[1961] 1 Q.B. 31 Page 271960 WL 18924 (CA), [1960] 3 All E.R. 332, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 504, (1960) 104 S.J. 704(Cite as: [1961] 1 Q.B. 31)had found themselves forced to adopt strange contortions of reasoning in order tojustify the conviction of dishonest men." The difficulty, which had to beremoved, was that the bailee had taken the chattel with the consent of the owner.In R. v. Pear, [FN100] the court decided, that if a horse was hired with theintention of stealing it, the fraudulent intention of the bailee at the inceptionof the transaction in some way negatived in law the consent of the owner to dowhat he in fact did. Therefore, there was a taking without consent, which came tobe called larceny by a trick. But the courts restricted this doctrine to thetransfer of possession; and they always refused to apply it to a case where whatwas in issue was the transfer of property. It is, perhaps, for this reason thatwe have not been troubled here by any argument about *70 larceny by a trick. Butthere has been a great difference of opinion whether this notion of consentshould or should not be imported into other branches of the law, particularlyliability under the Factors Act, 1889. Until recently, the ruling judgments onthis point have been obiter; but I trust that the law may now be regarded assettled by the decision of Sellers J. in HDu Jardin v. Beadman, [FN101] where heheld that "consent" in the Factors Act, 1889 , was not to be interpreted in anartificial way in order to bring it into harmony with the criminal law. I neednot pursue the controversy further. Its only importance for my purpose is so thatthe speech of Viscount Sumner, which I think to be crucial in HLake v. Simmons,[FN102] is properly understood.FN99 H[1952] 2 Q.B. 712; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 1601; [1952] 2 All E.R. 160.FN100 (1779) 2 East P.C. 685.FN101 H[1952] 2 Q.B. 712.FN102 H[1927] A.C. 487, 503.The facts in Lake v. Simmons centred round a woman who was living with a Vander Borgh, and who had dealings with the plaintiff, a jeweller. She falselyrepresented to him that she was Mrs. Van der Borgh and she obtained jewelleryfrom him by falsely representing that she desired to show it to her husband forhis approval, and also to a person she named as Commander Digby, who did not infact exist. She made away with the jewellery and the plaintiff sued to recoverhis loss under a Lloyd's policy, the defendant being an underwriter. The policywas against (inter alia) theft, but subject to an exception on which the argumentturned. A convenient summary of its essential terms is given by Viscount Sumner[FN103]: "The exception clause takes out of the stipulated cover against 'thefts'generally ... those committed by customers ... but only when, the words 'inrespect of goods entrusted to them by the assured' are satisfied."FN103 Ibid. 507.All three courts held that there was a theft, i.e., larceny by a trick, and,accordingly, that the loss fell within the general words. There was, however,much difference of opinion about the operation of the exception. McCardie J. held[FN104] that the jewellery was not entrusted to the woman as a customer, but thatshe received it as a mere agent or messenger for the purpose of showing it toothers. He, therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff. His decision wasreversed by a majority in the Court of Appeal. [FN105] None of the Lords Justicesaccepted his view that the woman was not a customer and the decision turned onthe meaning of "entrusted." *71 Bankes L.J. and Warrington L.J. held that therewas an entrusting within the exception so that the loss fell outside the policy.Atkin L.J. held that there was not. He said [FN106] that the word "entrust"implied a consensual act and that the fact of larceny negatived consent both incriminal and in civil matters. It would be absurd to hold, he thought, that thewoman could both take the goods without the consent of the true owner for thepurpose of larceny by a trick and be "entrusted" with the goods by the trueowner.Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
[1961] 1 Q.B. 31 Page 281960 WL 18924 (CA), [1960] 3 All E.R. 332, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 504, (1960) 104 S.J. 704(Cite as: [1961] 1 Q.B. 31)FN104 [1926] 1 K.B. 382; 42 T.L.R. 168.FN105 H[1926] 2 K.B. 51; 42 T.L.R. 425, C.A.FN106 H[1926] 2 K.B. 51, 71, 72.In the House of Lords, [FN107] the decision of the Court of Appeal wasreversed. Viscount Haldane said [FN108] that for the purpose of an entrustingwithin the meaning of the policy there must be a definite contract. He held thatthere was never any contract at all, because the plaintiff was entirely deceivedas to the identity of the person with whom he was transacting; it was only on thefooting and in the belief that she was Mrs. Van der Borgh that he was willing todeal with her at all. This is a bare summary of his reasoning; it is sufficientfor my purpose to say that it is clear authority for the view from which I amdissenting. None of the rest of their Lordships expressly followed ViscountHaldane. Lord Atkinson's opinion [FN109] turned on the construction of thepolicy. He held that the entrusting within the exception could not mean thedelivery in all good faith by a dealer of goods to a customer which that customerhad planned to steal. He also inclined to McCardie J.'s view that the woman wasnot a customer. Lord Blanesburgh [FN110] based his conclusion on the simpleground that the woman was not a customer, but entirely agreed with the judgmentof Viscount Sumner. Lord Wrenbury [FN111] simply concurred.FN107 H[1927] A.C. 487.FN108 Ibid. 499.FN109 Ibid. 511.FN110 Ibid. 513.FN111 Ibid. 513.It is clear, therefore, that Viscount Haldane's reasoning can be accepted asthe ratio decidendi only if it was assented to by Viscount Sumner. I know thatthe fault must be mine, but I find the speech of Viscount Sumner very difficultto interpret. I think that the operative part of his reasoning begins [FN112]after he has set out the policy. He gave a special meaning to the word"entrusted," derived from the use of the same word in an earlier part of thepolicy. He held that it meant entrusted on the condition of sale or return. Heheld that there was not an *72 entrusting to the woman on this condition; ifthere was an entrusting, it was either to Van der Borgh or Commander Digby, oneof whom was imaginary and the other was not a customer. That was his firstreason. The second reason [FN113] was, I think, an acceptance of Atkin L.J.'sview of the effect of larceny by a trick. Finally, he agreed [FN114] that thewoman was not a customer for the purpose of the exceptions clause.FN112 Ibid. 507.FN113 H[1927] A.C. 487, 508.FN114 Ibid. 511.But, before he gave this statement of his reasons, he made a number ofobservations that might suggest that he was agreeing with the view expressed byCopr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works