the defendant seems reasonable and probable, and,therefore, sufficiently established as the judge has held.FN52 The following are the relevant passages of the judgment of Slade J. on thesematters: "I am now going to decide two questions which, on the view of thepresent case that I take, cannot affect the result hereafter. The first one is... was Hutchinson Hardy? I find as a fact that he was. I draw that inferencefrom evidence which appears to be almost overwhelming, and it is shortly this.Hutchinson obtained possession of the Renault Dauphine on the Saturday before thebank holiday in August, 1957, in Poole in Dorsetshire. He sold it to thedefendant the following Tuesday afternoon in Blackpool. It was the same car,registration number ULJ 101. He obtained the log book from Miss Elsie Ingram, andhe handed over that same log book on the following Tuesday. It matters not in theleast, as I understand it, whether Hutchinson was Hardy, or whether Hardy wassomeone acting with the authority of Hutchinson - that is to say, acting as agentof Hutchinson to dispose of the car. I find as a fact that they were one and thesame person. If they were not, it can mean only that in that short period fromthe afternoon of Saturday, August 3, 1957, until the afternoon of Tuesday, August6, 1957, there must have been some intermediate disposition of the car unless, ofcourse, as I say, Hutchinson said to one of his fellow rogues: 'I do not want toappear in this again. You take this car and sell it on my behalf.' The secondquestion is this. If section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, should arisehereafter, I have to decide whether the defendant bought the Renault Dauphine onTuesday, August 6, 1957, in good faith and without notice of the defect inHardy's title. ... I have seen Quinn [one of the defendant's salesmen] andBickerstaffe [the defendant's manager] in the witness-box. I think they were bothhonest men, and I find as a fact that they did accept the Renault Dauphine and175 in cash in return for the defendant's 1956 Ford Consulworth 780, both in good faith and without notice of any defectin Hardy's title to the Renault Dauphine car."Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works