[1961] 1 Q.B. 31 Page 91960 WL 18924 (CA), [1960] 3 All E.R. 332, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 504, (1960) 104 S.J. 704(Cite as: [1961] 1 Q.B. 31)FN30 1 H. & C. 803.FN31 H[1927] A.C. 487.FN32 (1883) 135 Mass. 283.FN33 9 Ch.D. 223.FN34 H[1927] A.C. 487, 500.FN35 [1952] 2 Q.B. 795; [1952] 2 T.L.R. 340; [1952] 2 All E.R. 456; Affd. [1953]1 Q.B. 401; [1953] 2 W.L.R. 427; [1953] 1 All E.R. 482, C.A.FN36 H[1919] 2 K.B. 243.HPhillips v. Brooks Ltd. [FN37] was referred to with approval in HDennant v.Skinner and Collom, [FN38] but that case is distinguishable, *43 for it wasbased on the passing of the property in goods under the particular law relatingto auction sales.FN37 H[1919] 2 K.B. 243.FN38 H[1948] 2 K.B. 164.As to the argument that there was a concluded contract before the rogueHutchinson offered to pay by cheque, it is submitted that this is not tenable.However, if there was, it was immediately repudiated by the rogue Hutchinson inoffering a cheque, and the repudiation was accepted by the plaintiffs. There wasnot such a contract because of a fundamental mistake arising out of therequirement as to cash on the one side and to offer a cheque on the other, or,alternatively, it was an implied term of the transaction that payment would be bycash, so that the offer of a cheque was a counter-offer which involved therejection of the original offer, as in Hyde v. Wrench. [FN39]FN39 (1840) 3 Beav. 334.The fact that a person is physically present and identifiable by sight andhearing cannot mean by itself that the other party always intends to contractwith the person physically present. Is it possible to say that if thenegotiations had taken place on the telephone, there would have been a materialdifference? Could the mere withdrawal of the physical presence of the rogueHutchinson alter the legal situation? Sir Frederick Pollock rightly said thatseeing a man does not tell you who he is. The primary question in HLake v.Simmons [FN40] was whether there was a contract of bailment with the supposedwife of Van Der Berg; there was no contract of bailment in that case becausethere was no real consent to the bargain; her claim to be someone she was notvitiated the whole transaction. [Reference was made to Sir Carleton Kemp Allen'sarticle, "Mistaken Identity" (1928) 44 L.Q.R. 72, 75.] Lake v. Simmons isdecisive of the present case, because if the contract of bailment there was void,the apparent contract of sale in the present case must be void too. The primaryquestion before the court in that case and in the present case was identical. So,too, in HJohn Rigby (Haulage) Ltd. v. Reliance Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. [FN41]Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
[1961] 1 Q.B. 31 Page 101960 WL 18924 (CA), [1960] 3 All E.R. 332, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 504, (1960) 104 S.J. 704(Cite as: [1961] 1 Q.B. 31)there was no contract with the thief who pretended to be the driver of asubcontractor, although he was physically present at the time of the purportedcontract: see per Jenkins L.J. [FN42]King's Norton Metal Co. Ltd. v. Edridge,Merrett & Co. Ltd. [FN43] underlines the importance of an existing third person.A. L. Smith L.J. [FN44] *44 referred to the distinction between not knowing who aperson is when contracting with him, and thinking that he is some existing thirdperson. That distinction emphasises the force of the plaintiffs' case. Theymistakenly believed that the man in the room and the man at Stanstead House wereone and the same person. Viewing their actions in an objective manner, it isclear that they intended to deal and to deal only with a particular person - theman living at Stanstead House.FN40 H[1927] A.C. 487, H.L.FN41 H[1956] 2 Q.B. 468; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 407; [1956] 3 All E.R. 1, C.A.FN42 H[1956] 2 Q.B. 468, 483.FN43 14 T.L.R. 98, C.A.FN44 Ibid. 99.Much stress has been placed on the fact that until the discussions about thecheque the plaintiffs had never heard of the existence of the real Hutchinson.But that factor cannot be decisive, because once they had verified the existenceof the real Hutchinson and assumed that they were dealing with the particularperson living at Stanstead House, there was produced in their minds a falseimpression about the identity of the actual person in the room - they believedthat he was the man they knew to be living at Stanstead House. It would make nodifference to their wrong impression had they met the real Hutchinson on previousoccasions or had heard of him previously. He was just as real a person after theinquiry at the post office as if they had known him. The plaintiffs, induced bythe fraudulent person into the belief that he was the real Hutchinson, made anoffer which by their actions they made quite clear was only addressed to the realHutchinson - and he alone was capable of accepting it.If the plaintiffs are wrong on the main question, they desire to challenge thetwo findings of the judge in the defendant's favour - first, that the rogueHutchinson was the same man as the man called Hardy who sold the car to thedefendant; and, secondly, assuming that he was the same man, that the defendanthad bought the car in good faith. The defendant relies on section 23 of the Saleof Goods Act, 1893, whereby a seller who has a voidable title can pass a goodtitle to a bona fide purchaser for value before the sale is avoided. To be withinthe section the defendant must prove that he bought from someone with a voidabletitle, which in the present case is the rogue Hutchinson. On the evidence it isnot shown that the rogue Hutchinson was the same person as Hardy; there is simplyno evidence on the point at all, and since the burden of proof rests on thedefendant he has not discharged the onus. The judge based his finding that theywere one and the same person on an inference; but an inference can only be drawnfrom some kind of evidence. The *45 judge's view was really no more than mereconjecture. It was just as consistent with the evidence that Hardy stole the carfrom the rogue Hutchinson and sold it to the defendant.Even if it was the rogue Hutchinson who sold the car to the defendant, thelatter did not buy it in good faith. It is conceded that the burden of provinglack of good faith rests on the plaintiffs: HWhitehorn Brothers v. Davison.[FN45] But a failure to make inquiries where the circumstances of the sale aresuspicious justifies a finding of lack of good faith: see per Vaughan WilliamsL.J. in Whitehorn Brothers v. Davison, [FN46]per Lord O'Hagan [FN47] and LordBlackburn [FN48] in Jones v. Gordon. There was a number of factors which shouldhave put the defendant on inquiry, and the absence of inquiry must lead to theCopr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works